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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Complexity is a new paradigm in social science inquiries. Dimensions derived
from complexity theories can explain interactions within a dynamic system that often
escape the traditional linear analysis or been dismissed as errors.
Observing a dynamic system such as the U.S. policy toward Iraq, a phenomenon
that dominated issues o f governance in the United States for the past decade, and
conducting this observation according to complexity theories is intended to reveal
dynamics within the policy that can explain its internal changes as impacted by
environmental factors. And by contrasting such a complex observation with that o f a
traditional linear analysis, a new insight may be added to the body o f knowledge gathered
on researches o f political phenomena.
The focus o f this research is to introduce a qualitative inquiry in the new sciences
o f complexity which to date have been applied solely to quantitative models. An
analytical model is applied within a qualitative research framework that employs a
traditional method o f inquiry, including interviews, focus group, and content analysis, in
order to observe changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to the traditional linear
method o f inquiry. The analytical model then moves to investigate the internal and
external changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity theories, and
compares the resulting complex analysis with that o f the linear one.
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This research is grounded in the existing body o f literature. Since there are a great
number o f existing studies that examine the impact o f changing trends in dynamic
systems both according to the Newtonian and the complex sciences, this research benefits
from such observations in order to explain the trajectory o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq
and its phase shifts from 1990-2004. However, most o f the complex studies o f changes in
dynamic systems are quantitative in nature. Therefore, by adopting a complex qualitative
approach to observe change in a dynamic system, in this case the U.S. policy toward Iraq,
this research can bring a different perspective and approach toward inquiries in the social
sciences.

Research Questions
The questions that this research attempts to answer are geared toward establishing
a contrast in discovery between observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to the
traditional linear model and also according to the new sciences o f complexity. These
research questions are the following:
1. How does a linear observation interpret the U.S. policy toward Iraq?
2. How do the new sciences o f complexity interpret the U.S. policy toward Iraq?
3. How does a linear observation o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq contrast and
compare with that o f a complex analysis?
In order to answer these questions, this research observes the history o f the U.S.
policy toward Iraq from 1990 to 2004. The research also examines the new sciences of
complexity and their application in various disciplines within the social sciences, designs
a theoretical base for the study, constructs a methodology and analytical model in order

2
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to interpret the data, collects data on the U.S. policy toward Iraq, analyzes the data
according to this study’s analytical model, and then presents the answers to the research
questions as it presents the study’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Why Does Complexity Matter?
The reason why complexity matters in a social science inquiry is because we are
no longer constrained by a single ontological model. Truth can now be seen not as an
attribute inherent in an entity or event but as the meaning we attribute to that entity or
event. This kind of ontological liberation is evident in a paradigm shift from a Newtonian
world to a complex world.
Several shifts may occur in a complex inquiry. Evans (1999) observes that the
types o f these shifts include moving from part to whole in our investigation o f a
phenomenon, from structure to process, and from objective to epistemic science. Other
types include shifts from building block to network as a metaphor o f knowledge, and
from truth to approximate descriptions (pp. 202-203).
In inquiries related to issues o f governance and public administration, there is no
"one right way" to see reality. Overman and Loraine (1996) explain that complexity
science “frees us from the constraint o f the one right way mentality that influences many
studies. It also frees us from the burden that comes from needing to control rather than to
evoke process and relationship” (p. 490).
Events and phenomena are interconnected to generate unpredicted potentials. The
collapse of these potentials into a defined formative outcome is the result of our
observation and interaction with reality. The world, according to Wheatley (1999), is a
participatory process that engenders energy, becoming, and intensionality (p. 33).

3
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There are many levels on which a dynamic system, such as the U.S. policy toward
Iraq, can be analyzed. Systems, such as the policy toward Iraq, are best understood if
observed as wholes contained within wholes that are impacted by various changing
elements in the environment of geopolitical dynamics. Every aspect in this dynamic, no
matter how small, can impact the policy and its trajectory as a whole. Lorenz (1993) has
explained how this works in describing the impact o f small events, such as the flapping o f
a butterfly wings on the atmospheric weather o f an entire continent. He traces how a
butterfly that is flapping its wings in Brazil, for example, can set off a tornado in Texas
(P- 14).
On the other hand, the world according to classical Newtonian sciences is
described clock-wise. Time and motion are reversible, and phenomena are reducible to
parts, functions, and building blocks. By applying the classical Newtonian analysis o f
machinery into the understanding of a phenomenon, researchers are collapsing possible
interpretations within the dynamics o f non-linear systems by following rationality and
one-dimensional interpretation, instead o f pluralistic and multi-dimensional view of the
world.
The new sciences o f complexity defy rational tools and enhance the prospect o f
serving the purposes o f scientific research by observing a dynamic system as a composite
o f interconnected relationships. These new sciences include the theories o f deterministic
chaos, bifurcation, and autopoiesis. They also encompass quantum theories, such as the
Copenhagen Interpretation, the Multiple-World Interpretation, Bohm ’s Deterministic
Interpretation, Capra’s Taoist Interpretation, and the Standard Model Interpretation.

4
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Complexity theories are an umbrella for emerging perspectives. The fundamental
positions o f these perspectives, according to Morcol (1999), are that simple systems
demonstrate complex behavior. Complex systems as such are self-organizing and
impacted by chaos (pp. 6-8).
Little (1999) suggests that in the world o f policies and governments, where goals
are multiple, unclear, and often conflicting, top-down systems of accountability are easily
transformed into systems o f constraints. These systems then result in policies and
governments that are inherently less responsive, less effective, and less efficient (p 166).
From the perspective o f many citizens o f democratic societies, policies and
governments seem incapable o f control by the people, who supposedly are sovereign.
Citizens often speak o f policies and governments, as entities that are separate from them
and that are closed and inaccessible to them. This perception tends to de-legitimize, in the
public's view, the actions and actors o f governments and policymakers (Little, 1999, pp.
166-167).
By applying the perspectives o f complexity to the inquiry o f observing the U.S.
policy toward Iraq, this research examines issues o f governance and democratic
accountability in the United States. In doing so, this research presents a complex
perspective of the U.S. policy toward Iraq that can better explain changes in governance
and the decision-making process in the United States and their impact on issues o f
citizenry and democratic accountability.

Importance o f This Research
This research is interested in undertaking a contemporary issue in governance,
namely the U.S. policy toward Iraq and observing it according to the new sciences o f

5
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complexity. The importance o f the research consists in its observation o f this policy with
a qualitative inquiry that is guided by the new sciences o f complexity. Up to now, such
methods o f inquires have been applied solely to quantitative models.
The study’s model employs traditional methods o f qualitative inquiry, interviews,
focus group, and content analysis, but it also extends them to investigate the changing
trends within the U.S. policy toward Iraq by observing them according to dimensions
derived from the complexity theories.
The new sciences o f complexity are the cutting-edge theories in public
administration. Observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to a traditional linear
interpretation and then according to complexity theories enables us to compare and
contrast elements within these two methods of interpretations and thereby uncover the
components that went into the construction of the policy.

The Purpose of This Study
The purpose of this study is not to depart from the linear methodology o f
Newtonian science but juxtapose it with a new methodology that is based on complexity
theories. The contrast between the two methodologies provides the research with an indepth analysis of a dynamic system that differs from an observation based only on a
singular perspective and ontology.
As such, this research is not interested in replacing linear observation with a
com plex one, or to assigned norm ative values to either one as being right or wrong.

Instead, it intends to bridge the gap between the Newtonian and complex scientific
contributions in order to advance our body of knowledge.

6
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Since complexity analysis relies on quantitative analysis in observing phenomena
in the social sciences, using complexity theories in qualitative inquiries is something new.
And since these qualitative inquires rely on the power o f words, not quantifiable
measures, an analytical model that uses complexity in a qualitative inquiry ought to
construct its analytical model through enhancing these qualitative characteristics by
employing words and images and their power o f analytical description.
As such, this research is constructing a Phi Model that is unique to the complex
analysis o f a qualitative inquiry. The model uses metaphors to build on the tradition of
verbal analogy and analysis. It guides these metaphorical expressions in order to present a
constructive interpretation of the U.S. policy toward Iraq that contrasts linear and
complex interpretations of data by moving through three specific analytical steps.
Step one o f the analogy consists o f observing data gathered on the U.S. policy
toward Iraq according to the traditional linear method. Step two o f the analysis derives
dimensions from the complexity theories in order to trace the behavior of emerging
indicators in the data. Finally, step three o f the analysis uses the same complex
dimensions in order to trace the behavior o f the same emerging indicators in the data and
observe changes in the policy as affected by factors that constitute its environment. By
doing so, the research observes the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity
theories, compares these complex observations with those of the traditional linear
observation, and then answers the study’s research questions by comparing and
contrasting between the two types o f analysis.
The perceived weakness of this model is that it implies linearity from the start by
dividing its analytical procedure into three steps. Flowever, such a division does not

7
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necessarily constrain the analytical model within a Newtonian methodology. With the
analytical model devoting two steps o f the analysis to complexity, the model is able to
remain faithful to complex analysis and compare the complex observations with those
derived through the linear analysis. In so doing, the model is shifting its emphases from
parts to whole, from structure to process, from objective to epistemic knowledge, from
building blocks to networks, and from truth to approximate descriptions.

Organization o f the Study
Chapter One o f this dissertation consists o f an introduction to this study that
outlines its purpose and significance. Chapter Two consists of a review o f the history o f
U.S. policy toward Iraq. Chapter Three presents review o f the literature dealing with
complexity sciences and their application. Chapter Four provides a theoretical model for
the study. Chapter Five consists of methodology. Chapter Six presents a linear analysis of
the collected data. Chapter Seven includes a complex analysis o f internal changes within
the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Chapter Eight presents a complex analysis o f external
changes in the environment that impacted this policy. And, Chapter Nine presents the
summary, conclusions, and recommendations o f the research.

8
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CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
Introduction
The United States is relatively a young country in comparison to Iraq. Although
the current state of Iraq was formed in 1920 by the amalgamating o f three former
Ottoman provinces, the area and societies that comprise modern Iraq have historical roots
that extend beyond the history of the United States and well into 6000 years BC.
The area presently known as Iraq was known to the ancient Greeks as
Mesopotamia, or the “land between the rivers,” and is in fact the cradle o f civilization,
wherein mankind’s first cities were born approximately five thousand years ago. The area
also witnessed the establishment and decay o f many political entities that conquered or
were conquered by other nations in the region.
The United States, on the other hand, was formed in 1776 after its Declaration of
Independence from England. The thirteen British colonies established earlier in North
America with the arrival o f Pilgrims from England rebelled against the British Crown,
citing “taxation without representation” among other grievances, and forming an
independent republic. The American Revolution, however, was more than a tax rebellion.
It brought forth a system o f government that gradually became one o f the most powerful
political structures in the world, with influence on other nations, including the historically
ancient Iraq.

9
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America’s influence and presence in the region o f the Middle East, however, was
absent for many years, began small, and then it gradually grew. European powers,
however, had a longer and larger influence on the region, especially during the turn o f the
Twentieth Century when the exploration and production o f Middle Eastern oil became o f
interest to the Western oil companies, especially when the reconstruction and expansion
o f the industrialized capitalist countries required a rapid increase in the production and
export o f Middle Eastern crude oil.
For decades, Iraq and the United States had little to do with one another. The days
o f Iraq’s greatest glory occurred long before there was a United States. In recent
centuries, while America was still a young and relatively isolated nation, the Ottoman
Turks ruled the Iraqis, whose relationship with the United States barely existed. Even
after the fall o f the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the formation o f the modern
state o f Iraq, it was Britain, not America, that dominated Iraqi politics.
In the decades after World War I, the United States took an interest in the G ulf
region while focusing its primary attention on Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iraq was a weak
Arab state that posed no threat to U.S. security and interest. It was not until the discovery
o f oil in Iraq during the late 1920s that Iraq and the United States came into contact with
one another.

The Development o f U.S./ Iraqi Relationships
On October 15, 1927 the British exploration team in Iraq hit a gusher, proving oil
reserves in large quantities near Kirkuk in northern Iraq. Paul (2002) reveals that
American oil companies secured 23.7 percent o f concession areas in Iraq for the

10
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exploration o f oil. As o f then, the U.S./ Iraqi relationships began to take form. It is ironic
that it was oil that started this relationship, and it was oil that would bring the two nations
into major conflicts and two devastating wars in the later years (p. 25).
The United States did not interfere in local Iraqi politics from the creation o f the
Iraqi state in 1920 until the establishment o f the Republic o f Iraq in 1958. The U.S.
virtually adopted a hands-off approach toward Iraq and accepted the Britain’s dominant
role in Iraqi affairs.
However, once the monarchic regime in Iraq was toppled in 1958 by the Iraqi
Army, and the new Republic reduced the concession areas o f all foreign companies to
five percent o f the oil, the United States became more proactive in its policy toward Iraq,
experimenting with regime change efforts in order to secure the return o f previous
privileges to the American oil companies in Iraq.

The Republic of Iraq and U.S. Regime Change Efforts
U.S. regime change efforts were successful in toppling the new military regime in
the 1963 coup and helped bringing into power the thuggish Baath Party. The political
turmoil resulted in a series o f military coups between 1963-1968, until the Baath returned
once more to power on July 17, 1968.
Evidence o f U.S. plots to overthrow the military regime that emerged after the
1958 coup are abundant, supported by testimonies that in later years were published by
various CIA field officers. Morris (2003) observes that the CIA, under President John F.
Kennedy, decided to conduct its own regime change in Baghdad, carried out in
collaboration with the Baath Party (p. 65).

11
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Britain and Egypt backed the American intervention for a coup against the
Republican regime in Iraq, while other United States allies, chiefly France and Germany
resisted. Without significant opposition within the US government, Kennedy pressed on.
In Cairo, Damascus, Tehran and Baghdad, American agents marshaled opponents o f the
Iraqi regime. Washington set up a base o f operations in Kuwait, intercepting Iraqi
communications and radioing orders to rebels. The United States also armed the Kurdish
insurgents in their fight against the government (Morris, 2003, p. 63).
In his explanation o f the CIA backing o f the Baath coup, Sale (2003) notes that
the CIA provided the Baathist National Guardsmen with lists o f suspected communists
who were then jailed, interrogated, and summarily gunned down. Zaher (1986) offers that
a top Baath Part official and one o f the coup’s leaders, named Ali Saleh al-Sadie,
confirmed the CIA/ Baath relationship by stating:
The Baath came to power in Iraq in 1963 while riding an American train.” An
American espionage service which had been in touch with the Iraqi Baath Party
also conveyed to the Baath, on a secrete broadcasting service, the names and
addresses o f the Iraqi Communists. Armed with the names and whereabouts o f
individual Communists, the Baath Party and its National Guard carried out
summary executions. Members and supporters o f the ICP were dragged out on the
streets and shot without a hearing (p. 32).
King Hussein o f Jordan also confirmed the CIA’s involvement in the 1963 coup
during an interview with Haikal, the chief editor o f the Egyptian al-Ahram newspaper in
September 1963. According to Batatu (1978), the king stated the following:

12
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Permit me to tell you that I know for a certainty that what happened in Iraq on
February 8 had the support o f American Intelligence. Some o f those who now rule
in Baghdad do not know o f this thing but I am aware o f the truth. Numerous
meetings were held between the Baath party and American Intelligence, the more
important in Kuwait. Do you know t h a t . . . on February 8 a secret radio beamed
to Iraq was supplying the men who pulled the coup with the names and addresses
of the Communists there so that they could be arrested an executed (p. 986).
The scale on which the killings and arrests took place during the coup indicated a
closely coordinated campaign. Sluglett & Sluglett (1990) suggest that those who carried
out the raid on suspects' homes were working from lists supplied to them by the CIA who
had a strong vested interest in breaking what was probably the strongest and most popular
Communist Party in the region (p. 86).
By supporting the 1963 coup, the CIA helped bring the thuggish Baath Party to
power and fatally weakened the prospects for Iraqi democracy (Batatu, 1978, p. 985). As
a reward for America’s support, Zaher (1986) observes that the 1963 coup leaders
declared that the rights o f the oil companies in Iraq would be respected and that they
would be permitted to continue their operations (p. 34).
The Baath regime o f 1968, however, shifted its alliance toward the Soviet Union
in opposition to increased U.S. support for Israel, and in 1970 it nationalized Iraqi oil.
These developments dampened the U.S./ Iraqi relationships, creating an atmosphere o f
hostility and mistrust. However, after the 1979 Iranian revolution in Iran and the
presidency of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the U.S. relationship with Iraq moved toward a

13
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warmer association o f mutual interest. Both countries saw in Iran a threat and as such,
began to cooperate with one another.
This relationship further blossomed during the Iran-Iraq War o f 1980-1989. The
U.S. provided Iraq with financial, agricultural, technological, and military aid in order to
win the war with Iran. In 1989, after years o f Iraq’s extensive use o f weapons o f mass
destruction against Iranian troops, Iran finally accepted a ceasefire.
From 1989 until the G ulf War of 1991, the United States made no mention of
Iraq’s stockpile o f weapons o f mass destruction, nor it attempted to destroy them. Instead,
it continued extending loans and credits to the regime o f Saddam Hussein.

Iraq’s Financial Problems After the Iran-Iraq War
Iraq emerged victorious from its war with Iran, but the cost o f the war had
devastated its economy. Iraq was desperately short o f money. Henderson (1991) points
out that every two weeks a meeting was held at Iraq’s central bank to decide which bills
had to be paid and which creditors would be told they had to wait. The country either had
to boost oil production by 40 percent, and hope that the price remained constant, or it had
to seek a 40 percent increase in oil prices (p. 219).
But oil exports were not providing the revenues that Saddam thought Iraq
deserved. The price, he said, should be $25 a barrel, certainly not bouncing around below
$20. Moreover, the Turks were building dams on the headwaters o f the Euphrates, which
threatened the river’s free flow through Iraq. In any direction Saddam looked, he saw

conspiracies against him (Henderson, 1991, p. 235).
Hiro (2002) explains that overproduction continued, with Kuwait exceeding its
OPEC quota by 40 percent, and the UAE by 30 percent. By May 1990, petroleum prices
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fell to $11 a barrel, a level at which Iraq’s oil income was just enough to meet current
expenses, leaving nothing to service foreign debts or fund urgently needed reconstruction
(p. 34).
In mid-July, 1990, Saddam gave a serious warning to Kuwait. The memorandum
sent to Kuwait, explains Henderson (1991), demanded compensation o f $2.4 billion for
oil that Saddam alleged had been stolen from the Rumaila oilfield, part o f which straddles
the common border. The Kuwaitis admitted that they had been taking oil from the
Rumaila field but only 30,000 barrels a day (pp. 225-226).
When the Republican Guard began massing on the Kuwaiti border in mid-July,
1990, it created a dilemma for the Bush administration. Washington continued to believe
that the United States’ interest would be served by finding a way to work with Saddam.
Meanwhile, Egyptian President Hossni Mubarak managed to persuade the Iraqis
to sit down with the Kuwaitis and discuss the issue at a meeting on July 28, 1990 in the
Saudi port o f Jeddah. But the session did not actually begin until August 1, 1990 because
Kuwait objected to Iraq’s threatening negotiating stance.
Izzat Ibrahim, the Deputy Chairman o f the Revolutionary Command Council,
accompanied by Saddam’s cousin and Iraq’s Local Government Minister, Ali Hassan alMajid, represented Iraq in the meeting. The presence o f Majid made two serious points:
first, that Iraq considered relations with Kuwait a local government matter; second, that
Kuwait should take into account the minister’s fearsome reputation in using chemical
weapons to punish rebellious Kurdish citizens in northern Iraq in 1988 (Henderson, 1991,
p. 227).
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The August 1, 1990 meeting in Jeddah went according to Saddam’s script.
According to the Research Unit for Political Economy (RUPE) (2003), the Iraqis
demanded that Kuwait wipe clean Iraq’s debt and pay Baghdad what amounted to $27
billion to offset the financial burden suffered by Iraq due to the Iran-Iraq War. This was a
demand clearly intended to elicit an angry Kuwaiti rejection, which it did, and so justify
an Iraqi attack. The meeting broke up after less than two hours. On that same day, the
Bush administration approved $695,000 worth of advanced data transmission devices for
Iraq (p. 33).

Iraq’s Invasion o f Kuwait
On August 2, 1990, at 1:00 A.M., 120,000 Republican Guards poured across the
border. Within thirty-six hours, Kuwait was conquered, its military was swept, and its
leadership had fled to Saudi Arabia (Pollack, 2002, p. 36). By doing so, Saddam altered
the balance o f petroleum power in the region (Pitt & Ritter, 2002, pp. 22-23).
There are several theories and speculations on the real motive beyond Saddam’s
invasion o f Kuwait. A key argument was “financial.” Kuwait was to be used as a cash
caw by Saddam in order to offset Iraq’s financial problems that were caused by Iraq’s
eight years war with Iran.
The idea o f using military force began to take shape among Saddam’s inner circle
in the early 1990. Tripp (2000) asserts that Kuwait was to be the immediate target, but the
longer-term aim was to extract resources from all the Arab G ulf states and particularly
from Saudi Arabia. Kuwait was to be a commodity that could either retained through a
puppet government or through annexation, or it could be exchanged for concessions.
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These would solve Iraq’s financial position, strengthening Saddam’s authority and
establish Iraq as a leader in the oil market (p. 252).
Another speculation on Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait is bordered on a conspiracy
theory and believed by many on the Arab street. The theory is based on the notion that
the United States was aiming to “shrink” Iraq’s military capacity to the period prior to the
Iran-Iraq War by creating a scenario whereby Iraq will be driven into a war and its
military power thus will be reduced to the 1970s level. Accordingly, Kuwait began to
instigate a problem with Iraq in early 1990 by demanding Iraq to pay back its loans and
by siphoning Iraqi oil from the Iraq’s oil field o f Rumaila.
This theory justifies its claim by pointing to the notion that the United States did
not warn Iraq not to invade Kuwait prior to August 2, 1990. Instead, on July 25, 1990,
U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad assured Saddam that the United States would not interfere
in matters between two Arab nations.
In the midst o f the debates in Washington over Saddam’s intentions, U.S.
Ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie met with Saddam on July 25, 1990. Glaspie
endorsed Saddam’s view that oil prices should be higher than $25 per barrel and
sympathized with his anxiety about low oil prices forcing a huge drop in Iraqi spending
(Henderson, 1991, p. 227). The Ambassador also assured Saddam that the United States
did not intend to intercede in Iraq’s dispute with Kuwait (Pollack, 2002, p. 35).
The conversation took place even as Iraq had massed troops at the Kuwaiti border
and declared that it considered Kuwait’s acts to be aggression. RUPE (2003) notes that it
was plain to the world that Iraq was about to invade. Given the eventual American
response, one would have expected that the United States would have send a clear
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message condemning the invasion. Instead, the United States ambassador responded in
the mildest possible terms (p. 39).
Reinforced by Ambassador Glaspie’s meeting with Saddam, Pollack (2002)
explains that the Bush administration continued to take a hands-off approach, and both
the State Department spokesman and the Assistant Secretary o f State for the Near East
emphasized publicly that the United States did not have any treaty obligations to defend
Kuwait (p. 35).
Another conspiracy theory is based on the notion that Saddam was provoked to
invade Kuwait in order for the U.S. military to have permanent base in the oil-rich
Middle East. Pollack (2002) suggests that Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait made possible
the establishment o f permanent U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia and the Bush
administration resolved to destroy Iraq’s conventional forces and weapons o f mass
destruction (WMD) (p. 39).
Sciolino (1991) advises that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was not a surgical
strike against key Kuwaiti installation, but a relentless onslaught o f military power. The
forces sent into Kuwait were far larger than what would have been needed to occupy the
country (p. 206). Dickey & Thomas (2002) offer that Saddam might have gotten away
with invading Kuwait if he had pulled back to the M utla Ridge, which overlooks Kuwait
(p. 38).
On August 2, 1990, the day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, the White House (1990)
issued Executive Order 12722, stating that the United States found the actions o f the Iraqi
government constituting an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security of
the United States.
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On August 3, 1990, the United Nations (1990a) passed resolution 660,
condemning Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait. On August 6, 1990 the UN (1990b) passed
resolution 661, levying economic sanctions against Iraq in order to compel it to leave
Kuwait. Resolution 661 was also issued to ban all trade with Iraq, including an oil and
arms embargo, and curtailment o f international flights and financial transactions. It also
froze Iraqi government assets abroad (Hurd, 2001). This was a devastating blow. Iraq
imported 70 percent of its food. By September 1990 Iraq was forced to begin food
rationing (Pitt & Ritter, 2002, p. 23).
In order to comply with the UN sanction requirements, President Bush (1991)
ordered all economic transactions with Iraq by U.S. citizens and organizations to be
prohibited. By 1991, U.S. authorities promptly ended all trade between Iraq and U.S.
corporations or citizens.
By August 8, 1990 Saddam announced that he was annexing Kuwait as Iraq’s
nineteenth province. At the same time, Pollack (2002) explains that American ground and
air forces were arriving in the Persian Gulf as part o f Operation Desert Shield (p. 39).
Tripp (2000) observes that Saudi Arabia was alarmed by the Iraqi forces on its
border. The United States began a military airlift that was to lead to the stationing o f over
half a million American troops in Saudi Arabia within six months (p. 253).
The arrival of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia infuriated a wealthy Saudi named
Osama bin Laden, who had made a name for him self while fighting against the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. As America steeled itself to attack one threat, it gave birth to
another, as it would learn later (Pitt & Ritter, 2002, p. 23).
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The United Nations (1990c) passed Resolution 678, providing for the use o f all
necessary means to end the occupation o f Kuwait. The United States scotched all
diplomatic efforts by the USSR, Europe, and Arab countries by continuing to insist that
Iraq withdraw unconditionally (RUPE, 2003, p. 39).
Pollack (2002) observes that Saddam launched a public relation offensive to
undermine the coalition’s political will. He threatened that a war with Iraq would be the
“Mother o f All Battles” in which thousands of troops would be killed. Pollack adds that
Saddam chose not to attack the coalition forces building up in Saudi Arabia because he
felt that in doing so, it would simply ensure the war that he preferred to deter (pp. 40-41).
On January 14, 1991 Congress (1991) authorized President Bush to wage war
against Iraq in accordance with various United Nations resolutions. President Bush
signed it into law as Public Law 102-1. On April 16, 1991 President Bush signed Public
Law 102-25, reactively defining the start o f the G ulf War as August 2, 1990.

The Gulf War
On January 16,1991 the international coalition began a dizzying and deadly aerial
assault upon Iraqi forces in Kuwait and their command center in Baghdad (Pitt & Ritter,
2002, p. 23). W ith this, the G ulf War, code-named Operation Desert Storm, had begun.
Tripp (2000) comments that Iraq had no effective defense against such an attack and
responded instead politically, firing a number of missiles against Israel, in symbolic
defiance and possibly hoping that an Israeli retaliation would disrupt the coalition by
causing its Arab members, Syria and Egypt in particular, to withdraw. However, this
failed to have the desired effect (p. 254).
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The U.S.-led coalition’s bombing campaign systematically destroyed Iraq’s
civilian infrastructure, including electricity generation, communication, water and
sanitation facilities. For more than a month the bombing o f Iraq continued without any
attempt to send in troops for the purported purpose of the Gulf War, namely, to evict Iraqi
troops from Kuwait (RUPE, 2003, p. 42).
Pitt & Ritter (2002) assert that for forty-two days the allies bombed and strafed,
sending 2,000 sorties a day against the Iraqi armies and air force. After a mouth o f this
punishing assault, President Bush urged the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam, who
Bush had publicly compared to Hitler. But, no such popular uprising took place at the
time (p. 24). According Research Unit for Political Economy (RUPR) (2003), as many as
15,000 civilians died as a direct result o f allied bombing (pp. 40-41).
By February 22, 1991 and prior to the allied ground assault, Iraq agreed to begin
withdrawing from Kuwait in twenty-four hours if the coalition would agree to suspend its
military operations immediately and lift the U.N. sanctions. To the coalition, this Iraqi
offer was just another hoax (Pollack, 2002, pp. 43-44).
Having rejected Saddam’s final offer, the coalition launched its long-awaited
ground campaign. By the time the coalition ground offensive began on February 24,
1991, Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti Theatre had fallen from their high o f around 550,000 to
about 350,000 because o f low morale and logistical problems (Pollack, 2002, p. 44).
Exactly 100 hours after the ground assault had begun, Iraq announced its withdrawal
from Kuwait. On February 28, 1991 Iraq and the United States agreed to a cease-fire (Pitt
& Ritter, 2002, p. 24).
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Meanwhile, between 100,000 and 200,000 Iraqi soldiers lost their lives in a
massive overkill. According to RUPE (2003), the heaviest toll was inflicted by U.S.
carpet-bombing o f Iraqi positions near the Kuwait-Iraq border, where tens o f thousands
o f ill-fed, ill-equipped conscripts were helplessly pinned down in trenches. Thousands
were buried alive as tanks equipped with plows and bulldozers smashed through
defenses. Others were cut down as they tried to surrender or flee (p. 41).
Pollack (2002) offers that the fog o f war had descended over the American
political and military leadership, prompting the most controversial decision o f the war.
President Bush was feeling domestic pressure to end the war and the slaughter of Iraqi
forces. Consequently, with the advice o f the Pentagon and CETCOM, the president
ordered a halt to the ground offensive and agreed to leave Saddam in power (p. 45).
According to RUPE (2003), the cost o f the war to the U.S. was $61 billion, o f which $48
billion was paid by US allies (p. 102).
President Bush and his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft explained the
reason for stopping the war after the liberation o f Kuwait and not continuing to Baghdad
in order to remove Saddam from power. According to their book, A World Transformed,
Bush and Scowcroft (1998) wrote the following:
Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation o f Iraq,
would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream...
and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs... Had we gone
the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying
power in a bitterly hostile land (p. 489).
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On April 3, 1991, the United Nations (1991a) issued Resolution 687, declaring a
cease-fire and demanded that Iraq accept the provisions that it destroy its weapons of
mass destruction and allow U.N. inspection to monitor that provision. Commenting on
this resolution, Chomsky (2000) asserts that the resolution did not mention any
enforcement mechanism (p. 16). Instead, Ritter (1999) explains that the resolution
required the certified destruction o f Iraq’s weapons o f mass destruction as a condition for
ending economic sanctions. Saddam was in no position to challenge the will o f the
United Nations, especially with the American-led coalition still overseeing southern Iraq
(p. 104).
The resolution also created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) for the
purpose of inspecting Iraq’s compliance with UN resolutions to destroy its WMD (Pitt &
Ritter, 2002, p. 25). This action, explains Hiro (2002), represented steps toward achieving
the goal o f establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons o f mass destruction
(pp. 46-47).

The Aftermath o f the G ulf War
O f the eight Republican Guard divisions deployed to the Kuwaiti Theater, only
three had been destroyed, and a fourth had lost about half of its strength. At least two
Republican Guard divisions had already escaped across the Euphrates River and were
moving to defend Baghdad. The Hammurabi Armored division and al-Faw Infantry
D ivision remained largely intact and, along w ith the remnants o f the M edina, were taking

up positions to defend Basra (Pollack, 2002, p. 45).
At the end o f the conflict, Saddam announced to the Iraqi people that they had
emerged victorious from the Mother o f All Battles. But that was a whistle in the dark
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(Ritter, 1999, p. 104). The Iraqi intifadah (uprising) against Saddam’s regime began in
Basra on March 1, 1991 with tired, hungry, and angry Iraqi soldiers who turned on the
regime and convinced many o f the Shiites who lived there to join them.
Pollack (2002) reveals that the first act o f the intifadah came from a nameless
Iraqi soldier who fired a long burst from his AK-47 at a mural o f Saddam in Saad Square
in Basra, sparking the huge number o f demoralized soldiers collected in the square to
rebel against the dictator. Within twenty-four hours the city was in chaos as small units of
rebels battled street to street with units loyal to the regime (p. 47).
Pollack (2002) adds that within just a few days, similar revolts erupted in twodozen other towns in southern Iraq, including the cities o f Nasiriya, Samawa, Karbala,
Najaf, Omara, Hilla, and Diwaniya. Iran tried to fuel the rebellion by dispatching
members o f its at-Tawabeen Division (Iraqi prisoners o f war who had remained in Iran)
and Badr Corps (Iraqi Shiites who had fled to Iran). The revolt in the south was also a
signal to the Iraqi Kurds, who had been looking for an opportunity to rise up again and
reassert their autonomy since the Anfal campaign (p. 47).
The uprisings in southern Iraq were spontaneous. Tripp (2000) notes that in each
town local leaderships emerged, some associated with underground Islamic
organizations. In the towns seized by the rebels, a terrible revenge was wrought on those
whom they regarded as agents o f or collaborators with the regime (pp. 255-256).
Although the Shiites revolt was almost entirely spontaneous and uncoordinated,
the Kurds had been planning their offensive since the invasion o f Kuwait, sensing that
they might have an opportunity if Saddam’s army were defeated in battle. By March 19,
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the Iraqi Kurds were in control o f virtually their entire ancient homeland, including the
major cities o f Arbil, Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah (Pollack, 2002, p. 48).
The regim e’s counterattack began on March 6, 1991 where the intifadah had been
bom in Basra. Pollack (2002) suggests that the Republican Guard’s Hammurabi Armored
and al-Faw Infantry Divisions, and the army’s Fifty-first Mechanized Division led the
regime’s forces in a bloody two-day offensive that crushed the rebels in tough street
battles. Altogether, 60,000 Shiites were killed in the suppression of the intifadah (pp. 5051).
Hiro (2002) alludes that most o f the deaths resulted from the artillery
bombardment o f residential areas by government troops. They also forced 70,000 Shiites,
including many clerics and most o f the 8,000 theological students of Najaf, to flee into
Iran (p. 43).
Having dealt a deathblow to the Shiite rebellion in the middle and the south, Tripp
(2000) advises that the Iraqi regime turned its forces on the rebellions that had broken out
simultaneously among the Kurds o f the north (p. 256). Using heavy artillery, Hiro (2002)
offers that multiple rocket launchers, and helicopter gunships, the Iraqi armored and
infantry divisions drove out the lightly armed rebels by nightfall. This led to a massive
Kurdish exodus to the mountainous Iranian and Turkish borders (p. 45).
Tripp (2000) warns his audience that nearly two million Kurds were on the move
within the space o f a few days, leading to the disintegration o f the rebel forces (p. 257).
The regime’s forces, according to Pollack (2002) acted with great brutality, slaughtering
roughly 20,000 Kurds, many o f them civilians. The scale o f the diaspora threatened a
humanitarian disaster (p. 51).
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In April 1991 the Security Council adopted Resolution 688 (United Nations,
1991b). It expressed concern about Iraq’s repression o f the Iraqi civilian population in
many parts o f Iraq, including in Kurdish populated areas. This led to a massive flow of
refugees across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threatened
international peace and security in the region. The resolution demanded that Iraq, as a
contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region,
immediately end the repression and open a dialogue to ensure that the human and
political rights o f all Iraqi citizens were respected.
Although the resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII o f the U.N. Charter
and therefore did not imply that member states could enforce its terms militarily, on April
16 the United States, Britain, and France created a safe haven in northern Iraq to protect
Kurdish refugees from the regime’s forces. Pollack (2002) notes that as part o f Operation
Provide Comfort, the three countries undertook to feed and care for more than 500,000
Kurdish refugees in an area of northern Iraq and announced the establishment of a no-fly
zone (NFZ) north o f the Thirty-sixth Parallel, in which Iraqi aircraft would be forbidden
to fly (p. 51).
After the insurgence, Hiro (2002) explains that the Iraqi government signed a
truce with the Kurdish leaders as a prelude to negotiations. A draft agreement reached in
June 1991 gave the Kurds predominant military and political authority over the Kurdish
area, with joint control o f the army and police by the Kurdish authority (p. 75).
Once the Iraqi military was reformed after the trauma o f Desert Storm, several
divisions were sent south to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Hawizeh and
Nasiriya marshes. Pollack (2002) offers that the regime’s forces began a massive
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program to drain the southern marshes altogether to simply eliminate the sanctuary of the
insurgents. The regime’s counterinsurgency operations were so brutal that in August
1992, the United States, Britain, and France declared a second no-fly zone under
Operation Southern Watch, below the Thirty-second Parallel in southern Iraq in order to
provide some protection for the Shiites from attacks by Iraqi aircraft and helicopter
gunships (p. 59).
The Bush administration was terrified that Iraq would fall into chaos or fragment
along ethnic and religious lines, leaving a power vacuum in the region and no state to
balance Iran. Pollack (2002) suggests that the United States did not assist the rebels
primarily out o f fear o f hastening the fragmentation o f Iraq and plunging the region into a
new cycle o f instability (p.49).
Hiro (2002) explains that the scenario o f an independent Kurdistan also worried
Turkey, with a large Kurdish population concentrated in its southeastern sector. During
his meeting with President Bush at Camp David on M arch 24, 1991 Turkish president
Turgut Ozal explained how an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would become the nucleus for
a Greater Kurdistan for the Kurdish populations o f Turkey, Iran, and Syria, thus
destabilizing the entire region (p. 44).

Containing the Iraqi Regime
Dickey & Thomas (2002) explain that Saddam was supposed to get rid o f his
stockpiles o f chemical and biological weapons, and to allow inspectors to m ake sure none

were hidden or being secretly manufactured (p. 40). However, W hitelaw & Mazzetti
(2002) observe that it took the UN weapons inspectors more years to uncover the extent
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o f Saddam’s weapons program, all the while maintaining the sanctions that had hurt the
Iraqi people more than Saddam and his regime (p. 18).
There was a qualitative difference, however. According to Ritter (1999), the Gulf
Wars cease-fire was not an arms control treaty brokered between two equal partners, but
rather a disarmament in which one side, Iraq, defeated on the battlefields o f Kuwait in the
1991 G ulf War was compelled to carry out the dictates o f the other side, the United
Nations. UNSCOM was an outcome o f the cease-fire, and disarmament was a
precondition for ending the war (p. 32).
UNSCOM engaged Saddam in a frustrating game o f cat and mouse, trying to hunt
down the evidence o f Iraq’s wrongdoing. Saddam had covered his tracks well, yet
UNSCOM continued to isolate inconsistencies in the stories told by Iraqi officials,
pressing hard on their inherent contradictions. Gradually at least part o f the truth
emerged.
From the outset Saddam decided to outwit the disarmament provisions o f the
Security Council resolution. Immediately after the adoption o f 687, an emergency
committee, chaired by Tariq Aziz and loosely based on the Special Security Organization
(SSO)-run Weapons Control and Maintenance Committee, met in Baghdad to craft Iraq’s
response. Broad guidelines were established (Ritter, 1999, pp. 105-106).
Whitelaw & Mazzetti (2002) observe that the United States was forced to track
Saddam’s weapons program with images taken from spy satellites and from aircraft
flying over Iraqi territory. Those were the same techniques used in the years before the
G ulf War, and they missed the mark by a mile when it came to judging the progress of
Saddam’s quest for WMD (p. 20).
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In June 1991' inspection teams led by David Kay succeeded in unmasking Iraq’s
undeclared program to enrich uranium using gigantic magnets called calutrons. In July
1991 the IAEA discovered several kilograms of highly enriched uranium and large stocks
of natural, un-enriched uranium.
The Iraqis then turned over to the inspectors huge amounts of WMD-filled bombs
and artillery shells, many o f their Scud missiles, and major chunks o f their nuclear
program. They held back considerable documentation, key equipment that would be
difficult to replace, and a residual force o f Scuds and WMD munitions as a final deterrent
(Pollack, 2002, p. 62).
Aided by national intelligence agencies, the inspectors kept turning up new Iraqi
WMD caches. Pollack (2002) reveals that in August 1991, the inspectors found Gerald
Bull’s super-gun, which Iraq had not declared. Shortly thereafter, they discovered a huge
quantity o f heavy water for use in nuclear reactors. In September 1991 another team led
by David Key uncovered a treasure trove o f sixty thousand documents detailing Iraq’s
nuclear weapons development program hidden away as part o f the harmless-sounding
Petro-Chemical 3 project outside o f Baghdad (pp. 62-63).
Timmerman (2002) advises that as of May 15, 1992, the Iraqi Government
provided a full disclosure o f its programs for weapons o f mass destruction. From May 26
to June 4, the 12th nuclear inspection team oversaw the destruction of three buildings at
the al-Atheer nuclear weapons fabrication facility. It also inspected uranium enrichment
sites at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, and destroyed and rendered harmless utilities and
ventilation systems.
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Sanctions
The UN sanctions were originally designed to force Iraqi troops withdrawal from
Kuwait. However, these sanctions were maintained after the end o f the Gulf War to
assure Iraqi disarmament and compliance with all relevant UN resolutions.
Unfortunately, the economic sanctions hurt the average Iraqi citizens more than it
hurt the Iraqi regime. So great were Iraq’s humanitarian problems that the United States
and the United Nations quickly recognized that allowance had to be made so that the
Iraqi people would not starve and to exempt food from the embargo, ease restrictions on
essential civilian needs, and unfreeze many o f Iraq’s foreign assets for the purchase o f
food and medicine.
On August 16 and September 19, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolutions
706 and 712 (United Nations, 1991c and 199Id). It approved the oil-for-food program,
and permitted Iraq to sell up to 1.6 billion dollars worth o f crude and oil products over six
months. Iraq's resulting revenues to be paid into escrow accounts. Ritter (1999) states that
66 percent for imports, 30 percent to a compensation fund, and four percent for
UNSCOM and other UN costs. Imports o f food and medicine were to be vetted by the
Security Council's sanctions committee (p. 149).
Saddam, however, refused to implement the oil-for-food program until 1996. He
rejected the amount o f oil allowed by the United Nation for Iraq to sell oil in order to buy
food. He also feared that the administration o f the program would threaten his authority
and weakens his control over the political situation in Iraq and his regime’s overall
security.
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Pollack (2002) explains that on April 14, 1995, the Security Council passed
Resolution 986. It adopted new formula for oil-for-food that allowed Iraq to export two
billion dollars worth o f crude every 180 days under UN supervision. The resolution gave
Baghdad primary responsibility for distribution o f humanitarian supplies (p. 74). Hiro
(2002) adds that a year later, Iraq declared that it was now ready to implement the oil-forfood deal and therefore would be increasing the monthly food ration by 35 percent (p.
141).
The human toll imposed by the U.N. economic sanctions was real. Real suffering,
real hunger, and real death were taking place, reaching gigantic proportions. The only
recourse available to Iraq was to accept the Security Council resolution, which authorized
Iraq to sell oil to finance the purchase o f food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods as
well as pay off war reparations and fund the work o f UNSCOM.

Regime Change Efforts During the Containment Era
The Bush administration began planning for a regime change in Iraq through a
CIA-supported plot. President Bush in late 1991 ordered the CIA to develop a plan to
overthrow Saddam. The agency put together a $30 million package to destabilize the
regime. It combined anti-Saddam propaganda with active support for Iraqi opposition
group (Ritter, 1999, p. 132).
The most promising avenue the CIA found was with a group o f exiles calling
themselves the Iraqi National Accord (INA), or a\-Wifaq. This group, according to
Pollack (2002), consisted o f former Iraqi military officers. The CIA also reached out to
an Iraqi exile named Ahmed Chalabi, a former banker who was convicted by a Jordanian
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court o f embezzling more than $70 million from Jordan’s Petra Bank, to serve as the
coordinator o f an effort to create the Iraqi National Congress (INC) to serve as a cohesive
opposition under a single umbrella organization (p. 63).
Chalabi was chosen because he was wealthy and had good organizational skills,
and because he had no base o f support inside Iraq or any standing with any o f the exile
groups. In short, Chalabi was acceptable as an office manager, which was all he was
supposed to be.
Dreyfuss (2002) notes that the INC has been trying to drag the United States into
war with Iraq. By its very nature, the INC's strategy o f building a paramilitary presence
inside Iraq, and creating a provisional government, launching attacks on Iraqi cities was
intended to create inexorable momentum for a war in which in the United States would
be compelled to support the INC. But American policy in the 1990s was focused
primarily on containing Saddam and disarming him o f WMD.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union o f Kurdistan
(PUK) then became part o f Washington’s strategy to use Kurdistan as a staging area to
oust Saddam, using the INC as the main instrument. However, the Bush administration
pursued an anti-Saddam coup not as its sole option, but as part o f a bigger game plan with
diverse roles assigned to U.N. sanctions, the maintenance o f no fly zone in Iraqi
Kurdistan, and the upkeep o f a U.S. armada in the G ulf (Hiro, 2002, p. 75).
Hiro (2002) explains that a dispute, however, between a pro-KDP landlord and his
pro-PUK peasants in May 1992 mushroomed into wide-scale fighting between the two
major Kurdish parties. Before a temporary cease-fire came into effect a w eek later, more
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than a thousand people were dead, and the PUK had stormed the parliament building in
Irbil and ransacked the government treasury (p. 79).
Meanwhile here in the United States, Bush lost to Democrat Bill Clinton in the
November 1992 presidential election. This pleased Saddam, who reckoned that there was
now a chance o f a fresh start with the new occupant in the White House, since Clinton
had no personal animus against him (Hiro, 2002, p. 48).

The Clinton Presidency
The new Clinton administration took office without the baggage o f President
Bush’s failed efforts to oust Saddam and with little desire to focus on Iraq. From the start,
the administration was dominated by the dovish position on Iraq. Pollack (2002) alludes
that the Clinton White House was not about to engage in a battle of wills with Saddam.
To the administration’s doves, containment o f Iraq offered the opportunity to prevent
Saddam from making trouble at a relatively low cost, with the hope o f pursuing the rest
o f their policy agenda (p. 65). Ritter (1999) observes that when Clinton and his national
security team took over in January 1993, America’s Iraq policy had grown from no
policy at all to one of open embrace, containment, confrontation and back to containment
(pp. 132-134).
There was a window o f opportunity for the new Clinton administration to
negotiate a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. If the negotiators were successful,
that outcome would have a profound effect on the region. The administration therefore
focused its energies on peacemaking, while containing the radical opponents o f peace,
such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya.
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There was still a debate regarding Iraq within the administration. At lower levels,
there were a number o f hawkish officials who believed that the United States should be
trying to topple Saddam. Others within the administration recognized that Saddam was
weak enough to be overthrown by internal forces. According to Pollack (2002), both
groups agreed that force would be necessary to check Saddam, and keeping containment
in place and intact would require the willingness of the United States to employ military
operations from time to time in response to Iraq (p. 66).

Attempt to Assassinate Former President Bush
Dickey & Thomas (2002) explain that in 1993, Kuwait accused Saddam o f hiring
some Kuwaiti liquor smugglers to try to assassinate former president Bush during his
visit to Kuwait (p. 38). Chomsky (2000) reports that administration officials, speaking
anonymously, informed the New York Times that the judgment o f Iraq’s guilt was based
on circumstantial evidence rather than ironclad intelligence (pp. 18-19).
On June 26, 1993, American warships fired twenty-three TLAMs at the Iraqi
intelligence service headquarters in Baghdad and flattened it (Dickey & Thomas, 2002, p.
38). Ironically, former President Bush whose life and honor Clinton was defending
seemed most reluctant about attacking Iraq. President Clinton, however, declared that the
plot against former President Bush was an attack against America (Stephanopoulos,
1999, p. 162).
Pollack (2002) reveals that after the June 1993 cruise missile strike, Saddam
decided that discretion was the better part o f valor by lowering his level of confrontation
with the United States and the United Nations. Saddam continued to look for ways to
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hamstring the inspectors while the Clinton administration was distracted by other
projects, such as in Somalia and Haiti (p. 67).

UN to Verify Iraq’s Completion o f its Disarmament
In early 1995, having destroyed all known research, development, and
manufacturing facilities for nuclear weapons, the IAEA channeled its resources into
strengthening its monitoring and verification regime in Iraq. Hiro (2002) reveals that UN
weapons inspection team chief Ekeus declared that the UNSCOM-IAEA verification and
monitoring system was fully operational (pp. 103-104).
Before UNSCOM was able to certify Iraq’s completion of its disarmament
requirements, the debate within the Clinton administration between the hawks and the
doves resurfaced on how long the U.S. should hold containment o f Iraq in place?
According to Pollack (2002), the hawks and the doves argued that containment could not
last and that the best thing the United States could do was to bow out gracefully before
the containment collapsed (p. 71).
In the Middle East, the anti-Iraqi front broke down in the spring o f 1995, with
Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates calling for an easing o f sanctions against the
Iraq. Sympathy for the Iraqi people was high in Jordan, which, with U.N. permission,
continued to receive its oil needs o f 75,000 barrels per day from Iraq (Hiro, 2002, p. 140).

The Hussein Kamel Fiasco and the Continuation o f UN Inspections
Fearing a retaliation by Saddam’s eldest son, Uday, Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s
son-in-law and Minister o f Military Industry, took the cautious step o f packing up his
brother, Saddam Kamel, their wives (both o f them Saddam’s daughters), and their
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children, and defected to Jordan in 1995. Kamel was afraid of Uday because o f the
tension and rivalry between the two caused by the increasing rise o f Kamel’s influence
within Saddam’s inner circle.
Hiro (2002) explains that while in Jordan, Kamel met with Ekeus and the CIA. He
told them that Iraq had withheld information on its WMD program. Saddam responded
by accusing Kamel him self o f secretly hiding vast amounts o f information about Iraq’s
WMD programs on his chicken farm near Habbaniya (pp. 65-66).
Barry (2003) notes that after six months in exile in Jordan, Kamel realized that the
United States would not support his dream o f becoming Iraq’s ruler after Saddam’s
demise. Kamel was hoping that the U.S. would use him as a replacement for Saddam
because he was a ranking official in the Baath Party and Iraqi government and member o f
Saddam’s own clan. Unfortunately, Kamel was misguided in his hope.
Pollack (2002) alludes that the United States did not trust Kamel and regarded
him as an opportunist thug that lacked any real support inside Iraq or within Saddam’s
clan. In February 1996, Kamel packed up his family and returned to Iraq, where he and
his brother were immediately divorced from their wives and killed by their tribe members
in a bloody shoot-out at their home (p. 79).
Pollack (2002) adds that during the spring o f 1996, UNSCOM began inspecting
sites more closely connected with Saddam himself to try to get at Iraq’s hidden WMD.
Iraq was well aware o f the CIA covert action campaign and assumed that American
inspectors were feeding information regarding the Iraqi security services to the CIA (p.
79).
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In 1997, Ekues reported to the Security Council that 93 percent o f Iraq’s major
weapons capability had been destroyed by UNSCOM. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) also certified that Iraq’s nuclear stocks were gone and most o f its longrange systems had been destroyed (RUPE, 2003, p. 48).

Continued CIA Plots for Regime Change in Iraq
The Clinton administration continued its attempt to use UN inspections for
espionage purposes and to support a secret CIA plot to overthrow Saddam. The CIA
funded the Iraqi Kurdish parties, the INC and the INA for mastering plans for regime
change in Baghdad. However, despite the CIA’s funding and support, the Iraqi opposition
groups remained fragmented, weak and ineffective.
In December 1994, Wafiq al-Samarraie, the head o f the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(the Mukhabaraf) fled to Kurdistan, where he made contact with U.S. intelligence.
Samarraie told UNSCOM that despite what it had been led to believe, Iraq continued to
possess and produce WMD (Pollack, 2002, p. 71).
Encouraged by Samarraie’s defection to Kurdistan, the White House decided to
accelerate its plan to overthrow Saddam and replace him with a small group o f generals,
including al-Samarraie. According to Hiro (2002), Chalabi and the INC were allied with •
Samarraie. Their joint plan envisaged suborning the commanders o f the Iraqi forces in
nearby Mosul and Kirkuk, and then infiltrating these cities with INC partisans to incite a
popular insurrection (p. 80).
Samarraie’s plan had several problems. First, there were few indications that the
rest o f the Iraqi Army was ready to defect to the rebels. Pollack (2002) explains that a
Kurdish-led revolution would rally the most royal formation to the regime. However, no
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one in the administration was aware o f the operation. National Security Adviser Anthony
Lake and Secretary o f State Warren Christopher were furious when they found out about
it (p. 72).
On March 6,1995 a force o f roughly 10,000 PUK militia and a few hundred INC
personnel launched a surprise attack on the 130th and 847th Infantry Brigades o f the
Thirty-eight Infantry Division. The disaffected battalion surrendered virtually en masse,
and the two brigades were routed. Saddam’s agents, however, rounded up Samarraie’s
accomplices in Baghdad and deployed armed Republican Guard and army units and
crushed the small Kurdish penetration. The disappointed and discredited Samarraie left
Kurdistan for Damascus, from where he went to London (Pollack, 2002, p. 73).
The CIA then turned to the INA to plot against Saddam, instead o f the INC and
the Kurds. Hiro (2001) suggests that the anti-Saddam coup was coordinated earlier by
the CIA and originated with Muhammad Abdullah al-Shahwani, a retired Iraqi general
running an import-export business in Amman. The coup was designed to take place in
June 1996 (p. 102).
In the fall o f 1994, Shahwani contacted Ayad Allawie o f the INA who had homes
in Amman and London, with a plan to stage a coup against Saddam. Shahwani had three
sons who were serving in the Republican Guard. Allawie alerted the Saudis and the
British Secrete Intelligence Services, MI6.
Hiro (2001) advises that in mid-January 1996, at a high-level gathering o f
intelligence officials from the U.S., Britain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait took place
in Riyadh under Prince Turki bin Faisal. The Americans committed $6 million to the plan
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o f toppling Saddam, the Saudis $6 million and the Kuwaitis $3 million. At about the
same time CIA Director Deutch got the go-ahead with the plot (p. 103).
Hiro (2001) adds that on June 26, 1996 the date o f the putative anti-Saddam coup,
the CIA station at the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan received a message from the Iraqi
General Intelligence Directorate: “We have arrested all your people, and so pack up and
go home” (p. 106). Within a few days, hundreds of the conspirators were arrested, and
the CIA teams supporting the operation had to flee the region (Pollack, 2002, p. 80).
KDP-PUK relations continued to deteriorate, with Kurdistan virtually divided into
two zones among them, both raising revenue through customs duties on goods moving
across either the intra-Kurdish borders or the Kurdistani frontiers with Turkey or Iran
(Hiro, 2002, pp. 84-85). The main reason for the conflict was money.
With six hundred oil trucks using the Iraqi-Turkish crossing daily in each
direction, Hiro (2002) offers that the KDPs customs duties amounted to an estimated half
a million dollars. Violating its 1994 pact with the PUK, the KDP refused to share this
revenue with its rival. The PUK responded by refusing to meet its obligation o f sharing
the control o f Irbil, a city o f more than 700,000, with the KDP. Barzani found this
unbearable (p. 85).
Pollack (2002) asserts that by September 1995, the intra-Kurdish violence
claimed three thousand lives, with the PUK gaining the upper hand (p. 81). Hiro (2002)
reveals that on August 22, 1996 Barzani, head o f the KDP addressed a letter to “His
Excellency President Saddam Hussein” via the commander of the northern-based First
Corps, requesting military assistance to “ease the foreign threat” from Iran. Saddam
complied (p. 86).
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Early on the morning of August 31, 1996 acting in cahoots with Barzani, Saddam
sent three Republican Guard armored divisions, armed with four hundred tanks, toward
Irbil while heavy Iraqi artillery targeted the city’s suburbs. The PUK commander in Irbil
ordered an evacuation. On their way to Irbil, the Iraqi forces executed two-hundred-plus
agents o f the INC (Hiro, 2002, p. 86).

Clinton’s Second Term
Clinton’s second administration continued to debate fiercely how best to handle
Iraq. It was determined to react strongly to Iraq’s provocation but it hoped to not have to
react so strongly that it would become a distraction for the president's other priorities.
Hiro (2002) explains that the covert cooperation between the United States and
UNSCOM deepened to the extent that the head o f the inspection team, Scott Ritter, gave
regular briefings to the U.S. National Security Council in Washington before and after his
inspection tours o f Iraq. On July 1, 1997, the Australian and pro-American Butler took
over as UNSCOM ’s new chief weapons inspector (p. 108).
In October 1997, Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz told the UN Security
Council that Iraq would no longer accept U.S. personnel in UNSCOM teams, since they
had shown more loyalty to the United States than to the United Nations. He charged that
under the U.N. umbrella the U.S. government was spying with the aim o f changing the
Iraqi regime (Hiro, 2002, pp. 108-110).
Pollack (2002) states that the Security Council reacted by threatened additional

actions if Iraq did not shape up. In response, Iraq declared that it would no longer
participate in the oil-for-food program unless the United Nations agreed to set a firm date
for the lifting o f sanctions (p. 88).
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Hiro (2002) notes that on November 12, 1997 Iraq expelled six U.S. inspectors
after accusing them o f spying. O f the remaining 83 UNSCOM staff in Baghdad, Butler
pulled out all except seven technicians to safeguard the UNSCOM headquarters (pp. 111-

112).
Pollack (2002) explains that Arab and European governments began to distance
themselves from Washington. The Saudis and other U.S. allies made it clear that they
would not support any attack on Iraq because their people were increasingly unhappy
about the plight o f the Iraqi populace, and they felt that the United States had not given
negotiations enough o f a chance (p. 88).

The Events o f 1998
Hiro (2002) emphasizes that on January 17, Saddam said that Iraq had met all its
obligations under Resolution 687 and demanded that the sanctions be lifted. To bolster
the morale of the Iraqis, Saddam decreed the training o f one million volunteers to prepare
for jihad if the U.N. embargo was not lifted by May 29, 1988 (p. 69).
A few hours later, a story broke on U.S. television that President Clinton allegedly
had an affair with Monica Lewinsky, a young White House intern. The scandal dogged
Clinton for a year. The Monica scandal also impinged directly on his decisions on Iraq
(Hiro, 2002, p. 114).
Clinton did not want to appear weak on Iraq while the Republicans in Congress
w ere gathering their forces to investigate w hether he lied under oath regarding his

involvement with Monica Lewinsky. Clinton tried also to use Iraq as a diversion in order
to push attention from the Monica scandal.
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On January 26, 1998, a group o f neo-conservatives signed a letter to President
Clinton, demanding a tougher stand against Iraq by the United States. The signatories
included Elliott Abrams, Richard L. Armitage, William J. Bennett, Jeffrey Bergner, John
Bolton, Paula Dobriansky, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, William
Kristol Richard Perle, Peter W. Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, William Schneider, Jr., Vin
Weber, Paul Wolfowitz, R. James Woolsey, and Robert B. Zoellick (Rumsfeld, 1998).
Hiro (2002) asserts that on January 27,1998 Butler complemented the
neoconservatives’ letter to Clinton by claiming that Iraq had enough biological weapons
and missiles to blow away Tel Aviv. His statement startled and angered the Security
Council, to which he had not presented any such evidence (p. 114).
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan then went to Baghdad and met with Tariq
Aziz. According to Pollack (2002), Aziz promised “immediate, unconditional, and
unrestricted access,” while Annan promised that U.N. personnel would “respect the
legitimate concerns o f Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity” (p. 89).
Hiro (2002) observes that in a closed session of the Security Council Annan
alluded to some UNSCOM inspectors acting as “cowboys,” throwing their weight around
and offending Iraqis (p. 117). This turn o f events left the Russian, French, and Chinese
delegations quietly impressed by Saddam’s survival skills.
Aruri (2002) notes that the Clinton administration greeted the agreement initially
with skepticism and reservations (p. 41). Soon afterward, however, Washington
converted the Security Council and secured the adoption o f Resolution 1154 on M arch 2,
1998, which was designed to establish the kind o f legal faqade needed to subvert the
Annan-Aziz agreement (see United Nations, 1998).
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Brown (2000) explains that Clinton also came under increasing pressure to amend
the sanctions against Iraq. Efforts to lift or change the sanctions were gaining momentum
both abroad and in the U.S. Congress, where 70 lawmakers signed a letter o f protest
asking President Clinton to allow more nonmilitary goods to enter Iraq. The lawmakers,
mostly Democrats, argued that the measures against Iraq were doing little to erode
Saddam Hussein's power, while at the same time they were hurting the country's 22
million citizens.
In May 1998, a Syrian delegation visited Baghdad. Three months later Syria and
Iraq signed agreements to reopen the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline with 1.4 million bpd
capacity, once the U.N. sanctions had been lifted (Hiro, 2002, p. 145).
At the Security Council there was a growing consensus among the Russians,
French, and Chinese diplomats that Iraq’s disarmament was practically finished, and that
the comprehensive review should be completed by Christmas 1998. Meanwhile,
President Clinton decreed that there would be no more attempts at military action to force
the Iraqis to allow access to presidential sites or anywhere else to the UNSCOM
inspectors (Cockbum & Cockbum, 1999, p. 281).
On April 13, 1998, the IAEA’s six monthly report concluded that Iraq had
compiled a full, final and complete account o f its previous nuclear arms projects, and that
the IAEA’s monitoring and verification regime did not reveal indications o f the existence
in Iraq o f prohibited equipment or materials or o f the conduct o f prohibited activity (Hiro,
2002, p. 120).
In June 1988, several Republican members o f Congress sent a letter to President
Clinton concerning U.S. policy toward Iraq. The letter expressed the members’ concern
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about the apparent failure o f the Clinton administration to fully support the work o f
UNSCOM (U.S. Congress, 1998a).
On August 4, 1998 Saddam decreed that cooperation with UNSCOM and the
IAEA be suspended since its work was completed regarding Iraq’s nuclear weapons
program. But he exempted UNSCOM ’s monitoring activities, and so the cameras and
sensors installed at suspected weapons sites remained intact (Hiro, 2002, p. 123).
On August 26, 1998 Ritter resigned his post because o f the direct impingement of
U.S. domestic politics on UNSCOM. Hiro (2002) states that Ritter did so in protest o f the
cancellation of his UNSCOM team by Butler under pressure from Washington (p. 124).
Having achieved fame as the UNSCOM martyr, Ritter inflicted another wound on
the organization. In an interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, he spoke o f his
relationship with Israeli intelligence. At the same time, the Washington Post reported that
Ritter, with, his supervisor’s approval, had been in the habit of bringing film taken by
UNSCOM’s U-2 spy plane to Israel for processing and analysis (Cockbum & Cockbum,
1999, p. 282).
Cockbum & Cockbum (1999) add that given this admission o f collusion with
Israel, the prospect o f any Arab support for UNSCOM was fading away. On November 1,
1998 Saddam suspended all cooperation with UNSCOM’s long-term monitoring
program, meaning that the inspectors could no longer inspect previously visited sites (p.
283).
Amid the furor over Scott Ritter’s resignation, another resignation passed with
little attention. Denis Halliday, the Irish Quaker who had been sent to Baghdad to
supervise the UN’s oil-for-food, resigned his post in disgust. According to Cockbum &
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Cockbum (1999), Halliday directed a bitter blast at the policy that caused “four thousand
to five thousand children to die unnecessarily every month due to the impact o f sanctions
because o f the breakdown o f water and sanitation, inadequate diet, and the bad internal
health situation” (p. 285).
RUPE (2003) then adds that Halliday was replaced by Hans von Sponeck, who
also resigned in 2000 on the same grounds as Halliday. Jutta Burghardt, Director o f the
UN World Food Program operation in Iraq, also resigned, saying, “I fully support what
Mr. Von Sponeck was saying” (p. 46).
Ritter (1999) explains that many o f the countries that had supported Desert Storm
no longer viewed Iraq in the same threatening light as they had in 1991. The Iraqi
military was a mere shadow o f its former self, unable to sustain any meaningful military
action beyond internal suppression of the Kurds and Shiites. The U.S. was criticized for
advocating the continuation o f sanctions (pp. 191-192).
On August 7, 1998 al-Qaeda detonated car bombs outside the U.S. Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. According to Pollack (2002), this was also the day after Monica
Lewinsky testified before a grand jury. The Clinton administration found itself caught up
in these other issues and was wary of threatening to use force against Iraq, given its
previous experiences (pp. 90-91).
In September 1998 Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act that called for the
overthrow o f the Iraqi regime and authorized $97 million worth o f Pentagon goods and
services for the effort through supporting the Iraqi opposition groups. In October 1998,
the Clinton administration announced plans to bring about “regime change” in Baghdad
(Hiro, 2002, p. 145).

45

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

On December 11, 1998 Butler met with Clinton National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger at the American Mission to the United Nations. Their common aim was to
manipulate the fast-moving situation in a way that would provide the United States with a
credible basis for bombing Iraq against the background o f imminent impeachment
proceedings against President Clinton.
Masud (1998) offers that Butler conferred with Berger on how to write his report
o f noncompliance before submitting it to the U.N. Security Council. The White House
wanted to ensure the report contained sufficiently tough language on which to justify its
decision to bomb Iraq.
Four days later on December 15, 1998 the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
advised Butler to withdraw all U.N. inspectors, monitors, and support staff from Iraq
immediately. Butler did so, without informing the Security Council. At 6 P.M. o f the
same day, Butler delivered his report to Annan that was prepared in close consultation
with U.S. officials, concluding that Iraq was not cooperating with UNSCOM. Three
hours later, and before the council members saw the report, news agencies published a
summary o f the report (Hiro, 2002, p. 129). On December 16, 1998, the United States
and Great Britain launched Operation Desert Fox, a limited punitive operation uncoupled
from any coercive demands on Saddam (Pollack, 2002, p. 92).
On Saturday, December 19 at 1:30 P.M. EST, the House o f Representatives
impeached Clinton on the first article o f perjury before a Grand Jury and on the third
article o f obstructing justice. H alf an hour later, the case went to the U.S. Senate, which
had the final authority to dismiss him. At 4:30 P.M. Clinton stopped the bombing o f Iraq
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after one hundred hours. By then, the Pentagon had fired 415 cruise missiles, 90 more
than in the Gulf War, and dropped 600 laser-guided bombs (Hiro, 2002, p. 130).
Desert Fox consisted o f four days o f air and cruise missile strikes. According to
Pollack (2002, p. 93), the ostensible goal o f the attack was to degrade Iraq’s WMD
programs and its ability to threaten its neighbors. Ritter (1999) suggests that precision
bombardment with cruise missiles made many walls crumble. They fell precisely as
targeted, but there was nothing o f substance within those walls. UNSCOM crumbled with
the buildings in Baghdad (p. 29).
Desert Fox, however, gave new heart to opposition inside Iraq. Grand Ayatollah
Sadiq al-Sadr began preaching subtle acts o f defiance against the regime, and his sermons
attracted tens o f thousands o f disaffected Shiites. Polack (2002) states that in February
1998 Saddam had al-Sadr and his two sons killed as they were leaving a mosque in N ajaf
(p. 93).
Cockburn & Cockbum (1999) warn their audience that for the first time since the
debate that preceded the Gulf War, Iraq had become a partisan issue in U.S. politics. The
CIA was hard at work on a whole new covert scheme o f “sabotage and subversion” to
undermine Saddam. And, Kurdish and Shiite agents were enlisted to destroy “key Iraqi
pillars o f economic and political power, like utility plants or broadcast stations” (p. 279).
Cockburn & Cockbum (1999) add that in early September 1998, Masood Barzani
and Jalal Talabanie were invited to Washington for a peace meeting at the Key Bridge
Marriott Hotel. The two Kurdish leaders agreed to swallow their enmity and unite in a
reformed Kurdish government, with elections to follow (p. 280).
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1999 and the Erosion of Containment
In the region o f the Middle East, however, the Iraqi regime was getting out o f its
isolation and was once again invited to return to the rank o f Arab nations. On January 24,
1999, for example, Iraq was invited to attend the Arab League foreign ministers’ meeting
in Cairo for the first time since 1990. The ministers expressed profound disquiet and
concern at the use o f the military option against Iraq and appealed for a diplomatic means
to be used in the future (Hiro, 2001, pp. 165-167).
In March 1999, NATO began an air campaign to force the Serbians to cease their
ethnic cleansing o f the Kosovar Albanians. This was a war the Clinton administration
had never wanted to fight. Its expectation had been that if NATO demonstrated its
willingness to use force, Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic would back down as he
had in Bosnia four years earlier. When Milosevic did not, W ashington found itself in an
air campaign that lasted for nearly three months.
Pollack (2002) notes that this was critical for U.S. policy toward Iraq because no
one in the National Security team wanted to live through another Kosovo. The final
element determining the fate of the regime change bid was the long-standing position o f
the doves that Iraq simply was not worth the efforts (pp. 98-99).
The Clinton administration decided to pursue a different track, crafting a new,
comprehensive U.N. resolution on Iraq to try to restore the consensus within the Security
Council. Throughout the summer and fall o f 1999, Washington negotiated a new
resolution that the Security Council eventually passed on December 17, 1999 as
Resolution 1284 (see united Nations, 1999).
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The resolution set up a new UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC). It removed the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports and provided for
fast-track approval o f agricultural and educational imports as well as food and medicine.
It also lifted the cap on the amount o f oil Baghdad could sell to pay for humanitarian
goods and greatly expanded the types o f goods it could import.
In August 2000 President Hugo Chavez o f Venezuela became the first foreignelected leader to visit Baghdad since 1990. He arrived in Baghdad in the course o f a tour
of OPEC member-states. Chavez’s trip set the scene for air flight-busting, a process that
started with a Russian plane arriving in mid-August 2000 from Moscow at the newly
reopened Saddam International Airport near Baghdad (Hiro, 2002, pp. 149-150).
Hiro (2001) explains that by late November 2000 Saudi Arabia reopened its
border with Iraq and allowed vehicular traffic, and Egypt had upgraded its consulate in
Baghdad to the ambassadorial level. “Iraq will soon be integrated into the Arab fold,”
said President Mubarak o f Egypt (p. 301).
Iraq then was invited to the Arab Summit o f 2000. Saddam dispatched his deputy,
Izzat Ibrahim to attend the meeting. While the Arab summit gathered in Cairo, Saddam
sent a convoy o f forty trucks o f food and medicine to the Palestinian Territories via
Amman. The next week a Palestinian plane brought many wounded Palestinians to
Baghdad for medical treatment. These gestures boosted Saddam’s already high standing
among young Palestinians (Hiro, 2002, p. 152).
Meanwhile, the American corporations and their foreign subsidiaries were
purchasing Iraqi oil on a large scale and selling petroleum-related equipment and spare
parts to Iraq. While the U.S. and Britain were carrying out almost daily air strikes against
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military installations in northern and southern Iraq, executives and some former architects
of American policy toward Iraq were doing business with Saddam’s government and
helping to rebuild its oil industry (Hiro, 2002, pp. 165-166).
Hiro (2002) suggests that Halliburton, o f which Dick Cheney was then the chief
executive officer, were in the forefront. Placing bids through their foreign subsidiaries
and affiliates, more than a dozen U.S. companies signed tens o f millions o f dollars worth
o f contracts with Iraq for oil-related equipment between m id-1998 and the end o f 1999
(p. 166).

The Presidency o f George W. Bush
In January 2001, George W. Bush became the 43rd President o f the United States.
According to Pollack (2002), the one topic on which the Bush team had already decided
was Iraq. It made regime change in Iraq one o f its first and highest priorities. This notion
was confirmed when the new Bush administration announced that the first
comprehensive foreign policy review would be conducted on Iraq (p. 104).
Abunimah & Masri (2002) further explain that the American media’s
demonization of Saddam helped the hawks in the Bush administration to target Iraq and
build a case against Saddam. The tendency o f the United States government and media to
demonize foreign leaders has been widely noted. With Iraq, this was particularly
insidious, because the habit o f many in the media to use “Saddam” and “Iraq” as
synonyms obscured the suffering and even the existence o f more than 22 million Iraqis
(pp. 107-108).
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The administration’s comprehensive Iraq policy review drove home to the
administration just how complicated the Iraq issue had become since Republicans had
last been in office. Initially, the Bush team wanted to have its Iraq policy review
completed in a matter of weeks, but it quickly became clear that it needed a much better
understanding of the multiplicity o f issues involved and much more staff working to
develop new options (Pollack, 2002, pp. 105-106).
W ith February 2001 came the Bush administration’s first military strike against
Iraq when the Pentagon concluded that Iraq was about to link parts o f its air defense
system with its freshly installed fiber-optic network. According to Hiro (2001), on
February 16, 2001, the Pentagon struck at 12:30 P.M. Two-dozen U.S. and UK warplanes
fired on five Iraqi air defense targets above the 33 rd Parallel, around Baghdad, containing
seven command and control nodes and twenty radar installations (p. 303).
The first deadline o f the Bush administration’s comprehensive review o f U.S.
policy toward Iraq came and went, as did a later one, and another and another. By May
2001 it was clear that the administration was not going to seek a radically new approach
to Iraq. It was simply too difficult to reconcile the costs and risks of regime change with
the administration’s other foreign and domestic policy priorities (Pollack, 2002, p. 106).
The INC took advantage o f the hawk’s agenda toward Iraq and pushed the WMD
envelope and the claim that Saddam had ties with al-Qaeda to the maximum. The INC
perpetuated in the American media that Saddam had an advanced program and
substantial experience in the production, storage and use o f chemical weapons, including
mustard agent and nerve agents such as Sarin, Tabun, and VX, and retained the expertise
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to continue production and step up production within weeks o f the departure of
inspectors.

September 11 and the Political Impact
On September 11, 2001, a group o f terrorists hijacked four American passenger
airplanes. Two o f the planes slammed into the World Trade Center towers in New York
City, causing the collapse o f both towers and the death o f more than 3,000 people. The
third airplane slammed into the Pentagon building in Washington, and the fourth crashed
in an open field in Pennsylvania. The Bush administration accused Saudi businessman
Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda group o f carrying out the attacks, and identified 19
passengers on the four hijacked flights, most were Saudi nationals, as members o f alQaeda.
On September 12, 2001, the Security Council passed Resolution 1368, calling on
all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and
sponsors of the terrorist attacks (See United Nations, 2001). Iraq was one o f the three
countries that refused to fly its flags at half-mast at its U.N. Mission in New York, the
others being Libya and China. Baghdad went beyond this gesture.
Iraq Watch (2001) reveals that in an open letter to the American people on
September 19, 2001, Saddam stated that the United States needed to try wisdom after it
has tried force over the last fifty years. Saddam added that the danger that may threaten
any people or nation does not call upon the people in charge to lead the way against this
danger only, but also to analyze its reasons in view o f abating them.
The Bush administration vowed to retaliate for the September 11 attacks, and the
president announced that he wanted Bin Laden dead or alive. Since Bin Laden and al-

52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Qaeda had training camps in Afghanistan, the administration demanded that the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan arrest and surrender Bin Laden to U.S. authorities.
The hawks within the administration, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, went a step further by calling for strikes against all terrorist groups and
terrorist-sponsoring states, regardless if they had any thing to do with September 11 or
not. The list o f terrorist groups, in addition to al-Qaeda included Hezbollah in Lebanon,
the PKK in Turkey, Hamas in Palestine, Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, and various other
organizations. The list o f states sponsoring terrorism included Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya,
North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan.
However, Iraq was put on the back burner while the doves agreed with cobbling
together a coalition to attack Afghanistan. The bombing o f Afghanistan started on
October 7, 2001.
The U.S. military operation in Afghanistan, codename “Operation Enduring
Freedom,” managed to topple the Taliban regime. Bin Laden, however, was able to
escape. Hiro (2002) explains that during this time, Americans were nervous, with
anthrax-related deaths in Florida triggering a nationwide alarm. The hawks then claimed
immediately and without evidence that Iraq was the instigator behind the anthrax attack.
The FBI, however, dismissed this claim (p. 176).
Once the Taliban were expelled from power, the hawks began discussing the
second phase o f the war on terror. As expected, they advanced their case for attacking
Iraq. The doves remained skeptical of the wisdom o f an anti-Iraq military campaign.
The hawks eventually succeeded in turning the administration, media, and public
attention toward Iraq. Instead of hunting for Bin Laden and continuing the war on al-
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Qaeda, the focus shifted toward Iraq as the primary state sponsoring terrorism that was
connected with September 11 and al-Qaeda. This terrorism was seen as posing an
imminent threat to the United States.
Hiro (2002) adds that the Iraq mania reached fever pitch in November 2001 when,
during his visit to Washington, Czech prime minister Milos Zeman told Powell that
Muhammad Atta, one o f the ringleaders o f the September 11 hijackers, had visited
Prague in April 2001 to confer with Iraqi intelligence officer Ahmad Ani. The U.S.
intelligence community, however, was unable to verify Iraq’s connection with September
11 (p. 177).

Preemption as a Policy
According to Hamad (2003), the terrorist attacks on America on September 11,
2001 provided the hawks within the Bush team with an opportunity to push their views
forward, especially regarding the notion o f a preemption strike as the United States’
official policy. September 11 gave the hawks the excuse they needed not to hold off with
respect to Iraq. Secretary o f Defense Donald Rumsfeld even began pushing for attacking
Iraq within hours after the terror attacks had occurred.
Within hours o f the attacks o f September 11, 2001 with no evidence pointing at
Iraq’s involvement in the attacks, Rumsfeld ordered the military to begin working on a
strike plan against Iraq. RUPE (2003) reveals that notes of the meeting quote Rumsfeld
as saying he w anted “best inform ation fast, go m assive, sweep it all up, things related and

not” (p. 53).
In an interview with ABC News (2003) with Bob Woodward, Rumsfeld insisted
that Saddam's Iraq should be a principal target o f the first round o f terrorism a day after
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the terrorist attacks on September 11 and before it was even clear who was behind the
attacks. A hint o f a deliberate campaign to connect Iraq with the September 11 attacks
and al-Qaeda surfaced in a June 2002 televised interview with General Wesley Clark on a
public-affairs program, M eet the Press. Lobe (2003) explains that Clark asserted that:
There was a concerted effort during the fall o f 2001, starting immediately after
September 11, to pin 9/11 and the terrorism problem on Saddam Hussein. It came
from the White House. It came from other people around the White House. It
came from all over. I got a call on September 11, 2 0 0 1 .1 was on CNN, and I got a
call at my home saying: 'You got to say this is connected and this is state
sponsored terrorism that this has to be connected to Saddam Hussein.'
Wolfowitz shared these views as well. According to Bob Woodward and Dan
Balz o f the Washington Post, Wolfowitz argued during meetings on September 15-16,
2001 o f the administration's war council at Camp David that, the real source o f all the
trouble and terrorism was Hussein (see Lobe, 2003).
Lobe (2003) notes that upon their return to Washington, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz
convened a secret, two-day meeting of the Defense Policy Board (DPB), chaired by
Richard Perle. Instead o f focusing on the first steps in carrying out a war on terrorism, the
discussions centered on how to use September 11 to strike at Iraq.
Paul O ’Neill, former Secretary of Treasury under President George W. Bush,
stated in an interview with CBS (2003) that, “from the very beginning, there was a
conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go.” Going after
Saddam was topic A, ten days after the inauguration, eight months before September 11.
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O ’Neill argued that it was all about finding a way to invade Iraq, with the president
saying, go find me a way to do this.
The hawks’ overreaching case was rooted in the doctrine o f a preemptive strike,
early unilateral action against a foe suspected o f posing a future threat to the United
States, a radical departure from the traditional policy o f a defensive war sanctified by
international law as set out in the United Nations Charter.
In 1992, Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary o f Defense for Policy under Bush Sr.,
supervised the drafting of a new Defense Policy Guidance document, objecting to what
he considered the premature ending o f the Gulf War. In the document, Wolfowitz
outlined plans for military intervention in Iraq as an action necessary to assure access to
vital raw material, primarily Persian Gulf oil and to prevent the proliferation o f weapons
o f mass destruction and threats from terrorism.
W olfowitz’s plan did not materialize at the time and was further ignored by
President Clinton. In 1998, however, it became part o f the thinking for a new
conservative think tank in Washington, called Project for the New American Century (see
PANC, 2003).
RUPE (2003) offers that in 1998, when the PANC was formed by Donald
Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby, and Zalmay
Khalidzad, it outlined its plan for a new America and published its strategy for America’s
domination o f the world. The strategy was named “Rebuilding America's Defenses:
Strategies, Forces And Resources For A New Century.” In 2002, it became the blueprint
for the Bush administration’s National Security doctrine. PANC developed its plans for
an era o f U.S. world domination, sidelining the UN and attacking Iraq (p. 77).

56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Usbome (2003) suggests that Paul Wolfowitz was the architect in persuading the
Bush team then focused on Iraq’s WMD and used it as the primary justification for
toppling Saddam Hussein because it was politically convenient. According to Leopold
(2003), a Pentagon committee led by Wolfowitz advised Bush to include a reference in
his 2002 January State o f the Union address to the nation that about Iraq was trying to
purchase 500 tons o f uranium from Niger in order to bolster the case for war in Iraq,
despite the fact that the CIA warned Wolfowitz's committee that the information was
unreliable.
The Bush administration became more vocal on its doctrine o f preemptive strike,
defending a policy o f striking terrorists and countries that harbored or supported terrorists
before they attacked the United States. Calabresi, Dickerson, Thompson & Waller (2002)
explain that Iraq was singled out from the other two countries that Bush identified as the
axis of evil and became the first target in Bush’s preemptive strike policy. Administration
officials, from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Secretary o f State Collin Powell
and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, began articulating and defending the
administration’s position to the public, the media, and Congress.
Hilton (2004) notes that on September 12, 2002 claims by Iraqi military officers
supplied by the INC that Iraq was training Arabs in hijacking planes and trains, planting
explosives in cities, sabotage and assassinations were given uncritical prominence in a
White House report. Later this information proved to be a fabrication. The INC also
claimed that Iraq had mobile biological warfare research facilities and the information
was included in Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council in February 2003.
Again, this information proved to be a fabrication by Chalabi and the INC.
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The Iraqi opposition role in the U.S. policy toward Iraq, however, was primarily
an exercise in public diplomacy aimed at showing American and international critics o f
the Bush team's push for regime change that Iraqis wanted to be liberated from Saddam’s
grip. But the Bush team was also spinning its intentions for the sake o f Iraqi public
opinion.
The Bush administration made it clear that it could not accept what had become
the status quo with respect to Iraq, a country ruled by Saddam Hussein and free to
attempt to reconstitute its assorted weapons o f mass destruction programs. Richelson
(2003) states that as part o f its campaign against the status quo, the Bush team published
documents and provided briefings detailing Iraq's WMD programs and attempts to
deceive other nations about its WMD activities.
The justification for a preemptive strike against Iraq increased as the propaganda
war to enlarge Iraq’s imminent threat to the U.S. increased. Statement by statement, the
administration officials elevated the hypothesis o f Iraqi threat posed by its WMD and ties
with al-Qaeda to an urgent national security matter.
Risen & Johnston (2003) allude that in order to gain support and legitimacy for its
policy, the Bush team sought to secure a new resolution in the United Nations to disarm
Iraq by force. At the same time, Bush sought Congressional authorization for his policy
o f a preemptive strike and war against Iraq.
On September 20, 2002, Bush sent a proposal to Congress, asking for the
authorization o f war if diplomacy did not result in disarming Saddam. On October 10,
2002, Congress passed Joint Resolution HJ Res. 114, Public Law 105-235, also known as
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“The Iraq Liberation Act o f 2002,” authorizing the use o f a force and a pre-emptive strike
to protect the national security o f the United States (U.S. Congress, 1998b).
Bush's threat o f unilateral, preemptive strike and the Congressional approval for
the use o f force led the Security Council to take up the Iraq issue. On November 8, 2002,
the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1441 (see United Nations, 2002).
The Bush administration was hopeful that the member states would realize that
Washington was not bound by their consensus and might pressure them into adopting a
satisfactory disarmament resolution. Resolution 1441 recognized the threat that Iraq's
noncompliance with previous UN Security Council resolutions and Iraq’s proliferation o f
weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles posed to international peace and
security, and it demanded the disarming o f Iraq’ W MD programs.
According to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry (2003), Saddam expressed his
government’s willingness to comply with the resolution and welcomed the inspectors’
return to Iraq. He characterized the Bush administration’s accusation about Iraq’s ties
with al-Qaeda and possession o f WMD as a ploy to use fear, especially after September
11, in order to justify a politically motivated war against Iraq.
In an interview with Saddam on February 4, 2003, he states that Iraq was
committed to dealing and implementing Resolution 1441 as demanded by the United
Nations. Saddam added that the U.S. and the world should know by now that Iraq does
not possess any of the weapons claimed by top-ranking officials in the U.S. and the UK
(Iraqi Foreign Ministry, 2003).
Iraq Watch (2002a) observes that on September 19, 2002, Saddam sent a message
to the United Nations, responding to President B ush’s accusations regarding the Iraqi
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threat. According to Saddam, the U.S. president left nothing to the imagination o f those
who cannot pinpoint his purposes and intentions.
Hiro (2002) advises that on October 1, 2002 the Iraqi foreign ministry published a
29 page dossier rebutting the charges made in the American and British documents on
Iraq’s WMD. Even British public opinion, historically and culturally close to America’s,
turned against U.S. policy to the extent that an opinion poll revealed that 37 percent
considered Bush the greatest danger to world peace, only six points behind Saddam (pp.
215-218).
On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted an 11,800-page declaration, which claimed
that it had no WMD (CNN, 2002). RUPE (2003) states that the United States insisted on
examining the report before anyone else, even before the weapons inspectors, and
promptly insisted on removing 8,000 pages from it before allowing the non-permanent
members o f the Security Council to look at it. Iraq then leaked the list o f American
companies whose names appeared in a report to the German daily, Die Tageszeitung (pp.
33-34).
Neuffer (2002) explains that the White House was not satisfied with the Iraqi
move and insisted that the U.N. Security Council pass another resolution that would
authorize force against Iraq in order to disarm Saddam. According to White House
spokesperson Scott McClellan, the Iraqi move was a tactic set up in hopes o f avoiding
strong UN Security Council action.
Neuffer (2002) adds that U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan considered the Iraqi
move as a possible breakthrough in the nearly four-year standoff concerning Iraq’s
weapons o f mass destruction. Iraq's announcement meant that UNMOVIC, led by Dr.
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Hans Blix, was able to enter Iraq for the first time since UNMOVIC was created in 1999.
The UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was also entrusted with the task o f
checking for nuclear weapons.
On December 26, 2002, the UN inspectors returned to Iraq and began the
inspection process (CNN, 2002). The Washington Post (2003) reveals that Blix stated in
a report to the UN Security Council on January 27, 2003 that Iraq was cooperating, but
emphasized that proactive cooperation by Iraq was more useful for the inspection
process. He also asked the Security Council to allow the inspections to go on for several
months to be completed thoroughly.
The Bush team, however, did not want to give the inspection more time, even if it
was merely a matter of months. As such, it asked the Security Council to authorize the
use o f force against Iraq instead. One o f the reasons for rushing to war was because the
administration did not want American public opinion that was supportive o f war in Iraq
to change before the administration had the opportunity to accomplish its goal. The other
reason was to avoid combat in bulky chemical suits during hot weather and to prepare for
the anticipated oil price shock with the arrival o f the hot season in Iraq.
Since Bush invested so much in building a case for war, and deployed nearly
200,000 troops to Kuwait, he in essence had boxed him self in one direction: to go to war
with Iraq. Pitt & Ritter (2002) explain that on August 2002, Perle said, “the failure to take
on Saddam after what the president said would produce such a collapse o f confidence in
the president that it would set back the war on terrorism” (p. 8).
In a four-hour council meeting, only the U.S., Britain, Spain and Bulgaria
supported the Bush proposal for a new resolution. Other council members refused to
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endorse it. Britain then suggested a compromise proposal. However, 11 out o f 15
members o f the Security Council rejected the British initiative as well. According to
Farley & W right (2003), this was a diplomatic setback both for Bush and British Prime
Minister Tony Blair.
The Bush team was facing worldwide opposition to its policy o f preemption.
Countless demonstrations both in the United States and abroad, at times reaching to
millions o f participants, took to the streets to express opposition to the administration’s
unilateral policy toward Iraq. Steinberg (2002) offers that many countries, including
some of America’s allies, expressed their frustration with the Bush team. These countries
included Canada, France, Germany, Pakistan, China, Russia, South Africa and India.
Within the U.S. itself, more than thirty major cities issued resolutions in opposition o f the
Bush policy.
Iraq Watch (2003a) asserts that in a joint statement on February 10, 2003 the
Foreign Ministers o f Russia, Germany and France stressed that their common aim was to
disarm Iraq according to UN resolution 687. However, the means to achieve it were to be
inspired by the principles o f the United Nations Charter. The three ministers agreed that
inspection had yielded results and that Russia, Germany and France favored the
continuation o f the inspections and the substantial strengthening o f their human and
technical capabilities by all possible means as an alternative to war.
Iraq Watch (2002b) notes that on February 9, 2002, Saddam sent a letter to
Turkish Prime Minster Bulent Ecevit stating, "Iraq has no weapons o f mass destruction
and has no intention o f making them. On July 16, 2002, Iraq Watch (2002c) explains that
the Jordanian Prime Minister and the Arab League Secretary General reiterated their
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rejection to any military action against Iraq. Jordan also denied its territories were to be
used as a launching pad by U.S. forces against Iraq.
Hiro (2002) emphasizes that on September 4-5, 2002 the Arab League’s Foreign
Ministers’ meeting in Cairo declared “total rejection o f the threat o f aggression on Arab
nations, in particular Iraq, reaffirming that these threats to the security and safety of any
Arab country were considered a threat to Arab national security.” This view was echoed
once again during the Arab League’ summit held in Beirut in March 2002. The summit
resolved to reject “exploitation of war on terrorism to threatening any Arab country and
using force against Iraq” (pp. 183-208).
Iraq Watch (2003b) suggests that on January 23, 2003, the Foreign Ministers for
Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey met in Turkey to express their
common resolve for attaining a peaceful solution to the Iraqi problem. The ministers
agreed that the countries o f the region did not wish to live through yet another war and all
its devastating consequences, and war was not to be an option to resolve the Iraqi crisis.
Hiro (2002) explains that at home, Congressional leaders who were entitled to
classified intelligence briefings were unable to see or hear any fresh evidence that
Baghdad posed an immediate threat to U.S. security. Among the early critics o f the Bush
Iraq strategy was Senator John Kerry, a veteran o f the Vietnam War, who accused Bush
o f allowing his rhetoric to get ahead o f his thinking.

Operation Iraqi Freedom
Armitage (2003) notes that Britain and the United States set March 17, 2003 as a
deadline for the U.N. Security Council to authorize war on Iraq. According to the State
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Department’s spokesperson, unless there was something that gels in the Security Council
by then, there was no reason to push beyond that. Farley & Wright (2003) offer that there
were no votes in the Security Council to issue a new resolution on Iraq.
On March 18, 2003, Bush gave Saddam and his two sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or
face invasion. Bush outlined the premise and rationale for his policy o f preemption as a
just means in defending America’s security against Iraq’s threat (White House, 2003a).
Saddam, however, refused to resign or leave Iraq.
On March 20, 2003, Bush announced the beginning of the war on Iraq, codenamed “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Sanger & Burns (2003) explain that the American
forces poised on the Kuwaiti borders and at the Persian G ulf began the invasion o f Iraq.
The air campaign against Baghdad, codenamed “Shock and Awe,” was launched from the
U.S. military base and command center in Qatar. They were, however, unsuccessful in
killing Saddam.
Secretary o f State Collin Powell explained the United States’ official justification
for the war in a statement on March 31, 2003. According to Powell, Coalition forces in
Iraq were fighting to protect the world from "the potentially catastrophic combination of
an outlaw state, weapons o f mass destruction, and terrorism," and in the process were
"liberating the Iraqi people from a ruthless tyranny that has showed utter contempt for
human life" (International Information Program, 2003).
The Bush administration refused to continue with the containment policy toward
Iraq because it reached the realization that such a policy was eroding. The continuation of
the sanctions were also hurting average Iraqi citizens and increasing worldwide
resentments against the United States and in support o f Iraq.
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After September 11, 2001 and the failure in capturing Bin Laden, Bush wanted to
use force against Iraq in order to show the American people that he was taking a tough
measures against fighting terrorism by linking the war in Iraq with the war on terrorism.
He was also sending a message to countries, such as Iran and Syria, not to support
terrorism or they will also face a U.S. military response.
The war continued despite national and international opposition. On April 9,
2003, the U.S. forces captured Baghdad, and the regime o f Saddam Hussein crumbled.
According to the New York Times (2003), Iraqi citizens streamed into the streets o f
Baghdad, celebrating the sudden disintegration o f Saddam’s three decades o f
dictatorship. The scene in central Baghdad, where jubilant Iraqis and American marines
collaborated in toppling a huge statue o f Saddam, signaled victory for America’s war.
Sanger (2003) explains that on May 1, 2003 while aboard the USS Abraham
Lincoln, Bush announced the end o f military combat in Iraq. On May 22, 2003, the U.N.
Security Council passed Resolution 1483, ending twelve years o f economic sanctions on
Iraq (see United Nations, 2003a). And, on August 14, 2003, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1500. The resolution established the U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq (see
United Nations, 2003b).
Hunt (2004) alludes that the White House retreated from its once-confident claims
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The administration's switch came after retired
chief U.S. weapons inspector David Kay said that he had concluded, after nine months of
searching, that Saddam did not have stockpiles o f forbidden weapons.
The Bush administration was wrong in its assessment both of Iraq’s capabilities
and intentions. Iraq had nothing to do with September 11 or al-Qaeda, and had reputedly
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admitted that it no longer possessed weapons o f mass destruction. The UN inspecting
teams were ready to verify that in 1995 if it was not for Hussein K amel’s defection to
Jordan and his allegations regarding Iraq’s continuous concealment policy. The lack o f
human intelligence inside Iraq and the heavy reliance on exiled Iraqi groups who
fabricated reports on Iraq’s ties with al-Qaeda and possession o f contributed to the
intelligence failure regarding Iraq.
According to former UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, the invasion o f Iraq was
not justified, especially when Iraq was fully cooperating with UN weapons inspectors and
relevant UN resolutions. Blix (2004) states that the Bush administration chose war with
Iraq not because o f the claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and it
refused to disarm (which was untrue to begin with) but because the administration did not
want to continue with the previous policy o f containment, especially after the events o f
September 11.
Hutton (2003) advises that the cost o f invading Iraq was $280 billion. The
estimated cost o f occupation until September 2004 was $87 billion. Most countries
refused to help the Bush administration’s adventure in Iraq either financially or militarily.
The immediate task for the Bush team that followed its quick military victory in
Iraq was the occupation of the country. It appointing J. Gamer as a Military Governor for
Iraq, and appointing former CIA operatives such as Chalabi and Allawie as members o f
advisory board under Garner, and contracted out Iraq’s oil industry to American firms.
The council members then chose their relatives to head Iraq’s new cabinet. Instead of
opening up to Iraqis, the council members were hiding inside one o f Saddam’s palaces,
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unable even to walk in the streets, refusing to leaving the palace except to fly to other
countries in order to promote themselves future appointments.
To empower Chalabi for future political manipulation, Hilton (2004) suggests that
the Pentagon handed him 25 tons o f captured Saddam’s intelligence documents after the
fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. The Pentagon then planed to spend $4 million over the
next year to buy back this intelligence from Chalabi. The Pentagon also awarded a
company that had extensive family and business ties to Chalabi $400 million in contracts.
Phillips (2003) notes that before the war, hundreds of Iraqis were involved in
discussions with Washington about securing and stabilizing their country after the end of
military combats. The Bush team, however, especially the neoconservatives in the
Pentagon, ignored all such advice. Instead, it relied solely on advice by Ahmad Chalabi
in disbanding the Iraqi Army, police and administrative cadre.
The Bush team failed to bring order and security to Iraq after a period o f chaos
that followed the power vacuum created by the downfall o f Saddam. It also failed in
returning normalcy to the Iraqi people who continued to suffer because o f massive
unemployment, severe economic problems, increased violence, and a shortage o f
electricity and clean water.
At night, most of downtown Baghdad lived in darkness, with only the blue and
red police sirens lighting the streets along with the sound o f intermittent gunfire
puncturing the silence. This was not a picture o f a festive newly liberated capital. With
most of Iraq suffering from power interruptions that lasted an average o f 16 hours daily,
it was a little hard to party in the dark.
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During the day, some o f Iraq’s 12 million unemployed hang out in front of the
heavily fortified headquarters o f the Military Governor o f Iraq, named Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA). With many unemployed former university professors,
engineers, and civil servants choosing to become cab drivers instead, Docena (2003)
asserts that many o f those Iraqis summed up their opinion o f the U.S. administration of
Iraq by stating that not even Saddam could have screwed up this badly.
Garner’s failure to restore order led the Bush team to replace him with a Civil
Administrator, and appointed former Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as Iraq’s new head of
the CPA. Bremer then created the Iraqi Governing Council, composed o f 25 members
who were chosen based on Iraq’s ethnic and religious composition for the purpose of
advising Bremer on the matter of administering Iraq. As Gamer before him, Bremer
packed the council with former CIA operatives such as Chalabi and Allawie.
Docena (2003) adds that Iraqis were in broad agreement that life was deteriorating
rather than improving. The prevailing sentiment was a complex mix o f resentment and
resignation, frustration and incredulity. The Iraqis felt bitter about being occupied and yet
many were resigned to entrusting their day-to-day survival to the Americans. Many Iraqis
also questioned how the United States despite all the time and money was unable to make
the reconstruction process work.
The occupation turned Iraqis’ temporary sense o f jubilation after the downfall o f
Saddam into a sense o f resentment. This was exacerbated when the Pentagon privatized
Iraq’s economy in violation o f standing international trade regulation. Many Iraqis
concluded from such an action that American came to Iraq not as a liberator but to
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occupy Iraq for its resources. When America reaps the profits of another nation's most
valuable resources, it is called a colonial power, not a liberator.
The U.S. military presence in a schoolyard in Faluja, a small city west o f Baghdad
caused a small demonstration in May 2003 demanding that school be opened. The
American troops stationed in the school yard responded by opening fire on the crowd,
killing a few demonstrators. This incident ignited a long and fierce insurgency against the
occupying force that continued to claim the lives o f U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
On December 13, 2003 while hiding in an underground hole, U.S. forces near
Tikreet captured Saddam. On capturing his foe, Bush stated that the United States came
to this moment through its resolve and focused action (White House, 2003b).
The insurgence in Iraq, nevertheless, continued despite Saddam’s capture. While
the White House was accusing Saddam o f financing and leading the insurgence, the mere
fact that the insurgence continued after Saddam’s capture proved that the White House’s
accusation was designed to discredit the insurgence as remnant of the old regime rather
than to acknowledge it as a resistance to occupation.
Klein (2004) explains that the condition in post-Saddam Iraq turned America’s
quick military victory into a losing political battle. To minimize criticism o f his handling
o f post-war Iraq, Bush decided to hand authority to the Iraqis in June 2004 with U.S.
forces to remain in Iraq for many years to come. The Bush team rejected many Iraqi’s
suggestions on how to handle the transition, including opinion expressed by the revered
Shiite clerk, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who called for direct elections.
Instead, Bremer chose the new interim Iraqi government from his appointed
members in the Iraqi Governing Council. Klein (2004) adds that UN envoy Brahimi went
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along with Bremer’s plan to stamp a form of credibility on the process. This, according to
the Bush administration, constitutes a transition to full Iraqi sovereignty. However, for
Iraqi sovereignty to be established by appointees appointing appointees to select
appointees to select appointees is neither a democracy nor sovereignty. Iraqis have thus
now ushered in a new democratic tradition of appointocracy.
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CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW
The History o f Complexity Sciences
Complexity studies were nonexistent until the work o f Poincare. In a series of
papers written during the period 1881-1886, Poincare analyzed and named many o f the
qualitative features displayed by dynamical systems. Ding & York (1997) note that
Poincare showed that problems in non-integratible and phase space trajectories are
complicated. Poincare’s observation is regarded as the very first indication o f chaotic
behavior in dynamical systems (pp. 1-2).
Brown (1996b) explains that Birkhoff then provided a more detailed depiction o f
this dynamic, followed by Cartwright, Littlewood, Van der Pol, Levinson, Smale, Peixoto
and Kolmogorov. These studies arrived at the conclusion that trajectories are unstable.
Chaos exists when the long-term prediction o f a system is impossible because uncertainty
in a system's initial state grows exponentially fast over time (p. 119).
Bishop (1997) offers that as a technical expression, chaos describes a specific
type o f irregular motion produced by a deterministic system that exhibits exponential
divergence from an equilibrium start leading to unpredictability (p. 256). As a structural
function in a system, chaos describes changes in the system triggered by environmental
conditions. These conditions will then lead the system to further dissipation and entropy
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production. This entropy, according to De Greene (1996), leads to further instabilities,
which leads to change in the threshold and the emergence of a new order and equilibrium
(p. 276).
Ding & York (1997) observe that a typical dynamic system can exhibit a variety
o f temporal behavior (p. 2). According to Brown (1996a), when the behavioral history o f
a system is examined, the nature o f change becomes the core o f its inquiry (p. 54).
Wheatley (1999) explains that if a system becomes unstable, it will move first into a
period of oscillation, swinging back and forth between two different states. After this
oscillation stage, the next state is chaos, and it is then the wild gyrations begin (p. 117).
Dennard (1996) alludes that a chaotic system is both self-referential and
transformational. It adheres to a set o f organizing principles to which the change process
always reconnects to create a stable structure. The structure itself is not deterministic as
much as it is accommodating to the environment o f which it is also a part (p. 499).
Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) note that in the early 1960s Edward Lorenz, a
meteorologist at MIT, began a series o f investigations aimed at establishing that
unpredictability in weather forecasting was compatible with a completely deterministic
description (p. 38).
Ding & York (1997) suggest that at the same time, a group o f mathematicians
developed a wide variety o f examples o f chaotic systems, known as the Anosov systems,
which had chaotic attractors. One important character of such systems is that they are
structurally stable, meaning that small perturbations would leave the system unchanged
(p. 9).
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Ding & York (1997) add that the state o f awareness o f chaotic behavior changed
dramatically in the 1970s. Computer technology had evolved to the point where many
scientists had available interactive computers with improved graphics. The examples of
chaos mushroomed in practically every field o f science (p. 10).
An important concept in chaos is the dynamics o f collapse. This dynamic is also
referred to as bifurcation or phase shift in the order o f a system. As the self-organizing
order emerges out o f the interaction o f elements within the system, the system’s
parameters become unstable and the order starts to collapse (Brem, 1999, p. 133). Such
collapse allows for the emergence o f a new, systemically self-organized order more
appropriate to the new context.
Brem (1999) adds that there are two types o f collapse, natural and human-made.
The first is the inevitable bifurcation that follows upon the increasing complexity o f a
systemic order wherein the order o f the system collapses and then reforms into a new
order. The second type o f collapse is the result o f cognitive and behavioral dysfunction
(pp. 134-135).
With the focus o f complexity theories on nonlinearity, instability, and
uncertainness, Elliott & Kiel (1996) offer that the application o f these theories to public
administration is a predictable eventuality. We live in a highly nonlinear world. The
social realm is clearly nonlinear, where instability and unpredictability are inherent, and
where cause and effect are often puzzling (p. 2).
Another important theory in complexity is that o f autopoiesis by Maturana and
Varela (1980). The central idea o f autopoiesis is that a living system is organized in a
way that all its components and processes jointly produce those same components and
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processes, thus establishing an autonomous, self-producing entity. Little (1999) explains
that autopoietic systems are self-organizing in that they produce and change their own
structures as well as their own components (p. 155).
A key notion of autopoiesis theory is self-reference. According to Little (1999),
the idea of self-reference designates the unity that a system is for itself. Self-reference is
independent o f observations by others and implies that unity can be produced through
relational operations (p. 160).
Prigogine & Stengers (1984) explain that structures may disappear, but also they
may appear. Some processes are well described by deterministic equations, such as in
measuring a chaotic behavior. Others involve probabilistic processes, such as in the
observation o f a quantum phenomenon (p. 9).
Evans (1999) notes that with the appearance o f quantum theory, the nature of
reality has .come into question. No longer can we assume that our experiments tell us
anything concrete about pre-existing states o f reality. Whatever reality is out there, it has
fuzzy and quantum indeterminacy (pp. 198-201). Overman & Loraine (1996) explain that
the quantum world is a world o f participatory collusion among particles in which two
entities separated by many meters and possessing no mechanism for communicating with
each other can exhibit correlations in their behavior (p. 488).
The history of quantum theories is a history o f conflicting interpretations o f
observed quantum phenomena. The most important theoretical positions in quantum
theories are the Copenhagen Interpretation, the Multiple W orlds’ Interpretation, Bohm's
Deterministic Interpretation, Capra's Taoist Interpretation, and the Standard Model
Interpretation.
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The Copenhagen Interpretation
Overman & Loraine (1996) explain that Max Planck hypothesized and later
Einstein demonstrated that electromagnetic radiation comes in discrete bundles o f energy
called quanta. From this beginning the Copenhagen Interpretation, championed by
physicist, Niels Bohr, began the process o f reformulating Newtonian physics into
quantum mechanics (p. 489).
Bohr (1983) theorized that the wave and particle theories o f light were not
mutually exclusive, but complementarity in their association. Bohr's complementarity
principle suggests that reality is irreducibly plural and complex and no single theoretical
description can exhaust it.
The notion o f a holistic universe led to another important concept: nonlocality.
Albert (1994) explains that nonlocality is the idea that something that occurs in region A
can have an effect in region B instantaneously regardless o f how far apart these two
regions happen to be. Morcol (1999) notes that nonlocality violates Einstein's special
theory o f relativity that states nothing can travel faster than light. “Nonlocality (or,
nonlocal causation) runs against the classical physical notion o f local causation by
traveling the space between them” (p. 14).

The Many Worlds Interpretation
Hugh Everett developed and Bryce DeWitt revived this theory. Morcol (1999)
explains that this theory is based on the notion that many worlds exist side ways across
time from reality, parallel to our universe but forever cut off from it. The overlapping
wave functions o f the universe do not collapse. Rather, all o f them are equally real and
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exist in their parts o f "superspace" and "supertime." All possible things, thus, do happen,
in some branch o f reality (p. 17).

Bohm’s Deterministic Interpretation
David Bohm (1952) describes the dynamics and interconnected nature o f reality
with a new term, holo-movement. Holomovement is a dynamic phenomenon out of
which all forms o f the material universe flow. Space and time emerge as forms flowering
out of holomovement.

Capra's Taoist Interpretation
Taoist philosophy, which originated in ancient China, has emphasized how the
way o f nature (the word Tao means “way”) is characterized by a continuous flux shaped
by the dynamic interplay o f yin and yang (dark and sunny sides o f a hill). The Tao is
determined by a flow o f opposite energies through which all trends eventually reverse
themselves.
Capra (1991) find's Bohm's notion o f implicate order compatible with Taoist
philosophy and thinks that science and mysticism are two "complementary manifestation
o f the human mind" (p. 306). Subatomic particles do not have any meaning as isolated
entities. They must be understood as “interconnections, not only between themselves but
also between them and the measurement” (p. 68).
To explain the quantum phenom ena, the S-Matrix (Scattering M atrix) theory is

used. Capra (1991) explains that the theory shifts the emphasis from objects to events. It
also shifts the emphasis from building blocks (elementary particles) to a web of
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interconnectedness. Elementary particles are regarded as intermediate states in a network
o f reactions.

The Standard Model Interpretation
The Standard Model Interpretation depicts a physical reality that is made up of
thirteen stable particles and four fundamental forces o f nature. Capra (1991) notes that
these thirteen particles have their anti-particles, which constitute the building blocks of
anti-matter. He offers that the thirteen particles are then divided into two categories:
leptons (such as the electron) and hadrons (p. 227). Morcol (1991) states that leptons are
"elementary" particles because they are not made up o f smaller particles. Hadrons, on the
other hand, are complex structures of more elementary particles called quarks (p. 22).
Morcol (1999) adds that there are commonalities between complexity and
quantum mechanics, as well as differences. Both Capra and Prigogine and Stengers, for
example, declare that the age o f deterministic science, as defined by Newton, Laplace,
and their followers is over. Both agree that the Cartesian dualism between "I" and "the
world" is irrelevant and invalid (p. 25).
According to Capra (1991), quantum mechanics’ indeterminism does not exist
with certainty but shows "tendencies to exist" (p. 68). Prigogine & Stengers (1984), on
the other hand, accept quantum theory's position that matter is not given, and that it has to
be constructed out o f a more fundamental concept in terms of quantum field.
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The Application of Complex Studies
Complexity had spread to all areas of the natural and social sciences. Morcol
(1999) notes that the first application was in interpreting Darwin's theory o f evolution,
which not only established that humans were a part o f a larger organic process but also
led to the notion that evolutionary time was irreversible. Darwin's theory became the
basis o f the biological sciences o f evolution, genetics, and ecology. Later, the application
of Darwin's theory of evolution to computer simulations led to the development o f
artificial life simulations and the neural networks research (p. 7).
In other application, such as in topology, Poincare discovered that a group o f
simple equations lead to multiple solutions. Poincare’s work evolved into a new
mathematics o f fractal geometry (Morcol, 1991, p. 7). Gleick (1987) then popularized
this geometry as the science o f chaos. Other applications o f complexity can be observed
in the following disciplines.

Complexity and Computer Technology
Closely connected with the development o f chaos theory is the breathtaking
progress in the performance o f computer hardware and software. Campbell & MayerKress (1991) suggest that many results would have been practically impossible without
the availability of fast, interactive computer graphics and scientific visualization tools.
Similar progress has been made in business areas where decisions are made with
increasing reference to com puterized databases and electronic spreadsheets. M odern

spreadsheets incorporate many features from simulation and visualization requirements
(p. 54).

78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Complexity and Engineering
Deterministic chaos has many possible applications in engineering. Aihara (1997)
explains that examples of these applications include deterministic nonlinear prediction,
identification and modeling of nonlinear systems, nonlinear filtering, dynamical memory
and search and information compression and coding. Other examples include pattern
recognition, production of spontaneous fluctuation, system design avoiding chaotic
oscillations, homodynamic control, and electronic and optical implementation o f chaotic
dynamics (p. 124).

Complexity and Neural Networks
The existence o f chaotic dynamics is confirmed in the microscopic level o f the
nerve membranes. Aihara (1997) offers that brains are nonlinear networks composed o f
chaotic subsystems, or neurons, that in turn are formed o f nonlinear devices o f nerve
membranes with chaotic dynamics. Chaos can be observed not only in oscillatory nerve
membranes stimulated by sinusoidal force but also in resting nerve membranes
stimulated by pulse-train force (pp. 111-119).
Aihara (1997) adds that chaotic phenomena in the macroscopic level o f EEG
(electro-encephalogram) and MEG (magneto-encephalogram) have also been studied by ■
calculating indices o f deterministic chaos. The results imply the existence of
deterministic chaos at the macroscopic level also. Oscillatory phenomena have also been
found in the cat visual cortex. This kind o f oscillation seem s important for clarification o f

the missing link between the microscopic and macroscopic chaos in the brain (p. 119).
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Complexity and Biology
Little (1999) suggests that biologists have struggled for some time with the
question o f what distinguishes systems that call living from those that we are as complex,
but are not living? This led to vitalism, or the idea that there is some substance or force
that accounts for life. Vitalism then led to systems theories with mechanistic explanations
of organisms as homeostatic goal seeking. System theory then led to open systems (p.
155).
Little (1999) adds that Maturana and Varela focused on a basic example, a living
cell and asked what it is that makes a cell an autonomous living whole (p. 155). A living
cell, according to Maturana and Varela (1980), produces itself in a process described as
autopoiesis, which means self-producing. Mingers (1995) asserts that the central idea o f
autopoiesis is that a living system is one organized in such a way that all its components
and processes jointly produce those self-same components and processes, thus
establishing an autonomous, self-producing entity.
Little (1999) explains that autopoietic systems not only produce themselves but
also continually renew themselves in ways that maintain the integrity o f their structure.
Although the system is open to and depends upon the environment for energy and raw
materials, it can use only that energy and material that is already present within the
system's boundaries (pp. 155-156).
While autopoiesis is maintained, the system's changes are determined by its
structure, not by the environment. Luhmann (1990) extended Maturana and Varela's
definition o f autopoiesis to propose a theory in which he reconceptualized social systems
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as autopoietic systems based on communication. According to Luhmann, it is
communications that are autopoietically produced.
A key notion o f autopoiesis theory and o f Luhmann's theory is self-reference.
Self-reference, according to Luhmann (1995) is independent o f observations by others
and ultimately leads to a paradox in which the overall system reconstructs itself into
subsystems and subsystems' environments. In this way the system “multiplies its own
reality” (p. 33).

Complexity and Evolution
From a Darwinian perspective, we might see life in the jungle. Creatures devour
each other; not everything survives. Dennard (1996) explains that a closer look by
complexity reveals that these events are aspects o f a more general order o f things, not
simply individualized, brutal acts. The species living within an ecosystem have co
evolved and worked out interactions that sustain the environment and the relationships
within it in a way that permits all species to survive. They do not compete as much as
they cooperate” (p. 497).
Natural selection, however, plays only a partial role in evolution. Morcol (1999)
notes that the laws o f complexity generate much o f the order in the natural world, then
natural selection comes into play, further molding and refining. Patterns in life are caused
by internal processes, “endogenous and natural, not exogenous impacts.” These patterns
are somehow self-organized and emerge as collective phenomena (p. 8).
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Dennard (1996) offers that organisms are being and becoming by means o f a
single evolutionary process. These manifestations exist as part o f a continual chaotic
process o f change and accommodation (p. 499).
Kendall, Schaffer, Tidd & Olsen (1997) suggests that in most simple population
models, chaotic dynamics are characterized by fluctuations. With the presence o f the
inevitable environmental and demographic stochasticity, chaos increases the probability
o f population extinction. Thus any species that evolved will be selected against (p. 193).
Kiel (1999) explains that rather than evolution being driven by some combination
o f mutation and fitness to an environment, evolutionary processes are the results o f
inherent forces seeking enhanced order and increasing complexity. This suggests that in
the social realm evolutionary fitness actually requires increasing complexification (p. 68).
Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometric ratio. This is known as the
Malthus equation. Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) notes that the conclusions o f the
Malthus equation can control perceptions not merely o f what is likely but also o f what is
possible. The idea that population growth was inexorable and eventually had an influence
on the evolutionary theories o f Darwin and the economic theories o f Ricardo (p. 28).
The concept o f evolutionary feedback regards energy dissipation as the driving
force o f evolution. De Greene (1996) recognizes that evolutionary feedback is
characterized by nonequilibrium conditions leading to the system's crossing a critical
threshold. Beyond this threshold the system becomes structurally unstable, which leads to
increased dissipation for further evolution (p. 276).
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Complexity and the Environment
Nonlinear systems exhibit bifurcations. Small changes in parameters lead to
qualitative transitions to new types o f solutions. Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) explain
that the global greenhouse effect is an example o f such a phenomenon. A small increase
in the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere leads to qualitative change in the
global ecology (p. 56).
Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) add that in studying the global climatic
problems such as the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion a workable chaotic control
theory would clearly be valuable. For example, it is already too late to reverse the
negative effects o f man-made perturbations by reducing these perturbations. Perhaps we
will are obligated to create hurricanes on the ocean to enhance carbon dioxide exchange,
prevent the hurricanes from touching land, or steer rain clouds to areas where
desertification is threatened in order to reverse these trends (p. 52).

Complexity and Economics
Historically, four Kondratiev cycles have been identified in economics, w ith the
first beginning with the Industrial Production Revolution about 1785. Kondratiev cycles
are divided into phases o f recovery, prosperity, recession, and depression. De Greene
(1996) suggests that the Kondratiev phenomenon has properties o f nonequilibrium,
nonlinearity, instability, and structural change (p. 282).
The overall K ondratiev system evolves in the following manner: from chaotic

attractor to limit cycle attractor to point attractor to limit-cycle attractor to chaotic
attractor, with successive growth o f exhaustion o f information and innovation, and so on.
De Greene (1996) adds that evolution show movement from nonequilibrium to
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equilibrium to nonequilibrium, and so on. Because o f the irreversibility of structural
change, the specific structures would not be the same. Each Kondratiev cycle is
characterized by a primary energy source. However, any o f these features can spill over
to the next Kondratiev cycle (pp. 288-291).
With or without the application o f Kondratiev in explaining chaotic behavior in
the economy, attention has been paid in the last decade to the presence of nonlinearities
in economic data. Boldrin (1997) notes that the issue has been approached uses the theory
of nonlinear dynamic systems to build statistical tests that are meant to discriminate
between a random and a deterministic explanation for a given time series (pp. 284-285).
Boldrin (1997) adds that the discovery o f nonlinear dynamics brought excitement
into economics and gave economists the analytical instruments to think of economic
oscillations as endogenous phenomena, driven by market behavior and not by
supernatural and stochastic forces (p. 293).

Complexity and Sociology
Brown (1996b) notes that social dynamics result from sets o f local interactions
between group members and their interactions with the environment. This signaling fits
within a variety o f classical social psychological perspectives that suggest individuals
adapt to their social environment or from impressions about others based on behavioral
experiences (p. 123).
K iel (1999) observes that a closer look at the com plexity o f social systems

behavior shows that the history o f a successful society within a region is largely a tale o f
increasing cooperation and complementarity, not competition. This means that
competition is simply one element of evolving complex systems (p. 69).
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Human societies display all the characteristic features o f nonlinear non
equilibrium systems, such as unpredictability generated by complex processes, phase
transitions, and critical mass phenomena. Mayntz (1991) offers that radical losses o f a
state of order are found at every level o f social reality (p. 300).
Mayntz (1991) adds that disorder and the emergence o f social order has become
the concern o f most social theories due to the existence o f human volition. This was true
o f social philosophy even before Hobbes explained how the state o f nature was created as
a means to curb the chaotic war of all against the natural state. Later, Emile Durkheim
found the basis o f social order in the conscience collective, while Max Weber pointed to
traditions, values, and interests as the social factors producing social norms (p. 300).
Marx (1906) used the dialectic as a metaphor to explain social contradictions that
result in movement through negation. His method was to search for the primary tensions
shaping a given society, and to trace their repercussions on the detailed pattern o f social
life. In so doing, he identified the laws o f movement of a society, documenting how one
stage o f social organization passes into another.

Complexity and Politics
The purpose o f theory, according to Einstein, is to make nature stand still when
our backs are turned. Brown (1996b) suggests that nature often dances around us. In
politics, decisions makers modify their own behavior and the influence o f social
environments through m igration or a generalized contagion process (pp. 123-136).

Structure collapses because o f consistently small reasons, as they grow larger and
more complex. Brem (1999) offers that causal distortion may not be the distortion that
collapses the system. The best we can do is to learn from each collapse in the subsequent
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design that emerges from it. Efforts to stabilize the system beyond its useful life may be
the roots o f catastrophic collapse as the system tries to address problems it is simply not
capable o f addressing (pp. 129-132).
Brem (1999) adds small distortions in nonlinear dynamic systems may have
consequences in the long term that will be unpredictable. Because o f this inherent
unpredictability of events, policymakers can address this ambiguous state o f affairs. A
more complexity based social scientific inquiry focuses more upon the error than the
certainty, recognizing the certainty as being potentially more an illusion than a reality (p.
131).
Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) stress that behavior over long times can be
essentially unpredictable and that a system governed by deterministic laws can exhibit
effectively random behavior runs directly counter to our normal intuition. Perhaps it is
because this intuition is inherently linear, deterministic chaos cannot occur for linear
systems (p. 22).
The potential harm comes when the system does not collapse when it ought to but
instead, collapses at a time far beyond this optimal time. Therefore, the adjustment is that
much more difficult and potentially catastrophic for the human beings involved. Brem
(1999) explains that the harm can take many forms including catastrophic downsizing,
pension plan collapse, corporate bankruptcy, and social safety systems structural
collapse. It is through embracing chaos rather than avoiding it that these problems are
best addressed. In policymaking, embracing chaos means assuming that human errors in
perception, mistakes in process, and flaws in outcome are natural (pp. 134-135).
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Brown (1996b) explains that while politics is a complicated process, its
complexity may even be understandable and manageable once political behavior can be
precisely described. Yet despite the wealth o f contemporary data and information,
political scientists do not know precisely how to describe political behavior or which
political phenomena are linear and can be transformed (p. 137).
Brown (1996b) adds that gaps in understanding o f political dynamics have
become particularly obvious during recent political events in Europe, Russia, Japan, and
the Middle East. These events came unexpectedly to political scientist as unpredicted
events (p. 120).
Politics, whether at the communal, state, national, or international level, results
from the interactions o f individuals. Political leaders base their decisions on interactions
with their advisors. Brown (1996b) notes that legislators chat in the halls before key votes
and discuss issues with staff, advisors, and adversaries or check with constituents back
home. The process is reflected down to the level o f the voter based on interactions with
friends and family (pp. 121-122).
Brem (1999) offers that complexity presents a real alternative to current practices.
Governance in utilizing complexity can frame society as a system that experiences flux
and transformations in behavior patterns that defy effective prediction. The higher the
level o f governance, the more it is involved in the enterprise o f guaranteeing and
empowering the democratic vision. The lower the level o f government is, the more the
focus would be on the “partnership between public, private, and social sectors in
manifesting democratic community” (p. 145).
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Brem (1999) states that democratic vision acts as a strange attractor around which
a self-organizing order of participatory democratic community forms and emerges. Policy
that empowers people to participate in their own governance would be appropriate (pp.
145-146). Leland (1998) asserts that American democratic government is more than selfinterest, and we need to move toward a more complex model o f political behavior (p.
274).

Complexity and Public Administration
Overman & Loraine (1996) allude that there is not one sentence, one paragraph,
or even one book that can tell us what the new sciences o f complexity are. Taken
together, however, the theories and ideas o f the new sciences o f complexity portend a
new administrative science (p. 487).
Mingus (1999) offers that the application o f quantum theory to public
administration is a movement toward a profound change in shifting scientific paradigm
from Newtonian physics to quantum physics. He warns his audience that the ontological
foundations o f this new paradigm must be examined (p. 245).
Overman & Loraine (1996) note that the new sciences o f complexity lead us to
rethink and reformulate a new science o f public administration for the 21st century
instead o f just reinventing the old one. This new administrative science is not going to be
based on a crude form of physics envy but on a careful reconsideration and reformulation
of the administrative phenomena that surround us in our everyday lives (p. 487).
Dennard (1996) offers that complexity does not necessarily provide
methodological relief for the administrative problems o f efficiency and service delivery.
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It does not tell us how to overcome disorder and chaotic behavior, for example. Rather, it
views disorder and chaos not as problems to be solved but as meaningful aspects o f a
process by which living systems “adapt, renew, maintain, and transcend through self
organization” (p. 495).
Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, describe interconnection and
interdependence as an exchange between all matters at the subatomic level.
Interdependence is not merely a mental connection but a physical one. Chaos is
understood as the turbulence implicit in these interconnections o f living things as they
accommodate each other. But quantum mechanics explains the nature of
interconnectedness in forming networks.
Overman & Loraine (1996) suggest that if the language and application o f
complexity resonates with the understanding o f the administrative world, then the next
important decision is how to use them. One ways to apply the new sciences is metaphor
(p. 491).
Chaos administration brings new order out o f chaos, invest greater confidence in
self-organization, and relax the constraints o f prediction and control. Quantum
administration focuses not only on the tangible organization but also on energy,
becoming, intensionality, and constructing reality (Overman & Loraine, 1996, p. 491).
Dennard (1996) explores that for Newton, a state o f entropy or chaos signaled a
system's decline. It would therefore seem natural that too much conflict might signal the
impending death o f a social order or organization. New complexity physics reframes the
nature o f social responsibility for public administrators. Instead o f taking responsibility
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for the strict maintenance o f social equilibrium, administrators might more appropriately
assist this creative evolutionary chaos (p. 498).
Newell & Meek (1999) examine that a complex system follows multiple logics.
This complex system contains a number o f interacting simple systems, but, their
interactions are unpredictable (p. 82).
Newell & Meek (1999) add that there are three main issues in the applications of
complex systems theory to public administration: the nature o f the relationship between
systems and human thoughts, the extent o f chaos people tolerate, and the differences
between human and non-human complex systems (p. 86).
There are dangers as well as potential advantages in the application o f complex
systems theory to public administration. Newell & Meek (1999) warn their audience that
one danger is not known when to stop. On the other hand, human traits o f cognition and
anticipation can facilitate systematic self-organization, by speeding up the process when
participants understand the objectives o f the change (pp. 102-103).
Little (1999) explains that the American administrative system reduces
complexity by coding in terms o f the accountable versus unaccountable or compliant
versus noncompliant. Decisions are structurally coupled to the administrative systems.
The political system, however, cannot exert direct control over the administrative system,
but can only perturb or irritate it (p. 168).
Little (1999) adds that the administrative system reacts to the perturbation by
increasing the complexity o f its structure o f bureaucratic control in an attempt to increase
internal accountability. Thus a cycle is created in which the complexity o f citizen desires
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is simplified into public opinion, which triggers the political system to irritate the
administrative system, reducing responsiveness and alienating the citizenry (p. 169).
Kiel (1999) suggests that a review o f the evolution of American public
administration reveals the challenges of managing public institutions in a complex
society. Public administration contends with a complex environment. This drive towards
complexity places demands on public administration to develop new perspectives for
dealing with new challenges (p. 63).
Newell & Meek (1999) offer that complexity calls for analogy over analysis, and
pattern recognition over cause-and-effect predictions. It draws on the strategies of the
learning organization, because no one individual possesses wide perspectives to handle
such a complex situation. Such perspectives can be developed only through group
interaction (p. 90).
Evans (1999) contends that quantum theory frees us from the constraint of the
"one right" way mentality that influences administrative life and from the burden that
comes from needing to control rather than to evoke process and relationship. As co
creators o f the world, our sense o f ourselves as fully human will be enhanced and we will
see ourselves simultaneously as authors and readers o f an unfolding text (pp. 213-214).
Overman & Loraine (1996) allude that the new administrative sciences must learn
to focus not only on the tangible but also on energy, becoming, intensionality, and on
constructing our reality. The implications o f quantum theory lead to reconsidering our
contemporary state o f consciousness (p. 491).
Wheatley (1999) explains that a quantum event in a new administrative science is
the place where energies meet to make something happen. No one event is the basic

91

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

element or causation agent. Each event has the capacity to intersect with another and
produce different outcomes (pp. 71-72).
Evans (1999) notes that the mechanical model o f the world adapted from
Descartes and Newton has informed social practice for three centuries, and has done
harm through its insistence on control and order. Through quantum theory, science
reveals a model for social organization to those who are willing to listen by freeing us
from the necessity of following a determined and constraining path in our relationships
(pp. 210-211).
Dennard (1996) observes that groups evolve to accommodate diversity and create
new forms, ideas, and understandings that will support these changes. Complexity
explains this process by recognizing that change does not occur along a planned,
incremental line of history. Instead it is the ability o f living systems to adapt to the
turbulence .caused by interrelationship (p. 499).
Dennard (1996) adds that the problems o f management are not methodological
but rather ontological. Complexity does not offer more information about how to manage
better but questions the basic logic o f most management philosophy (p. 495).
K iel'(1999) suggests that the work of the early 20th century leaders in public
administration reveals efforts to emulate the epistemology o f the natural sciences. These
efforts were also intended to develop an enterprise dominated by Newtonian sciences
overlaid on the simple elements o f urban administration (p. 63).
Kiel (1999) observes that as we enter the 21st century, scholars in the field of
public administration are struggling to find an intellectual framework that attempts to
bring to life a public administration that is dominated by the stale elements o f
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instrumentalism (p. 64). Evans (1999) explains that views of public administration,
arising out o f a greater understanding o f complexity, argue that traditional control gets in
the way o f organizational learning. Public administrators ought to change from intending
control over work processes to empowering o f the bottom-up self-organizing processes
(p. 206).
Evans (1996) offers that complexity invites us to visualize a plural society, rich
with diversity, whose citizens are bound more by covenant than by contract. This is
possible because o f the quantum properties o f human consciousness. If we wish to
actualize this vision, we ought to discard some o f our most treasured notions about our
reality and ourselves (p. 494).
Overman & Loraine (1996) advise that quantum administration is a world with
different foci on energy, becoming, coincidence, constructivism, and new states o f
awareness. Quantum administration shifts the focus from structural and functional
aspects o f organization to the spiritual characteristics o f organizational life (p. 489). This
model, according to Kiel (1999), may serve as a new foundation for public administration
that resolves both the problem o f instrumentalism and the need for expanding the
democratic project (pp. 63-64).
Newell & Meek (1999) state that we are shifting attention from individual
components and relationships to the overall pattern or m otif created by the system. Public
administrators are best served by focusing their attention on complex systems, treating
chaos as one possible characteristic and self-organization as one possible property o f a
complex system (pp. 83-84).
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Evans (1996) observes that managing chaos and complexity in government
presents a picture o f the public agency with which practitioners can readily identify.
While its theoretical base derives from some o f the more puzzling aspects of the new
physics, one can make this material accessible and relevant. The positive aspect o f this
puzzling uncertainty is that change brings opportunities to learn and improve in highly
energized organizations (p. 492).
Kiel (1999) notes that at least two clear challenges arise in the effort to apply the
sciences o f complexity to public administration. First, the novelty o f the sciences has not
yet served to produce a universal definition o f complexity. Secondly, the scope o f the
concepts and perspectives that are incorporated in these sciences covers a vast area o f
research activity (p. 67).
Nevertheless, complexity has a role to play in guiding public administration.
According to Newell & Meek (1999), this is because agencies are charged with
responsibility for interacting with a complex environment and need to find ways to be
more responsive to that environment (p. 98).
Evans (1996) observes that the management o f public organizations is a process
o f liberating the creative energies o f individuals and work groups rather than of direction
and control (p. 491). Kiel (1999) explains that the role o f the public administrator
involves more than developing systems that expedite democratic participation. The public
administrator has a pedagogical role aimed at transforming citizens from passive
economically rational individuals to “cognizant citizens” (p. 70).
Little (1999) suggests that public administration needs the theoretical notions o f
autonomy, self-organization, and self-governance. The ability o f a network of
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autonomous system's to maintain itself when confronted with disturbances in a complex
environment is vital qualities in an administrative situation (p. 159).
Dennard (1996) notes that for the public administrator, self-organization means
that one can justify a faith, with empirical science, in the citizens' ability to co-create
goals, plans, and outcomes that can be sustained by them and their communities. Self
organization also means that administrators cannot rely on their expertise alone to address
social conditions but ought to participate with citizens in their own governance. Public
administrators ought to support democracy as it occurs rather than planning for it (p.
496).
Dennard (1996) adds public administrators are constrained by bureaucratic
structure. However, in an interconnected and turbulent environment, small actions are as
powerful as cumulative ones (p. 496). According to Evans (1996), the best strategy for
the public manager is one that does not set bounds but instead expects instability that
does not monitor productivity but tolerates variation (p. 491).
Newell & Meek (1999) suggest that self-organizing control occurs when political
interactions and dialogues between members o f a group produce coherent behavior,
despite the absence o f formal hierarchy imposed from outside it. Managers can affect the
context within which networks operate (p. 89).
Little (1999) observes that in the American system of governance, the relative
fragmentation o f the political system has allowed the administrative system to further
splinter into a number o f relatively autonomous administrative systems that are
structurally coupled to the political system, but are not subsystems o f the political system.
This relative autonomy is suggested by the “binary coding of politics versus
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administration.” This led to a governance system which includes both the political and
relatively autonomous administrative subsystems (p. 168).
Evans (1996) offers that in a self-organizing system, change and adaptation arise
out o f fluctuations that can come from either internal or external sources. One source of
creative disorder is work force diversity. One external source of fluctuation is enhancing
citizen participation and bringing citizens into the process. Empowered and involved
citizens not only fulfill the intention o f democracy, but they also provide practical
insights into the kinds of service an agency provides (p. 491).
In addition to internal patterns of adaptation, Newell & Meek (1999) explain that
public administration scholars have identified external patterns o f government adaptation.
External relationships, such as "contracting out" governmental services to private
agencies, have evolved to the extent where government management and citizen interface
have been altered. The result is a "hollow state" which requires new legitimacy and
control and accountability o f governance. As these third party administrative
relationships build, the notion o f networks has been offered to assist administrative
theory (p. 98).
Since public administrators are both citizens and participants in government's
environment, they have the potential to function as either internal or external observers.
This can lead to confusion if they do not make others aware o f their perspective as
observers (Little, 1999, p. 170). This new archetype for an effective public administrator
in a chaotic world is not the one-dimensional rational administrator. Instead it is engaged
and multidimensional administrator (Dennard, 1996, p. 499).
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Overman & Loraine (1996) notes that the modern administrator knows chaos best
from first-hand experience. Chaos is too much happening too quickly all at once, and
seemingly out o f control and incomprehensible. Chaos is when everything seems on the
verge o f collapse today, yet somehow emerges tomorrow or next month in a new form
with new structures and new relationships (p. 487).
Overman & Loraine (1994) advise that chaos theory suggests that researchers and
managers should seek to understand the apparently chaotic conditions of their
organizations rather than requiring more information and means o f controlling them.
When managers recognize chaos as a source of change, then new information can
contribute and speed the continuing evolution o f organizational systems (p. 196).
Overman & Loraine (1996) add that understanding chaos theory means adopting a
new perspective, and part o f any new perspective is a new language. Part o f
understanding chaos theory is using the new language to explain everyday organizational
and policy phenomena (p. 488).
Morcol (1999) advises that public administration need to use action research and
experimental praxis and establish dialogical communities to achieve practical discourse
and communal judgment. Public administrators ought to use methodologies that
recognize participatory role, such as mediation, intuitive knowledge, and transformational
leadership (p. 31).
Kiel (1999) observes that these emerging models include two distinct approaches.
One approach involves applications o f several elements o f critique as it applies to public
administration. A second approach represents efforts to reinvigorate the principles of
direct and participatory democracy through the agencies o f public administration (p. 66).
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Kiel (1999) adds that what distinguishes applications o f the sciences o f
complexity from the competing paradigms in public administration is that these sciences
are founded on knowledge derived from the natural sciences. Rather than rejecting
complexity, the complexity sciences bring forward emerging views o f the world (p. 66).

Organizational Myth and the Garbage Can Model
Meyer & Rowan (1977) observe that traditional conceptualizations o f an
organizational environment focus on the organization's task or technical environment.
Because Western culture places a high value on rationality, participants in ambiguous
organizational environments find themselves in the position o f having to make sense o f a
world that is not sensible (p. 346).
Meyer & Rowan (1977) note that myths about formal organizational structure
have two key points. The first point is that formal organizational structure is rationalized
and has impersonal prescriptions. The other point is that organizational structure is highly
institutionalized and do not consider individual participation (pp. 349-354).
The Garbage Can Model (GCM) has been influential in dealing with
organizational myth. The GCM implies that random outcomes should be expected,
because the connections between decisions and outcomes are determined by temporal
factors rather than by causal connections between decisions and outcomes.
Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) propose the garbage can model to elucidate
processes o f decision-m aking that is defined by three characteristics: problem atic

preferences, uncertainty, and fluid participation. Problematic preferences refer to
ambiguity regarding problems and goals. Uncertainty refers to organizational members
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do not fully understand the workings of their organization. And, fluid participation means
that different actors are involved in different decisions (pp. 345-348).
In contrast to rational choice theory, in which solutions are chosen for their
efficient resolution of preexisting problems, garbage can theory sees problems as
independent. Cohen, March & Olsen (1972) observe that solutions may exist prior to any
problem, and advocates of particular solutions will seek to attach them to any problem
and choice opportunity that promises to serve as a vehicle for the policy's adoption. The
linking o f problems and solutions is determined more by temporal sorting than by
rational fitting o f solutions to problems (pp. 18-22).
The GCM suggests that organizations tend to produce many solutions which are
discarded due to a lack o f appropriate problems. However problems may eventually arise
for which a search o f the garbage might yield fitting solutions. The mix o f garbage
depends on the mix o f labeled cans available, on what garbage is currently produced and
the speed with which garbage and garbage cans are removed (Cohen, M arch & Olsen,
1972, p. 12).
Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) explain that problems require attention.
Problems are the result o f performance gaps or the inability to predict the future. Thus,
problems may originate inside or outside the organization. The organization man goes
through the garbage and looks for a suitable fix called a solution (p. 11).
Two aspects o f organizational structure are elaborated in the garbage can model.
The first is the decision structure. The second is the access structure or the mapping of
problems onto choices. According to this model, decision processes within organizations
do not operate according to rational choice models. Problems, solutions, participants, and
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choice opportunities flow into the organization at different rates and connect according to
a temporal rather than a causal logic (Cohen, M arch & Olsen, 1972, p. 16).
Solutions, however, have a life on their own. They are distinct from problems.
Solutions are answers looking for a question. Participants may have ideas for solutions.
Significant solutions have to be prepared without knowledge of the problems they might
have to solve (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 11).
Choice opportunities are occasions when organizations are expected to produce
behavior that can be called a decision. Just like politicians cherish ‘photo opportunities,’
the organization man needs occasional ‘decision opportunities’ for reasons unrelated to
the decision itself. Participants come and go. Cohen, March & Olsen (1972) state that .
participation varies between problems and solutions. Participation may vary depending
on the other time demands o f participants. Participants may have favorite problems or
favorite solutions which they carry around with them (p. 13).
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CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL BASE AND ANALYTICAL MODEL
Theoretical Base
There are four sections that compose the theoretical base o f this research. These sections
are the following:
1. The Section on Linear Perspectives explains the policy toward Iraq according to the
Newtonian science. It emphasizes rationality, cause and effect, linear progression, and
analyzing the whole by breaking it into parts and studying each part separately.
2. The Section on Complexity explains the policy according to the new sciences of
complexity. It emphasizes interconnectedness, relationships, mutual causality, change
through chaos and collapse dynamics, and understanding the whole as an inter-related
loop matrix o f interactions.
3. The Section on Metaphorical Perspective explains the use o f language as a cognitive
container expressed through metaphors to translate abstract concepts into meanings
and lived experiences.
4. The Section on a Phi-Model for the Purpose o f Data Analysis designs an analytical
model based on the combination o f the three previous sections.

The Section on Linear Perspectives
We speak in linear order. In a sentence, we say some words earlier and others
later. Since speaking is correlated with time and time is metaphorically conceptualized in
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terms of space, it is natural for us to conceptualize language metaphorically in terms o f
space. Lakoff & Johnson (20030 offer that our writing system reinforces this
conceptualization. Writing a sentence down allows us to conceptualize it even more
readily as a spatial object with words in a linear order.
The universe, according to this thinking is observed as a linear progression. Time
and motion are reversible, and phenomena are reducible to parts. The whole is observed
by breaking it into parts and then each part is examined separately in fixed time and space
with focus on design, control, cause and effect and prediction. Jorgensen (1989) observes
that the emphasis is on object and objectivity, breaking up, or disassembling o f data into
pieces, parts, elements, or objects. With data broken down into manageable pieces, then
they are sorted in order to search for types, sequences, patterns or wholes within them.
The aim o f this process is to reconstruct the data in a meaningful way.
The understanding o f a phenomenon within a linear, objective perspective is
devoid o f the human experience. Researchers are obligated to remove their own personal
experiences from their inquiry and adapt a “one size fits all” method of analysis in their
inquiry and observations.
Linear analysis and the understanding o f the whole through its parts is a
Newtonian concept. This concept emphasizes objective reality, rationalism, critical mass,
force, gravity, inertia, forms, linear time and motion, order, closed-system, reason, and
the mechanism o f cause and effect in observing natural and social phenomenon. Linear,
objective observation is a uniform and non-subjective procedure that if applied to various
studies, different observers will reach the same results. Instrumentalism as such is the
norm.
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Objectivism has dominated Western culture, and in particular Western
philosophy, from the Pre-Socratic to the present day. Lakoff & Johnson (2003) explain
that objectivism has flourished in both the rationalist and empiricist traditions, which
differ only in how they perceive absolute truths. For the rationalists, only the innate
capacity to reason can lead to knowledge o f things. For the empiricists, the knowledge o f
the world arises from the sense perceptions.
Lakoff & Johnson (2003) note that the rise of empirical science as a model for
truth became dominant in Western thought. Hobbes, for example, found absurdity in the
use of metaphors and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. Locke viewed
metaphors and rhetoric as enemy o f truth. In Western culture, objectivism is governs the
realms of science, law, politics, journalism, morality, business, economics, and education
(pp. 189-195).
Lakoff & Johnson (2003) explain that there is, however, no objective or absolute
truth. Truth depends on categorization. A statement can be true only relative to some
understanding o f it. Understanding always involves human categorization, which is a
function o f interactional properties and o f dimensions that emerge from experiences (pp.
165-185).
Lakoff & Johnson (2003) add that the meaning o f a sentence is given in terms o f a
conceptual structure. Most o f the conceptual structure of a natural language, however, is
metaphorical in nature. Truth is absolute or objective but is based on understanding.
Thus, sentences do not have inherent, objectively given meanings, and communication
cannot be merely the transmission o f such meanings (pp. 196-197).
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Morcol (1999) explains that the ontological implications o f the complementarity
aspects o f reality are too important to be confined to the subatomic world. In our
everyday world the particle aspect of reality dominates its wave aspect, but the latter is
still there, although it may be insignificant. This suggests that conceptual dichotomies are
epistemological illusions and that multiple interpretations of reality can coexist (p. 11).
Nevertheless, in order to show a contrast between linearism and nonlinear
perspectives, we need to present both perspectives in order for us to contrast and compare
between the two varying perspectives. As such, this section on linear perspective is
designed as a theoretical base to start the analysis as a linear interpretation.

Instrumental Reliability
An important notion in linear analysis is that o f instrumental reliability. The
importance o f such notion is to assure objectivity and that every researcher can duplicate
the process and come up with similar findings.
Reliability in a linear analysis is to be established by collecting data from various
sources. O’Sullivan & Rassel (1999) suggest that these measures are designed to assure
data collection, assigning definitions, and analyzing data linearly need to be systematic.
The terms then ought to be defined precisely, ambiguous items or terms to be eliminated,
information is made to be accessible to participants, and directions need to be clear and
easy to follow (p. 37).
W eber (1990) explains that reliability problem s in a linear analysis often grow out

o f the ambiguity o f word meanings, category definitions, or other coding rules.
Classification by computer, however, may lead to better code reliability. Once correctly
defined for the computer, the coding rules then need to be applied in the same way. The
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validity o f concepts based on their classification is assured to the extent that it measures
the construct it intended to measure (p. 15).
Weber (1990) adds that three specific types o f reliability are assured during the
process o f linear analysis: stability, reproducibility, and accuracy. Stability refers to the
extent to which concept classification is invariant over time. Inconsistencies in coding
will constitute unreliability. Reproducibility refers to the extent to which concept
classification produces the same results when the same data is coded by more than one
coder. Accuracy refers to the extent to which the classification of data corresponds to a
standard (p. 17).

Concepts and Conceptual Definitions
Lakoff & Johnson (2003) observe that another important notion in a linear
analysis is that o f concepts and conceptual definitions. Concepts are abstract
representations of ideas. Concepts are identified before data is collected. Any adequate
theory o f the human conceptual system are given an account of how concepts are
grounded, structured, related to each other, and defined (p. 106).
Lakoff & Johnson (2003) note that humans categorize objects, not in settheoretical terms, but in terms o f prototypes and family resemblance. They categorize
things in terms o f prototypes. A prototypical desk, for example, has a well-defined
surface, four legs, and often one or a few storage compartments (p. 122).
A definition is not a m atter o f giving some fixed set o f necessary and sufficient

conditions for the application of a concept. Instead, concepts need to be defined by
prototypes and by how they relate to these prototypes. Rather than being rigidly defined,
concepts arising from our experiences are open-ended. These definitions are indications
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of what are meant by the concepts. The appropriateness o f each conceptual definition
depends on the purpose o f the study.

Data Classification
Charmaz, (1983) explains that an important notion in a linear analysis is that of
data classification. Data may appear to be a mass o f confusing and unrelated accounts.
Studying and sorting out the data help in composing a systematic order to be created (p.
114). Seidel (1998) observes that the goal is to make sense out o f each collection, looking
for patterns and relationships both within a collection, and also across collections, and to
make general discoveries about the unit o f analysis (p. E5).
Weber (1990) offers that the primary task during the process o f data classification
is to look for concepts and themes within the data, and to identify these concepts and
themes. Each concept consists o f one, several, or many words. The words and phrases
that are classified in the same concept will have similar meanings. This similarity needs
to be based on words sharing similar connotations. Data classification are based on
identifying the concepts’ names, the concepts’ definitions and the assignment o f specific
words, sentences, and paragraphs to a concept (pp. 24-25).
Agar (1991) suggests that a computer-aided software, such as Ethnograph, can be
used in order to aid with the coding process. The emerging themes serve as the literal
metaphor o f the data. Ethnograph is primarily oriented toward segmenting and sorting
data, breaking down wholes into parts, and focusing attention on the collections o f parts,
at the expense o f the wholes from which they came. Consequently, it may bias the
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analysis toward segmenting and sorting, and away from intensive analysis o f small bits o f
data, and away from viewing the parts in context (p. 193).
Wiseman (1979) advises that breaking down data into its constituent parts,
however, is misleading. Therefore, a process o f going back and forth between the parts
and the whole o f the data is utilized in order to observe the data in its entirety (p. 278).
Seidel (1998) notes that by doing so, it is possible to compare and contrast between
themes and discover similarities and differences, build typologies (landscape maps), or
find patterns (p. E6).
Weber (1990) explains that certain problems arise when classifying data. These
problems stem from the ambiguity o f both the concept definitions and the words assigned
to these concepts. The construction o f valid and useful concept categories depends on the
interaction between language and the classification scheme. Words, sentences, and
phrases in the concepts are classified where they most clearly belong. Words and phrases
with sufficient ambiguity are dropped from the concept (pp. 25-36).

The Section on Complexity
Wheatley (1999) offers that the world is the world of relationships, processes,
intermediate states, and change. No event or a phenomenon can be drawn independent
from the other or understood by breaking them into parts. What is important in any
diagram is the overall process by which elements meet and change (p. 30).
Evans (1999) suggests that we are no longer constrained by a single ontological
model dependent on correspondence as the meaning we attribute to an event. Without
necessarily accepting linear reasoning and perspectives as the only model for ontology,
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we may in essence introduce the Aristotelian notion o f final causes- volitional acts of
consciousness in meaning to change our ontological and epistemological thinking toward
the complex (p. 202).
Evans (1999) adds that these kinds o f perspectives help us shift our thinking
toward the multiple and the complex. Five indicators may suggest such a shift is taking
place. A Shift from the part to the whole, from structure to process, from objective to
epistemic science, from building blocks to networks, and from truth to approximate
descriptions (pp. 202-203).
This section provides the research with the theoretical base to build an analytical
model that utilizes the new sciences o f complexity and their dimensions to interpret the
collected data on the U.S. policy toward Iraq. These sciences differ from the Newtonian
science in the sense that they observe the world as irreversible, non-linear,
interconnected, and evolving.
Morcol (1999) explains that the new sciences of complexity are the arena for
emerging perspective. Although these perspectives take into account the observer’s
experiences, the primary focus is on simple systems demonstrating complex behavior
(pp. 6-8).
This research derives four distinct dimensions from the new sciences o f
complexity and designates them as guides in leading the analysis toward the multiple and
the complex. These four dimensions are the following

Autopoiesis
This term means self-production. Little (1999) observes that the central idea of
autopoiesis is that a dynamic (living) system is one that is organized in such a way that
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all its components and processes jointly produce those self-same components and
processes, thus establishing an autonomous, self-producing entity. Autopoietic systems
are self-organizing in that they produce and change their own structures as well as their
own components (p. 155).
Morgan (1986) suggests that the theory o f autopoiesis encourages us to
understand the evolution o f living systems as the result o f internally generated changes.
Autopoiesis places emphasis on the way the entire system o f interactions shapes its
future. It is the pattern, or whole, that evolves (p. 240).
Morgan (1986) adds that one of the strengths o f the theory o f autopoiesis is that it
shows us that while the preservation o f an identity is fundamental for all living systems,
there are different ways in which closure in relation to the environment can be achieved.
When we recognize that the environment is not an independent domain, and that we don’t
necessarily have to compete or struggle against the environment, a completely new
relationship becomes possible (p. 245).
Although autopoiesis is an internal process o f change within a system, it does,
however, pay attention to the environment since living systems do not live independently
and are impacted by changes in the environment. Observing a system from the standpoint
o f autopoiesis enables us to understand the internal dynamics of self-organization that are
triggered by the environmental changes.

Bifurcation

This term means a phase shift in the order o f a dynamic system. Brem (1999)
explains that as the self-organizing order emergent out o f the interaction o f elements
within a system becomes complex in response to changing context, the system becomes
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unstable and the order starts to collapse. Such collapse allows for the emergence o f new
systemically self-organized order more appropriate to the current context and is a normal
phenomenon (p. 133). In Table One, I illustrate the four main phases o f a system
behavior that exhibit transformation through bifurcation from equilibrium to chaos and
later to the emergence of a new order and equilibrium.
When a system is at equilibrium, its structure is relatively stable and its property
is interconnected while containing the seeds o f change. Environmental changes then sets
off a series o f internal changes and reorganization that will lead to a period o f oscillation
and disorder. From the chaotic disorder, a new structure will emerge without precedence
that will bring the system back to equilibrium. This is the essence of bifurcation.

Phase
One

Phase State
Initial state

Two

Oscillation state

Three

Chaotic state

Four

Emergence

Characteristics
The System’s internal
structure (its point attractor)
is stable and at equilibrium.
The system’s internal
structure will witness an
internal destabilization. The
structural components will
revolve back and forth
between boundaries, toward
a cyclical path, rather than
being fixed in one place.
The system’s internal
structure will go through a
restructuring and self
organization process
(strange attractor).
A new order will emerge
out of chaos and without
retracting previous m apping
and without precedence,
reaching a new equilibrium.

Table 1. Dynamic System Behavior
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Bifurcation intends to interpret the system’s geometry o f behavior and the
acceleration of irreversible evolution over time. It constructs metaphorically the growth
of uncertainty as a translation o f chaotic behavior. And it does so by describing the
information about the system over time when compared with the initial state o f
equilibrium.
Brown (1996a) notes that in a system increasing in entropy, the number o f
possible states that evolve from some initial distribution over time increase. Movement of
the system away from equilibrium, associated with some internal irreversible processes,
increase the rate o f dissipation. Instability, triggered by nonequilibrium environmental
conditions, lead to further dissipation and entropy (pp. 56-57).
De Greene (1996) offers that the probability then increases that the system, with
its internal processes, becomes unstable with respect to given fluctuations. This
instability enables the system to cross a threshold o f an unstable structure, and then it
leads it to changes in the system in the threshold by creating interplay among its forces
(p. 276).
All systems must collapse in order for their older structures to dissipate and for
the new orders to emerge. If collapse, however, is delayed through artificial engineering,
the system results in catastrophes.

The S-Matrix
To explain the quantum phenom ena, the S-M atrix (Scattering M atrix) theory is

used. Morcol (1999) observes that the theory shifts the emphasis from objects to events
and from building blocks and elementary particles to a web of interconnectedness. The
universe is a dynamic web o f interrelated events. None o f the properties o f any part of
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this web is fundamental. All phenomena in the universe are uniquely determined by
mutual self-consistency (pp. 21-22).
Morgan (1986) suggests that matrix systems increase the adaptability of the
systems in dealing with their environments. The matrix analysis o f living systems provide
means o f breaking down the barriers between specifics and allowing elements from
different specifics to fuse their abilities in an interconnected web o f association (pp. 5859).

Mutual Causality
According to Daneke (1999), this term represents the relationship between events
that impact one another. Lakoff & Johnson (2003) advise that the concept o f causation is
based on the prototype o f direct manipulation, which emerges directly from our
experience. Causation is a basic human concept. It is best understood as an experiential
gestalt (pp. 69-75).
Morgan (1986) suggests that mutual causality translates the changes in the system
shaped by the processes of positive and negative feedback, rather than a single or
collective o f spatial and temporal causes. Feedback is when one element o f experience in
a system influences the next. Feedback can be positive or negative. Together, these
feedback mechanisms can explain why systems gain or preserve a given form, and how
this can be elaborated and transformed over time (p. 46).
Morgan (1986) adds that positive feedback is when accounting for a system’s
change, we will observe that more changes in the system’s environment will lead to more
changes in the system internally, and fewer changes in the system’s environment will
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lead to fewer changes in the system internally, and visa versa. Negative feedback, on the
other hand is when a change in a variable initiates changes in the opposite direction, with
more changes in the environment leading to less changes inside the system and less
changes in the environment leading to more changes inside the system, and visa versa
(pp. 247-248).
There is, as such, a mutual causation in the relationship between the environment
and the system. This relationship is best understood as being in a state o f interaction and
mutual dependence with one impacting the other.
Morgan (1986) offers that one o f the features of complex systems o f mutual
causality is that any given set of starting conditions lead to different end points. Random
kicks combine with the systemic relations transform the system in unpredictable ways.
Systems frequently move from kick to kick, from one pattern o f transformation being
kicked into another. The transformation stemming from this kick settles into a new
pattern of relations that is eventually kicked by another incident or pattern o f chance
connections (p. 254).

The Section on Metaphorical Perspective
People frequently use metaphors in daily life to ease communication. Lakoff &
Johnson (2003) explain that researchers are increasingly employing metaphors to
represent cultures. Metaphor is a natural phenomenon and a natural part o f human
thought and language. Which metaphor we use depends on our interactions and practices
(pp. 244-247).

113

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Goodman (1968) suggests that metaphor comes in many varieties, most o f them
listed in the prodigious if chaotic standard catalogue o f figures o f speech. Among
metaphors some involve transfer o f a schema between disjoint realms. But not for all
metaphors are the two realms disjoint. Sometimes one realm intersects or is an expansion
or a contraction o f the other (p. 81).
Goodman (1968) adds that metaphorical force requires a combination o f novelty
with fitness, o f the odd with the obvious. The good metaphor satisfies while it startles.
Metaphor is most potent when the transferred schema effects a new and notable
organization rather than a mere relabeling o f an old one (pp. 79-80).
Metaphors are conceptual in nature. Although metaphors always involve transfer
in the sense that some labels o f the schema are given new extensions, the realm itself may
remain constant under the transfer (Goodman, 1968, p. 83).
Lakoff & Johnson (2003) explain that metaphors play a central role in the
construction o f social and political reality. How we think metaphorically matters.
“Because concepts are metaphorically structured in a systematic way, it is possible for us
to use expressions from one domain to talk about corresponding concepts in the
metaphorically defined domain” (p. 52).
Pearce (1996) offers that some people criticize the use o f metaphor as too simple.
However, the risk is not in simplification but rather in oversimplification to the point of
distortion or inaccuracy. Metaphor can either be developed in conjunction with people
within the culture who will be affected by the change, or evaluated as a result o f input
from the participants (p. 26).
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Morgan (1986) observes that one o f the strength o f metaphor rests in the fact that
it refers to the symbolic significance o f rational aspects o f a system. A second strength o f
metaphor stems of providing a new focus for the creation o f organized action (p. 135).
Matravers (1998) notes that an important role o f metaphor in communication is to
cause a belief the content o f which is not captured by the metaphor itself, but rather by a
statement o f similarity. If metaphors do relate things through resemblance, it should be
possible to specify the respect in which the things resemble each other simply by
specifying the common property (pp. 108-109).
Davidson (1979) suggests that what metaphor adds to the ordinary is an
achievement that uses no semantic resources beyond the resources on which the ordinary
depends. A metaphor implies a kind and degree o f artistic success (p. 29).
Morgan (1986) explains that a particular strength o f metaphor is the contribution
that it makes to the understanding o f change (p. 137). Lakoff & Johnson (2003) offer that
the heart o f metaphor is inference. It allows inferences in sensory-motor domains, such as
domains o f space and objects, to be used to draw inferences about other domains.
Because we reason in terms o f metaphor, the metaphors we use determine about how we
live (p. 244).
A statement is metaphorically true when others equally do not hold. Morcol
(1999) explains that the changes in one's cognitive structure fall along from literal, to
comparative-metaphorical, and to interactive-metaphorical. Literal language requires
assimilation to existing frameworks o f understanding. Comparative metaphor requires
simple extensions of the framework. Interactive metaphor facilitates an extensive change
in the rules o f understanding (p. 48).
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Morcol (1999) states that “the interactive-metaphorical learning, which is the
most radical change in our cognitive framework, represents a major shift in the
ontological metaphors and epistemological assumptions.” This shift is from the
Newtonian deterministic knowledge to the indeterministic knowledge (p. 49). Elliott &
Kiel (1996) note that the obvious metaphorical value o f applying theories of chaos and
complexity to the social realm serves as an impetus for the emergence o f the application
of these theories to social phenomena (pp. 2-3).
Lakoff & Johnson (2003) emphasize that metaphor is not just a matter o f
language and mere words. Metaphor is in our very concept o f an argument. We act
according to the way we conceive o f things. The essence o f metaphor is understanding
and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another (pp. 5-6).
Garth Morgan (1986) developed several metaphors to describe organizations. His
metaphors provide examples of organizational forms. M organ’s metaphorical models are
useful illustration o f metaphorical interpretation o f the organizational systems both
linearly and in accordance with the new sciences of complexity. The following are two of
Morgan’s metaphorical models, the machine metaphor and the flux metaphor, that are o f
interest to this research:

The Machine Metaphor
We live in a technological society dominated by the needs o f machine and
mechanical m odes o f thought. A ristotle used mechanistic principles to understand the

movement of animals. Archimedes, Galileo, and others used machines to make important
contributions to mathematics and physics. This mechanistic view influenced scientific
though right into the twentieth century and received its fullest expression in the
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contributions o f physics Sir Isaac Newton. Newton developed a theory of the universe as
a celestial machine (Morgan, 1986, p. 347).
Morgan (1986) states that by examining a system through the lens o f the machine
metaphor, we can observe if they were mildly or overly bureaucratized and if they had
manifested increasingly bureaucratic behavior as a concern for control (p. 325). Under
the influence o f the machine metaphor, organization theory looks into a form of
engineering that is preoccupied with relations between goals, structures, and efficiency
(Morgan, 1986, p. 40).
The strengths o f the machine as a metaphor rely in its explanation of
straightforwardness o f tasks, such as decision-making and progression o f events. It also
can explain the environment of the system when such an environment is stable. However,
mechanistic explanation o f the linear analysis will have limitations. These limitations
occur when the interpretation becomes difficult because o f its inability to capture the
system’s web o f associations and function other than in line.

The Flux Metaphor
Around the year 500 B.C., the Greek Philosopher Heraclitus noted that one could
not step into the same river twice, for other waters are continually flowing on. He was
one of the first western philosophers to address the idea that the universe is in constant
state of flux embodying characteristics o f both permanence and change (Morgan, 1986, p.
233).
Like Heraclitus, Bohm (1952) views process, flux, and change as fundamental,
arguing that the state o f the universe at any point in time reflects a more basic reality. He
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calls this reality the implicit order, and distinguishes it from the explicit order manifested
in the world around us.
Bohm (1952) use's the term holomovement or holoflux to express the undivided
and flowing nature o f this order, which provides the generative source o f explicate forms.
According to Morgan (1986), these forms, like Heraclitus river, have the appearance o f
stability while being underpinned by flux and change. He believes that the world unfolds
and enfolds from moment to moment as a kind o f pulsating wholeness. Each moment of
existence has similarities with, yet differs from, its predecessors, creating the appearance
o f continuity in the midst o f change (p. 234).
Morgan (1986) adds that from the perspective o f the flux and transformation
metaphor we can acquire interesting insights on the logic o f change shaping a system and
its environment. We are able to appreciate the autopoietic loop linking a system’s selfimage to its understanding and enactment o f its environment, or to use ideas about mutual
causality or the dialectical nature of change to understand the dynamics shaping the
system and its industry (p. 327).
Morgan (1986) observes that the strength o f the flux metaphor is that it forces us
to understand the world in a constant state o f flux. The limitations o f the flux metaphor
lie in the notion that the metaphor could be too far idealistic, and the understanding of
logic o f change may have to depend on our hindsight (pp. 267-272).

The Section on a Phi-Model
Harvey & Reed (1996) note that models, as opposed to theories, are well-formed
metaphors and analogies. Models are used to study chaotic phenomena. They do not
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express the truth of the world, but provide heuristic insights. While theories claim to
explain reality, models are partial constructions that speak a language o f "as if," not
"what is" (p. 309).
The analytical model in this research is a structuralist model in order to grasp the
theoretical basis o f the research and conduct the analysis o f data by using axiomatic
methods. This structuralist model guides the analysis beyond assumptions in order to
grasp the essence within the data, employing an ontology that will echo Plato's vision of
the world as being structured by a concatenation o f geometric forms. The goal o f the
model is to capture the reliable and theoretically articulated knowledge derived from
analyzing the data.
The model has a main linguistic format for the purpose o f analytical expression.
Within this format, there are two functional units to guide the specific steps o f analysis,
one unit to guide the linear analysis and the other to guide the complex analysis.
The main linguistic format is known as the metaphorical form and it is based on
the theoretical explanation presented in the section on metaphorical perspectives. The
functional unit specific to linear analysis is known as the linear form and it is based on
the theoretical explanation presented in the section on linear perspective. The functional
unit specific to complex analysis is known as the complex form and it is based on the
theoretical explanation presented in the section on complexity.
Together, these units and their host linguistic format compose and construct the
research’s Phi-Model for the purpose o f analyzing collected data on the U.S. policy
toward Iraq. In Figure One (page 120), I illustrate the graphic presentation o f this model.
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The Linear Form

The
Complex
Form

Figure 1. The Phi-Model

After collecting the data, the Phi Model guides the three steps o f data analysis
within a metaphorical presentation. Step one is comprised o f interpreting the data
according to the linear tradition and by using a machine metaphorical presentation in
breaking the whole into parts and then analyzing each part separately.
Step two is consisting o f interpreting the data according to four specific
dimensions derived from complexity theories (autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and
mutual causality) and by using a flux metaphorical presentation. Emphasis is on
observing internal changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq as impacted by environmental
changes. And, step three is comprised o f complex analysis and flux metaphorical
presentation the same as the procedure in step two but emphasis will be on the policy’s
external changes. In Table Two (page 121), I illustrate these three steps.
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Paradigm
Unit of Analysis
Theoretical Base
Metaphorical Format
Characteristic
Objective

Patterns/ Indicators o f
Observation

Analytic Guide

Step One
The U.S. policy toward
Iraq.
The Section on Linear
perspective
The M achine Metaphor
Linear
Interpreting data
according to concepts,
themes and emerging
super themes.
Events along the linear
progression

Computer software,
such as Ethnograph to
code the data.

Step Two
The U.S. policy toward
Iraq
The Section on
Complexity
The Flux Metaphor
Comparative
Analyzing internal
changes in the policy
toward Iraq.

Step Three
The U.S. policy toward
Iraq
The Section on
Complexity
The Flux Metaphor
Interactive
Analyzing external
changes in the policy
toward Iraq.

Patterns involving the
internal mechanism o f
change and selforganization
Four dimensions derived
from the complexity
theories:
1. Autopoiesis.
2. Bifurcation.
3. S-Matrix.
4. Mutual Causation

Patterns with the
environment that impact
internal changes.

Graphic
Representation

Four dimensions derived
from the complexity
theories:
1. Autopoiesis.
2. Bifurcation.
3. S-Matrix.
4. Mutual Causation

O

) c*

Table 2. The Three Analytical Steps o f the Phi-Model

The Phi-Model’s Three Analytical Steps

Step One
The first step is to analyze the data according to the linear tradition. During this
step, collected data on the policy toward Iraq are analyzed and a machine metaphorical
model is used to present the analysis.
The linear analysis emphasizes breaking down data into its parts and then
studying each part separately. Breaking down data into its constituent parts, however, can
be distorted and misleading. Therefore, a process of going back and forth between the
parts and the whole o f the data is utilized in order to observe the data in its entirety. By
doing so, it is possible to compare and contrast between themes and discover similarities,
differences and find patterns.
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The primary task during this step is to look for concepts and themes within the
data, and to identify these concepts and themes. Each concept consists o f one, several, or
many words. The words and phrases that are classified in the same concept have similar
meanings. This similarity is based on words sharing similar connotations. A computeraided software, such as Ethnograph, is used in order to aid with the coding process.
By observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq through the lens o f the machine
metaphor, we are able to witness the line o f progression within the policy and its linear
movement from one phase to another. We can, for example, observe the policy moving
from the state o f reactive measure toward Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, to a state of
proactive measure in 1998 when the policy adopted the doctrine o f regime change in Iraq
through the funding o f Iraqi opposition. Then, when we can observe it moving toward a
proactive preemptive measure when it actively sought to implement the regime change in
Iraq through direct military involvement in 2003.

Step Two
The second step is to analyze the data based on the new sciences o f complexity.
Super themes (Interpretive Levels) that emerge during step one are used to observe the
internal changes in the policy toward Iraq according to the complexity theories. The
analysis is presented according to a flux metaphorical model.
Step two is designed to observe the policy toward Iraq as a dynamic system that
experienced internal processes of phase change. These changes are occurring as the
policy is evolving, self-organizing, experiencing chaotic behavior and emerging with new
order that is better equipped to deal with its environment. This step traces the behavior of
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the Interpretive Levels as measures o f internal changes in the policy according to four
specific dimensions derived from the complexity theories. These dimensions are
autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix, and mutual causality.

Autopoiesis
The dimension o f autopoiesis explains internal changes within the unit o f analysis
based on the concept o f autopoiesis in complexity theories. The Interpretive Levels that
emerge from step one o f the analysis are observed according to autopoiesis in order to
determine changes in their behavior as indicator o f internal change in the policy toward
Iraq.

Bifurcation
The dimension o f bifurcation explains internal changes within the unit o f analysis
based on the concept o f bifurcation in complexity theories. The Interpretive Levels that
emerge in step one o f the analysis are observed according to bifurcation in order to
determine changes in their behavior as indicator o f internal change in the policy. By
observing the system according to the bifurcation dimension, we are able to witness
whether the U.S. policy toward Iraq is experiencing any type of collapse dynamics, is the
collapse delayed, and what are the catastrophic consequences.

The S-Matrix
The dimension o f the S-Matrix explains internal changes within the U.S. policy
toward Iraq based on the concept of the S-Matrix in complexity theories. The Interpretive
Levels that emerge in step one o f the analysis determine according to the S-Matrix how
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changes in the behavior o f these indicators reflect internal changes in the policy as a
function o f interconnectedness.

Mutual Causality
The dimension o f mutual causality explains internal changes within the U.S.
policy toward Iraq based on the concept o f mutual causality in complexity theories. The
Interpretive Levels that emerge in step one o f the analysis are observed according to
mutual causality and its concepts o f positive and negative feedback to see how these
indicators’ behavior translate internal changes in the policy.

Step Three
This step follows the same procedure outlined in step two. The only exception is
that instead o f observing internal changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq, emphasis is on
external changes that trigger the internal changes in the policy.
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CHAPTER V

METHODOLOGY
The Research Design
Research is a systematic investigation o f a phenomenon (O ’Sullivan and Rassel,
1999, p. 24). This study is designed to investigate systematically, within the context o f
complexity theories, the U.S. policy toward Iraq from the G ulf W ar o f 1990 until the
official end o f the preemptive war o f 2003.
The study uses the method o f qualitative inquiry in conducting the research. The
rationale for doing so is because qualitative research is descriptive, interpretive,
disclosive and explanatory. Marshal & Rossman (1999) offer that qualitative study is
used by academic as well as practitioners because it takes place in the natural world, is
interactive and humanistic in its methods, and emergent, not pre-figured (p. 2).
Qualitative analysis, according to Seidel (1998), is progressive because it is a
cycle that keeps repeating. It is recursive because one part can call the investigator to a
previous part. And, it is holographic because each step in the process contains the entire
process (p. E2). Such an explanatory study can identify the events, beliefs and attitudes
that shape the characteristics of the policy toward Iraq and its progression. As Marshall
and Rossman (1999) suggest, qualitative data analysis is an accepted data collection
technique for an explanatory study and is useful for interpreting major events and social
conflicts (p. 33).
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Qualitative research is useful because it allows the investigator to use narratives,
such as related events, or describe the process step by step. Qualitative design is flexible,
continuous design, builds for themes, enabling the investigator to listen to ideas,
concepts, and themes. This study follows Rubin and Rubin (1995) recommendations by
conducting research that is:
a) Transparent, the reader is able to see the basic process o f data collection, and is
able to assess the strength, weaknesses, and biases in the research.
b) Consistent, the study checks out ideas, even inconsistent ones. The goal is not to
eliminate inconsistent ideas but to understand why they occur.
c) Coherent, the study offers explanation for apparent contradictions.
d) Communicable, the research feels real to its participants and uses the participants’
first hand experience in answering questions (pp. 24-48).
This research is important because o f the tradition o f qualitative inquiry. It is also
important because it is multi-methods in focus, collecting variety o f empirical materials,
consisting o f complex time-consuming data analysis, using long passages, and has
specific procedures (Creswell, 1998, pp. 16 & 122).
Qualitative design is useful for this research because it is an in-depth study, using
detailed information on fewer cases, using detailed information about the context in
which the policy toward Iraq occurred, and allowing flexibility in the types o f data to be
obtained. Qualitative study produces verbal data that is difficult to convert to numbers,
and it is characterized by extensive use o f verbal information on the unique feature and
environment o f the unit o f analysis.
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Attention is paid to recording information accurately, dividing trivial from
important details, drawing appropriate connections, and looking concept and themes in
the analysis o f qualitative data. The strength o f this method is that it is unobtrusive and
non-reactive. O’Sullivan & Rassel (1999) explain that the data is analyzed without
disturbing the setting in which it was created, the procedure for analysis is clearly
delineated, and the information and actual analyses are checked (pp. 36-37). Another
strength o f the study is that it is using the new sciences o f complexity in a qualitative
inquiry, which has not been done prior to this research.

The Analytical Model
The specific model designed for this purpose is the Phi Model. The Phi Model is a
structuralist model, composed o f three specific forms, a metaphorical form, a linear form
and a complex form. The metaphorical form is responsible to assign the specific
metaphorical containers as an expressive format o f analytical expression. These
metaphorical containers are the machine metaphor and the flux metaphor.
The Phi model is designed to guide the analysis in three steps. Step one is
designed to analyze the data linearly and according to the classical, Newtonian science.
Step two is designed to analyze the data according to complexity theories and to explain
the internal changes in the policy toward Iraq. And, step three is designed to analyze the
data according to complexity theories by observing the impact o f environmental changes.
The machine metaphorical model is assigned to express the analysis during step
one. The flux metaphorical model is assigned to express the analysis during steps two and
three. Super themes (Interpretive Levels) derived from step one are used as indicators to

127

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

determine internal changes in the policy toward Iraq during step two and to determine
external changes that impacted the policy during step three. Four specific dimensions
derived from complexity theories guide the complex analysis during steps two and three
and trace the behavior o f each indicator. These dimensions are autopoietic, bifurcation,
the S-Matrix, and mutual causality.
The rationale for analyzing the data in this fashion is to provide the research with
a linear analysis during step one that to be used in contrast with complex analysis o f data
during steps two and three. Without a linear analysis o f data, a comparison o f analyses
between linear and complex observations is unable to take place.

Step One
Data for analysis during step one is collected through secondary data review,
focus group, and one-on-one interview. The rationale for collecting data through
document review, focus group and one-on-one interview is to obtain official and nonofficial data regarding the U.S. policy toward Iraq and construct a linear analysis o f the
policy that does not reflect only the official explanation.
The linear analysis constitutes the research’s first analytical procedure and it
follows the Phi Model by breaking the data into parts, such as concepts, themes and super
themes, and then interpreting the whole by analyzing the parts. Computer software, such
as Ethnograph, assists in the process o f coding.
The linear analysis o f secondary data, focus group and one-on-one interview is
appropriate for this research because it provides the first step in the process o f analytical
comparison based on official and non-official data. Weber (1990) notes that in order to
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make valid inferences from data, the classification procedure is reliable in the sense o f
being consistent (p. 12).
Once concepts are identified, those with common function compose the emerging
themes. Collectively, these themes illustrate the changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq.
From grouping similar themes together, super themes emerge in order to constitute the
interpretive levels for the complex analysis in steps two and three.
Four trajectory phases from 1990 to 2004 are specifically examined because o f
their impact on the policy’s overall progression. The first phase is the period that
precedes Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait in 1990, which constitutes U.S. support o f the regime
of Saddam Flussein. The second phase is the period of the G ulf War o f 1990 that
symbolizes a shift in the policy from supporting to confronting Saddam. The third phase
is the period from 1991 to 2003, which reflects the policy o f containing Saddam. And the
fourth phase is the period of toppling the regime o f Saddam Hussein directly in 2003.

Step Two
Super themes that emerge from the linear analysis during step one are used as
Interpretive Levels to observe changes in the policy toward Iraq. Four specific
dimensions derived from the complexity theories, such as autopoiesis, bifurcation, the SMatrix, and mutual causality, guide the analysis by tracing changes in the Interpretive
Levels’ behavior as indication o f changes in the policy in a flux metaphorical language.
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Step Three
The analysis in step three is the same as the one in step two. The same procedure
used in step two is used in step three. The emphasis o f the analysis, however, is on
observing the environmental changes that impact the U.S. policy toward Iraq.

Data Collection Strategies
This study utilizes a triangulated method o f data collection. It uses secondary
data, focus group and one-on-one interviews in order to obtain data. As such, the study’s
methodology in obtaining and collecting data consists o f three main strategies. The first
strategy is collecting secondary data from existing data on the policy toward Iraq, such as
books, articles and official governmental documents. The second strategy is collecting
data on the policy by conducting a focus group. And, the third strategy is collecting data
on the policy through one-on-one interviews.

Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB)
Since there is a target population made o f human subjects to participate in a focus
group and the one-on-one interviews, approval from Western Michigan University’s
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) prior to collecting data is obtained.
Participants in the focus group and one-on-one interview are informed of the purpose of
the study, the risk that might occurred, the voluntary nature o f their participation and
confidentiality, why they are selected, and what is to be done with the information.
Informed consent is then obtained from each participant.
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The research is designed to protect its human subjects from physical harms, pain,
discomfort, embarrassment, loss o f privacy, and abuse. The participants are able to
weight benefits and risks and assess voluntary participation. An incentive for
participating in the focus group and the one-on-one interviews is to discuss an important
public policy issue such as the U.S. policy toward Iraq among professional academic
scholars. Please see Appendix A to read this research’s approval by Western Michigan
University’s Human Subjects Institutional Review Board.

Secondary Data
This study is collecting its data first from existing literature on the policy toward
Iraq. The sources o f data vary, such as the National Archive, the White House, the
Library of Congress, the Internet, and the library o f Western Michigan University.
The types o f data are official governmental data on the policy toward Iraq, such as
presidential speeches, Congressional Acts, Public Laws, and press releases by various
governmental entities, and non-governmental data on the policy toward Iraq, such as
articles and books. The limitation o f this strategy is that it does not involve live data.
Some of the secondary data is in poor shape, not easily accessible, and reflect the bias
opinion o f their authors. Therefore, supplemental data is needed, such as from focus
group and one-on-one interview, in order to balance out the secondary data.

The Focus Group
The rationale for using focus group in data collection is to obtain live data that
may differ with the official documents and explanation of the policy toward Iraq. The
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existence o f these official governmental documents may have already influenced the
focus group participants. However, there may also exists a possibility for these
participants to reflect their own independent perspectives.
The focus group is to some degree low in cost, saves time, and generates speedy
results. The focus group is also conducted as a semi-structured discussion by a small
group o f knowledgeable academic professionals living in Michigan to address the policy
toward Iraq and generate synergy and rich discussion about the topic. The hallmark of
this process is group interaction led by the investigator as a moderator o f the discussion.
In addition to guiding the discussion, the investigator records, collects and transcribes the
data.
Open-ended questions are used, composed o f introduction questions, transitional
questions, key questions, and closing questions. Krueger (1994) notes that these questions
are clear, based on significant background o f information, presented in context, and
focused. Please see Appendix B to read the focus group’s questions.
Krueger (1994) explains that the process includes listening for inconsistent
comments and probing for understanding, listening for vague and cryptic comments and
probing for understanding, taking notes carefully, seeking confirmation, considering
words in context and with consistency, intensity and specificity, and looking for big ideas
(pp. 145-156). O ’Sullivan & Rassel (1999) observe that emphasis is on systematically
looking for trends and patterns in participants’ answers (p. 193).
Planning for the focus groups involves peer review in order to examine the
feasibility o f the data collection instruments (the questions). After the completion o f the
planning, a pilot test is conducted similar to the actual focus group.
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The pilot test is designed to assist the researcher to examine forming the groups,
moderating the session, testing the recording procedure, examining the adequacy o f the
time and place o f the session and its coordination by examining the questions and their
logical flow, preparing the discussion session, recording the session, and conducting the
interviews. Attention is paid to the feasibility o f the plan, how much time and efforts are
needed to collect, compile, and transcribe the data, and the appropriateness o f the plan.

Focus Group Sampling
Purposive sampling o f professionals working in academic fields in Michigan is
used to form the focus group. The participants are individuals who hold graduate degrees
in various disciplines and have some knowledge o f the policy toward Iraq.
O ’Sullivan & Rassel (1999) advise that purposive sampling in qualitative studies
is a form o f non-probability sampling. Non-probability sampling is subjective and its
usefulness depends on the purpose of the study and the criteria for selection. In non
probability sampling, it is not important to obtain accurate estimate o f population
characteristics. The adequacy o f the non-probability sample is evaluated through
subjective means, not by mathematical evaluation, especially when the study is not
intended to apply statistical theory to estimate the accuracy o f the sample (pp. 145-148).
The process of purposive sampling begins by examining the electronically
published lists o f professors teaching or who have taught in departments such as political
science, public administration, history, sociology, and philosophy at ten institutions o f
higher-learning in Michigan. A search engine, such as Google or InfoTrac is utilized to
access the electronically published websites o f these institutions, and through these
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websites to access the electronically published lists of the faculty within the various
schools and departments.
The rationale for choosing professors from these disciplines is because o f the
diversity and depth in perspective that an academic scholar in such disciplines can offer
the focus group discussion while observing the policy toward Iraq. Limiting the sample to
professors within only one or two disciplines, such as in political science or public
administration, renders their perspectives narrow and restrained. However, by enlarging
the sampling list to include professors from various disciplines such as in philosophy,
history, sociology, political science and public administration is able to create a larger
pool of wider and more diverse opinions.
From the electronically published lists o f various university departments, an
approximately 100 prospective candidates are selected by purposively choosing
professors or associate professors who are specialized in Middle Eastern history, religion,
sociology, and politics, or in American government, policy, political theory, public
administration, ethics or international political systems. Special attention is devoted to
individuals with publications in these fields.
Once the names and addresses o f these 100 individuals are gathered, invitation
letters to participate in the focus group along with self-addressed/ stamped envelopes are
mailed to each prospective candidate. A one-page survey questionnaire is included with
each invitation letter to serve as a screening tool in the selection o f the final candidates.
The invitation letters explain the topic and the purpose o f the focus group, and its
duration and contact persons.
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From those who respond favorably to participating in the focus group and answer
yes to the question o f whether they are familiar with the U.S . policy toward Iraq on the
questionnaire list, 10-12 candidates are selected as finalists. Once selected, the
participants are informed o f the place suggested for the focus group session, such as in a
private function room in a restaurant o f choice that is located in a midpoint for all
candidates.
A letter o f acknowledgment is mailed to each candidate. Along with the letter, a
one-page survey questionnaire is attached in a self-addressed/stamped envelope in order
for the participant to respond with the best available time to participate in the focus
group.
Once the candidates answer the survey questions and return them with their time
of availability and preference for a place o f gathering, a date and place is selected that is
agreeable to all prospective participants. Then, a confirmation letter is mailed to each
prospective participant in order to inform the participants o f the exact time, data, and
place of the focus group.
Each prospective participant learns the purpose o f the study, the duration and time
required to conduct the focus group, how data is gathered, for what reason the data is
used, how confidentiality is addressed, the benefits o f the study, and any possible risks
associated with the study. The prospective participants are informed that they can
withdraw from the focus group at any time and that their participation is voluntary and by
consent.
Each participant is assigned a code name in order to maintain confidentiality. The
participants’ identity is remains confidential at all times and no personal information is

135

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

collected from them. A separate master list with the names of participants and the
corresponding code numbers is kept. Once the data is collected and transcribed, the
master list is destroyed. During the actual session, the participants are asked several key
questions (no more than six), with a few additional probe questions to facilitate
discussion regarding the U.S. policy toward Iraq and their reflections and opinion o f this
policy.
A total o f ten to 12 candidates participate in the focus group. The rationale for
selecting only ten to twelve participants in the focus group is to keep the participants’
number small enough to facilitate good discussion, yet large enough to promote diversity
in opinion. The focus group session is audiotaped and transcribed. Once transcribed, the
audiotapes are destroyed. Any references to personal information that may emerge during
the focus group session are not transcribed and omitted.
All data retained for at least three years in a locked file. All participants sign a
consent form approved by Western Michigan University HSIRB in order to participate in
the focus group. All the signed consent forms are kept in a locked box in the principle
investigator’s office. During the focus group discussion, the participants are presented
with a list o f concepts that emerge in the literature review of the U.S. policy toward Iraq
in order to facilitate discussions and generate inputs.

One-on-One Interviews
The third strategy in collecting data is through one-on-one interviews. These
interviews are structural, whereby all respondents are asked the same questions regarding
the U.S. policy toward Iraq. The purpose in asking different respondents the same
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questions is to compare and contrast the answers with a common framework. These
questions follow the same order, and they are asked o f one individual at a time.
Each participant in the interview learns o f the purpose o f the study. The questions
on the policy toward Iraq are asked without changes in wording. Probe questions are used
without directing answers. The investigator’s personal opinions remain excluded.
The investigator relies on good listening skills and focuses on general trends and
patterns in the answers. The same procedure o f purposive sampling designed in selecting
the focus group participants is utilized to select the one-on-one interview participants.
Since each participant in the one-on-one interviews does not have to be concerned
about the preference for time and place of other participants, there is no need, as is the
case with the focus group, to coordinate availability schedule and preferences between all
participants. For the purpose o f the one-on-one interview, every participant chooses his/
her own time, date and place for the interview. Once a participant has selected a time,
date, and place for the interview, a confirmation letter is mailed to him/ her in order to
confirm the interview.
All one-on-one interviews are recorded and then transcribed. Each participant’s
name remains confidential and not referenced in the data. Each participant signs a
consent letter approved by W estern Michigan University’s HSIRB, indicating his/her
willingness to participate in the one-on-one interview.
The interview questions are open-ended and designed to facilitate in-depth
discussion and information. Probe and follow up questions are used to supplement the
key questions. Please see Appendix C to read these key questions.
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Summary
The assumption in this study is that the concepts to form emerging themes during
the processes o f linear analysis are related, and that the instruments to collect data
through secondary data review, focus group and one-on-one interview are reliable. The
assumption is that the purposive sampling o f secondary data, focus group and one-on-one
interview participants are appropriate. And, the transfer o f dimensions and images from
the complexity theories to steps two and three of the analysis are also accurate and based
on a correct understanding o f the new sciences o f complexity.
This study relies solely on the written word and its metaphorical construction.
Marshall & Rossman (1999) explain that the written word, according to is subject to the
investigator’s abilities and as such may contain errors and omissions (p. 117).
Developing a conceptual framework, designing a study that is systematic and
manageable, and having a continuous concern for ethical issues, resources, and
trustworthiness o f the overall data are important (Marshal & Rossman, 1999, pp. 55 &
91). Also, the investigator’s background as an Iraqi native who lived in Iraq for nearly 20
years and had to escape to the United States due to the tyrannical nature o f the former
Iraqi regime o f Saddam Hussein may bias his overall approach to data collection and
analyses. However, having a committee to challenge the investigator’s data collection
procedure and analysis and his own alertness to such bias help in maintaining a level o f
objectivity throughout the research process.
Conducting focus group and one-on-one interview in the aftermath of a war and
obtaining answers from participants without the possibility o f the war polarizing their
opinion also represent a challenge to the research’s objectivity. A careful screening
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process is thus important. The aim is to obtain objective data from the focus group and
one-on-one interview participants without having their answers polarized by the war in
Iraq and its aftermath.
In order to have a balanced observation o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq within the
context o f the new sciences of complexity, a comprehensive research strategy beyond the
immediate scope o f the policy is needed. A thorough knowledge o f the new sciences o f
complexity and their application to comprehensive policy studies will enrich further
investigation o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq as a dynamic system.
A comprehensive qualitative analysis o f a dynamic system according to the
complexity theories requires an analysis not bounded by time and space. Since the world,
according to complexity theories, is an interconnected web of associations, an analysis o f
a particular system within the world requires the encapsulation o f empirical information
concerning the world as a whole.
The same is true in regard to a comprehensive qualitative analysis o f the U.S.
policy toward Iraq. Such an analysis requires an understanding o f the social, political, and
economic dynamics both in Iraq and the United States from the early evolutionary stages
of both political entities up to date. It also requires discussing the interconnectedness o f
these dynamics with their environment and events in the world as a whole beyond
temporal and spatial limitation. Yet, such a wider scope is beyond the limitation o f this
research and it is open to future researches.
During this research, data analysis is guided by a Phi Model and constructed in
three steps. In the first step of the analysis, the U.S. policy toward Iraq is observed as a
linear progression, moving from one phase to another. The language o f the analysis is

139

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

presented as a machine metaphor. Data collected from focus group, one-on-one
interviews and secondary data is linearly analyzed by breaking it into parts (concepts,
themes, and super themes) and then by analyzing each part separately. Computer
software such as Ethnograph is utilized for the purpose o f coding the data.
The second step o f the analysis interprets the super themes that emerge in step one
according to four specific dimensions derived from complexity theories. These
dimensions are bifurcation, S-Matrix and mutual causality. The purpose o f the analysis is
to observe internal changes within the policy toward Iraq as impacted by trends in the
policy’s environment. The changes in the behavior o f the super themes as assessed by the
four dimensions derived from the complexity theories are indication o f internal changes
in the policy. The language of the analysis is a flux metaphor.
The third and final step is the same as step two. The same procedure used in step
two is used in step three. The emphasis o f the analysis, however, is observing the
environmental changes that impact the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Collectively, three steps
provide the study with a contrasting analysis o f the policy toward Iraq between two
perspectives: linear and complex.
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CHAPTER VI

THE LINEAR ANALYSIS
Introduction
The Linear Analysis constitutes the first step designed by the Phi Model in the
analysis o f U.S. policy toward Iraq. The linear analysis relies on the traditional inquiry of
understanding the whole by breaking it into parts and then analyzing each part separately.
Such analysis is an important prerequisite for a qualitative inquiry that will utilize the
complexity theories in steps two and three o f the Phi Model. Without the linear analysis,
the inquiry lacks the trends, themes and interpretive levels that enable steps two and three
o f the model to take place.
Step one uses Morgan’s Machine Metaphorical Model (Morgan, 1986, pp. 325347) for the purpose o f presenting the analysis. The material for this analysis is collected
from books, articles, official governmental documents, and lives data. The live data is
collected from a focus group and one-on-one interviews.

Ethnograph and Conceptual Analysis
The four collected data sets from books, articles, official governmental documents
and live data are broken into parts. Ethnograph is used in order to facilitate that process
while utilizing a codebook composed o f 67 specific concepts. Appendix D lists these
concepts and their definitions.
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The total occurrences o f all 67 concepts in the four data sets are 1343. Some
concepts have higher frequencies in the four data sets than others. There are certain
concepts that Ethnograph validates as important because o f their high frequencies in all
four data sets. There are other concepts that Ethnograph fails to validate as important and
considered insignificant because o f their low occurrence in the four data sets. Table Three
lists the 67 concepts and the number o f their occurrences in the four data sets.

Concept
Administrative
state
Ambiguity
American psyche

#
16

44
27
47

Concept
Kondratiev
wave
Legitimacy
Looking into
a mirror
Machiavellian
methods
Metaphor of
war
ME status quo
Militarism
Misleading

Hegemony

30
9

1
15

Hobbes vs.
Kant
Hypocrisy
Ideology

Control issues
Current as
epiphenomenon
Debate

4
2

Imperial pres.
Imperialism

9
14

7

Intensionality

5

Democratic
cave-in
Discourse

13

Iraqi
opposition
Irony

#
12

22
11

Concept
Dollar vs.
Euro
Enemy
Falsehood

10
33

Appointocracy

4

Fear factor

15

Attila the Elun

10

Folly politics

45

Capacity
Capitalism
Circular
reasoning
Coercion

12
11
7

Force
UN/ US goals
Geopolitics

38

Cold War
politics
Colonialism
Containment

12

34

67
54

#
7

Concept
Priorities

#
4

47
4

Power interest
Regionalism

25
53

16

45

1

Regime
change
Rhetoric

13
34
43

Simplicity
Survival
Symbolism

6
9
7

Mistrust

19

13

Misuse of
intelligence
Multilateral
Narrow state
interests
Oil
Paranoia

22

Trajectory’s
status quo
Trotskyism

9
47

Unilateralism
UN mistakes

22
9

70
5

Unipolarism
U.S. and Iraq
abuse o f UN
War as a
corrective

8
16

6

56

Pattern of
behavior
Preemption

8

Presidential x

11

29

Table 3. List o f Ethnograph Concepts and Their Occurrence in the Four Data Sets
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24

1

6

The highest occurring concepts are “The Role o f Oil,” “Force,” “Rhetoric,”
“Imperialism,” and “Enemy.” The lowest scoring concepts are “Debate,” “Priorities,” and
“Colonialism.” Figure Two illustrates a random sampling of the highest and lowest
occurring concepts in the data sets.

oil

force

rhetoric

imperialim

enerry

Debate

Priorities

Colonial

Figure 2. Random Sampling o f Highest and Lowest Occurring Concepts in Data

Concept occurrences in each individual data set differed as well. For example, in
the Books Data Set, the concept “Hypocrisy” occurs 33 times. In the Articles Data Set,
the concept “The Role o f Oil” occurs 35 times. In the Live Data Set, the concept “Narrow
State Interests” occurs 21 times. And, in the Documents Data Set, the concept
“Misleading” occurs 14 times. Figure Three illustrates these highest occurring concepts
in the four individual data sets.

■ Hypocrisy
■ Oil
□ State Interest

f

_____

.

..

■

■■■■■

Books

■■
Articles

'

□ Misleading

\

.

■

Live

Documents

Figure 3. The Highest Occurring Concepts in Each Data Sets
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As for the lowest occurring concepts in each individual data set, the concept
“Cold War Politics” is the lowest occurring concept in Books Data Set. The concept
“War as a Corrective Action” is the lowest occurring concept in Articles Data Set. The
concept “Capitalism” is the lowest occurring concept in Live Data Set. And, “The Middle
East and the Status Quo” is the lowest occurring concept in the Official Documents Data
Set. Figure Four illustrates these concepts’ low occurrences in each individual data set.

■ CW Politics
■ War Corrective
Act
□ Capitalism
□ ME Quo
Books

Articles

Live

Documents

Figure 4. The Lowest Occurring Concepts in the Data Sets

Books, Articles and Live Data Sets have an average o f 55 concepts occurring in
each set out o f the total o f 67 concepts, while Documents Data Set includes only 42
concepts out o f the total 67 concepts. This difference in the utility o f concepts makes
Document Data Set stand alone in a different category from the other three data sets.
Figure Five illustrates this difference.

B ooks

Articles

Live

3

D ocum ents

Figure 5. Chart o f the Total Numbers o f Concepts Occurred in the Data Sets
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In the Books Data Set, 433 are the total number o f concepts occurrences. In
Articles Data Set, the total are 447, and in the Live Data Set 326. In the Documents Data
Set, however, the total is only 139 occurrences, making the Document Data Set once
more stand alone in a different category than the other three data sets. Figure Six
illustrates this difference:

Documents
B ooks

A rtic les
Figure 6. Chart o f the Total Numbers o f Concepts Occurrences the Four Data

Since the total number o f concepts that compose Ethnograph’s codebook is 67
and some concepts do not occur in one or more data set, these non-occurring concepts are
valued at zero. In the Book Data Set, for example, there are 16 zero-valued concepts. In
the Articles Data Set, there are eight zero-valued concepts. In the Live Data Set, there are
nine zero-valued concepts. And, in Documents Data Set, there are 25 zero-valued
concepts. Figure Seven illustrates the total number o f non-occurrences o f concepts.

Books
Documents

Articles

Figure 7. The Total Number o f Non-Occurrences o f Concepts in the Four Data Sets
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As Figure Seven illustrates, the largest number o f zero-valued concepts is in the
Document Data Set. This is another example o f a difference between this data set and the
other three data sets. These combined differences illustrate that there is more
commonality between the Books, Article, and Live Data Sets and more differences
between these three sets and the Documents Data Set. It also refers to the gap between
the thinking and perspective o f ordinary citizens who generate the three data sets o f
books, articles and live, and the thinking and perspectives o f governmental officials who
generate the Documents Data Set.
Ethnograph is useful in recognizing such gaps in the relationships between the
four data sets as well as in identifying the level o f importance of each concept based on
its occurrences in the data sets. Several important trends emerge during this process.
1. The Articles Data Set shares a similarity with the general trend in the combined
four data sets because its highest and lowest occurring concepts are similar in
numbers to the highest and lowest occurring concepts in the four sets. As such,
article depicting the U.S. policy toward Iraq are credible source in observing the
policy and its trajectory.
2. Each data set is unique, and the four data sets are valid in their representations of
the policy.
3. The Documents Data Set stands alone and in a different category than the other
three data sets. The differences indicate a gap between the perspectives o f
ordinary citizens who generate Books, Articles and Live Data on the U.S. policy
toward Iraq and those who author the official governmental documents. This
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indicates that the myths and propaganda depicted by the official governmental
documents regarding the policy do not resonate with ordinary citizens.
4. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in observing U.S. policy toward Iraq and my
own anticipation, the former Iraqi regime’s behavior is not the most important
factor in any data set, including the governmental data set. What emerge as the
most important factors in U.S. policy toward Iraq are concepts such as “Oil,”
“Hypocrisy,” “Regionalism,” “Narrow State Interests,” and “Legitimacy.”
5. An extreme explanation o f U.S. policy toward Iraq, according to concepts such as
“Colonialism” and “Trotskyism,” is marginal.
6. Attempts to represent the U.S. policy toward Iraq based on ethics and morality are
also marginal. This is demonstrated in the low occurrences o f concepts such as
“Current as Epiphenomenon” and “Looking into a Mirror.”

Theme Analysis
Once the data are coded, several themes emerge from grouping concepts together
that share similar characteristics both in meaning and in the frequency of occurrences. A
total of 13 themes emerge in this process. Table Four demonstrates these 13 emerging
themes, definitions, and the concepts that construct each theme.
Table 4. Emerging Themes, Definitions, and Composing Concepts

Theme
The Baseball
Pitcher

The Judas
Syndrome

Definition

Concepts

It is a type o f functional and behavioral state o f the
American executive leadership in post Cold W ar
era that often operates aside the constitutional
separation o f power and emphasizes the rule o f the
executive branch over Congress.
It represents the policies adopted by nations states
for their own narrow interests, but is presented as
though they are serving a common good. These
policies also suffer, as a consequence of mistrust
and abuse.

Administrative State, Imperial
Presidency, Appointocracy,
Unilateralism, and Paranoia

U.S. and Iraq Abuse o f UN,
Mistrust, Narrow State Interests,
Presidential Extra, Gap Between
UN & U.S. Goals, UN Mistakes,
and Folly Politics
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T able 4— Continued

Theme

Definition

Concepts

Political
Metamorphism

The phase shifts and changes in composition of
U.S. policy toward Iraq

Amebic
Response

The Ameba changes its shape in response to light.
This metaphor represents Saddam’s response to
U.S. policy as a means for survival.
The metaphor o f economy represents America’s
pow er interests based on oil and the dollar as
pow er instruments to dominant the world.
The metaphor of Pax-Americana represents
A m erica’s drive to dominate the world as a new
imperial power, through the use o f military.
The metaphor of the Telephone Pole represents the
collapse o f the opposition party in the United
States as a viable voice for political discourse,
resulting in the administration’s political agendas
standing alone without challenge or examination.
M oby Dick avenges the threat to his environment
and the slaying of his mate by using force and
violence to offset the very violence that causes the
imbalance in his world. This metaphor emphases
w ar as a corrective action, and the leaning toward
the philosophy of Hobbes as a translation in doing
good.
The environment o f the Eskimos is cold that
requires balance in resources in order to preserve
energy for survival. Such necessity requires
cooperation, a sense o f community and universal
and regional collaboration in order to survive.
It is the means to achieve an end in the policy
tow ard Iraq.

Economic
Issues
Pax-Americana

The Telephone
Pole

M oby Dick

Eskimo
Community

Tactics

Rasputin

Shadows

Beyond Good
and Evil

Rasputin was the palace-power behind most of
T sar’s policies. This metaphor represents the
special powers (such as think tanks and special
interests) behind the decision-making process in
the policy toward Iraq.
It represents policies based on vague definitions,
symbolism, and simplistic explanation o f the
w orld in regard to the policy toward Iraq.
It represents the negation o f looking inward and
taking responsibility o f U.S. role in creating the
very evil in Iraq that it cried against while placing
itself hypocritically on a high moral ground.

Containment, Trajectory and
Status Quo, Kondratiev, Regime
Change Trajectory, and Iraqi
. Opposition
Control Issues, Survival Issues

Capitalism, Dollar Vs. Euro, The
role o f Oil, and Power Interests.
Colonialism, Hegemony,
Imperialism, and Militarism
Democratic Cave in, Discourse,
Debate, Priorities and Resources

War as a Corrective Action,
Force, Metaphor of War,
Hobbes vs. Kant, American
Psyche, Unipolar World, and
Capacity

Geopolitics, Regionalism, Cold
W ar Politics, ME Status Quo,
Multilateralism, and Legitimacy.

Circular Reasoning, Coercion,
Irony, Machiavelli, Fear Factor,
Falsehood, Misuse or
Misinterpretation o f Intelligence,
Current as Epiphenomenon,
Misleading,
Pattern o f Behavior, and Attila the
Hun.
Ideology, Intensionality,
Preemption, Rhetoric, Special
Interests, and Trotskyism.

Simplicity, Symbolism,
Ambiguity, Enemy, and the War
on Terrorism.
Hypocrisy and Looking into a
M irror
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The Baseball Pitcher
Four concepts go into the construction o f the baseball pitcher as an emerging
theme. These concepts are “Administrative State,” “Imperial Presidency,”
“Appointocracy,” “Unilateralism,” and “Paranoia.”
The baseball pitcher plays on a team. His performance, however, depends largely
on his own skills. The metaphor as such reflects a type of governance that resembles the
baseball pitcher in its reliance on governmental resources for support but it bases its
decision-making process on its own agendas. Let us examine the role o f some o f the
concepts that went into the construction o f this theme in order to better understand the
dynamics of the policy itself through the lens o f these concepts that interplay in the
composition of the theme.

Administrative State
The tendency in governance to move toward an administrative type encourages
the evolution of a strong executive at the expense o f the constitutional separation of
powers. Review o f secondary data (books, articles and documents) reveals that the move
toward an administrative state in the United States gradually was increasing, especially
after the Vietnam War and during the Nixon administration. The aim was to bring about a
strong executive who was able to dictate certain political agendas outside the traditional
checks and balances in governance.
Such a tendency was reduced in later events. After the Watergate scandal and the
resignation of Richard Nixon, the drive toward an administrative state slowed
considerably. However, it was revived during the presidency o f George W. Bush. As a
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consequence, the U.S. policy toward Iraq became increasingly guided by the Executive
branch o f government and was curtailed according to this branch’s political will.
Congress, in the process, became a less partner and subservient to the Executive branch
rather than its equal.
A political historian and expert on this matter states in a one-on-one interview that
“Congress chose to surrender its right to declare war in 2002 to the president as a failure
o f courage and a failure o f conscience. The stage had been set by not questioning a
variety o f policies and the decisions that Bush had made all the way along the road.”

Imperial Presidency
Within this metaphor, the concept o f Imperial Presidency is the chief aim of the
administrative state. When there is an imperial presidency handling America’s foreign
policy, such policy will be immune from the scrutiny and examination o f the two other
branches o f government. The concept of the imperial presidency and strong executive
emerged during the Kennedy administration. The concept then further developed during
the Nixon administration as contempt for Congress and the process o f checks and
balances were increased and favored by the administration.
However, with the manner in which Nixon resigned his position as president, the
concept o f Imperial Presidency was marginalized during the administrations o f Ford,
Carter, Reagan and Clinton. With George W. Bush in the White house, attempts once
again were made to revive the concept by belittling the role o f Congress and
strengthening the executive branch to dictate its political agenda with little or no
oversight by Congress,
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Unilateralism
The Imperial Presidency and its administrative state rely on unilateralism as a
necessary mechanism in order to carry out their function. Unilateralism, as a concept, is
the willingness to take political actions by a government with little or no regard to
established national and international norms. As such, unilateralism serves the imperial
presidency because it is able to advance its political agenda without adherence to other
concerns.
However, unilateralism is not something new or unique only to the imperial
presidency and the administrative state. In a one-on-one interview, a political scientist
states that “unilateralism is not some thing new in American politics, and although it was
used to advance the concepts of administrative state and imperial presidency, it,
nevertheless, was embedded in America’s political tradition.” This expert adds that “if we
are to be political realists, we have to understand that every major war that occurred in
our time was unilateral.”
Yet, unilateralism was not a normative practice in U.S. foreign policy despite its
historical past and current occurrences. In a one-on-one interview with a political
historian “the Bush administration has departed from the previous administrations by its
unilateralism.” This expert cites a few examples for such unilateral action, such as “the
refusal to accept revisions to the Hague tribunals, the refusal to honor the Kyoto accord,
and the failure of the U.S. to attract viable allies in the war in Iraq, especially its
traditional allies.”
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Appointocracy
It is used as a vehicle by the baseball pitcher in order to shift governance toward
an administrative state, headed by an imperial presidency. Appointocracy is not only a
symptom of the administrative state but also one o f its main products and requirements. If
we to observe the American administration of post-Saddam Iraq, it will become clear to
us that appointocracy was one o f the main ingredients that went into the construction o f
both the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council. Even the Bush
administration’s attempt to build democracy in Iraq by transferring authority to Iraqis
after June 30, 2004 became based on such a concept by appointing selected Iraqis by the
Bush administration to form the new Iraqi government.
In a one-on-one interview with a former leader o f an Iraqi opposition group in
exile, the tendency to rely too much on appointocracy became a matter o f concern. The
former leader asks that the policy’s decision-makers to avoid “appointed Iraqis chosen by
America rather than the Iraqi people,” and advises them to “build civil and democratic
institutions from the bottom up, by creating local councils that are democratic, and to
respect the right o f the Iraqi people to take charge o f their own affairs.”
The frequency in the content analysis of four for a concept related to issues o f
appointocracy, and a frequency o f 16 for a concept related to issue o f administrative state
demonstrate that there is a tendency in U.S. policy toward Iraq, while building on past
traditions in some aspects and violating other traditions in other aspects, to gradually
move toward an administrative state and an imperial presidency while practicing a
unilateral approach toward decision making in the political process whether abroad or at
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home. This increased tendency is represented by the metaphor o f the baseball pitcher and
constitutes one o f the features of the policy.

The Judas Syndrome
The second theme that emerges from grouping similar concepts together is the
metaphor o f The Judas Syndrome. This theme is constructed from concepts such as “U.S.
and Iraqi Abuse o f the United Nations,” “Mistrust,” “Narrow State Interests,”
“Presidential Extras,” “Gap Between UN and UN Goals Relative to Iraq,” “UN
Mistakes,” and “Folly Politics.”
The Judas Syndrome is a metaphor that represents policies intended to do good
deeds but results instead in creating negative consequences. The metaphor borrows its
meaning from the Biblical character o f Judas, one o f the twelve disciples o f Jesus. Judas
betrayed Jesus thinking he was doing something noble in having Jesus brought to the
High Priest in Jerusalem to persuade him to his cause. However, Judas’ action led to the
arrest and consequent crucifixion o f Jesus, instead.
The Judas metaphor, as such, represents national and international policies
adopted to do good deeds that subsequently cause more harm than good. Now, let us
examine some o f the concepts that went into the construction o f this theme and observe
the policy’s dynamics through their lenses.

Folly Politics
Perhaps the most obvious policy that intended to do good but resulted in causing
harm was the UN economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after 1990. The sanctions were
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intended to disarm Saddam and force his compliance with UN resolutions. Instead, they
harmed the Iraqi people and caused the deaths o f nearly one-quarter-million Iraqi
children each year because o f malnutrition and disease.
The UN attempted to modify the sanctions in order to ease the suffering o f the
Iraqi people, and allowed Iraq to sell limited amount of its oil in order to buy food. But
this Oil for Food program came late, especially when Saddam refused to implement it for
many years because he feared losing control over Iraq as a result. The United States’
insistence on enforcing the sanctions despite their negative impacts made the policy more
punitive and less positive.
In a one-on-one interview with a political scientist, there is a testimony to the
fallacy o f designing a policy based on good intentions without carefully thinking through
the consequences. According to the interview, “the sanctions meant to change the Iraqi
regim e’s attitude. The UN and the U.S. thought that it would be able to take the authority
from Saddam by having direct connection with the Iraqi people through the distribution
o f food through the oil-for-food program. This, however, did not work because neither
the UN nor the U.S. anticipated how the sanction was going to hurt average Iraqis.”

Gap Between U.S. and UN Goals
In addition to such folly politics, there is also the concept o f a gap between the
U.S. goals in Iraq and those o f the UN. As the history chapter reveals, after the G ulf War
o f 1991, the goal o f the United Nations was to disarm Iraq of weapons o f mass
destruction. The United States goal, however, was to implement a regime change in Iraq
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by toppling the regime o f Saddam Hussein either through supporting plots by the Iraqi
opposition groups or by direct military involvement.
The differences in goals between the United Nations and the United States toward
Iraq created a gap in the overall political approach toward Iraq between the UN and the
U.S. The U.S. used such a gap in order to exploit the UN for its own political agenda, and
the UN failed to recognize these illegal and unauthorized practices by the United States.
At times when there was a roadblock in front o f UN inspectors in Iraq, the United
Nations attempted to resolve the matter peacefully through negotiation. The United
States, on the other hand, used the situation to escalate the tension and attack Iraq
militarily.
The U.S. justified its action by stating that it continued to believe that Iraq was
producing weapons o f mass destruction. Although there was no clear evidence to support
this claim, the United States government continued to portray Iraq as having the same
weapon capacity in 2003 as it did in 1990.

Mistrust
An important component that comprises the Judas Syndrome is Mistrust. Based
on this concept, neither Saddam nor the United States trusted one another, and they
constructed their relationships based on such mistrust. This notion went back as early as
the 1970s and it further heightened after the Gulf War o f 1991. Such mistrust in the
Middle East was caused by the United States support for Israel and the Baathists poor
human rights record in Iraq and political alliances in the world.
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After the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, the United States saw in Iraq a useful
(yet temporary) ally to do its bidding in the region. Iraq also used U.S. support in order to
build its military capability during its eight years war with Iran. Once the Iran-Iraq war
ended in 1988, however, that temporary alliance came to an end. In its stead, mistrust
returned in a full scale, leading to open hostilities and later to a military conflict during
the G ulf War of 1991.
The ignorance and miscalculations on both the Iraqi and the American sides was
created by the lack o f any real relationship prior to the Iran-Iraq War. According to a
participant in this research focus group, “the key event for mistrust between the United
States and Iraq was the invasion o f Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.”
Another participant agrees with the statement. He argues that ’’Saddam
miscalculated. He assumed that he had a free hand to settle his dispute with Kuwait, but
he overlooked the security o f oil in the area, which brought him to U.S. attention as a
dangerous man.”
The mistrust, however, was mutual both between Saddam and the United States.
Another participant in the focus group states that “there was a mutual mistrust and
misunderstanding between America and Saddam. The U.S. did not quite understand what
Saddam was like, and Saddam did not understand America’s interests.”
Saddam also miscalculated U.S. resolve and thought that his war with Iran had
earned him a favor with the United States that would prevent a confrontation if he
attempted to attack Kuwait. This error in judgment by Saddam was, according to a focus
group participant, “a vast miscalculation. Taking Kuwait militarily while the U.S. was the
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only remaining superpower who had vested economic interests in the region and its
stability simply was wrong.”

Nation-state Interest
Another concept that participates in the construction o f the Judas Syndrome is
“Nation-state Interests.” When a nation-state prefers its narrow interests to the collective
interests of the world community, it is in effect creating a Judas Syndrome.
It was based on the narrow nation-state interests o f the United States during the
1980s, for example, that the Reagan administration supported Iraq during its war with
Iran. According to a one-on-one interview with a political historian, “what happened in
the Iran-Iraq War came in the aftermath o f the revolution in Iran and the hostage crisis
with the United States, which rendered the United States much less disposed to come to
Iran’s assistance in the context and to hope to offset Iran with Iraqi power.”
Once Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. national interest moved from the
position of supporting Saddam to confronting him. All focus group participants agree on
this point and expressed their consensus in a statement by one o f their participants who
stressed that “Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait threatened Saudi Arabia, and a threat to
Saudi Arabia was a direct threat to the United States because o f the U.S. reliance on
Saudi oil.”
Another focus group participant argues: “if Saddam was going to stay in Kuwait
he was going to become a potential threat to Saudi Arabia. He was a wild card that grew
even wilder. As long as he was a wild card against Iran, America did not mind him, but
when he grew wilder by taking Kuwait, then the situation changed.”
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As o f 1990, U.S. national interest continued to verge toward continuous
confrontation with Saddam. In 1998, this confrontation was clearly pronounced with the
U.S. government officially adopting the policy o f regime change in Iraq. The Bush
administration later built on this policy to justify its own doctrine o f preemption and
consequence invasion o f Iraq.
According to a focus group participant, “the strategy o f the current administration,
as reflected in the national interest and self-interest o f the U.S. as they saw it, had to do
with a regime change in Iraq. Our policy now is based solely on national interest. Under
the Bush administration, the U.S. is backing off from international interest for its own
self-interest.”
The United States alone, however, is not the only nation in the world who is
guilty o f advocating its national interest and placing it above international norms and the
collective interests o f the world community. In a one-on-one interview with a political
scientist, “France, Russia and Germany all had interests and contracts in Iraq. They did
not support the American effort because o f their national interest, not because of
international law.”
The nation-state interest, especially the power interest o f corporate America and
the governmental policy that defends them, becomes more problematic when it is held as
part o f the national interest. A member o f the focus group equates the national interests
and national security. He states that “our national security, self-interests are the most
important elements in our policy now. There is a problem in summing national interests
and national security as the same.”
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When U.S. national interest and national security are viewed as one, not all
nation-states will support the United States in all aspects o f its foreign policy, especially
the policy toward Iraq. This does not mean that those nations are against American
security. Rather, it means that they have their own national interest to follow. As one o f
the focus group members explains it, “we are falling into the argument that other
countries either have to agree with us or we will do it anyway. The issue is not whether or
not France and Germany support us. The U.S. has its own self-interest, so do France and
other nation-states.”
In a one-on-one interview with the former leader o f an Iraqi opposition group in
exile, the subject agrees with the focus group’s assessment with regards to U.S. policy
and interest in Iraq, stating that “the underlining reason for the U.S. involvement in Iraq
was for its own interests in the Middle East, mostly economic. Politically, the U.S. policy
toward Iraq is not going to influence the overall American foreign policy that much,
although things changed after September 11, 2001.”
Content analysis with frequencies o f 15 for a concept related to issues of
containment, 13 for a concept related to issues o f Middle East stability and status quo,
and 47 for a concept related to issues o f nation-state interest indicate that U.S. selfinterest changed after September 11, 2001 toward removing U.S. troops from Saudi
Arabia. The presence o f these troops in the Muslim holy land in Saudi Arabia after the
G ulf War o f 1991 angered Islamic fundamentalists and led some of them (the al-Qaeda
network) to retaliate by attacking the United States on September 11, 2001. And since the
purpose o f these troops was to contain Saddam, their removal meant the end of
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containment itself and the subsequent removal of Saddam him self from power in Iraq in
order to end the justification for the positioning o f U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.

Presidential Extras
Another important concept that participates in the construction o f the Judas
Syndrome is Presidential Extras. Presidents are human beings, and like many other
human beings in powerful positions, at times they allow their personal affairs,
relationships, family ties, and political affiliations to play an important role in their
political decision-making process.
As such, presidential extras emerge as a result o f personal affairs or because of
family ties related to U.S. policy abroad or at home. The policy toward Iraq is one o f the
arenas that witnessed such an impact.
Two presidents stand out in allowing their “extra” personal issues to affect their
decisions regarding Iraq. One was President Clinton who used Iraq as a diversion from
his impeachment trials in 1998. The other was President George W. Bush who used
Saddam’s alleged attempt to assassinate his father, former President Bush, during his trip
to Kuwait in 1993, as a motivation to further the cause toward war in Iraq in 2003.
In regards to President Clinton’s extra presidential issues, his decision to launch
Operation Desert Fox against Iraq, for example, began just one day prior to his
impeachment by the U.S. House o f Representatives and ended once the House impeached
him. The timing o f Desert Fox, among other issues, led many political commentators to
believe that the President’s decision to bomb Iraq was based on diverting attention from
his impeachment trial. They labeled it with the phrase, “wagging the dog,” a reference to
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a Hollywood movie that depicted a fictional president who started a war with a third
world country in order to divert attention from a scandal in which he was involved.
In a one-on-one interview, an expert on U.S. policy toward Iraq echoed the
“wagging the dog” analogy by stating that “the reason people said that Clinton’s action in
Iraq at the time was akin to wagging the dog was because it took place while he was
under the threat o f impeachment and he wanted to generate popular support to overcome
impeachment.”
Presidential extras reflect negatively on the president and undermine his decision,
even if these extra issues are just a matter o f perception. A member o f the focus group
views President Clinton as a weak president precisely because o f such a perception,
stating that “Clinton was a weak president, had a sex scandal and was impeached because
of it, and as a consequence he did not carry on his Iraq policy, as he should.”
In reference to President George W. Bush and the impact o f his personal issues on
his decisions regarding Iraq, another focus group participant states that “Bush is not very
smart to carrying out a complex confrontational policy such as this one. Cheney and
others drove the policy and Bush went along with them because he did not like Saddam,
especially when Saddam tried to assassinate his father in 1993.”
In another interview, a political scientist disagrees with the previous statement by
the participant in the focus group. According to this expert, “the underlining motive for
the war with Iraq in 2003 was to defend the United States. When America perceives
threat, although not clear or easy to define, such a perceived threat becomes central to its
ability to defend itself. As for the issue o f Bush trying to defend his father’s honor by
going after Saddam, no one can play that kind o f psychological game.”
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UN Mistakes
The other critical concept in the Judas Syndrome is the issue o f UN mistakes in
reference to its relation to U.S. policy toward Iraq. These mistakes, although lacking
intensionality and evil intent, result in promoting the mentality and behavior of violence,
whether by Iraq or by the United States, and in causing harm to the Iraqi people who
suffered for many years the horror o f brutality, economic sanctions and wars. The history
chapter in this dissertation summarizes these United Nations mistakes as the following

• When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United Nations imposed
economic sanctions on Iraq in order to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. When
sanctions alone did not persuade Saddam to pull his armies out o f Kuwait, the UN
authorized the use o f force to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 and maintained the
sanctions until the fall o f Saddam’s regime in 2003. The UN neither lifted nor
eased these sanctions despite the suffering of the Iraqi people.
• The United States infiltrated the UN inspection teams in Iraq with its own spies,
often with UN knowledge and authorization. Yet, the UN failed to take any action
to restore its credibility as an impartial world body even when those spies where
exposed.
• Despite three decades o f the Iraqi regim e’s violation o f human rights in Iraq from
the rise o f the Baath Party to power in Iraq in 1968, the UN did not react against
the Iraqi government's behavior except in 1991 when it passed Resolution 668,
demanding Iraq to treat its citizens fairly. The resolution, however, was
ineffective because it was not adopted under Chapter VII that obligated all UN
member states to enforce the resolution.
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•

Between 1991 and 2003, the United States took it upon itself to unilaterally
interpret the UN resolutions and bomb Iraq without the United Nations’
authorization. Yet, the UN failed to issue any resolution against the United States
for its violation o f established international norms.

•

In 2003, the United Nations refused to authorize the use o f force against Iraq. Yet,
the Bush administration went ahead with its military plan o f a preemptive strike
and invaded Iraq. The UN, however, failed to issue any resolution against the
United States’ unauthorized use o f force against Iraq. Instead, the UN issued
Resolution 1511 (see United Nations, 2003c), legitimizing the U.S. occupation
and administration o f Iraq.

The United States and Iraq’s Abuse o f the United Nations
The last component that participates in the construction o f the Judas Syndrome is
the concept o f “The United States and Iraq’s Abuse o f the United Nations.” Content
analysis yields a frequency o f 16 for a concept related to issues o f U.S. and Iraq’s abuse
o f the UN mission in Iraq that Iraq did so in order to retaliate against U.S. spies in UN
inspection teams, and also to give the false impression that it continued to possess WMD
as a measure o f deterrence. On the other hand, the United States used the UN and its
inspection teams to gather information on the Iraqi regime’s security apparatus and
defense mechanism in order to plan plots for regime change. As such, both Iraq and the
U.S. were guilty o f using the United Nations for their own political agendas, instead of
actively working within the UN mandate to implement the 1991 ceasefire resolution.

163

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Political Metamorphism
The theme o f political metamorphism emphasizes the changes that take place in
the policy as it moves from one phase to another. The theme is emerging from the
grouping together o f concepts such as “Containment,” “Iraqi Opposition,” “Kondratiev’s
Wave,” “Regime Change Trajectory,” and the “Trajectory of U.S. Policy toward Iraq.”

Containment
The first concept that takes part in the construction of this theme is Containment.
Containment was a phase in the U.S. policy toward Iraq that followed the G ulf W ar o f
1991. It began during the administration o f George H. Bush and continued during the
administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In 1998, however, the Clinton
administration, while maintaining containment, shifted the policy toward officially
adopting the concept o f regime change by signing the Iraq Liberation Act into law. After
September 11, 2001, containment was no longer a viable element in the policy, and the
Bush administration replaced it with the concept o f preemption and toppling the Iraqi
regime o f Saddam Hussein through direct military intervention.
The longest period o f the containment era occurred during the presidency o f Bill
Clinton. During this period, Saddam was contained within a specific sphere o f action
designed by the Clinton administration. The Iraqi regime was managed so it would not
pose a threat to its neighbors or to the United States. Several mechanisms were used to
enforce this management. Among these mechanism were the enforcement o f the UN
economic sanctions, the no-fly-zones in northern and southern Iraq, supporting the Iraqi
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opposition, and periodically attacking Saddam’s military and security installations by
cruise missiles.
The Clinton administration adopted containment not only toward Iraq but also
toward terrorism as well. In a one-on-one interview, a political scientist and an expert on
Clinton’s foreign policy states that “the Clinton administration policy o f containment was
practiced not only in Iraq but also was tried to contain terrorism as the administration was
reluctant to commit troops on ground. Its preferred policy was to use cruise missiles and
high-flying bombers in order to contain the world. Such policy did not remove Saddam’s
threat or terrorism’s ability to strike against us.”
The former leader o f the Iraqi opposition group agrees that containment was not
working. In a one-on-one interview, the expert states that “in the mid-1990, the U.S.
policy was designed to contain Saddam, not cause his removal. During the Clinton
administration, containment was tried through the enforcement o f the no-fly-zone and the
UN economic sanctions. But the no-fly-zone was not effective because Saddam
continued sending his tanks to southern Iraq and killing people. It was because o f that
Clinton adopted the policy o f regime change in 1998.”
In addition to the ineffectiveness o f the no-fly-zone, there was also the issue o f
Saddam smuggling oil outside the UN imposed embargo that added to the erosion o f the
policy o f containment. In the same interview stated above, the former leader argues that
“Clinton figured out that Saddam was smuggling oil, and continued supporting
Palestinian terrorist groups. So the United States had no choice but to replace Saddam,
especially when he was unable to change, did not trust America, and America did not
trust him.”
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Under George W. Bush, containment finally collapsed. Even if containment was
allowed to continue, it was going to stand as an obstacle to forwarding U.S. interests. As
one of the participants in the focus group had phrase it, “containment was beneath the
new America, the world’s new empire and the sole superpower.”

The Iraqi Opposition
The other concept that takes part in the construction o f the theme of political
metamorphism is the concept o f the Iraqi Opposition. The Iraqi opposition groups were
part of U.S. policy toward Iraq and emerged from being an insignificant element in 1990
to becoming part o f U.S. efforts in implementing a regime change in Iraq in 1995 to
becoming an important part of the regime change policy in Iraq as o f 1998.
The Iraqi opposition groups were used by the U.S. policy toward Iraq to advance
the policy’s agendas, as they too used the policy to advance their own agendas. Often,
these opposition groups fed the U.S. false information and flimsy intelligence in order to
encourage a tougher U.S. policy toward Iraq and to engage the United States militarily in
removing Saddam from power.
According to a one-on-one interview with the former leader o f an Iraqi opposition
group in exile, “some o f the opposition had some information about what Saddam was
doing. Others had outdated information. And at times, Saddam used to send false
information indirectly to confuse the Americans.”
The former leader adds that, “the Iraqi opposition could not get rid of Saddam on
its own. But in 1994 and 1995 the Iraqi opposition was in a good position to get rid o f
him. Unfortunately the CIA leaked the information and Saddam was able to get rid o f the
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plotters. The CIA did not trust the Iraqi opposition to do a good job partly because they
failed to form a united front.”
According to another one-on-one interview with a political scientist, “relying on
exiled groups has a long tradition in the American administration’s practices during the
20th century. The Iraqi opposition did what such people always do, telling the U.S. what
it wanted to hear and how that would help its position.”
According to a third interview with a political historian, "the Iraqi opposition
groups were active, starting in 1991. They were pushing for their own interest. They did
not get the results, but they did not give up. They had some influence on the policy
toward Iraq but they were as much used as using.”
According to a focus group participant, “the U.S. had to rely on human
intelligence in an environment where it did not have very good tools to gather
information. So the information that came through the exiled groups was often
misleading.”

The Kondratiev’s Wave
The other concept within this theme is the Kondratiev’s Wave. Although it is
often used in economics, we can use the concept o f the Kondratiev’s Wave in this
analysis as a reference to the cycle o f appearance and reappearance o f a phenomenon
repeatedly once in every three or four successive blocks o f time. In assessing the U.S.
policy toward Iraq from 1990 to 2003, for example, we can trace such a wave by
following the cycle o f appearance and reappearance of a particular phenomenon but each
time under different conditions.
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In a one-on-one interview with a political scientist, emphasis is placed on the
recycling of political influence between the two major political parties in the United
States every five or six decades. This recycling o f influence in successive time sequence
is analogous to the Kondratiev’s Wave. The expert states that “the principal impact o f the
Iraq war o f 2003 in the U.S. was to force the opposition party to develop a peace
framework for its political platform and an anti-war agenda. This is something that occurs
in America only once every several generations, when one party’s views are so dominant
that they remain dominant for sixty some years.”
This recycling o f political influence also involves the recycling o f political
agendas within the U.S. policy toward Iraq. It includes choosing ready-made solutions
that were adopted in previous experiences, such as in Vietnam or Cuba, and applying
them to Iraq with no regard to the specific conditions o f Iraq and the changes in the
circumstances. Relying on ready-made solutions from previous experience is analogous
to pulling a response out o f a hat, with the responses written prior to the actual event.
This scenario is also known in management and organizational theories as the Garbage
Can Model, with managers pulling ready-made solutions out of the garbage can to fit
arising problems.

Regime Change Trajectory
The fourth concept that takes part in the construction of this theme is the
trajectory of regime change in Iraq. This concept represents the evolution o f regime
change politics in the policy toward Iraq from a covert action in 1990 to an official policy
o f the United States in 1998, and then to the main principle of the war o f preemption in
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2003. Content analysis uncovers a frequency o f 45 for a concept related to issues o f
regime change trajectory that the transition in the development of this concept from 1990
to 2003 had pointed to its impact on the overall direction o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq.

The Trajectory o f the Policy
The final concept that takes part in the construction o f this theme is that o f the
trajectory o f policy itself toward Iraq. The concept illustrates changes and progression in
the U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1990 to 2003. These changes are indicators of
metamorphism in the policy, making the concept itself one of the indicators o f change in
the political metamorphism o f the policy. Other indicators of political metamorphism are
the remaining concepts that participate in the construction o f this theme.
The trajectory in the policy began during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. It was
intended to maintain status quo in the Middle East without allowing any regional power
to disrupt this political balance in the region. This trajectory continued during the G ulf
War after Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990. It was then too that the policy was intended
to restore the balance in the region that Saddam had disrupted momentarily by his
invasion o f Kuwait. Such a trajectory continued during the containment era o f the 1990s,
and also during the Iraq war o f 2003. During each period, the policy’s intent was to
maintain the status quo in the Middle East.
Why was maintaining political balance in the Middle East so important to the
policy? One o f the participants in the focus group answers this question by stating “if
Saddam was sitting on empty sand without oil, his problems wouldn’t be a big deal for
us. America’s corporate interest, where oil is a big part o f it, played an important part in
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our political calculations. This was an active trajectory to either interfere passively as did
Clinton or aggressively as did Bush. This is not going to go away until the oil is gone.”
Another participant o f the focus group presents a different picture by arguing that
there is a difference in the trajectory between Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. and their approach
toward Iraq. The participant states that “we miss out if we do not calculate the differences
between the Bushes. The current Bush is very much a mediocrity, supported by
ideologues who believe that there can be a Pax Americana. His father, Bush Sr., on the
other hand, was much more moderate and pragmatic and had a better understanding o f
the reality o f world politics.”
Both perspectives, despite their differences, emphasize that there is a trajectory in
the policy toward Iraq, a sort o f phase shift that evolves with changes in the
administrations as well as world politics. This is important because it stresses the notion
that the policy toward Iraq is dynamic, never static, and always changing.

The Amebic Response
The microorganism known as the Ameba changes its shape and behavior in
response to light. Borrowing from this metaphor in order to describe the behavior o f the
former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, the theme represents the former Iraqi regim e’s
response to the U.S. policy toward Iraq based on its need for survival. The theme consists
of two concepts: “Control Issue,” and “Survival Issue.”
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Control Issue
Consists o f the former Iraqi regime’s continuous attempts to sabotage or disrupt
international relief efforts, such as the UN Oil-for-Food-Program in order to maintain its
control over the Iraqi people. Control issue as practiced by the regime o f Saddam Hussein
continued without disruption without regard by the regime to ease up the suffering o f the
Iraqi people who were hurt by the UN imposed economic sanctions.

Survival Issue
Refers to the tactics and maneuvers adopted by the former Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein in order to survive. These tactics ranged from playing a cat-and-mouse
game with the UN inspection teams, manipulating divisions within the United Nations
Security Council in order to serve its interest, manipulating divisions among the Iraqi
ethnic and tribal groups in order to disable unified efforts against the regime, and
infiltrating the Iraqi opposition groups in order to pass false information to the United
States, all intended to serve as means for the regime to remain in power.
Perhaps the Iraqi regime’s tactic in passing false information to the United States
about Iraq’s WMD was the most dangerous game played by the regime. On one hand,
passing this false information to the United States through double agents in the Iraqi
opposition groups may have served as deterrence and delayed any plan o f military
invasion o f Iraq. But, it brought the world into a consensus that Iraq was not entirely free
o f WMD and as such it prolonged the inspection o f Iraq’s weapons programs. It also led
in 2003 to the conclusion by the United States that these weapons were a threat and
warranted a full-scale invasion in order to disarm Iraq. Thus, while Iraq intended to use
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false information about its WMD to deter invasion, in the end it actually invited its own
invasion.
In a one-on-one interview with the former leader of an Iraqi opposition group in
exile, “Saddam wanted to show the international community that he had those kind o f
weapons so America would not attack him. Tariq Aziz, while in prison today, admitted to
this. So it was a kind o f deterrence tactic. But for America, it had to look at Saddam’s
history. The issue was trust.”

Economic Issues
The theme o f economic issues represents America’s economic interests based on
oil and the dollar as power instruments to dominate the Middle East. The theme emerges
by grouping together concepts such as “Capitalism,” “Dollar versus the Euro,” and
“Power Interests.”

Capitalism
This concept refers to the specific mode o f production that is based on capital
investment and surplus. Capitalism uses natural resources, technology, and labor to
change these materials into goods (products). Upon their sale profit is generated for the
owners of the production means as a result o f differences between aggregate costs and
revenues. Capitalism is also based on competition, marketing and the use o f the nation
state mechanism in order to advance its interest.
In the United States, capitalism is the main engine of its economy. The frequency
in content analysis o f 11 for a concept related to issues of capitalism reveals that the
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health o f the United' States is based on the progress and prosperity o f its capitalist system.
As such, the United States government employs its public policies in order to support the
American capitalist system on a global scale.
Content analysis demonstrates a frequency o f 25 for a concept related to issues of
power interest, a low frequency o f one for a concept related to issues o f colonialism, and
a frequency o f 11 for a concept related to issues o f capitalism that since American
capitalism depends on raw materials, open markets, and cheap labor, the United States
government utilizes its policies and military in order to assure the American capitalist
system’s access to these necessities. And, it is precisely in quest of such resources to
compete successfully with other economic systems in the world that the U.S. policy
toward Iraq has born. This policy has become part of the American capitalist system’s
strive for survival and continuation as a viable economic system.

The Dollar Versus the Euro
The other concept that takes part in the construction o f this theme is the
competition between U.S. Dollar and the new European currency, the Euro. For decades,
the Dollar maintained its supremacy in the world, reflecting the supremacy o f the U.S.
capitalist system in the world. However, with the formation o f the European Union and
the creation o f the Euro as its new currency that supremacy o f the Dollar is challenged.
Nation states that want to carve a notch for themselves outside the economic
hegemony o f American capitalism are welcoming the Euro. This drive toward the Euro is
empowering Europe as a new economic and political block to challenge U.S. leadership
and influence in the world. Content analysis with a frequency count o f 12 for a concept
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related to the issues of the Dollar versus the Euro indicates that Iraq became part o f this
equation by adopting the Euro for its economic transactions, a matter that further shifted
the El.S. policy toward Iraq in favor o f toppling the Iraqi regime and by doing, thereby
reducing the influence of the Euro in that oil-rich part o f the world.

on
The third concept that participates in the construction o f this theme is “Oil.” This
concept represents the impact o f oil as a political influence on the policy. Oil impacted
both Iraqi and U.S. behavior toward one another, dictating and directing the course o f
their policies.
During the containment era in the 1990s, for example, Iraq was allowed to sell
limited amount o f its oil in order to buy food for its citizens. OPEC exempted Iraq from
its quota in order to help Iraq recover from the devastation o f the Gulf War. Saddam used
this quota also to sell oil that was smuggled outside UN authorization. Saddam’s action
encouraged U.S. policy to adopt a more aggressive approach toward Iraq in order to end
the smuggling o f Iraqi oil and impacting o f the world oil market.
One o f the participants in the focus group alludes to the role o f oil in directing
U.S. policy and leading to war in 2003, stating that “oil on its own was not a cause for
war, especially when Iraq was willing to sell its oil and we were willing to buy it. The
important issue was controlling this oil and using it politically to benefit U.S. interest in
its competition with Europe.”
Another focus group participant agrees with this notion, adding that “Iraq was
always a bit o f a question mark, especially when it nationalized its oil in 1972. After
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Septemberl 1, 2001, Iraqi oil became a weak spot in the link between oil and U.S. power,
so we needed to secure that link and strengthen it by removing the source that made it
weak for us: Saddam.”
In a one-on-one interview with a political historian, the importance o f oil in
directing the policy is echoed once more. According to this expert, “the underlining
motive for the Bush administration to go to war in 2003 was oil. The administration had a
domestic agenda to roll-back domestic relation in the United States to the 1890s, by
securing the economic advantages for the key sectors in the society and by bringing us
back to complete reliance on oil.”
The high frequency count in content analysis o f 70 for a concept related to issues
of oil and its impact on the U.S. policy toward Iraq, the frequency count o f 30 for a
concept related to issues o f hegemony, and the frequency count o f 15 for a concept
related to issues o f containment demonstrate that when demand for energy became the
central issue in U.S. policy, the Bush administration’s policy toward Iraq was influenced
by increased demand for foreign oil by the United States both as an energy source and as
a political veto to maintain U.S. hegemony in the world. It was primarily because o f this
demand that the Bush administration was determined to end the policy o f containment in
Iraq and to topple the regime o f Saddam Hussein by force.

Power Interest
The last concept that goes in the formation o f this theme is that o f Power Interest.
This refers to the special interest o f the United States as a nation-state obligated to protect
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the interest o f its corporations. Power interest plays a major role in shaping the policy
toward Iraq as well as other nations in the world.
Content analysis provides a frequency o f 25 for a concept related to issues o f
power interests that one o f the major reasons for the Bush administration to go to war
with Iraq in 2003, for example, was because American oil and military corporations
foresaw in Iraq a fertile arena not only for profit but also for global economic hegemony.
The war became a vehicle to advance the economic interest o f corporate America.
The line between U.S. interest and corporate America’s interest became so murky
that when we speak of U.S. interest, we are in effect speaking o f Am erica’s corporate
interest. The American government on its own has no specific economic interests because
it is not a producer. Rather, it relies on taxes it collects from the public and profitgenerating organizations in order to pay for its programs.
The core function o f government in the United States is to protect the economic
interest o f the private sector. Without the private sector, there would be no American
nation-state. And the government does so through its policies, treaties, bureaucracy, and
the use o f its military.
One o f the most vital industries in the American private sector is energy. Energy
is either produced, such as electricity, or generated through the use o f natural resources,
such as the sun, oil, and coal. Oil is the largest o f these energy sources and the
corporations that produce this type o f energy (also known as fossil fuel energy) are
among the most politically influential segments in America’s economic sector. U.S.
government devotes a considerable amount o f its resources to protect and advance the
interest o f this group.
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The lesson corporate America learned from the Cold War was not to allow other
economic rivals in the world and nation-states once again to challenge the power interest
o f the United States. With the rise o f regionalism in the world, such as the European
Union and the Asian economic block, America’s power interest began to see an emerging
challenge to its dominant role in the world. This challenge came in the form o f the Euro,
the Yin, the European Common Market, and the rise o f the Asian capitalist industries.
A participant in the focus group captures the role o f power interest in impacting
U.S. policies. According to this participant, “in regard to our policy in Iraq, there was a
sense that we needed to do more, especially in response to our power interest in the
world. There was a coalition o f political forces arising out of the opportunity o f the
United States deemed as the single super power.”
Another participant in the focus group agrees with this statement by saying that
“if we talked about Iraq in terms o f simple, short-term economic interest, this will not
explain our involvement there. Unless we talk about a long-term power interest, and
economics is an important part o f it, then we can see the connection.” A third participant
in the focus group wants to link the U.S. military function in Iraq with that o f power
interest by suggesting that “we cannot explain the U.S. military function in Iraq unless we
talk about power interest and the ideology o f groups such as Project for the New
American Century and others who brought it to action in relation to America’s power of
interest.”
Power interest, as such, is a major economic and political factor both in our
capitalist system and in driving our governmental policies. Because o f this impact, we see
ourselves departing from the traditional capitalist systems in the world, such as the one in
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Europe. This departure is reflected in Iraq, where the Europeans approached Iraq in a
certain way while we approached it in another. Europe seemed to prefer a more peaceful
approach toward solving the Iraqi problem while we preferred a more aggressive
approach.

Pax Americana
This theme is a metaphor that represents America’s drive to dominate the world
as a new imperial power through the use of its military, political and economic
hegemony. The concepts that go into the construction o f this theme are “Colonialism,”
“Hegemony,” “Imperialism,” and “Militarism.”

Colonialism
This concept represents the military and political occupation o f one nation by
another through acts of war and invasion. In dealing with Iraq, content analysis reveals
that the United States constructed its policy toward Iraq as an imperial power, dictating to
the smaller and weaker nation o f Iraq to adhere to U.S. political will from a position of
power and intimidation. This geared the U.S. policy toward Iraq more toward securing
U.S. political and economic interests than implementing UN resolutions pertaining to
Iraqi disarmament.

Hegemony
This concept represents the political or economic domination o f one political
entity over another. In dealing with Iraq, the U.S. thus operated from a position o f
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intended dominance rather than merely working within the United Nations regulations.
The history o f the United States’ foreign policy also reflects such a hegemonial
tendencies, such as in the U.S. occupations o f the Philippines, Granada, and Haiti.
In a one-one-one interview, a political scientist and a leading consultant for the
Republican Party argues that the United States was justified to practice such an approach
toward Iraq because of its political, economic and military power as the only superpower
in the world. This expert reflected a Hegelian justification for such a practice by stating
that “the U.S. must be looked at as a great world power that it is in other people’s
interests to try to interest into cooperating with them. Politics in the world have to change
since no other nation is able to build strong military capability sufficient to counter the
weight o f U.S. military.”
One o f the focus group participants agrees with the expert in his analysis o f U.S.
power. However, the focus group participant also alludes to other powers that are on the
rise in the world that they may constitute a challenge to U.S. hegemony in the future. The
participant states that “the only foreseeable counter-weight to the United States is China.
China is able to develop its muscles further in the future, and other nations in the world
will rally behind it in order to play against the U.S. and bring about another bipolar
world. People resent U.S. power even though it is a benign power.”
Another participant in the focus group points to the danger o f having U.S. power
dominated by ideologues in government, as they will manipulate this power to serve
particular political and economic interests with no regard to world peace and U.S.
leadership position in the world. The focus group participant argues that “the ideologues
in the Bush team are bound on world domination through the use of U.S. military. This is
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very dangerous and will further make us isolated and hated in the world. It is aimed to
serve the interest and greed of a few American corporations.”

Imperialism
The subjugating by force or coercion o f the political and economic system o f one
nation to the power, political and economic will o f a dominating nation-state is
imperialism. In dealing with Iraq, the United States operated from the position o f
imperialism rather than working within the United Nations framework o f regulations and
laws.
One o f the participants in the focus group suggests that the Iraq war o f 2003 was a
continuation o f an imperialistic policy that the United States had adopted once it
remained the only super power in the world after the collapse o f the Soviet Union. This
person states that “the clear cause for the recent war goes to as early as 1998 when we
were truly feeling like an imperialist power with the Soviet Union gone.”
Content analysis with a frequency o f 14 for a concept related to issues
imperialism reveals that the Iraq war o f 2003 was driven by the same mentality as that o f
an imperial power. The United States was able to assert its will with little or no regard to
international norms. A participant in the focus group agrees with this analysis and
identified two specific conditions that formed the U.S. imperialist policy toward Iraq.
These conditions are “the reconstitution of an American hegemony in the Middle East is
unrivaled and in need o f no legitimation, and the assumption that the United States is
responsible for the maintenance o f a stable regional security conducive to its interest.”
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Militarism
This concept refers to the use o f military as a political tool to advance the regional
and global interests o f a nation-state. In its relations with Iraq, the United States acted
from the position o f militarism to dictate its policy rather than acting within the United
Nations regulations. A member of the focus group places the U.S. policy toward Iraq
within the context o f militarism by suggesting that “America needed a target since the
Soviet Union no longer existed. We needed a target for our military. Having a military
makes no sense if you have no enemy. Iraq provided that military enemy.”
The frequency count in content analysis o f 34 for a concept related to issues o f
militarism indicates that “for the Pentagon to maintain its tremendous budget, arms
industries, and feeding its contracts, for the oil companies to increase their profits, and for
the Bush administration to establish a permanent military presence in the Middle East to
control its oil resources, Iraq was presented as a challenge in order to justify U.S. military
intervention.”
Accordingly, militarism is the language o f colonialism and imperialism in order to
maintain U.S. hegemony in the world. Iraq was the arena to test such a policy and
provide a bridge to extend U.S. dominant power to other points o f interests in the world
and manipulate existing nation-states to submit to U.S. political, economic and military
will.

The Telephone Pole
This theme is a metaphor that represents the collapse o f the opposition party in the
United States as a viable voice for political discourse, resulting in the lack o f political
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debates and the supremacy o f artificial priorities to take hold under the guise o f justifying
U.S. political agendas. The policy toward Iraq is one o f the arenas that is witnessing such
a development. The emerging political agenda stands alone as a telephone pole, distant
from other political agendas that are achieved through dialogue and the democratic
process of political examinations and debates.
Several concepts go into the construction o f this theme. These concepts are
“Democratic Cave-in,” “Discourse,” “Debate,” and “Priorities and Resources.”

Debate
The first concept that goes in the construction o f this theme is that o f the absence
o f debate in the policy toward Iraq. Debate, as the name suggests, to the absence of
political discourse on agendas presented by various administrations to Congressional
committees on U.S. policy toward Iraq. As a consequence, these agendas are enacted as
part o f the policy without going through the required examinations required by
democratic debates and due process. The lack or absence o f debate aided in the emerging
o f political unipolarism in governance o f the United States, which in turn aid in the
development o f the administrative state and the imperial presidency.
Content analysis yields a frequency o f seven for a concept related to issues o f
debate that the most interesting feature o f the debate over the Iraqi issue is that it never
took place. Many words flowed, and there was dispute about how to proceed. But
discussion was kept within rigid bounds that excluded the obvious answer that the U.S.
had to act according to its national interest.
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In a one-on-one interview w ith a political historian, reference is made to the
notion that the issue o f debate became problematic during the presidency o f George W.
Bush, and the lack o f debate was a form o f political tragedy that impacted governance in
the United States. The expert states that “it is tragic that there was so little debate about
the war in Iraq in 2003, and that the Democrats gave a blank check for the invasion of
Iraq and caved in to the administration.”

Democratic Cave-in
This concept refers to the notion that the Democratic members o f Congress did
not oppose or seriously challenge the political agendas o f two U.S. Republican
administrations in 1991 and 2003 and oppose these wars in Iraq. As content analysis
reveals through a frequency o f 13 for a concept related to issues o f Democratic cave in
that many Democratic members o f Congress became cheerleaders for the Republican
administration’s agenda in Iraq. And, contrary to the Democratic members o f Congress,
their Republican counterparts challenged the political agenda o f the Democratic
administration o f Bill Clinton and pushed it to adopt a more aggressive policy toward
Iraq, including signing into law the Iraq Liberation Act o f 1998 and adopting regime
change in Iraq as the official policy o f the United States.

Discourse
The third concept that takes part in the construction of this theme is Discourse.
Discourse is the essence o f politics. W hen there is no discourse, politics is a mere
dictation o f narrow, unchallenged and unexamined viewpoints.
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Commenting on the importance o f political discourse in U.S. politics and the
resulting process o f decision making in governance, a political scientist states in a oneon-one interview, “people talk, that is how they find out about what is going on in the
world, and that is how they deliberate and make decisions.” The expert, who is also a
strategist for the Republican Party, does not see the Congressional act in 2003 to
authorize President Bush with the decision to go to war as something that is outside the
tradition o f political discourse in America. The expert states that “Congress authorized
Bush to go to war in Iraq because that is what Congress has done historically. After the
Vietnam crisis, Congressed passed the War Powers Act to restrain the power o f the
president, but even that Act delegated to the president the authority to declare war but he
had 90 days to state the reason.”
The expert justifies Congress’ delegation o f its authority to declare war to the
executive branch because of the awesome responsibility o f such decision. According to
the expert, “Congress persistently placed that responsibility with the executive, because
war is too daunting o f a responsibility for a contemporary Congress to imagine.”
A participant o f the focus group agrees with the expert’s analysis and refers to the
American system o f government as one designed in a manner that allows for such
delegation o f authority as part o f political discourse itself. The focus group participant
states that “the issue here is the synergy o f interests. We talk about checks and balances,
but checks and balances operate in an environment in which they are integrated. Congress
is reluctant to accept the full weight o f making a decision about going to war, and it
prefer to put that accountability on the head o f the executive branch. The executive, on
the other hand, is happy to do it.”
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Another participant in the focus group alludes to the danger o f delegating the
Congressional power o f declaring war to the Executive by arguing that “Congress was
interested in such Constitutional responsibility in order to arrive at the decision to go to
war after lengthy discourse. Surrendering this responsibility to the Executive will deprive
the decision of discourse.”
Another focus group participant agrees with the former participant’s statement,
and to demonstrate this point in the argument, the participant refers to the error in
judgment that the Bush administration has made by relying on faulty intelligence as
evidence to go to war instead o f allowing for the political discourse to take place. The
focus group’s participant states that “Powell’s address to the UN was not convincing
because the so-called evidence seemed to be trivial. If there were enough debates on
Iraq’s WMD in Congress, Bush would not have had the authority to rely on such faulty
intelligence and go to war.”
Why was the Bush administration so convinced in its belief about the Iraqi threat
that it discouraged the traditional debating o f issues to take place? Another participant in
the focus group answers the question by stating that “during the 1980s, the CIA
considered the Soviet Union as a serious threat. Later, it saw the situation quite
differently. By pressuring the governmental apparatus, such as intelligence, U.S.
politicians make situations appear closer to what they want those answers to be. This is
our new political discourse.”
A political historian comments on the discourse within the government apparatus
itself, such as between the State Department and the Pentagon. In a one-on-one interview,
the expert states that “in 1991, there was a great deal of controversy between the State
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Department and the Department o f Defense, on what action should be taken regarding
Saddam. In some ways like 2003 there were not consistent views o f what should be
done.”
A participant in the focus group connects the continuous political discourse in the
United States to the Cold War politics. The focus group’s participant states that “politics
in America is really connected to Cold War politics and the idea o f George Kennan in the
1950s in stabilizing what have been put in place in the world. Those who had this vision
were able to be more persuasive than other voices.”
Another focus group participant emphasizes more the impact o f the emerging
disconnect between governmental agencies on the policy’s direction than on Kennan’s
notion o f maintaining the status quo in the world. He argues that “one can be struck by
the discourse in 2003 between the Pentagon’s plan for the invasion o f Iraq and that of the
State Department. It was the disconnect between these two groups that lent credence to
the notion that our policy toward Iraq was designed to achieve the ultimate goals of
people like Wolfowitz and others in the Pentagon.”

Priorities and Resources
This concept refers to political operatives acting on behalf o f the Bush
administration and its policy toward Iraq to negate political debates with the opposition
party for the sake o f artificial political priorities and agendas based on the perspectives o f
the controlling political party in the White House. The history chapter suggests that such
tendencies are sought in order to minimize criticism by the opposition party to the
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administration’s political agenda in removing Saddam by force and direct military
intervention.

Moby Dick
This is a story of a whale that had to remove a threat to its environment, through
the use o f destructive force, that caused the slaying o f its mate. This metaphor represents
public policy that utilizes force in retaliation to offensives against the United States,
instead o f understanding the roots o f these acts and treating their causes.
On September 11, 2001 terrorists attacked America. The Bush administration
designed its national security policy to prevent future terrorist attacks by adopting
preemptive force as a response in protecting the homeland. Little or no attention was paid
to treating the causes of the terrorist attacks on America, and Iraq was chosen as one of
the arena to witness America’s wrath.
As such, the U.S. policy toward Iraq became analogous to the rage o f Moby Dick,
and hence, this theme was selected to explain this particular aspect o f the policy. The
concepts that participate in the construction o f this theme are “War as a Corrective
Action,” “Force,” “Hobbes versus Kant,” the “American Psyche,” “Unipolar W orld,” and
“Capacity.”

War as a Corrective Action
This concept represents the political mindset that war can be used as a corrective
measure for failed policies or to remove a threat. In relation to Iraq and the United States,
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both the Iraqi government and various U.S. administrations used military operations to
correct what they perceived to be failed policies or to respond to outside threats.
Content analysis through a frequency of six for a concept related to issues o f war
as a corrective action demonstrates that Iraq used war against Iran in 1980 as a
preemptive strike against what it perceived to be an Iranian threat to the security and
stability o f the regime. Iraq also used the military operation against Kuwait in 1990 as a
response to what it perceived to be an economic threat posed by Kuwait to Iraq’s national
interest.
Examination o f such data also reveals that the U.S. used the Gulf War o f 1991 to
counter the Iraqi illegal invasion o f Kuwait and remove the threat to U.S. national interest
in the region. The U.S. used Operation Desert Fox in 1998 as a response to what it
perceived to be an Iraqi defiance o f UN resolutions and refusal to disarm. And, it used
war in 2003 as a preemptive strike to correct the failed policy o f containment and to
neutralize what it believed to be an imminent threat posed by Iraq’s WMD and ties with
al-Qaeda. In all these cases, excessive force was used to justify failed policies and to
enforce new political agendas.

Force
The second concept that takes part in the construction o f this theme is that o f
“Force” and the utility o f the mentality o f force when used either by Iraq against its
citizens or neighbors or by the United States against Iraq. Content analysis yields a
frequency o f 44 for a concept related to issues of force that Saddam’s solution for his
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problem with Kuwait, for example, was an example o f the mentality o f using force to
serve a political agenda.
The history chapter in this dissertation shows how Saddam responded to the
uprising inside Iraq that followed Iraq’s defeat in Kuwait with the use o f massive force.
Force was also used by the United States against Iraq in order to serve its political
purposes. The excessive use of force, for example, during the G ulf War o f 1991 was
intended not only to end Iraqi occupation o f Kuwait but also to send a message to
Saddam and other nations in the world not to repeat such an adventure in the future.
The use o f force in 2003 was not provoked by Iraq, and it was decided entirely as
a political choice by the Bush administration that perceived Iraq (although without any
credible evidence) as posing an imminent threat to the United States. Hence, force
became a political tool to serve the purpose o f a particular policy.

War as a Metaphor
This concept refers to the political use o f war as a metaphor in order to explain a
public policy designed to resolve a certain conflict. For example, poverty was identified
by the Johnson administration as an obstacle for creating a Great Society. As such, the
administration launched its metaphorical war on poverty by designing political measures
to combat poverty. The Reagan administration used the same kind o f metaphor to launch
a war on drugs. Then, the Bush administration used it to fight terrorism.
War as a metaphor has become a normative phrase in American political jargon as
well as a policy toward Iraq. However, when the line between what is fiction and what is
real becomes murky, it leads to catastrophe. This was the case o f using war as a metaphor
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by the Bush administration in 2001 and 2002 that eventually led to the creation o f an
actual war in Iraq in 2003.

Hobbes Versus Kant
This concept represents the philosophical differences between two political
perspectives. On the one hand, there is the Hobbesian philosophy that believes in force
and cruelty as the main attributes that characterize community. Man lives in a savage
state of nature. On the other hand, and the Kantian philosophy believes in reason and
enlightenment as the basis to build a human community. Content analysis yields a
frequency of nine for a concept related to issues o f Hobbesian thinking versus that of
Kantian that the policy toward Iraq leaned toward the Hobbesian approach. The policy
has become hostage to a mentality o f force, fear and violence.
The Iraqi regime used the same Hobbesian perspective as well and resorted to
violence when its authority was threatened. As such, for both Iraq and the United States,
violence became the language o f their policies in order to justify positions o f authority
and power.
In the United States, the Bush administration went a step further when violence
was curtailed by international mediation. It invented an enemy in order to institutionalize
fear and preemption. And with the political manipulation o f fear, the Bush administration
collapsed governance in the United States inwards toward an imperial presidency by
turning fear and violence into forms o f political legitimacy.
Western Europe, on the other hand, walked away from the Hobbesian notion o f
fear and violence and embraced the Kantian notion o f enlightenment and rational
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thinking. The European approach toward Iraq (with the exception o f England and the
former Soviet client states in Eastern Europe) differed from that o f the United States.

The American Psyche
This concept refers to the notion that America uses its policies and military forces
in the world not to create wars or force its will on others but to act as a benevolent and
benign power in order to protect the oppressed and promote peace and democracy.
America is thus neither an imperialist nation nor a colonial power, and its policy toward
Iraq is generated from America’s nobility and commitment to root out the evil Saddam
Hussein from Iraq.
The concept neglects the historic role o f America in supporting Saddam and other
tyrants in the world so long as it was in the U.S. interest to do so, enforcing a crippling
sanction on Iraq for 12 years that resulted in the senseless deaths o f millions o f innocent
Iraqi children and subjecting Iraq to routine bombings that resulted in the killing of
thousands o f civilians. This concept is used by hawkish politicians in the United States to
manipulate public sentiment in justifying violence in the policy toward Iraq.
This concept views the pay-off for America’s investments in Iraq as a matter of
pride. In a one-on-one interview with a political scientist, “pride means a great deal to
Americans. We defended Europe to protect our own freedom by keeping other people
from slavery, and we were happy and proud to do so. This is part o f the American
psyche. This underlines the entire U.S. foreign policy.”
A participant in the focus group attributes the Bush administration’s plan to build
democracy in Iraq to the American psyche and concern with doing good. The focus group
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participant states that “democracy in Iraq is doable because the fact is what really is at
stake here the argument that all human beings are capable o f being free. The United
States believes that all human beings are capable o f living the life of freedom and benefit
from democracy.”
Another participant in the focus group agrees with this assessment, and attributes
the United States decision not to invade Iraq in 1991 to the American psyche as well.
“Powell and Schwarzkopf were intimidated by the American culture. The American
public did not allow any kind of deviation from the objective o f the war and that was to
liberate Kuwait only.”
A third participant in the focus group uses the concept o f the American psyche to
criticize President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The participant states that
“with the current Bush administration the attitude that we had in 1991 toward invading
another country had completely disappeared. The idea was that you couldn’t go to war
unless you get it over with in a hurry, before any American got killed. And that argues
against our theory o f occupying a country now.”
But a fourth participant in the focus group disagrees and blames the United States
itself for blocking the emergence o f democracy in the Middle by supporting reactionary
and totalitarian regimes. The participant argues that “it was the U.S. who continued to
support the anti-democratic regimes in the region, instead o f supporting democracy. We
cannot impose democracy on Iraq. If we do, it will fail.”
A political historian explains the changes in U.S. policy in the region based on the
concept o f the American psyche. In another one-on-one interview, the expert states that
“it is quite clear that the people o f good will in the U.S. had deep concern about Saddam
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Hussein and his inhumanity, as well as the corruption o f his regime. The picture o f
Hussein as someone capable o f using WMD was already there. There was also a genuine
fear o f post-Cold War regimes that seem to be out of control.”
A participant in the focus group attempts to connect the current shift in the policy
toward Iraq with its history while maintaining the influence o f the American psyche on
such policy. The focus group participant states that “the levels o f American psyche and
strategic planning are formative. If we connected that to the Iranian revolution in 1979,
the 1970’s oil embargo, the Reagan’s presidency and the hostage crisis, then we would
have a background picture for the current Republican administration.”

Unipolar World
This concept refers to the political reality after the collapse o f the Soviet Union
and the emergence o f the United States as the only remaining superpower in the world.
With the world having only one superpower, it has become a world o f unipolarism, with
virtually no other country capable o f challenging the policies and military might o f the
United States. And without such challenge, the U.S. policy toward Iraq becomes devoid
of effective opposition by other nation-states. This allows the United States to dictate its
will both on Iraq and the world.
A participant in the focus group comments on such reality, and what this means to
the American people. The participant states that “when the United States became the
single superpower, we no longer had the Soviet Union to challenge our political will. And
after the terrible tragedy o f September 11, the American people developed a unilateral
sense to do something about Iraq with or without other nations supporting us.”
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Capacity
The sum total o f the United States’ military, political, intelligence, and
information capacity to deal with internal and external threats comprises its capacity. One
o f these perceived external threats was Iraq.
Capacity has to do with America’s defensive capability to encounter, fight and
eliminate the source o f the threat. The U.S. defense apparatus and intelligence networks
are primarily designed to respond to threats posed by nation-states. This design is the
result o f long decades o f the Cold War. However, current threats are generated by
clandestine, privately-funded networks o f operatives. These threats constitute high
intensity threshold (HIT), while traditional threats posed by nation-states constitute low
intensity threshold (LIT).
The policy toward Iraq responds to an LIT. However, policymakers present the
threat as a high intensity threshold. This misguided identification o f threat is based on
U.S. capacity to respond primarily to nation-state threats, rather than the administration’s
political agenda to get rid o f Saddam’s regime.
In order to be able to respond to all kinds o f threats, especially those posed by
non-nation states, the U.S. must redesign its defense and intelligence capacity beyond its
current function as a Cold-War warrior. The United States must align its capacity with a
clear definition o f what constitute high or low threshold threats and respond with clear
and objective strategy to each threat based on the appropriate capacity.
A participant in the focus group refers to the Bush administration’s use of faulty
intelligence as a measure o f such outdated capacity. The participant states that “the
problem with the intelligence was that America lacked human sources on the ground in
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Iraq and instead it relied on the Iraqi opposition groups. America did not want to create a
political problem here at home o f having American citizens being captured or killed as
spies.”

Eskimo Community
The environment o f the Eskimos is cold and bitter and that requires good
management of scarce resources in order to preserve heat and energy for survival needs.
Such necessity requires cooperation, a sense o f community and universal association as
well as regional collaboration, multilateralism, and acceptance o f norms by the collective
in order to maintain the collective will to survive.
This theme is composed o f several concepts: “Cold War Politics,” “Geopolitics,”
Legitimacy,” “The Middle East and the Status Quo,” “Multilateralism” and
“Regionalism.”

Cold War Politics
This concept refers to geopolitics as a whole and the United States policy toward
Iraq in particular at the time when the Soviet Union still constituted the w orld’s second
superpower. For America, Cold War politics means taking actions after considering
possible responses by the Soviet Union.
The policy toward Iraq during the Cold W ar had to consider a challenge by the
Soviet Union and, as such, it was balanced and reflective of geopolitical interest in the
world. After the collapse o f the Soviet Union it became unbalanced and representative of
the narrow interest o f the United States.
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Content analysis reveals through a frequency o f 12 for a concept related to issues
o f Cold War politics that when comparing the Gulf War o f 1991 that was born during the
Cold War, with the Iraq war of 2003 that took place after the end o f Cold War, a
difference in the policy’s approach toward Iraq could be seen clearly. The G ulf W ar was
restrained with international norms and United Nations authorization. The 2003 war was
conducted outside UN authority and in violation of international norms.
In a one-on-one interview, a political historian explains such differences, “there
was strategic concern that included the Cold War and the influence o f the Soviet Union,
with Iraq on its way to becoming a client state o f the Soviet Union. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the U.S. was no longer concerned about a counterweight to its foreign
policy.”
A participant in the focus group agrees, arguing that “we attend to the views
rather more o f a kind o f balance o f powers, playing one against another, rather than
responding to them directly. With the Soviet Union having veto power in the UN, we did
not have much flexibility in dealing with others within the very troubled environment in
the world, such as in Iraq. That changed once the Soviet Union disappeared.”
Another focus group participant expands further on this observation, suggesting
that “Iraq was a pro-Soviet state. When the Soviet Union collapsed, a lot o f things had to
be reshuffled in the new world order. At this point, the U.S. had the upper hand in settling
things with Iraq for its past associations and pay a price for being a former client-state of
the Soviet Union.”
Another focus group participant alludes to the demise o f even concepts such as
Pan-Arabism, nationalism, and Baathism once the Soviet Union collapsed. “Some o f
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Saddam’s action had also to do with the idealism o f Pan-Arabism, of Baathism. Such
idealism no longer held ground in the Arab world, especially in a world without the
Soviet Union and the U.S. as the single superpower. It was the Soviet Union that enabled
such regimes to promote their idealism.”

Geopolitics
This concept refers the collective international political relationships as nation
states attempt to deal and negotiate with one another for a peaceful coexistence.
Geopolitics, however, often is complex since it represents the various political interests
and agendas o f different nation-states in the world.
At times, dialogues and negotiations between these nation-states are successful in
reaching treaties and alliances. Other times, they fail, leading to conflicts and even wars.
Within such a complex system, the U.S. policy toward Iraq has born. Because o f such
conditions, the forces of antagonism and alliances in the world are influencing the policy.
Analyzing the policy toward Iraq in the context o f geopolitics, a political scientist
and an expert on U.S. policy toward Iraq stated in a one-on-one interview that “the policy
toward Iraq needs to be looked at in the context o f broader world politics. It is a big
mistake to try to turn relationships between the United States and any particular nation
into an immediate relationship.”
Another participant in the focus group agrees with this assessment and identified
the Gulf War as an example o f an emerging political phenomenon that is impacted by
world politics. This participant states that “the central factor in the 1991 war was the
disappearance o f the Soviet Union, which changed the calculus o f power in the region
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and gave an opportunity to the United States to think differently about how to react and
relate to Iraq.”
Another participant in the focus group further explains the G ulf W ar’s
international efforts as remaining within the confines o f world politics by suggesting that
“Bush Sr. realized there was a practical reason to have world support, especially from the
Arab countries. We needed coalition support so the United States did not look as if was
alone in the war with Iraq. Without a coalition we would have endangered and
destabilized the region.”
Another focus group participant expands on this statement: “the reason former
President Bush did not go to Baghdad in 1991 is because he did not have a mandate from
the United Nations to do so. If he was going to go alone, the coalition that he put together
was going to collapse. Also, our Arab partners did not want to see us bombing an Arab
country and seeing the Iraqis butchered outside the UN mandate.”
The political scientist, however, stresses the importance o f having nation-state
interests continue to play a significant role in world politics. In a one-on-one interview
with this expert, “we continue to look after our national interest. But the fundamental
issue is: we want to promote our interest unilaterally or should we do it through
collaboration and cooperation?”
A participant in the focus group answers this question in comparing the
administrations o f former President Bush and o f President George W. Bush. The
participant states that “the former president was versed in the dynamics o f Middle
Eastern politics. His administration did not want to take a unilateral action. His son,
however, had alienated U.S. traditional allies.”
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Another focus group participant references the relationship between the United
States and Europe or between the United States and the United Nations regarding Iraq as
a product o f such world politics. The participant argues that “the impact o f the Iraq war
on the world is a question o f the relationship between the U.S. and Europe and between
the U.S. and the UN. No one can hide from the reality o f these guerillas living in the
world.”
The political scientist offers a remedy to the seemingly complicated political
dynamics in the world by suggesting that the world needed to agree with the United
States on a viable strategy in finding solutions to world problems. The expert states that
“the only viable strategy for the world is to find ways to interest the U.S. in cooperating
with them, rather than antagonizing it.”
The expert justifies his proposal with the notion that the United States is a
superpower that is reconstructing the political order in the world. This ability, as such,
entitles the United States the privilege o f guiding political directions in world politics.
According to the expert, “the U.S. began approaching Eastern European countries to
counter-balance France and Germany. This is done based on historical tension in Europe.
Even the expansion o f NATO is based on controlling such classical sources o f discord
and to displace the geopolitical center from Europe.”
A member o f the focus group agrees with this analysis by suggesting that “in
terms o f geopolitics, it is one o f the clever moves by the current administration to court
the expansion o f NATO and undercut the European unity that was forged economically.”
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Legitimacy
The third concept that participates in the construction o f this Eskimo Community
theme is Legitimacy. Issues o f legitimacy have to do with respecting international laws
and established international norms. Iraq violated these norms, for example, in 1991 by
invading a sovereign state, and the UN responded by authorizing force to expel Iraqi
troops from Kuwait.
Yet, the U.S. launched a preemptive and unprovoked war on Iraq in 2003 and
occupied a sovereign nation without authorization from the United Nations. These actions
placed the entire U.S. policy toward Iraq under the scrutiny of international law to
examine its legitimacy.
The UN authority as a source o f political legitimacy, however, is questioned in an
interview with a political scientist and a strategist for the Republican Party. The expert
argues that “we often take the UN Security Council as a source o f law, which it never is.
A prudent example was what happened in Haiti during thel990s. The U.S. worked the
Security Council to justify its intervention in Haiti by manipulating the refugees issue to
turn the tide on and off almost at will as a consequence o f our sanctions and the vigor of
our enforcement of the policy at sea.”
A political historian comments on the U.S. manipulation o f the United Nations in
order to get resolutions passed in its favor. He states that “once the U.S. gets the
declaration it wants from the UN, other states that are carrying out the Security Council
policy will retain the right to judge the actions o f the party in question. In 1991 the U.S.
could easily have decided to get the UN to approve the invasion o f Iraq under the guise of
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removing the threat. But it chose not to do so at the time because Bush was not ready to
replace Saddam.”
Content analysis provides a frequency of 47 for a concept related to issues o f
legitimacy that the U.N. Charter is a solemn treaty recognized by the United States as the
foundation o f international law. The U.S. Constitution provides a mechanism by
declaring treaties as the law o f the land. It further authorizes Congress to punish offenses
against this law. With the Bush administration declaring war on Iraq in 2003 outside the
specifics o f the UN Charter, it had violated the U.S. Constitution that obligates the United
States to honor all treaties that the United States is a signatory to.
The history chapter demonstrates that it is the Security Council that determines
the existence o f any threat to the peace, breach o f the peace, or act o f aggression, and
shall make recommendation, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, which detail the preferred measures not involving the use o f armed
force. The only exception is Article 51, which permits the right o f self-defense against
armed attack until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.
These arguably are legitimate ways to react to the many threats to world peace. If
Iraq’s neighbors feeling threatened, for example, they can approach the Security Council
to authorize appropriate measures to respond to the threat. If the U.S. feels threatened, it
can do the same. But no state has the authority to make its own determination on these
matters and to act as it chooses. Accordingly, the U.S. had no such authority in 2003 to
interpret the UN resolution unilaterally and invade Iraq based on its own arbitrary
interpretation.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin summarizes both the negative and positive
aspects o f the 2003 war in Iraq within the context o f international law by stating that “the
toppling o f the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein was a plus. But, the human losses,
the humanitarian catastrophe, the destruction o f Iraq were negative.” Putin calls the U.S.led war in Iraq “illegitimate and a threat to international law.” He also criticized the
United States for failing to find weapons o f mass destruction in Iraq, which was the only
justification for war and argued that “even in the most acute moment of the fight for its
survival, the Iraqi regime did not use such weapons. If in the last moment o f its existence
it did not use them, it means they do not exist” (Kalamazoo Gazette, 2003, p. 2A).

The Middle East and the Status Quo
The other concept that takes part in the construction o f the Eskimo Community
theme is the concept o f maintaining the political status quo in the Middle East. The
concept refers to the notion that policies o f Middle Eastern countries and that o f the
United States are primarily designed to prevent radical changes in the political dynamics
in the region o f the Middle East and to maintain its political status quo.
Content analysis reveals through a frequency o f 13 for a concept related to issues
o f the Middle East and status quo that it was based on such a notion that many Arab
nations cooperated with the United States in supporting Saddam during the 1980s. The
purpose o f that support was not to empower Iraq to emerge as the most powerful nation
in the region but to box the Islamic revolution in Iran within its own boundaries and help
sustain the political status quo in the region.
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It was also this concept that led the United States and many Arab nations to reject
Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait in 1990 once more restore the status quo to the region. And it
was this same rationale that drove the Bush administration to launch its war against Iraq
in 2003 in order to maintain the status quo by returning a democratized Iraq to the
community o f nations after the U.S. was no longer able to maintain its troops in Saudi
Arabia to contain Saddam after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

Multilateralism
Decisions taken whether on national or international levels based on multiple
inputs, perspectives and concerns comprise multilateralism. This involves debate,
discourse, dialogue, and compromise through negotiations.
The transformation o f policy from multilateralism to unilateralism is a failure o f
policy. While multilateralism often enjoys legitimacy because it involves multiple voices,
unilateralism often rejects the legitimacy o f multilateralism because such legitimacy
politically threatens the political agenda o f a single nation-state. The U.S. policy toward
Iraq has experienced both unilateral and multilateral approaches.
Considering both policy options toward Iraq, a participant in the focus group
emphasizes the importance o f political experience in order to develop an appreciation for
multilateralism. The participant states that “Former President Bush had a different
approach than his son. A lot o f wisdom came out o f his experience. But his son came to
politics as an ideologue with no experience in foreign policy. Bill Clinton was also an
experienced politician and because o f that, he saw the importance o f multilateralism.”
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Regionalism
Political, economic, and military decisions taken by nation-states are often
influenced by the nations within this geographical sphere. Examples o f such regions are
Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. Even though the U.S. policy
toward Iraq is primarily designed to serve its national interest, regionalism does influence
the policy.
Analyzing European regionalism and its impact on the political approach toward
Iraq, a political scientist states in a one-on-one interview that “Europe will never be a
counterweight to the U.S. because of the problem with France and Germany. Eastern
Europe is not going to settle for that. Europe does not have the political will to
completely restructure itself or find itself creating a new regime in which France and
Germany can disappear for the sake of a united Europe.”
In explaining Middle Eastern regionalism, a former leader o f an Iraqi opposition
group in exile states in a one-on-one interview that “the problem in not supporting the
war o f 2003 was created by a regional influence. Turkey, for example, did not want to see
the Kurds independent in northern Iraq. The Saudis did not want to see a Shiite state in
southern Iraq that would bolster and strengthen Iran.”
A participant in the focus group belittles regionalism and emphasizes the
importance o f nation-states and their narrow interests in explaining the policy toward
Iraq. The participant, for example, sees no authentic regionalism in the Middle East. Most
Arab nations supported the United States’ war in 2003 to get rid o f Saddam even if they
did not do so publicly. The participant argues that “the Arab governments secretly
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supported the invasion o f Iraq in 2003, but publicly they did not announce it because o f
internal concerns.”

Tactics
The means to achieve strategic ends are tactics. Here tactics refers to the means o f
achieving U.S. policy goals toward Iraq. Tactics are various procedures and utilities
adopted by the United States for the purpose o f implementing its political agenda.
W hen the agenda is not clear, tactical means vary, thereby reflecting the
confusion in the strategy. But, when the agenda is clear, the tactics used to achieve the
political strategy are rational. In the case o f U.S. policy toward Iraq, there was no clear
strategy toward Iraq as o f 1990. As such, the tactics employed toward advancing this
policy are numerous, illustrating the confusion and disarray in the political strategy itself.
This theme therefore requires using a total o f eleven concepts. These concepts are
“Attila the Hun,” “Circular Reasoning,” “Coercion,” “Current as Epiphenomenon,”
“Misuse or Misinterpretation o f Intelligence,” “Fear Factor,” “Irony,” “Machiavellian
Methods,” “Falsehood,” “Misleading,” and “Patterns o f Behavior.”

Attila the Hun
This concept refer to the tactic o f transforming Saddam’s image in the world by .
U.S. government and U.S. media from that o f the usual brutal dictator to an even larger
and further exaggerated image more akin Attila the Hun. Content analysis with a
frequency o f ten for the concept o f Attila the Hun indicates that this portrayal o f Saddam
as Attila the Hun made it easier for the United States to launch two wars on Iraq, reduce
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Iraq to one person and punish the entire country for the crimes o f one person, placing the
country under crippling sanction for 12 years, and then occupying the country under
unpopular and illegitimate military control.

Circular Reasoning
The notion of doing A as a prerequisite for accomplishing B, and doing B as a
prerequisite for accomplishing C is termed here as circular reasoning. As such, the U.S.
policy toward Iraq, for example, is adopting certain steps in order to reach a certain
phase, and it thus uses its position in reaching that phase to follow up other steps in order
to reach another phase, and so on. All these steps were taken to advance the interest o f
the United States.
In explaining these steps and their rationale within the overall tactics o f circular
reasoning, one o f the participants in the focus group states that “the sanctions were in
place in order to create a condition for the Baath Party itself or the Iraqi army to remove
Saddam. But after 12 years o f sanctions and the suffering o f the Iraqi people Saddam
continued to remain in power. So America had to do something about it.”
Another focus group participant explains the Bush administration’s reliance on
circular reasoning in 2003 in order to justify its preemption policy toward Iraq. He argues
that “when most o f the UN resolutions were implemented by Iraq, Bush used the old
issue o f WMD as a reason to keep the issue of confronting Iraq circular and at the center.
He started to use old stories about Iraq’s use o f WMD, such as against Iran and the Kurds
as though these stories were taking place recently.”
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Coercion
Political maneuvers and actions designed to alter political situations toward the
desired outcomes o f an intended political agenda constitute coercion. Viewing the U.S.
policy toward Iraq since 1958 illustrates repeated instances o f this tactic.
Content analysis uncovers a frequency o f 38 for a concept related to issues o f
coercion that coercion relied on intimidating the United Nations to take actions against
Iraq to advance the political agenda o f the United States. Bush’s unilateral and
preemptive strike in 2003, for example, forced the United Nations to legitimize an action
that lacked authorization, and to issue resolutions legalizing the U.S. occupation o f Iraq.

Current as an Epiphenomenon
The fourth concept that takes part in the creation o f this theme o f tactics is
“Current as an Epiphenomenon.” It illustrates the continuous negation o f considering past
roles and associations undertaken by the policy, and the constant reliance on the present
instead to justify a political agenda. By emphasizing the present, the Bush administration
is able tactically to avoid admitting past errors and enables itself to claim a moralist
position to enhance its myth as a liberator o f the Iraqi people.
The frequency count in content analysis o f two for a concept related to issues o f
current as an epiphenomenon reveals that the Bush administration described atrocities
committed by the regime of Saddam Hussein against his neighbors and his own people as
a justification for war. Bush, however, purposely neglected to state the U.S. role in the
past in supporting Saddam while the Baath regime was committing such atrocities. By
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doing so, the administration placed itself and its political agenda on high moral ground in
order to justify its preemption policy toward Iraq.

Misuse or Misinterpretation of Intelligence
This concept refers the U.S. government’s misuse or misinterpretation o f its own
intelligence in order to serve its political agenda in Iraq. Content analysis yields a
frequency o f 22 for a concept related to issues o f misuse or misinterpretation o f
intelligence that the Bush administration, for example, had used faulty intelligence in
order to justify its war on Iraq in 2003.

Fear Factor
The U.S. government is using fear as a prime motivator to persuade public
support and opinion to favor its political agenda in Iraq. A frequency count in the content
analysis o f 15 for a concept related to issues o f fear factor reveals that September 11
provided the Bush administration with an atmosphere to manipulate fear in order to
persuade public opinion to support a war in Iraq.
A participant in the focus group further explains the Bush administration’s
attempt to connect between September 11 and Iraq by stating that “the Bush
administration was successful in arguing that Saddam was somehow responsible for
September 11. The sense o f having been violated among the American people provided
an opportunity for the administration to have a military solution to political problems.”
Another focus group participant agrees and stresses the impact o f fear in
persuading public opinion. The participant states that “it is a great mistake to
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underestimate the power o f fear. When the Bush administration influenced the
unconscious imagination o f the American people with a series o f lies and fear tactics, it in
essence had created an ultimate tragedy in American policy.”

The Irony o f Paradox
The American Heritage Dictionary defines irony as “the use o f words to convey
the opposite o f their literal meaning” (Morris, 1975, p. 692). Irony here means saying
something but doing something else. For example, the U.S. insisted on enforcing the UN
economic sanctions on Iraq in order to force Saddam to comply with the UN resolution.
The irony, however, was that the sanctions benefited Saddam by keeping the Iraqi people
weak and withered, and hurt average Iraqis more than it hurt the regime.
Another irony was having U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia after the G ulf
War in order to protect the Saudis and U.S. oil interests in the region. Ironically, the
presence o f these troops in a Muslim holy land angered some Muslim fundamentalists,
such as the al-Qaeda network which attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.
The network was voicing its opposition to the positioning o f U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.
Consequently an action intended to secure America’s security led to the biggest attack on
America’s security in its modem history.
A participant in the focus group comments on this irony by stating that “there
were 400,000 American troops in Saudi Arabia to shield that country. Unfortunately, that
attracted Muslim fundamentalists not only in Saudi Arabia, but also all over the Arab
world. We never understood that even the Saudi royal family remain in power so long as
the fundamentalists allowed it.”
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Machiavellian Methods
Political decisions and tactics based on the principle that the end justifies the
means are Machiavellian in nature. The U.S. is employing this perspective in its policy
toward Iraq in order to serve its interest.
One o f the tactics that the United States used as a means to justify its war in Iraq
in 2003 was the issue o f Iraq’s WMD in Iraq. In a one-on-one interview with a former
leader o f an Iraqi opposition group in exile, “WMD become one of the main justifications
for war in 2003 because it was easier to explain. Everyone was going to understand that.”
A participant in the focus group also comments on Iraq’s WMD and how it was
used by the Bush administration to justify the war o f 2003. He states that “the issue of
WMD is a political foil is as much as any other political message. Given the complexity
o f the preemptive strike that confused many people, some thought that Saddam did have
WMD and we were obligated to stopping him.”

Falsehoods
The exaggerations and misrepresentation o f reality in favor o f serving certain
political agendas constitute falsehoods. Content analysis yields a frequency o f 33 for a
concept related to issues o f falsehood that the Bush administration is relying on
exaggerations and misrepresentation o f reality in order to advance its political agenda.
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Misleading
This concept refers to the use o f false information, coercion, and fabrication in
order to lead others toward desired political objectives that they do not otherwise want to
support if they are left to make their own choices and decisions without being misled.
To mislead the American people toward supporting the war o f choice in Iraq in
2003, the Bush administration used selective intelligence to justify such action. A
participant in the focus group thus states that “not all the intelligence pointed to Iraq
having WMD. Bush purposely selected faulty intelligence in order to go to war. He
manipulated intelligence for political purpose and the interest o f power.” Another focus
group participant agrees: “Bush and his crowd were selectively receiving bad intelligence
regarding Iraq’s WMD. Perhaps there was some bad intelligence. But Bush used only the
bad intelligence needed to justify war.”

Pattern o f Behavior
The last concept that participates in the construction o f the theme o f tactics is
“Pattern o f Behavior.” It refers to the special types o f relationships between the United
States’ government and the governments o f other nations to advance U.S. interest, despite
the tyrannical nature of these other nations’ governments.
Content analysis shows in a frequency count o f six for a concept related to issues
of pattern o f behavior that U.S. relationships with China and Saudi Arabia, for example,
were based on U.S. economic interest regardless of China and Saudi Arabia’s tyrannical
political systems. Often, the policy toward Iraq used such artificial priorities in order
secure support for its agenda.
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Rasputin
The palace power behind most o f the Tsar’s policies in Russia prior to the
Bolshevik Revolution o f 1917 was Rasputin. This metaphor represents the special power
interests, such as think tanks, ideologues, and special interests, active cynically in
influencing policy decisions. In regard to the policy toward Iraq, this theme is utilized by
these various actors in order to direct the policy toward engaging the United States in a
war with Iraq to remove the regime o f Saddam Hussein by force. The concepts that are
participating in the construction of this theme are “Ideology,” “Intensionality,”
“Preemption,” “Rhetoric,” “Special Interests,” and “Trotskyism.”

Ideology
The American Heritage Dictionary defines ideology as “the body o f ideas
reflecting the social needs and aspirations o f an individual, group, class, or culture”
(Morris, 1975, p. 654). According to the Dictionary o f Philosophy and Religion, the term
refers to “a set o f beliefs presented as objective whereas in fact they merely reflect the
material condition o f society” (Reese, 1985, p. 245). Here, ideology is a specific thinking
process that played an important role in the policy toward Iraq.
In a frequency count in the content analysis o f 54 for a concept related to issues of
ideology demonstrates that the policy toward Iraq from 1990 until 2001 was designed by
pragmatics, not ideologues. Although in 1998, the ideologues in Congress managed to
persuade the Clinton administration to officially adopt the concept o f regime change in
Iraq, the policy remained without the influence o f a particular political ideology until
2001 with the rise to power o f the neoconservatives in the Bush administration.
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The dominance o f one politically driven ideology on the process o f decision
making is dangerous because it can manipulate resources toward achieving specific
political objectives in the name o f national interest. In the case o f Iraq, the main reason
for the Bush administration to go to war in 2003 was not because Saddam’s regime posed
a high intensity threshold threat to the United States. On the contrary, and despite all the
allegations made by the administration regarding Saddam’s WMD and ties with alQaeda, the Iraqi regime remained a low intensity threat. But, since the hawks within the
administration were ideologically driven to replace Saddam, issues o f national security
and fighting terrorism were used to justify a war in Iraq as a first response to a fictional
imminent threat.

Intensionality
The conscious and deliberate use o f political means to achieve a desired end,
intensionality, deserves the question, for example, whether the Bush administration was
duped by faulty intelligence into launching a preemptive war on Iraq or the
administration intended to go to war from day one.
Content analysis reveals in a frequency count o f five for a concept related to
issues o f intensionality that even Deputy Secretary o f Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was
one of the architects o f the Iraq war in 2003, admitted that the Bush team focused on
Iraq’s WMD and used it as the primary justification for toppling Saddam Hussein
because it was politically convenient.
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Preemption
The political doctrine o f preemption justifies the use o f U.S. military to strike at
any target in the world without provocation. Such strikes are based only on perception of
future threats.
Preemption is now part o f our national security mode of operation, and the focal
strategy o f the Bush administration’s policy. In a one-on-one interview, however, a
political scientist suggests that preemptive strike policy is not preemptive at all.
According to this expert “the national security document in itself did not require going to
Iraq. What it did was to identify the circumstances within which for us it was reasonable
to perceive threats, and as threats emerged on the horizon they would then become
eligible for response.”
Based on this argument, Iraq became eligible for a response because its threat on
the horizon was sufficient under our doctrine o f preemption. As for the document itself,
to suggest going to war preemptively, the expert adds that “the doctrine does not say that
we will go to war in the world preemptively. It says that when we perceive threats that we
are unable to meet except by preemption, then preemption is warranted.”
A participant in the focus group echoes this statement but more positively,
“preemption has always been an intrinsic part o f our foreign and national security policy
since the beginning o f the republic. Even George W ashington’s farewell address provided
adequate justification for a doctrine of preemption. The document that we see in the
national security strategy is part o f our political tradition.”
Another focus group member agrees, and argues that “preemption in Iraq was
premised on the notion that the Iraqi regime was no longer capable o f being fixed and
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returned to the international community. The U.S. policy toward Iraq was no longer
viewed by the Bush administration as successful in managing the Iraqi regime and for a
new regime to emerge.”
A third participant in the focus group, however, disagrees with all three
statements. He states that “we put ourselves in a position o f unjust war and that is similar
to Germany’s attacking of France or Poland during WWII. This is where George W.
Bush did such a good job in selling this war to the American people by presenting it as a
just war.”
Another focus group member also rejects preemption despite its alleged historical
tradition in the American policy and its adoption by the current Bush administration. He
argues that “the U.S. is prepared to take a preemptive strike against anyone it thinks is
likely to do something in the future. This is the fundamental principle of the U.S. It is
basically saying that we don’t have to worry about international law and the United
Nations, and we don’t have to worry about the world court. Our policy as such is
motivated by power interest. This is the real danger.”
Another expert denounces preemption and stresses that it is not part o f the
American political tradition despite similar actions in the past that resembled preemption.
“The current policy of preemption is a rather substantial furthering o f U.S. foreign policy
There are ties to previous policies in that vein, such as in our intervention in Vietnam and
Nicaragua. But on its own, preemption is neither a diversion nor a natural extension o f
our political tradition.”
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Rhetoric
The Dictionary o f Philosophy and Religion defines rhetoric as “the art of
persuasive yielding belief but not knowledge” (Reese, 1985, p. 491). The American
Heritage Dictionary defines rhetoric as “exaggeration in prose or verse, and the
persuasive use o f language to influence the thoughts and action o f listeners” (Morris,
1975, p. 1114). Here, the use o f jargons may be defined as rhetoric, used by the United
States’ government to justify its political agenda. It goes hand in hand with propaganda.
Political rhetoric can also be recycled and used in different situations. In a oneone-one interview a political historian alludes to the use o f similar rhetoric during the
Vietnam War and the Iraq war o f 2003 in order to justify the use o f force in bothsituations. “In a 1969 political poster that was issued by the U.S. government, the U.S.
psychologically wanted to bolster homeland morale by claiming in the poster that the
U.S. was in Vietnam to stop terrorism. Today, we are using the same rhetoric in Iraq.”

Special Interest
Representatives o f various political, economic, and social groups, special
interests, lobby the executive and legislative branches of government to secure policies
favors for their groups. Review o f governmental documents reveals that various
interest groups lobbied both Congress and the Executive branch since the 1980s to
influence the policy toward Iraq.
During the 1980s, for example, oil companies, military technology and
industrial lobbyists were successful in influencing the policy toward supporting Iraq in
order to gain contracts in Iraq. As o f 1990, military-related lobbyists influenced the
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administration to maintain the use o f force in Iraq and were thereby able to increase the
sale o f military equipment to the government. And in 2003 the oil companies,
telecommunications and military industrial lobbyists were again successful in
influencing the administration to invade Iraq in order to gain no-bid contracts by the
Pentagon in Iraq.

Trotskyism
The current political ideology within the American neoconservative movement is
based on Trotsky’s ideas o f permanent revolution (war) and the destruction o f older
orders through violence in order to construct new orders that are more in line with U.S.
interest. The founders o f the neoconservative movement in the United States, such as
Irvin Kristol, were Trotskyites who believed in permanent revolution on a global level
with the United States playing a major role in promoting freedom and democracy.
Today, KristoPs students and successors, such as Paul Wolfowitz, Donald
Rumsfeld, Douglas Faith, Richard Perle, and Dick Cheney are using their prominent
positions within the U.S. government in order to repackage KristoPs Trotskyite ideas and
bring about a permanent revolution in the world by destroying the older order (especially
in the Middle East) through the violent intervention o f U.S. militarism.
A member o f the focus group, without mentioning Trotsky by name, explains this
mantra in the policy toward Iraq that involves destroying the old order in order to build a
new through war. This political scientist argues that “the war in Iraq removed the
sovereign. This is extremely important. It also impacted the broader political situation by
taking people who were marginalized in Iraq and then empowering them. The game is to

217

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

try keep them fighting one another with the hope o f continuing to interact with them
peacefully.”

Shadows
The metaphor o f shadows represents policies based on vague definitions,
symbolism, and simplistic explanation o f reality in regard to the policy toward Iraq in
order to avoid complicated analysis and examination o f motives and intents. The theme
emerges from the grouping together o f several similar concepts. These concepts are
“Ambiguity,” “Enemy,” “Simplicity,” “Symbolism,” and “War on Terrorism.”

Ambiguity
Uncertainty and confusion, ambiguity, regarding a particular political issue also
pertains to owe policy toward Iraq. It refers to the uncertainty and confusion regarding a
clear and consistent strategy in the policy as it moved from one phase to another.
One o f the focus group experts captures this ambiguity in the U.S. decision
making process, particularly after the liberation o f Kuwait in 1991. The ambiguity
stemmed from the question whether to proceed to Baghdad in order to remove Saddam
from power or remain confined within the UN mandate. The expert argues that “the
decision not to go to Baghdad in 1991 was a failure o f nerve, fearing to appear
imperialistic in the goals and design.”
Another participant points to the ambiguity in U.S. policy toward the Middle East
as a whole. The expert states that “ever since the U.S. helped to depose Mossadaq in Iran
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in the mid 1950s, we have not really known where to go as o f then. During the Iran-Iraq
War, we sided with Iraq, and later in 1991 we went to war with Iraq.”

Enemy
This concept refers to the target of offensive or defensive measures taken by the
U.S. government both politically and militarily. With reference to Iraq, the U.S. policy’s
definition o f enemy is not clear and continues to change.
At one point, the Iraqi regime was considered a friend o f the United States during
the Iran-Iraq War. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Iraqi regime became an enemy. During
the containment era, the U.S. government did not identify the Iraq regime as “enemy”
even when it officially adopted the concept of regime change in 1998. Then in 2002 the
Bush administration identified Iraq as part of the axis o f evil.
It is important to identify what is meant by “enemy” when designing foreign
policy. This definition must be clear, precise, timely, and objective. As such, the
definition requires a proactive perspective rather than a reactive measure to a specific
phenomenon. The definition must also be guided by clear goals, and devoid o f ideology.
The focus must be on political and economic interests.
Once a definition is reached, the nation must map out a sound strategy, assess its
strengths and weaknesses, and design its methodology based on a definition well-suited
to achieving its objectives. This ought to be done without resorting to any extreme
measures, reacting on impulse, or justifying inappropriate methods according to the
misguided mantra that the end justifies the means.
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Simplicity in Explaining Complex Issues
It is necessary to avoid complex political issues to simplistic explanation that
lacks depth and substance. An example o f such oversimplicity is used by the Bush
administration in reducing global political dynamics to the simplistic slogan, “you are
either with us or against us.”
With Bush describing the Iraqi regime during his 2002 State o f the Union Address
as part o f the axis o f evil (in addition to Iran and North Korea), he in essence had reduced
politics to a sound bite, a simplistic representation o f certain archetypes (in this case by
using evil as a metaphor to represent the Iraqi regime). In doing so, he is portraying any
action against Iraq by the United States as good, and designed to confront evil. When a
nation is fighting evil, it is doing so on behalf o f humanity and for world peace. Thus,
Bush’s simplistic representation is a cleaver manipulation of imagery in order to justify
the administration’s political agenda.

Symbolism
The use o f symbols is a time-honored means to explain a complex political issue.
In regard to the policy toward Iraq, the history chapter shows numerous uses of
symbolism, such as portraying patriotism, liberty, human rights, peace, democracy,
fighting terrorism, eliminating threats, and fighting aggression in order to dress up the
policy with enough positive imagery to win public support.
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War on Terror
The definition o f a war on terror has evolved into a vague and unspecified
political response by the U.S. government to international terrorism. This response lacks
specificity, duration, boundaries, correct definition, accurate identification o f the enemy,
or a clear and defined exit strategy. It is an on-going political war intended as a substitute
for the required police action necessary in fighting terror, and it is stretching across the
globe, targeting any person or entity that the U.S. government in its interest may identify
as a potential threat.
During this declared political war on terror, Iraq was identified as a target after
September 11, 2001. Analyzing the connection between the war on terror and Iraq, a
focus group member states that “our presence in Iraq will attract the essence o f
international terrorism into Iraq, whereby we can defeat them once and for all and that
will be the end o f the war on terror.”
To explain the rationale for choosing Iraq to become the battlefield in the war on
terror, the expert states that “the terrorists did not respond to our presence in Afghanistan.
However, they responded to our presence in Iraq and made it their battleground. We are
now engaged with them there. It is classical warfare and we have the best advantage to
destroy them.”
Based on this analysis, the U.S. is compensating for the lack o f its capacity to
fight clandestine private organizations o f operatives by pulling the terrorists into Iraq.
This would be a preferable alternative by in effect creating a nation state. Once they are
there, the U.S. would fight them with the capacity that it has to fight a nation-state.
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The expert adds that “terrorists do not have a state, and as such we have to hold
the states accountable that give them haven accountable in order to control terrorism.
This, in reality, will reinforce sovereignty because we are telling other nations that they
have responsibilities to avoid these things from taking place.”
However, in a one-on-one interview with a political historian, reference is made
to the notion that Saddam had no connection with international terrorism, especially those
who were responsible for September 11. As such, choosing Iraq as a target or
battleground in the war on terror, when Iraq itself had nothing to do with September 11,
undermines the logic beyond the previous argument. “Saddam had nothing to do with
September 11. He did support some Palestinian terrorists and the Iranian Mujahideen. His
regime also terrorized the Iraqi people. But, that terror was directed inward, not toward
the United States. This was the Bush administration’s main mistake in linking Saddam
with the war on terror.”

Beyond Good and Evil
The metaphor o f beyond good and evil represents the deliberate and conscious
rejection of looking inward in order to avoid taking responsibility for the U.S. role in
creating atrocities in Iraq by supporting the regime o f Saddam Hussein in the past.
Instead, the United States completely has negated its responsibility and blamed Saddam
solely for these atrocities to which it was also a party. There are only two concepts that
are participating in the construction o f this theme. These concepts are “Hypocrisy,” and
“Looking into the Mirror.”
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Hypocrisy

This concept refers to the notion o f criticizing others for doing something wrong
while committing a similar wrong or failing to comment publicly about these wrongs
when they occurred. Content analysis reveals through a frequency count o f 67 for a
concept related to issues o f hypocrisy that America’s history with Iraq is one o f the more
hypocritical tales in American foreign policy.
Time and again, America turned a blind eye to Saddam’s crimes and flinched at
the opportunity o f replacing him while he was committing unthinkable atrocities on his
people. At times it seemed that Saddam fixated the United States. Several administrations
tolerated him because they were worried that if he fell, Iraq would disintegrate and ignite
chaos in the Middle East.
One of the participants in the focus group comments on the resulting policy
stance: “America supported Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War and stayed with him while
he was gassing the Kurds. He was our good guy then, and we made that relationship
possible by oversimplifying things.”
Another focus group participant explains the reason for U.S. support for Saddam
during the Iran-Iraq War and why that support was gradually reduced and later changed
into confrontation. He states that “our initial support o f Iraq came after the hostage crisis.
But once that situation was resolved, we had less interest in supporting Iraq. After the
G ulf War was won, Bush called Saddam a bad guy, but did not want to topple him
because he did not want to dismantle Iraq or disrupt the political status quo in the Middle
East.”
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Looking into a Mirror
It is a metaphorical expression o f U.S. government behavior to reject reflecting
inward and assessing its own role in supporting the former Iraqi regime o f Saddam
Hussein. Such rejection o f looking into a mirror enables the U.S. to take the high moral
ground, blaming Saddam alone for the wrong doings in Iraq while ignoring the U.S. role
in contributing to Saddam’s actions and sustaining his power for nearly 35 years.
Content analysis demonstrates through a frequency o f four for a concept related to
issues o f looking into a mirror that the United States supported Iraq during the 1980s and
helped building its weapon programs. When Saddam used these weapons against the
Kurds, the United States turned a blind eye to Saddam’s crimes and continued supporting
him. Later in 2003, when the Bush administration wanted to build up its case against
Saddam and justify its war, it used the very story o f Saddam using WMD against his
people as though the United States had just discovered the incident and had nothing to do
with it.

Four Emerging Interpretive Levels (Super Themes)
From the 13 metaphorical themes, four super themes are emerging. The rationale
chosen in composing these four super themes is to construct each super theme out o f the
combination o f two or more themes that share a common trait. For example, one o f the
super themes that is emerging is Mythticism. This super theme is composed o f grouping
together three metaphorical themes, such as the Telephone Pole, Shadows, and Beyond
Good and Evil.
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The common thread between these three themes is that the U.S. policy toward
Iraq relies on imagery and shadow reality than on factual evidence, reason, and
substance. The policy also uses the power o f myth to exercise expressive judgment,
divide the world into a struggle between good and evil, and to stand alone in the world
(as a telephone pole) in order to uphold good and defeat evil within the perceived
tradition of the American regime values. The emerging super theme, as such is
constructed to describe the specific trends relative to the U.S. political and administrative
system within the context of U.S. policy toward Iraq. It describes this policy as relying on
prediction, far-reaching goals, and myths.
The other three resulting and evolving Interpretive Levels are dichotomy, rational
choice, and primordial interests. Together, these four super themes compose the data’s
Interpretive Levels, explaining the policy toward Iraq in a condensed format that is used
as an indicator for the complexity analysis that follows in the next two chapters. Table
Five explains these emerging Interpretive Levels.

Interpretive Level
Mythticism

The Dichotomy
between Tyranny and
Suffering
Rational Choice

The Primordial
Interests

Definition

Themes

It describes the specific trends relative to the U.S.
political and administrative system within the context o f
U.S. policy toward Iraq. It relied on prediction, farreaching and attainable goals, and the myths that
perpetuated U.S. foreign policy as one that promoted
democracy, human rights, and freedom.
It describes within the context o f U.S. policy toward Iraq
the dichotomy between the suffering o f the Iraq people
on one hand and the tyrannical regime o f Saddam
Hussein on the other hand.
Making rational choice appropriate to temporal
situations. It favors the reliance on tactics, maneuvers,
short-term strategies and cautious trajectory. It is devoid
o f prediction and far-reaching goals and utilizes
administrative knowledge and experience.
The fundamental law that governed the U.S. policy
toward Iraq was based on advancing the primitive nation
state interests o f the United States.

The Telephone Pole;
Shadows; and
Beyond Good and
Evil.

The Judas
Syndrome; The
amebic Response.
Political
Metamorphism;
Moby Dick; Tactics;
and Rasputin.
The Baseball
Pitcher; Economy;
and Eskimo
Community.

Table 5. Super Themes (Interpretive Levels), Definitions and Composing Themes
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Mythticism
Myth is a powerful element both in policy and in organizational dynamics. As
explained earlier in Chapter Two, because Western culture places a high value on
rationality, which implies theories o f cause and effect, policymakers and participants in
ambiguous organizational environments find themselves in the position o f having to
make sense o f a world that is not eminently sensible. The means to do so is by creating
myths capable o f enabling the policy and its organization to deal with the reality o f its
environment.
Meyer & Rowan (1977) explain that myths about formal organizational structure
have several key points. The first point is that formal organizational structure is
“rationalized and has impersonal prescriptions on how to pursue some purposes in a rule
like way and rationally.” The other point is that structure is “highly institutionalized and
do not consider individual participation.” However, as rationalized institutional rules
arise in given domains o f work activity, formal organizations incorporate these rules as
structural elements (pp. 349-354).
The Garbage Can Model (GCM) is influential in dealing with organizational myth
and theory. It implies that random outcomes should be expected, because the connections
between decisions and outcomes are determined by temporal factors rather than by causal
connections between decisions and outcomes (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972).
According to this model, many decision processes within organizations do not
operate according to rational choice models. Rather, confounding situational elements
further limit the cognitive capacities o f organizational participants. Problems, solutions,
participants, and choice opportunities flow into the organization at different rates and
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connect elements according to a temporal and mythical rather than a causal logic (Cohen,
March & Olsen, 1972). This is the case with the U.S. policy toward Iraq.
Mythticism is the specific trends relative to the U.S. political and administrative
system within the context o f U.S. policy toward Iraq may be termed as mythticism.
Metaphorically, it represents the special characteristics o f the “home base” and its
trajectory. Home base refers to the impact o f the policy domestically on the American
people and how they perceived it.
This Interpretive Level is based on series o f internal collapses in the policy as it
responded through either legitimate or illegal means to emerging trends within the home
base or in the environment. Mythticism relies on prediction, far-reaching and unattainable
goals, and the myths that perpetuated U.S. foreign policy as one that promotes
democracy, human rights, and freedom. The super theme is constructed by the grouping
together o f the following themes: The Telephone Pole, Shadows, and Beyond Good and
Evil.
Mythticism is composed o f themes that represent the collapse o f the opposition
party in the United States as a viable voice for political discourse, resulting in the lack of
political debates and the supremacy of priorities and resources to justify specific agendas
in U.S. policy toward Iraq. These agendas then stood alone as a telephone pole, dictating
their messages to a wider mass without challenge or examination.
Mythticism also represents a policy that is based on vague definitions, symbolism,
and simplistic explanation o f the world. In addition, Mythticism rests on a theme that
represents the negation o f looking inward and taking responsibility for the U.S. own role
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in creating the very evil in Iraq that it opposes while placing itself on a high moral
ground.

The Dichotomy between Tyranny and Suffering
This super theme describes the dichotomy between the suffering o f the Iraq
people on one hand and the tyrannical regime o f Saddam Hussein on the other hand. The
policy neglected to recognize this dichotomy by continually treating Iraq and the regime
o f Saddam Hussein as one or defining the regime in the person of Saddam Hussein.
This super theme is constructed by grouping together the following themes: The
Judas Syndrome and the Amebic Response. It reveals the error in U.S. Policy toward
Iraq in neglecting to see the dichotomy between Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people.
Instead, the policy reduced such a dichotomy to one person, and as such it emerged as a
folly policy, hurting the Iraqi people in the name o f containing Saddam or toppling his
regime.
The negation also caused the policy toward Iraq to differ from the UN path and
international perspectives, thereby creating a paradox resulting in a gap between U.S.
aims and objectives in Iraq and those o f the UN and the international community. The
gap was further widened when the UN itself committed errors in its approach toward Iraq
and in managing the U.S. policy toward Iraq within the international legal framework.
This dichotomy is composed o f themes that represent the U.S. policy toward Iraq.
These themes are designed primarily to serve U.S. interest as a nation-state at any cost to
others. As a consequence, the policy suffers o f mistrust and abuse. The dichotomy also
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represents Iraq’s response to the U.S. policy as a means for survival while entangling the
Iraqi people in the process and causing them more suffering.

Rational Choice
The super theme o f Rational Choice represents the tactical choices made by the
policy in order to respond to internal and external changes. It is based on making
appropriate rational choice in response to specific emerging conditions. As such, it favors
the reliance on maneuvers, short-term planning and cautious procedures. Among the four
super themes, this one proves most rational because it is devoid o f prediction and farreaching goals. It also utilizes administrative knowledge and prior experience. The super
theme is constructed by the grouping together of the following themes: Political
Metamorphism, Moby Dick, Tactics, and Rasputin.
Rational Choice illustrates the triumph of tactics in the policy toward Iraq over
strategy. Because the policy lacks any long-term comprehensive strategy, and it is a
trajectory in its nature, responding primarily to trends, it has as a consequence no clear
objective or strategy. The policy evolves according to the specifics dictated by emerging
trends during each segment o f its progression.

The Primordial o f Interests
This super theme represents the raw, primitive interests of the United States as a
nation-state in generating, directing and guiding its policy toward Iraq. It is constructed
by grouping together the following themes: The Baseball Pitcher, Economy, Eskimo
Community, and Pax Americana.
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The super theme o f Primordial Interests is composed o f themes that explain the
type o f functional and behavioral state o f the American executive leadership in the postCold War era. This type o f state often operates outside the constitutional separation of
powers and emphasizes the rule o f the executive branch over Congress. This behavior in
its relationship with Iraq and the world is based on how the U.S. as a nation-state is
perceiving signals from its environment and how its responds to such perceptions.
Primordial Interests also represent America’s power interest in oil and the dollar
as political tools to dominate the world. And, in order to carry on its function within the
context o f the policy toward Iraq, the U.S. as a nation-state seeks to cooperate with other
nation-states in the world in order to bring about a sense o f an inter-related global
community even while maneuvering between regional associations to maintain its niche
in the environment. This drive toward a global sense of community while striving at the
same time to dominate the world is an important reason for the dialectical relationships in
geopolitics and U.S. relations with the world.

Conclusions
So what does the linear analysis reveal in relation to the policy toward Iraq? What
do the four data sets, their Ethnograph coding, the emerging themes, and the evolving
super themes tell us about this policy? Does the policy make sense? Does it follow a
specific pattern, design, strategy, or ideology? Does it achieve its goals? And, what are
the outcomes o f this policy?
The linear analysis is an important first step in observing the U.S. policy toward
Iraq. However, as an only step, this analysis is incomplete because it is not capable o f
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uncovering the hidden meanings that transcend logical progressions o f reductionism
(interpreting the whole by reducing it into parts). Therefore, complexity theories are
needed to complete this analysis.
But, as a first step, the linear analysis is able to diagnose important dimensions o f
the policy. Mainly, the analysis reveals that the U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1990 until
2003 is a trajectory. This means that the policy neither evolves from a particular point nor
leads to a desired aim. Rather, it is a system o f complex relationships that is fixed within
the particularities o f its time and the political and administrative system o f governance
that generates it.
Such a system does react to its environment, but it is primarily driven by one
force, the sole self-interest of the United States as a nation-state in competition for
resources. This nation-state, though, is transformed from being one o f the two
superpowers in a bipolar world in 1990 to one that is the only superpower in a unipolar
world in 2003.
Nevertheless, this lone superpower is unable to dictate its hegemony and political
will on the world despite its military and economic might. The reason for such a
challenge is because o f the competing self-interests o f other nation-states which are able
to form regional alliances in order to preserve their primordial interests and compete with
the United States for scarce world resource.
The U.S. policy toward Iraq operates on four distinct, yet inter-related levels.
These levels are Mythticism, Dichotomy, Rational choice and the Primordial o f Interests.
Out o f the four emerging inter-related levels, the Primordial Level is the driving engine
beyond the policy and its associations. Everything else falls in between. The policy is
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implemented from day to day as a tool to advance the primordial interests o f the United
States. Once this is understood, the overall picture, direction and aim o f the policy starts
to make sense.
Where to go from here? Since policies operate in an interacting and evolving
world, it is difficult to predict where the U.S. policy toward Iraq will lead or what will be
its next phase. By tracing the policy to 1990, however, and observing it since, the linear
analysis is capable o f observing its trajectory as it progresses from one phase to another.
This trajectory begins in 1990 as a response to Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait and its
disruption o f the oil market (and as such the U.S. nation as a state interest in the region).
It then gradually moves ahead ambiguously and without clear objective, responding only
to evolving trends. Within this progression, the policy adopts several tactics in order to
survive. The supremacy o f tactics within the policy is at the expense o f clear goals and
strategy. It reveals a repeated process of internal collapse that the linear analysis is unable
to explain (yet the complex analysis will in steps two and three o f this dissertation).
As the responses to trends create more o f a dead-end trajectory for the policy
rather than opening windows o f opportunity, policy-makers begin to adopt desperate
measures, often outside the collective of internationalism, in order for the policy to
survive. These measures result in efforts at regime change in Iraq either through political
proxies composed o f exiled Iraqi opposition groups, such as in 1998, or through a
military invasion, such as in 2003. The policy, however, despite the efforts at regime
change does not move forward toward a desired end. Instead, it further alienates the
United States in the world and exposes its political tactics as Machiavellian in nature,
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designed only to advance its nation-state interest at the expense o f legitimacy and world
peace.
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CHAPTER VII

THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Introduction
Step one emerges with four Interpretive Levels: Mythticism, Dichotomy, Rational
choice, and Primordial Interests. This chapter focuses on interpreting the internal changes
within the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity theories by observing the
behavior o f these four Interpretive Levels and presenting the observation in a flux
metaphorical model.
The U.S. policy toward Iraq is a dynamic (living) rather than a static system. This
dynamic system goes through internal processes of phase change while the policy is
responding to changing trends in its environment. The characteristics o f these internal
processes and restructuring are comparative with changes in the policy’s environment.
Hence, this analysis is identified as the “Comparative Structure.”

Internal Changes in the Policy Toward Iraq
Within the decision-making processes o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq there are
interpretive levels that explain the mechanism o f the policy as a whole. This unfolding
empirical reality is to be understood by observing the trajectory o f its transformation
from one phase to another. Such a trajectory invites us to search for the basic dynamics
that generated and sustained the policy and its environments in comparative relationships.
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To understand the internal changes and the processes o f self-organization within
the U.S. policy toward Iraq and these processes’ relationships and causality, four
dimensions are derived from the complexity theories to interpret the policy’s internal
mechanism. These four dimensions are autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual
causality. M organ’s flux metaphor is utilized to observe changing trends in the U.S.
policy toward Iraq and according to each specific complexity dimension.
Each dimension explains the internal changes within the policy according to the
specific characteristics o f that particular dimension. They do so by tracing the behavior of
each Interpretive Level as an indicator o f change. Each Interpretive Level is illustrated as
a flux metaphor. Together, the four Interpretive Levels, as observed by the four
complexity dimensions, provide perspectives on the policy’s internal changes and
restructuring based on the new sciences o f complexity. Table Six illustrates these four
dimensions and how they function in observing the four Interpretive Levels.

Dimensions

Functions

Autopoietic

The analysis o f self-organization within the policy by monitoring the
behavior of the four Interpretive Levels.
Bifurcation
The analysis o f phase shift, collapse, entropy, and the emergence o f a new
order within the policy by monitoring the behavior o f the four Interpretive
Levels.
The S-Matrix
The analysis o f the policy’s web o f associations and their impact on the
internal dynamics by monitoring the behavior o f the four Interpretive
Levels.
Mutual causality
The analysis o f changes in the internal structure o f the policy through the
processes of positive and negative feedback by monitoring the behavior o f
the four Interpretive Levels.
Table 6. Complexity Dim ensions and the Flux Metaphorical Interpretation

Autopoiesis
Autopoiesis is used as an analytical lens in observing internal changes in the U.S.
policy toward Iraq. This enables the manifestation o f self-production, reassembling of
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components and changing o f structure through top-down dynamics to take place. These
dynamics occur because the policy responds to external changes in its environment.
Every pattern in the case o f U.S. policy toward Iraq gives way to another pattern
and do not stay fixed in time and place. For example, neither containment nor preemption
stayed fixed. This flow in the process is flux, and the internal changes that occur are
irreversible. Preemption, for example, is unable to return to containment, and
containment is unable to return to cooperation and negotiation.
In order to understand the impact o f autopoiesis on observing internal changes in
the policy, behavioral changes in each indicator (each Interpretive Level) are observed in
order to assess the level o f internal changes in the policy. As such, autopoiesis serves as a
complexity guide in the process o f observing the internal changes in the policy through
the observation o f behavioral changes in the Interpretive Levels.
The dimension o f autopoiesis explains internal changes within the unit o f analysis
based on the concept o f autopoiesis in complexity theories. The emerging Interpretive
Levels in step one o f the analysis are observed according to autopoiesis in order to
determine changes in their behavior as indicator o f internal change in the policy toward
Iraq. Although the U.S. policy toward Iraq does experience self-organization in some of
its aspects, nevertheless and as a whole, it resists self-organization in order to maintain its
original structure. By interpreting each super theme according to autopoiesis, we are able
to see which aspect o f the policy witness self-organization and why, and which other
aspects resist such a notion.
The rationale for using the four super themes that emerge from the linear analysis
in order to observe the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to dimensions derived from the
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complexity theories is because these super themes provide consistency in the overall
analysis o f the data and follow the methodological steps outlined by the Phi Model and
explained earlier in Chapter Five.
A qualitative inquiry based on complexity analysis is not capable o f launching
“pure” complex analysis and completely divorce itself from prior linear findings as it
lacks the mechanism to do so. The linear findings and themes serve as new raw data to
further explaining the data but in accordance to complexity theories. Even quantitative
inquires use “linear” data in order to explain the same data but in the light o f complexity
dimensions. For example, data that is regarded as “error” in regression is used in complex
analysis in order to understand the dynamic changes and characteristics o f such error. As
such, what is emerging during the linear analysis in this research, such as the four super
themes, is playing the role o f “errors” in a linear regression. The complex analysis
explains the nature, dynamics, and characteristics o f these errors as an observation o f a
dynamic system.

Autopoiesis and Mythticism
In order to respond to changing trends in its environment, the U.S. policy toward
Iraq moves from one myth to another in order to answer the conditions provided by each
trend. As such, the policy does witness self-organization in its myth structure, utilizing
the temporal imagery during its trajectory from one phase to another.
There are several trends in the data that support such a notion. Examples o f such
trends are the policy’s promotion o f regional stability in the region o f the Middle East by
supporting Saddam during the 1980s. This trend, as it is shown in the history chapter,
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changes to the notion of legitimacy o f international law during the Gulf War o f 1991.
Later, the policymakers reorganize the political myth to reflect an image o f containing
Saddam and disarming his regime during the 1990s.
Analyzing the policy’s myth in the context o f geopolitics, a political scientist and
a strategist for the Republican Party states in a one-on-one interview that “the policy
toward Iraq needs to be looked at in the context o f broader world politics. It is a big
mistake to try to turn relationships between the United States and any particular nation
into an immediate relationship.”
An economist in the focus group agrees with this assessment and identifies the
Gulf War as an example of an emerging political myth in the United States that is
impacted by world politics. This participant states that “the central factor in the 1991 war
is the disappearance o f the Soviet Union, which changes the calculus of power in the
region and gives an opportunity to the United States to think differently about how to
react and relate to Iraq.”
The frequency count in the content analysis o f 13 for a concept related to issues o f
Middle East stability and status quo reveals that it was based on such a notion that many
Arab nations cooperated with the United States in supporting Saddam during the 1980s.
The purpose o f that support is not to empower Iraq to emerge as the most powerful nation
in the region but to box the Islamic revolution in Iran within its own boundaries and help
sustain the political status quo in the region.
A political scientist in the focus group states that “the policy toward Iraq from
1990 until 2001 is designed by pragmatics, not ideologues. The pragmatic aspect in the
policy’s decision-making process makes its myth more acceptable within the political
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normative processes on world level than when pragmatism changes to ideology-driven
policymaking (as it is the case after September 11, 2001).” Another focus group
participant, a historian, states that “although in 1998, the ideologues in Congress manage
to persuade the Clinton administration to officially adopt the concept o f regime change in
Iraq, the policy remains without the influence o f a particular political ideology until 2001
with the rise to power of the neoconservatives in the Bush administration.”
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, the myth and policy of
containment no longer was capable o f responding to changing trends in the environment.
A frequency in the content analysis o f 16 for a concept related to issue o f Machiavellian
methods reveals that policymakers reorganized the policy’s myth once more and had it
reassemble to represent the U.S. resolve in removing Saddam’s threat to the security of
the United States that was posed, according to this myth, by Saddam’s possession o f
weapons o f mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda. However, when no such weapons were
found or evidence o f ties with al-Qaeda could be established, the policymakers
reorganized the political myth as brining freedom and democracy to Iraq through the
direct U.S. military removal o f the regime o f Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
These trends are exhibited in presidential speeches, Executive Orders, and
legislative agendas. They are also illustrated in the media by various governmental
spokespersons as they try to reflect the policy’s trajectory o f myth from one phase to
another.
The policy’s myth, although impacted by world politics and international
normative processes, as exemplified by UN actions, is nevertheless a creature o f its own
making and uses UN relations to justify its existence. The UN authority as a source o f
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political legitimacy to justify an American political myth is questioned in an interview
with a political scientist. The expert argues that “we often take the UN Security Council
as a source o f law, which it never is. A prudent example is what happened in Haiti during
thel990s. The U.S. worked the Security Council to justify its intervention in Haiti by
manipulating the refugees issue to turn the tide on and off almost at will as a consequence
o f our sanctions and the vigor o f our enforcement o f the policy at sea.”
A political historian comments on the U.S. manipulation o f the United Nations in
order to get resolutions passed in its favor. He states that “once the U.S. gets the
declaration it wants from the UN, other states that are carrying out the Security Council
policy retain the right to judge the actions o f the party in question. In 1991 the U.S. could
easily have decided to get the UN to approve the invasion of Iraq under the guise of
removing the threat. But it chose not to do so at the time because Bush was not ready to
replace Saddam.”
Contrary to the world o f make believe in the making o f the policy’s myth and in
its justification outside international political normative, content analysis in a frequency
o f 47 for a concept related to issues of legitimacy reveals that it is the Security Council
that determines the existence o f any threat to the peace, breach o f the peace, or act of
aggression, and shall make recommendation, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, which detail the preferred measures not involving the
use of armed force. The only exception is Article 51, which permits the right of selfdefense against armed attack until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security. This provision puts the policy’s myth within
the test o f reality, and examines it outside the parameters o f its fictional boundaries.

240

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The frequency in the content analysis o f 16 for a concept related to issues o f
administrative state, the frequency o f nine for a concept related to issues o f imperial
presidency, and the frequency o f 47 for a concept related to issues o f legitimacy reveal
that the U.N. Charter is a solemn treaty recognized by the United States as the foundation
o f international law. The U.S. Constitution provides a mechanism by declaring treaties as
the law o f the land. It further authorizes Congress to punish offenses against this law.
With the Bush administration declaring war on Iraq in 2003 outside the specifics o f the
UN Charter, it had violated the U.S. Constitution that obligates the United States to honor
all treaties to which the United States is a signatory.
A philosopher in the focus group argues against subjugating an American political
process and its myth to international normative processes. Instead, the expert suggests
that a political process in the United States and its myth “find their justification within the
American political tradition and its history.” Commenting of the Bush administration’s
doctrine o f preemption, for example, the expert states, “preemption has always been an
intrinsic part of our foreign and national security policy since the beginning o f the
republic. Even George W ashington’s farewell address provided adequate justification for
a doctrine o f preemption. The document that we see in the national security strategy is
part o f our political tradition.”
Another focus group member, a public administrator, also rejects preemption
despite its alleged historical tradition in the American policy and its adoption by the
current Bush administration. He argues that “the U.S. is prepared to take a preemptive
strike against anyone it thinks is likely to do something in the future. This is the
fundamental principle o f the U.S. It is basically saying that we don’t have to worry about
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international law and the United Nations, and we don’t have to worry about the world
court. Our policy as such is motivated by power interest. This is the real danger.”
Another focus group member, a sociologist, agrees, and argues that “preemption
in Iraq was premised on the notion that the Iraqi regime was no longer capable o f being
fixed and returned to the international community. The U.S. policy toward Iraq was no
longer viewed by the Bush administration as successful in managing the Iraqi regime and
for a new regime to emerge.”
Another expert, an Iraqi-American chemist, rejects preemption and stresses that it
is not part o f the American political tradition despite similar actions in the past that
resembled preemption. “The current policy of preemption is a rather substantial
furthering o f U.S. foreign policy. There are ties to previous policies in that vein, such as
in our intervention in Vietnam and Nicaragua. But on its own, preemption is neither a
diversion nor a natural extension o f our political tradition.”
Political myth is also recycled and used in different situations. In a one-one-one
interview a political historian alludes to the use o f similar rhetoric during the Vietnam
War and the Iraq war of 2003 in order to justify the use o f force in both situations. “In a
1969 political poster that was issued by the U.S. government, the U.S. psychologically
wanted to bolster homeland morale by claiming in the poster that the U.S. was in
Vietnam to stop terrorism. Today, we are using the same rhetoric in Iraq.”
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Autopoiesis and Dichotomy
The U.S. policymaker’s lack of recognition o f the dichotomy between the regime
o f Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi people does not experience any change throughout the
shifts in the policy toward Iraq. This lack o f recognition remains constant, contributing to
the policy’s failure to engage itself with the Iraqi people and truly reflect the policy’s
various assemblies o f myth.
There are several trends in the history chapter that support such a notion and the
welfare o f the Iraqi people was never an issue to be considered by the U.S. policymakers
from the start. For example, as the regime o f Saddam Hussein fell out of favor because o f
its invasion o f Kuwait in 1990, the plight o f the Iraqi people for freedom was exploited
by the policymakers in the United States for mere propaganda purposes, and they did not
differentiate in their punitive actions toward Iraq between targeting Saddam’s regime and
targeting the Iraqi people who were suffering under the brutality o f Saddam’s regime.
This is the formula of the policy’s basic internal mechanism. By ignoring this
dichotomy, the policy creates a dichotomy o f its own, between U.S. interests in Iraq and
the aspirations o f the Iraqi people. Because o f this trend, the Iraqi people, with the
exception o f a few isolated exiled groups, are divorcing themselves from the United
States and its plans, widening the gap o f mistrust and suspicions with the United States
and its appointed administrators in post-war Iraq.
The history chapter reveals that as the U.S. policy moved from supporting
Saddam during the 1980s to confronting him in 1991, the dichotomous nature o f the
policy goes through a series o f internal artificial changes in order to maintain the policy’s
main structure intact while reorganizing it artificially. During the Iran-Iraq War, for
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example, the U.S. policy toward Iraq at the time was constructed to favor U.S. support of
Saddam while ignoring the Iraqi people’s suffering at the hand o f Saddam’s regime.
When the environment changed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the policymakers
rearranged the policy’s dichotomy in order to allow it on the surface to separate between
the Iraqi people and their government. This was the first time that the policymakers
acknowledged, though without a reorganization o f the policy, that there was a dichotomy
between the Iraqi people and their government.
It was based on the narrow nation-state interests of the United States during the
1980s, for example, that the Reagan administration supported Iraq during its war with
Iran. According to a one-on-one interview with a political historian, “what happened in
the Iran-Iraq War came in the aftermath o f the revolution in Iran and the hostage crisis
with the United States, which rendered the United States much less disposed to come to
Iran’s assistance in the context and to hope to offset Iran with Iraqi power.”
One of the participants in the focus group, a historian, comments on the resulting
policy stance: “America supported Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War and stayed with him
while he was gassing the Kurds. He was our good guy then, and we made that
relationship possible by oversimplifying things.”
Another focus group participant, a public administrator, explains the reason for
U.S. support for Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War and why that support was gradually
reduced and later changed into confrontation. He states that “our initial support o f Iraq
came after the hostage crisis. But once that situation was resolved, we had less interest in
supporting Iraq. After the G ulf War was won, Bush called Saddam a bad guy, but did not
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want to topple him because he did not want to dismantle Iraq or disrupt the political
status quo in the Middle East.”
Content analysis with a frequency count o f 67 for a concept related to issues of
hypocrisy reveals that the United States supported Iraq during the 1980s and helped
building its weapon programs. When Saddam used these weapons against the Kurds, the
United States turned a blind eye to Saddam’s crimes and continued supporting him. Later
in 2003, when the Bush administration wanted to build up its case against Saddam and
justify its war, it used the very story of Saddam using WMD against his people as though
the United States had just discovered the incident and had nothing to do with it.
The main political structure that neglects the dichotomy, as such, is not allowed to
experience a complete reorganization and reflect the dichotomy on a policy level. The
policymakers continue to treat the dichotomy superficially, as something secondary to
other objectives.
The policymakers, for example, continued to deal with the dichotomy during the
G ulf War o f 1991 in the same way as before. This situation continued during the
containment era o f the 1990s and throughout the administration o f President George W.
Bush.
The frequency in the content analysis o f 15 for a concept related to issues of
containment reveals that as containment was enforced on Iraq and Saddam’s regime
reluctantly responded to UN resolutions, unintended consequences were taking their toll
on the Iraqi people. These unintended consequences are best illustrated in the Judas
Syndrome, with policymakers intending to do something, such as enforcing an economic
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sanction on Iraq in order to assure Saddam’s compliance with UN resolutions, but the
intended consequences o f these sanctions resulted in hurting the Iraqi people.
Despite the severity o f these sanctions on Iraq, their negative impact did not result
in the policy toward Iraq shifting internally in recognition o f a dichotomy between the
Iraqi people and the Iraqi regime. Instead, the policymakers continued with their
disregard o f this dichotomy, allowing the UN sanctions to hurt the Iraqi people without
concern.
Content analysis also reveals through a frequency of ten for the concept o f Attila
the Hun that facilitated U.S. foreign policy initiatives. The portrayal o f Saddam as Attila
the Hun made it easier for the United States to launch two wars on Iraq, reduce Iraq to
one person and punish the entire country for the crimes o f one person, placing the country
under crippling sanction for 12 years, and then occupying the country under unpopular
and illegitimate military control.
In a one-on-one interview with a political historian, there is a testimony to the
fallacy o f designing a policy based on good intentions without carefully thinking through
the consequences. According to the interview, “the sanctions meant to change the Iraqi
regime’s attitude. The UN and the U.S. thought that it would be able to take the authority
from Saddam by having direct connection with the Iraqi people through the distribution
o f food through the oil-for-food program. This, however, did not work because neither
the UN nor the U.S. anticipated how the sanction was going to hurt average Iraqis.”
Artificial engineering is also employed in order for the U.S. policymakers to
continue abusing the United Nation’s mission in Iraq. An economist in the focus group
states that “such an abuse resulted in the policymakers’ failure to recognize the negative
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impacts o f sanctions on the Iraqi people.” Another focus group participant, an IraqiAmerican chemist, states that artificial engineering is further encouraged by “presidential
extraordinary issues, the continuous mistrust in the U.S./ Iraqi relationships, and the
widening gap between U.S. and UN goals in Iraq.” Collectively, these trends weaken the
effective recognition of the issue o f dichotomy in the U.S. policy toward Iraq and
maintain the mistreatment o f the Iraqi people as an irrelevant issue in the overall political
objectives in the United States.
In a one-on-one interview, a former leader o f an exiled Iraqi opposition group
states that “in the mid-1990, the U.S. policy was designed to contain Saddam, not cause
his removal. During the Clinton administration, containment was tried through the
enforcement o f the no-fly-zone and the UN economic sanctions. But the no-fly-zone was
not effective because Saddam continued sending his tanks to southern Iraq and killing
people. It was because of that Clinton adopted the policy o f regime change in 1998.”
In addition to the ineffectiveness o f the no-fly-zone, there was also the issue o f
Saddam smuggling oil outside the UN imposed embargo that added to the erosion o f the
policy o f containment. In the same interview mentioned above, the former leader argues
that “Clinton figured out that Saddam was smuggling oil, and continued supporting
Palestinian terrorist groups. So the United States had no choice but to replace Saddam,
especially when he was unable to change, did not trust America, and America did not
trust him. During all these events, however, the welfare o f the Iraqi people themselves
was not a factor either in Saddam’s calculations or in the U.S. policymakers’
calculations.”
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In explaining these dichotomies and their rationale within the overall circular
reasoning o f the policy toward Iraq, one o f the participants in the focus group, a
philosopher, states that “the sanctions were in place in order to create a condition for the
Baath Party itself or the Iraqi army to remove Saddam. But after 12 years of sanctions
and the suffering o f the Iraqi people Saddam continued to remain in power. So America
had to do something about it.”
After September 11, 2001, the Bush administration focused on the Iraqi regime
itself as the main threat to the United States. In a frequency in the content analysis o f 45
for a concept related to issues of regime change trajectory reveals that as the
administration developed its policy o f preemption toward Iraq, the issue o f dichotomy
was used by the Bush administration to support its goal o f regime change in Iraq. The
dichotomy between the Iraqi people and the regime o f Saddam Hussein, however,
remained within the policy’s on-going organizational structure. After Saddam was
toppled in 2003, the Bush administration continued to ignore the welfare o f the Iraqi
people, dealing with them instead with the mentality o f an occupying force that came to
dictate its political will rather than to liberate.
Content analysis reveals a frequency o f six pertaining to a concept elated to issues
o f war as a corrective action that the Bush administration described as atrocities
committed by the regime of Saddam Hussein against his neighbors and his own people as
a justification for war. Bush, however, purposely neglected to state the U.S. role in the
past in supporting Saddam while the Iraqi regime was committing such atrocities. By
doing so, the administration placed itself and its political agenda on high moral ground in
order to justify its preemption policy toward Iraq.
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Autopoiesis and Rational Choice
The U.S. policy toward Iraq lacks a coherent, consistent, comprehensive and clear
strategy from the start to the end. However, the policy’s tactics do experience autopoiesis,
as the policy responds to various environmental needs and changes throughout its
trajectory. These tactics are the policy’s only rational choice, representing its true
objective: advancing the United States’ nation-state interest. It is during the changes o f
these tactical responses that autopoiesis takes place and self-organization occurs.
Can a tactic be rational when the policy’s decisionmaking process itself is
irrational? The answer to this question is yes. In dealing with temporal trends in the
environment, content analysis yields a frequency o f 13 for a concept related to issues o f
political trajectory and a frequency o f 47 for a concept related to issues o f nation-state
interest. It reveals that the tactics that were applied to bolster the policy were appropriate
in dealing with particular trends. However, when these tactics were placed in the overall
context, they made no sense and emerged as irrational because they lacked a strategy to
follow.
If we describe this metaphorically, it is similar to having the correct tires on a car
that was involved in an accident. The tires can be regarded as tactics employed to get the
car moving from point A to point B. However, these tires were not the ones that drove
and commanded the car. Therefore, regardless o f their correct size and function, they
were not responsible for the car’s accident since they had no control over the driver’s
strategy. As such, their correct size and functions were irrelevant to the accident.
If we observe rational choice during each phase in the policy’s trajectory, we are
able to witness continuous processes o f autopoiesis within the series o f choices that are
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made by various administrations regarding Iraq. This observation can be determined
through the tracing o f rational choice behavior as an indicator o f internal change in the
policy. The tracing o f this ingredient’ self-arrangement reveals that its characteristics,
such as the policy’s metamorphism, Moby Dick (the theme o f using revenge and force)
and Rasputin (the theme o f relying on think-tanks and ideologues in the decision-making
process) are rational if viewed in relation to emerging trends in the environment during
each phase in the policy’s progression but irrational if viewed in relation to the policy’s
overall trajectory.
A philosopher in the focus group states that “during the 1980s, the U.S. policy
toward Iraq was driven by pragmatists who considered the policy’s tactical support for
Saddam as a rational choice in order to advance U.S. interest in the region. From a
tactical point o f view and without relying any ethical or moral evaluation, these
pragmatists were correct in their assessments and choices.”
The history chapter in this dissertation shows that supporting Iraq during its war
with Iran did stop the threat o f the Iranian revolution from spreading to other countries
and destabilizing the region, and as a consequence it served the U.S. oil interest and its
stability in the region. But from a strategic point o f view, aiding Saddam was a mistake
because it strengthened his capabilities and allowed him to threaten the very U.S. interest
that the rational choice was aiming to protect.
After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, a frequency count in the content analysis
o f 47 for a concept related to nation-state interest demonstrates that the tactical choice
was to end the Iraqi occupation o f Kuwait and Saddam’s perceived threat in holding
Western energy hostage in his hand by controlling the Kuwaiti oil. As such, the tactical
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choice o f removing'Saddam from Kuwait and freeing Kuwaiti oil from Iraqi control was
a correct tactic in serving U.S. oil interests. However, changing the direction o f these
tactics from supporting Saddam in the 1980s to opposing him in the 1990s had to
experience an internal metamorphism and an autopoietic change in order for the policy to
transform from one that supported Saddam to one that opposed him.
In 1990, Saddam miscalculated U.S. resolve and thought that his previous war
with Iran during the 1980s had earned him a favor with the United States that would
prevent a confrontation if he attempted to attack Kuwait. This error in judgment by
Saddam was, according to a political scientist in the focus group, “a vast miscalculation.
Taking Kuwait militarily while the U.S. was the only remaining superpower who had
vested economic interests in the region and its stability simply was wrong.”
The mistrust, however, was mutual both between Saddam and the United States.
Another participant in the focus group, a sociologist, states that “there was a mutual
mistrust and misunderstanding between America and Saddam. The U.S. did not quite
understand what Saddam was like, and Saddam did not understand America’s interests.”
During the policy’s autopoietic change in 1991, elements that went into the
composition o f rational choice during the 1980s had to be reshuffled and reorganized in
order to correspond with the environmental change triggered with Iraq’s invasion o f
Kuwait in 1990. Some elements, such as the U.S. support for the Iraqi opposition groups,
supporting regime change efforts in Iraq, the use o f force against the Iraqi regime, and the
metaphor o f war as the language o f the policy toward Iraq became the functional
ingredients o f the policy’s rational choice. Other elements, such as the policy’s
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Machiavellian tactics and its hypocritical nature, were pushed to the back as less
important ingredients.
As the environmental trends changed due to containment during the 1990s, these
elements had to be reshuffled and rearranged once more in order to respond to the
presiding trend in the environment. A political historian in the focus group thus states that
“the abuse o f the UN became a functional ingredient in the policy toward Iraq and it was
placed on the top o f the policymakers’ list of priorities.”
Not only the U.S. abused the UN mission in Iraq during the 1990s. So did
Saddam. Content analysis uncovers a frequency o f 16 for a concept related to issues of
U.S. and Iraq’s abuse o f the UN mission in Iraq. Iraq did so in order to retaliate against
U.S. spies in UN inspection teams, and also to give the false impression that it continued
to possess WMD as a measure o f deterrence. For its part, the United States used the UN
and its inspection teams to gather information on the Iraqi regime’s security apparatus
and defense mechanism in order to plan plots for regime change. As such, both Iraq and
the U.S. were guilty o f using the United Nations for their own political agendas, instead
of actively working within the UN mandate to implement the ceasefire agreement
resolution at the end o f the Gulf War o f 1991.
This theme o f mistrust between Iraq, the U.S., and the UN made containment an
ineffective tactic after more than a decade of its trial. A former leader o f an exiled Iraqi
opposition group agrees that containment was not working. In a one-on-one interview,
the expert states that “in the mid-1990, the U.S. policy was designed to contain Saddam,
not cause his removal. During the Clinton administration, containment was tried through
the enforcement of the No-Fly-Zone and the UN economic sanctions. But the no-fly-zone
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was not effective because Saddam continued sending his tanks to southern Iraq and
killing people. It was because of that Clinton adopted the policy o f regime change in
1998.”
In addition to the ineffectiveness o f the No-Fly-Zone, there was also the issue o f
Saddam smuggling oil outside the UN imposed embargo that added to the erosion o f the
policy o f containment. In the same interview stated above, the expert argues that “Clinton
figured out that Saddam was smuggling oil, and continued supporting Palestinian terrorist
groups. So the United States had no choice but to replace Saddam, especially when he
was unable to change, did not trust America, and America did not trust him.”
After September 11, 2001 the Bush administration adopted preemption as its new
tactic. Because o f that, specific elements, on one hand, were pushed to the front o f the
policy toward Iraq as functional ingredients o f the policy, such as ideology, war as a
corrective action, Hobbesian thinking, falsehood, misuse o f intelligence, ideology,
turning Saddam into Attila the Hun, the use o f symbolism, ambiguity, current as
epiphenomenon, fear factor, and Machiavellian methods, and refusing to look into the
mirror. On the other hand, elements such as lack o f discourse and debate, multilateralism,
and legitimacy were pushed to the backbumer. W ith such rearrangement, phenomena
such as Moby Dick and Rasputinism emerged in the policy toward Iraq as evolving
trends that continue up to date.
To illustrate the process o f self-organization graphically as it arranged the
policymakers’ rational choice, let us compare the organizational states o f these choices
during two phases in the progression o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq. We designate the
functional positions o f certain ingredients within these choices in 1991 as Position A.
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misuse o f UN mission in Iraq are shifted in priorities according to their functional
positions during each period. For example, during the Gulf War o f 1991 (Position A),
support for Iraqi opposition is not a priority tactic, but it becomes so during the 1990s (in
Position B). Also, regime change is a priority tactic while in Position B, but it is not as
such while in Position A. These changes in functional positioning are the result o f the
process o f autopoiesis (self organization) in the internal dynamics o f the policy’s rational
choice. Figure Eight explains these dynamics.

A

B

A: Metaphor o f
War
D

B

B: Legitimacy
C: Support for
Iraqi
opposition

A
Position A: Rational choice
during the Gulf
War o f 1990

Position B: Rational
choic during the
containment era

D: Regime
Change

Figure 8. Autopoiesis and Rational Choice

Under George W. Bush, containment finally collapsed. Even if containment was
allowed to continue, it was going to stand as an obstacle to forwarding U.S. interests. As
one o f the participants in the focus group, a public administrator, phrases it, “containment
was beneath the new America, the world’s new empire and the sole superpower.”
Although collapse dynamics occurs within the policy’s tactics, content analysis
reveals that the most interesting feature o f the debate over the Iraqi issue is that it never
took place. Many words flowed, and there was dispute about how to proceed. But
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discussion was kept within rigid bounds that excluded the obvious answer that the U.S.
had to act according to its national interest.
In a one-on-one interview with a political historian, reference is made to the
notion that the issue o f debate became problematic during the presidency o f George W.
Bush, and the lack o f debate was a form of political tragedy that impacted governance in
the United States. The expert states that “it is tragic that there was so little debate about
the war in Iraq in 2003, and that the Democrats gave a blank check for the invasion of
Iraq and caved in to the administration.”
Content analysis yields a frequency of 13 for a concept related to issues of
Democratic cave-in, the frequency o f seven for a concept related to issues o f debate, and
the frequency o f 34 for a concept related to issues o f discourse. These frequency counts
reveal that many Democratic members of Congress became cheerleaders for the
Republican administration’s agenda in Iraq. And, contrary to the Democratic members of
Congress, their Republican counterparts challenged the political agenda o f the
Democratic administration o f Bill Clinton and pushed it to adopt a more aggressive
policy toward Iraq, including signing into law the Iraq Liberation Act o f 1998 and
adopting regime change in Iraq as the official policy o f the United States.
Commenting on the importance of political discourse in U.S. politics and the
resulting process o f decisionmaking in choosing a tactic, a political scientist and strategist
for the Republican Party states in a one-on-one interview, “people talk, that is how they
find out about what is going on in the world, and that is how they deliberate and make
decisions.” The expert does not see the Congressional act in 2003 to authorize President
Bush with the decision to go to war as something that was outside the tradition o f
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political discourse in America. The expert states that “Congress authorized Bush to go to
war in Iraq because that is what Congress has done historically. After the Vietnam crisis,
Congressed passed the War Powers Act to restrain the power o f the president, but even
that Act delegated to the president the authority to declare war but he had 90 days to state
the reason.”
The Republican strategist justifies Congress’ delegation o f its authority to declare
war to the executive branch because o f the awesome responsibility of such decision:
“Congress persistently placed that responsibility with the executive, because war is too
daunting o f a responsibility for a contemporary Congress to imagine.”
A political historian states in a one-on-one interview that “Congress chose to
surrender its right to declare war in 2002 to the president as a failure of courage and a
failure o f conscience. The stage had been set by not questioning a variety o f policies and
the decisions that Bush had made all the way along the road.”
W ith tactical choices collapsing outside the traditional political discourse in
American politics, there has to be another dynamic that is motivating these collapses in
order to secure its own interest. This dynamic is the U.S. primordial interest, the main
engine that drove the U.S. policy toward Iraq from start to date.
Another political scientist in the focus group agrees with this analysis and refers
to the American system of government as one designed in a manner that allows for such
dynamic as part of political discourse itself. The focus group participant states that “the
issue here is the synergy of interests. We talk about checks and balances, but checks and
balances operate in an environment in which they are integrated. Congress is reluctant to
accept the full weight of making a decision about going to war, and it prefer to put that
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accountability on the head of the executive branch. The executive, on the other hand, is
happy to do it.”

Autopoiesis and Primordial Interests
Primordial interests are the raw, primitive, and underlining core o f the policy
toward Iraq. They represent the basic, selfish, narrow nation-state interest that drives the
policy in its many phases. This primitive notion is self-organized in order to respond to
changing trends in the environment.
During the policy’s process o f adaptation to environmental needs, the primordial
interest itself goes through the internal process of self-organization. By doing so, the
history chapter shows that the policy is moving from the traditional system o f governance
that characterized the American federal government since its inception in the 1770s
toward the type o f an administrative state that discourages discourse and debate and
promotes a strong executive headed by an imperial presidency. This trend became
apparent during the Kennedy and the N ixon’s administrations, though it was reduced
during the Carter, Reagan and Clinton’s administrations, before it resurfaced during the
administration o f George W. Bush.
It was based on the narrow nation-state interests o f the United States during the
1980s, for example, that the Reagan administration supported Iraq during its war with
Iran. According to a one-on-one interview with a political historian, “what happened in
the Iran-Iraq War came in the aftermath o f the revolution in Iran and the hostage crisis
with the United States, which rendered the United States much less disposed to come to
Iran’s assistance in the context and to hope to offset Iran with Iraqi power.”

257

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

If we look at the U.S. policy toward Iraq prior to Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait on
August 2, 1990, the history chapter reveals that the primordial interests o f the policy at
the time was structured around supporting Saddam through bank loans, agricultural
credits, technology, and military aid in order to assure an Iranian defeat. Such primordial
interests were to protect U.S. interests in the region o f the Middle East and they were in a
state o f equilibrium for nearly a decade, illustrating a trend and a policy that was
organized without a need for further self-organization or experiencing any internal
changes to produce new self-reassemblies.
Once the environment changed, triggered by Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait on
August 2, 1990, the policymakers’ decision-making process experienced internal
processes o f self-organization. These internal changes were in response to the change in
the environment. Saddam’s invasion was the kick that triggered change, and as a
consequence, what followed was a phase shift in the policy, experienced as an autopoietic
manifestation in the policy’s primordial interests to shift the relationship with Saddam
from an alliance to open hostility. Presidential directive and Congressional Acts were
imitated to legalize the shift within the framework o f multilateral association and under
the umbrella o f the United Nations.
After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. national interest moved from the
position o f supporting Saddam to confronting him. All o f the focus group participants
agree on this point and expressed their consensus in a statement by one o f their
participants who stresses that “Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait threatened Saudi Arabia,
and a threat to Saudi Arabia was a direct threat to the United States because o f the U.S.
reliance on Saudi oil.”
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Metaphorically, the shift is represented in the concept of the Eskimo Community,
employing the role o f oil, Cold War politics, multilateralism and legitimacy as its
functional vehicles. The policy’s primordial interests are served by returning the
management of Kuwaiti oil to the Sabah Royal family in Kuwait, as in 1991. Saddam’s
acceptance o f the conditions for a ceasefire after the G ulf War on 1991 satisfied the
mechanism of change required at the time and maintained the primordial organizational
structure within the U.S. policy toward Iraq until future environmental conditions
dictated further needs for restructuring.
The history chapter in this dissertation demonstrates that during the 1990s, when
Saddam emerged as unwilling to actively cooperate with UN inspection teams to destroy
his WMD, his police state capacity proved to be capable o f maintaining him in power
despite the UN economic sanctions imposed on Iraq. Content analysis through a
frequency o f 15 for a concept related to issues o f containment and the frequency o f 53 for
a concept related to issues o f regionalism reveal that the attitude in the region and the
world was shifting gradually toward easing the sanctions on Iraq and to returning Iraq to
the community of nations. As such, conditions in the environment had once again
changed, requiring another autopoietic change in the organizational structure o f the U.S.
policy toward Iraq and its primordial interests.
The organizational state o f the policy’s primordial interests during the
containment era experienced internal reshuffling. The mechanism o f change and self
organization relied on specific ingredients such as coercion, unilateralism, paranoia and
militarism in order to function as primary functional elements. These ingredients surfaced
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to the front o f the organizational restructuring o f primordial interests by pushing aside as
less important other ingredients such as geopolitics and Middle East status quo.
After the terrorist attacks o f September 11, 2001, the organizational state o f the
U.S. policy toward Iraq and its primordial interests self-assembled once again,
responding to the environmental triggers of the time. The metaphorical representation of
these changes is illustrated in the theme of the Baseball Pitcher. With the U.S. standing
alone and apart from the international team, eager only to secure home runs for its own
primordial interests, the policymakers reassembled the policy’s organizational structure
to satisfy the needs for responding to emerging trends in its environment and adjusting its
primordial interests to represent these changes.
A philosopher in the focus group states that “the quest for power continued to
present challenges to the United State nation-state interest.” As the Euro rose to challenge
the supremacy o f the dollar, and as oil became a political veto power after September 11,
2001 in the hands o f emerging ideologues in U.S. government, the organizational state of
the policy’s primordial interests self-organized itself in order to correspond with
changing trends in the environment.
The nation-state interest, especially the power interest of corporate America and
the governmental policy that defends them, becomes more problematic when it is held as
part of the national interest. A sociologist in the focus group is alert to equating the
national interests and national security. He states that “our national security, self-interests
are the most important elements in our policy now. There is a problem in summing
national interests and national security as the same.”
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When U.S. national interest and national security are viewed as one, not all
nation-states will support the United States in all aspects o f its foreign policy, especially
the policy toward Iraq. This does not mean that those nations are against American
security. Rather, it means that they have their own national interest to follow. As the
philosopher member o f the focus group explains, “we are falling into the argument that
other countries either have to agree with us or we will do it anyway. The issue is not
whether or not France and Germany support us. The U.S. has its own self-interest, so do
France and other nation-states.”
In another one-on-one interview, the subject agrees with the philosopher’s
assessment with regards to U.S. policy and interest in Iraq, stating that “the underlining
reason for the U.S. involvement in Iraq was for its own interests in the Middle East,
mostly economic. Politically, the U.S. policy toward Iraq is not going to influence the
overall American foreign policy that much, although things changed after September 11,
2001 .”

New ingredients in the decision making process are employed to function as
primary vehicles during the process o f self-organization, pushing aside previous vehicles
that once were important for the policy to function in its environment. These new
ingredients are appointocracy, the administrative state, and the imperial presidency.
These ingredients are operating to brining about the organizational state o f Pax
Americana as the policy’s new metaphorical mantra. On the other hand, ingredients such
multilateralism, legitimacy, discourse, and political debate are pushed to the side.
A political scientist in the focus group captures the role o f power interest in
impacting U.S. policies. According to this participant, “in regard to our policy in Iraq,
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there was a sense that we needed to do more, especially in response to our power interest
in the world. There was a coalition o f political forces arising out o f the opportunity o f the
United States deemed as the single super power.”
Another participant in the focus group, an Iraqi-American chemist, agrees with
this statement, saying that “if we talked about Iraq in terms of simple, short-term
economic interest, this will not explain our involvement there. Unless we talk about a
long-term power interest, and economics is an important part o f it, then we can see the
connection.”
A third participant in the focus group, an economist, links the U.S. military
function in Iraq with that o f power interest by suggesting that “we cannot explain the
U.S. military function in Iraq unless we talk about power interest and the ideology o f
groups such as Project for the New American Century, Wolfowitz, Cheney, and others
who brought it to action in relation to America’s power o f interest.”
Content analysis yields a frequency o f 14 for a concept related to issues of
imperialism, thereby revealing that the Iraq war o f 2003 was driven by the same
mentality as that o f an imperial power. The United States was able to assert its will with
little or no regard to international norms. A historian in the focus group agrees with this
analysis and identifies two specific conditions that formed the U.S. imperialist policy
toward Iraq. These conditions are “the reconstitution of an American hegemony in the
Middle East that would be unquestioned, unrivaled, and in need o f no legitimation, and
the assumption that the United States is responsible for the maintenance o f a stable
regional security environment conducive to its power interest.”
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This analysis echoes the public administrator’s observation in the focus group that
“for the Pentagon to maintain its tremendous budget, arms industries, and feeding its
contracts, for the oil companies to increase their profits, and for the Bush administration
to establish a permanent military presence in the Middle East to control its oil resources,
Iraq was presented as a challenge in order to justify U.S. military intervention.”
A political historian and expert on U.S. policy toward Iraq, however, stresses the
importance of having nation-state interests continue to play a significant role in world
politics. “We continue to look after our national interest. But the fundamental issue is: we
want to promote our interest unilaterally or should we do it through collaboration and
cooperation?”

Bifurcation
If autopoiesis illustrates the processes o f self-organization in the policy,
bifurcation illustrates how these processes take place and the internal transformation of
the policy from one organizational state to another. Bifurcation explains the internal
changes within the policymakers’ decisionmaking process as the U.S. policy toward Iraq
moves from a state o f equilibrium during a particular organizational phase to a state of
oscillation, chaos, and then the emerging o f a new organizational order in a new state o f
equilibrium. We are able to observe these changes by tracing the behavior o f the four
Interpretive Levels as the policy moved from one phase to another.
As with autopoiesis, internal changes in the policy according to bifurcation are
also observed and expressed in a flux metaphorical expression. The reason for choosing a
flux metaphorical expression is to observe the dynamic nature o f the policymakers’
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decisionmaking process unfolding and enfolding as a kind o f pulsating wholeness.
Although the policy toward Iraq does experience bifurcation and collapse dynamics in
some o f its aspects, nevertheless and as a whole the policy resists bifurcation and collapse
in order to maintain its original structure. By interpreting each super theme according to
bifurcation, we are able to witness which aspect o f the policy do indeed witness collapse
and why, and which other aspects resist such a notion.
By observing the policy according to bifurcation, we are able to witness whether a
policy decision experience any type o f collapse dynamics. Is the collapse delayed or
prevented through artificial engineering, and if so, what is the impact o f catastrophic
consequences on the policy?
As the older internal structure o f the policy became unstable in responding to
environmental changes after Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait in 1990, for example, the
older structure prepared to collapse in order for a new structure to emerge. Then, as the
collapse dynamic of the decade-long containment phase o f the 1990s allowed for the
emergence o f a new phase in the policy, preemptive emerged as a response to the
environment of post-September 11.
Bifurcation means a phase shift in the order o f a dynamic system. As the self
organizing order emerged out o f the interaction o f elements within the policy’s
parameters, as it was the case with the emergence o f preemption after the September 11
attacks, the policy became unstable and its older order o f containment started to collapse.
Such a collapse allowed for the emergence o f preemption as a new systematically self
organized order that was more appropriate to the new context in the environment.
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When the policy was at equilibrium, such as during the 1980s, its structure was
relatively stable and its property was interconnected while containing the seeds of
change. Environmental changes that was triggered by Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait in
1990 then set off a series o f internal changes and reorganization that led to a period o f
oscillation and disorder. From the chaotic disorder, a new structure emerged that brought
the system back to equilibrium. This was the policy’s essence o f bifurcation.
Bifurcation intends to interpret the policy’s geometry o f behavior and the
acceleration o f irreversible evolution over time. It constructs metaphorically the growth
of uncertainty as a translation o f chaotic behavior. And it does so by describing the
information about the system over time when compared with the initial state o f
equilibrium.
All systems must collapse in order for their older structures to dissipate and for
the new orders to emerge. If collapse, however, is delayed through artificial engineering,
the system results in catastrophes. Although aspects o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq does
collapse and emerge with new orders, not all aspects o f the policy, however, collapse. By
observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to bifurcation, we are able to witness
whether the U.S. policy toward Iraq experience any type o f collapse dynamics, whether
the collapse is delayed, and what are the catastrophic consequences.

Mythticism and Bifurcation
Mythticism is one o f the aspects in the U.S. policy toward Iraq that witness a
collapse dynamics through the process o f bifurcation. In 1990, for example, the policy’s
myth was shifted from a state o f equilibrium that represented U.S. support for Saddam
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during the 1980s to one that confronted him as a symbol o f evil and tyranny in the
Middle East after he invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. This shift reflected the collapse
o f the myth’s older structure and allowed for the emergence o f a new myth and a new
structure that was better capable o f dealing with the changes in the policy’s environment.
Such a shift occurred by reshuffling the older structure’s ingredients, such as the
balance o f power in the region, stability, and defusing radical Islam, and it allowed for
new organizational elements to form the emerging new myth. The history chapter reveals
that these new myth and its organizational elements that emerged after Saddam’s
invasion o f Kuwait in 1990 were the new world order, defeating aggression, and
international legitimacy. The new myth brought the policy into a state of equilibrium,
until other triggers in the environment (such as the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001) caused the policy to experience a disorder, collapsing its older mythical structure,
and allowing for a new myth and a new state o f equilibrium to emerge. This process
continued throughout the policy’s various phase shifts. Figure Nine illustrates this
process.
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behavior.

Phase Three: A new
order is emerging in
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Figure 9. Internal Changes in a System According to Bifurcation
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Figure Nine shows that the myth that sustained its organizational order during the
1980s remained in a state o f equilibrium until Saddam invaded Kuwait on August 2,
1990. However, once the environment changed due to Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait, the
policy’s internal processes changed. A new myth then emerged through the dissipation o f
the older myth.
The new myth that emerged after the G ulf War o f 1991 became destabilized due
to another kick in the policy’s environment during the period from 1991-2001. This new
kick was caused by the negative impact o f war and destruction o f the infrastructure inside
Iraq on the Iraqi people. This trend led the m yth’s structural order that emerged in 1991
to collapse and another myth to emerge during the containment era in order to correspond
with changes in the environment.
The newly emerged myth during the containment era brought the policy once
more into equilibrium. This equilibrium continued until another kick in the environment,
caused mainly by the terrorists’ attacks on America on September 11, 2001, provided
another kick in the environment that destabilized the policy’s internal order, collapsing its
older myth, and emerging with a newer myth and newer state o f equilibrium that was a
more fitting to respond to the environment. Figure Ten (page 267) illustrates these four
different phase shifts in the policy’s Mythticism from the 1980s until 2003.
A participant in the focus group, a public administrator, explains the power of
myth in the Bush administration’s attempt to connect September 11 and Iraq and to
connect this myth to the American psyche and its new state after September 11, 2001. He
states that “the Bush administration was successful in arguing that Saddam was somehow
responsible for September 11, which was a complete lie. But the sense o f having been
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violated among the American people provided an opportunity for the administration to
have a military solution to political problems.”

MythC:
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peace;
regime

Myth A:
Stability;
Balance;
Status quo

1980s
Supporting
Saddam

G ulf War
Confronting
Saddam

1990s
Containing
Saddam

September 11
Toppling
Saddam

Figure 10. Phase Shifts in Mythticism

Another focus group participant, a sociologist, agrees and stresses the impact of
fear in persuading public opinion as a trajectory development in the American psyche.
The participant states that “it is a great mistake to underestimate the power o f fear. When
the Bush administration influenced the unconscious imagination o f the American people
with a series o f lies and fear tactics, it in essence had created an ultimate tragedy in
American policy.”
An historian in the focus group attempts to connect the current shift in the policy
toward Iraq with its history while maintaining the influence o f the American psyche on
such policy. He states that “the levels o f American psyche and strategic planning are
formative. If we connected that to the Iranian revolution in 1979, the 1970’s oil embargo,
the Reagan’s presidency and the hostage crisis, then we would have a background picture
for the current Republican administration.”
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Bifurcation and Dichotomy •
The policy o f dichotomy refuses to go through phase shifts when the environment
is triggered by kicks. Changes in the policy’s environment do not result in a change
within the policy’s dichotomous nature. Instead, artificial engineering, such as the
enforcement o f the economic sanctions against Iraq, U.S. support of a few isolated exiled
Iraqi opportunists, and the practice o f coercion in dealing with Iraq, are used to maintain
the prolongation o f the policy’s dichotomy.
A focus group participant, an Iraqi-American chemist, states that this type of
artificial engineering “created a catastrophe both for the Iraqi people and the U.S. policy
toward Iraq as policymakers continued to link Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people,
treating them in effect as one.” By doing so, the artificial engineering increased the trend
toward more and more failures in the overall U.S. policy toward Iraq.
A political scientist in the focus group suggests that the policy o f ignoring the
welfare o f the Iraqi people is a continuation o f an imperialistic policy that the United
States had adopted once it remained the only super power in the world after the collapse
o f the Soviet Union. This person states that “the clear cause for the recent war goes to as
early as 1998 when we were truly feeling like an imperialist power with the Soviet Union
gone.”

Bifurcation and Rational Choice
Rational choice does go through bifurcation and phase shifts. Unlike the policy of
dichotomy, rational choice experience the collapse o f its older tactics during each phase
shift, allowing for new tactics to emerge and respond to the trends in the environment.
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Rational choice during the 1980s, for example, was designed to support Saddam
and neutralize the Iranian revolution. The history chapter reveals that after Saddam’s
invasion o f Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the policy’s older structure o f supporting Saddam
experienced a period of oscillation and reshuffling. This chaotic disorder eventually led
to the collapse o f the older tactic and emerged with a new tactic that enabled the United
States to engage in a military combat with Iraq and changed the nature o f its relationship
with the Iraqi regime from supportive to hostile.
During the containment period o f the 1990s, rational choice was the same as the
structure that emerged after the G ulf War o f 1991. However, as the Iraqi regime
continued to play a cat-and-mouse game with UN weapon inspectors, there was no
possibility for the Iraqi Army to topple the Iraqi regime o f Saddam Hussein through a
military coup. The high frequency count in the content analysis o f 47 for a concept
related to issues o f geopolitics reveals that the political climate in the region was
becoming hostile to the U.S. as the result o f the continuous use o f force against Iraq and
the negative impact o f the economic sanctions against the Iraqi people.
The policymakers then shifted the internal mechanism o f the policy toward Iraq
toward a new phase by officially adopting a new tactic as illustrated in the concept o f
regime change and the Iraq Liberation Act o f 1998. As such, rational choice experienced
a structural change and collapsed its older structural order (tactic) that emerged after the
Gulf War o f 1991.
The containment era’s rational choice that espoused regime change in Iraq
through the support o f the Iraqi opposition had to dissipate and give way in order for a
new tactic to emerge. The new tactic was illustrated in the Bush administration’s concept
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of preemption, and it led the United States toward implementing regime change in Iraq
through direct military invasion o f Iraq. This new tactic was also translated in the
language o f the Iraq Liberation Act o f 2002 and various Presidential Executive Orders.
Figure 11 illustrates these various transitions in rational choice from the 1980s to 2003.
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Figure 11. Phase Shifts in Rational Choice

After September 11, 2001, the history chapter reveals that the environment
created another kick that triggered the policy o f preemption. The terrorists’ attacks on
America, combined with the new Bush administration’s ideological perspective on Iraq,
combined with the elevation o f the role and impact o f oil and power interests on U.S.
foreign policy, all provided a new atmosphere for a new political dynamic to emerge and
for the older order o f containment to dissipate. In a one-on-one interview, an expert on
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the U.S. policy toward Iraq states that these changes had “transformed the United States
into a new imperial power in post-Cold War era as the time was right once again for a
new dynamic to emerge in American politics.”
The history chapter in this dissertation also reveals that even the new political
dynamic that emerged in 2003 is now once again experiencing instability and challenges
(oscillation) due to changes in the environment. The policymakers, as a consequence, are
designating certain ingredients, such as falsehood, misuse of intelligence, fear factor, and
militarism in order to artificially prolong the age o f this tactic and prevent it from
collapsing.
To explain the rationale for choosing Iraq to become the battlefield in the war on
terror, a philosopher in the focus group states that “the terrorists did not respond to our
presence in Afghanistan. However, they responded to our presence in Iraq and made it
their battleground. We are now engaged with them there. It is classical warfare and we
have the best advantage to destroy them.”
Based on this analysis, the U.S. is compensating for the lack o f its tactical
capacity to fight clandestine private organizations o f operatives by pulling the terrorists
into Iraq. This would be a preferable alternative by in effect creating a nation state. Once
they were there, the U.S. could fight them with the capacity that it had designed to fight a
nation-state.
The expert adds that “terrorists do not have a state, and as such we have to hold
the states accountable that give them haven accountable in order to control terrorism.
This, in reality, will reinforce sovereignty because we are telling other nations that they
have responsibilities to avoid these things from taking place.”
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Bifurcation and Primordial Interests
The primordial interests o f the United States do not experience any structural
change in their order. Instead, the U.S. policy toward Iraq remains consistent in its
structural order in representing the same primordial interests, such as from the 1980s until
2004. Because of the consistency o f the United States’ nation-state interest during all
phases o f its policy progression, no collapse occurs within the policy to change its
primordial interests from one phase to another. Content analysis with a frequency o f 47
for a concept related to issues o f nation-state interest reveals that the primary interest of
the United States during all these periods remained the same: securing and serving the
narrow self-interest o f the United States as a nation-state.
The frequency in the content analysis o f 11 for a concept related to issues of
capitalism reveals that since American capitalism, like any other capitalist system in the
world, depends on raw materials, open markets, and cheap labor, the United States
government utilizes its policies and military in order to assure the American capitalist
system’s access to these necessities. And, it is precisely in quest o f such resources to
compete successfully with other economic systems in the world that the U.S. policy
toward Iraq has bom. This policy is becoming part o f the American capitalist system’s
strive for survival and continuation as a viable economic system.

The S-Matrix
The S-Matrix explains the policy’s internal changes by shifting the emphasis from
objects to events. On their own, the ingredients that compose the four Interpretive Levels
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themselves do not have meaning as isolated entities. They are understood best as
interconnected, thereby reflecting the oneness o f the policy. These four Interpretive
Levels and their behavior determine the internal changes within the policy.
As with autopoiesis and bifurcation, the S-Matrix expresses internal changes in
the policy in a flux metaphor. It focuses on the connections that simultaneously create
internal patterns o f unity and change within the policy. The S- Matrix also illustrates the
interconnected and dynamic nature o f the policy as a system that does not live
independently and is not predictable and rational. Instead, the policy must be seen as a
system that shares many worlds, many dimensions, many players, and many forces.
In order to understand the impact o f the S-Matrix on the policy’s internal changes,
the behavioral changes in each indicator is assessed as they relate to the level o f change
in the policy’s internal mechanism as a whole. As such, the S-Matrix serves as a
complexity-guide in the process o f observing the internal changes in the policy through
the observing o f behavioral changes in its Interpretive Levels.
The dimension of the S-Matrix explains internal changes within the U.S. policy
toward Iraq based on the concept o f the S-Matrix in complexity theories. The Interpretive
Levels emerging in step one of the analysis determine according to the S-Matrix how
changes in the behavior o f these indicators reflect internal changes in the policy as a
function o f interconnectedness.

The S-Matrix and Mythticism
The policy’s internal mechanism that is producing its myth during each phase is
composed o f relationships that are interdependent and interconnected. These relationships
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are based on process rather than units. As such, the ingredients (components) that
compose mythticism during each phase o f the policy’s progression share the same
ingredients. In making the transition from one myth to another, for example, these
ingredients share an interconnected web o f interrelated relationships.
The S-Matrix, however, is not a causal relationship. Rather, the S-Matrix explains
the complex interconnected relationships o f temporal events during a specific trajectory
period. In order to understand a particular myth o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq during a
specific period, this myth is best understood when observed as interconnected web.
Figure 12 depicts the components engaged in the interplay o f the policy’s myth
during a trajectory phase in 2003. These components are illustrated as interconnected
throughout the policy’s dynamic relationships with its environment. These holistic
relationships assist us in the understanding o f the policy as an interactive dynamic.
In this dynamic, there is no starting or ending point since the web is a continuous
process o f relationships, bridged through time. If we observe any particular component
within this web, we are able to determine that the policy and its internal relationships are
manifested in continuous mythticism.

Myth:
Liberating
the Iraqi
people

Administrat
-ive state

militarism

Appointocracy

Halliburton
and other
sweetheart
deals

Figure 12. Mythticism and the S-Matrix Analogy in 2003
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As Figure 12 shows, the myth o f liberating the Iraqi people that is portraying the
policy’s preemption in 2003 is interconnected with a number o f other elements within
governance in the United States. These elements are utilized by the Bush administration
in order to justify not only its policy in Iraq but also its entire political agenda. Within
this web o f interconnectedness, there is antagonism caused by such a policy, as well as
alliances. The result o f this complex relationship is witnessed within the emerging
political discourse in the United States. It is this relationship that makes the U.S. policy
toward Iraq as part o f an interconnected whole that is best understood if viewed within
the context of the entire web o f relationships that constitute the nature o f the policy.
Figure 12 illustrates, for example, that the myth o f liberating the Iraqi people in
2003 does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it is interconnected with other factors in the
policy, such as militarism, the rise of the administrative state, appointocracy, and granting
sweetheart deals to companies such as Halliburton. The S-Matrix does not suggest that
either one of these elements is causing the myth o f liberating the Iraqi people in 2003.
Rather, the S-Matrix suggests that in order to understand such a myth, it needs to be
viewed within the context o f relationships with the factors in the m yth’s web of
association.
A political scientist in the focus group comments on Iraq’s WMD and how it was
used by the Bush administration to justify the war o f 2003. He states that “the issue of
WMD as a political foil is as much as any other political message. Given the complexity
o f the preemptive strike that confused many people, some thought that Saddam did have
WMD and we were obligated to stopping him.” Underpinning the U.S. policy toward Iraq
in 2003 to only the issue o f WMD will not fully explain the myth o f liberating the Iraqi
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people. This myth, as such, has to be understood within the S-Matrix context that brings
into the picture other elements that went into the making o f this myth. Figure 12
demonstrates some o f these elements.
Another focus group participant, a public administrator, explains the Bush
administration’s reliance on circular reasoning in 2003 in order to justify its preemption
policy toward Iraq. He argues that “when most o f the UN resolutions were implemented
by Iraq, Bush used the old issue o f WMD as a reason to keep the issue o f confronting
Iraq circular and at the center. He started to use old stories about Iraq’s use o f WMD,
such as against Iran and the Kurds as though these stories were taking place recently.”
Content analysis provides a frequency count of 22 for issues related to
unilateralism. The Bush administration thus relies on coercion to intimidate the United
Nations into taking actions against Iraq to advance the political agenda o f the United
States. Bush's unilateral and preemptive strike in 2003, for example, forced the United
Nations to legitimize an action that lacked authorization, and to issue resolutions
legalizing the U.S. occupation o f Iraq. Put together, all these elements weave a detailed
quilt that better explain changes in the policy’s myth.

The S-Matrix and Dichotomy
As with mythticism, the internal mechanism of the U.S. policy toward Iraq is
manifested in its relationships with its failure to recognize the dichotomy between the
Iraqi people and the government o f Saddam Hussein. If we observe the dichotomous
nature o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq during one o f its trajectory phases, we are able to
see this dichotomous trend as it relates within an interconnected web o f relationships with

277

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

other elements in governance in the United States. Figure 13 illustrates sanction as a
specific notion within the policy’s dichotomous nature during the containment era o f the
1990s with other components in the policy.

Supporting
isolated
exiled
groups

Destruction
of the
Infrastruc
ture

Dichotomy;

Sanctions

Continuous
bombing of
Iraq

Mistrust

Figure 13. Dichotomy and the S-Matrix Analogy During the Containment Era

Observing the sanction linearly, however, gives us only part o f the picture. As
such, the sanction needs to be observed within a broader and more complex context that
encompasses many elements that are associated with it. The S-Matrix provides that
observation by showing the sanction’s interrelated connections with elements such as the
U.S. continuous bombing o f Iraq, the continuous mistrust between Iraq, the U.S. and the
UN, the destruction o f the Iraqi infrastructure, and the U.S. support o f a few isolated Iraqi
opposition groups in exile. Collectively, these elements contribute to the dichotomous
nature o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq and make its signature element, the sanction, more
damaging and more devastating than if it is observed linearly.
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The S-Matrix and Rational Choice
The S-Matrix illustrates the interconnected relationships between the ingredients
that compose the policy’s rational choice. If we observe a policy’s tactic during a
particular phase, we are able to witness this tactic’s relations with other components that
constitute the interconnected nature o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq and within the issue o f
governance in the United States.
In explaining the policy’s tactic after September 11, 2001 and adopting the
preemption as a rational choice for the U.S. policy toward Iraq, an economist in the focus
group states that “for the Pentagon to maintain its tremendous budget, arms industries,
and feeding its contracts, for the oil companies to increase their profits, and for the Bush
administration to establish a permanent military presence in the Middle East to control its
oil resources, Iraq was presented as a challenge in order to justify U.S. military
intervention.”
In placing preemption within such a complex matrix, understanding the policy
toward Iraq becomes richer and more complex than if observed linearly. This type o f
analysis can be applied to other trends in the policy as well. A participant in the focus
group connects the political discourse in the United States to the Cold War politics as an
example o f such analysis. This historian states that “politics in America is connected to
Cold War politics and the idea o f George Kennan in the 1950s in stabilizing what have
been put in place in the world.”
Another focus group participant, a public administrator, emphasizes more the
impact o f the emerging disconnect between governmental agencies on the policy’s
direction than on Kennan’s notion o f maintaining the status quo in the world. He argues
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that “one can be struck by the discourse in 2003 between the Pentagon’s plan for the
invasion o f Iraq and that o f the State Department. It was the disconnect between these
two groups that lent credence to the notion that our policy toward Iraq was designed to
achieve the ultimate goals o f people like W olfowitz and others in the Pentagon.”
Developing such a complex perspective through the analysis o f the S-Matrix that
places related elements within a nexus o f relationship is therefore important. It places
political decisions and tactics in more suitable formats and enables policymakers to have
multi-dimensional perspectives o f phenomena.
In a one-on-one interview, a former leader o f an exiled Iraqi opposition group
explains the interconnectedness o f the policy’s tactic in 1998 o f supporting the Iraqi
opposition groups in order to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and the
association o f this tactic with other elements that were engaged within a complex web of
relationships. According to this expert, “the Iraqi opposition could not get rid o f Saddam
on its own. But in the 1990s it was in a good position to get rid o f him. Unfortunately the
CIA leaked the information and Saddam was able to get rid o f the plotters. The CIA did
not trust the Iraqi opposition to do a good job partly because they failed to form a united
front.”
Figure 14 (page 281) depicts the policy’s tactic in 1998 in supporting the Iraqi
opposition groups and its relationship with other components within the U.S. political
system. As Figure 14 shows, supporting the Iraqi opposition, and thereby the concept of
regime change in Iraq, is not an isolated event. Rather, it is connected with other temporal
events that need to be investigated in order for the tactic o f supporting the Iraqi
opposition in 1998 to be understood fully. Together, these elements while engaged in
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their web o f association, they give us a better and richer understanding o f the policy’s
trajectory and tactics than if observed individually.
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Figure 14. Rational Choice and the S-Matrix Analogy in 1998

The S-Matrix and Primordial Interests
The S-Matrix explains the primordial interests o f the United States as viewed by
the U.S. policy toward Iraq but in relation with the holistic interests o f the United States
as a nation-state. Figure 15 traces the primordial interests of the U.S. policy toward Iraq
in 2003 within the context o f these interests’ relation with the interests o f the United
States as a nation-state.
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Figure 15. Primordial Interests and the S-Matrix Analogy in 2003
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Figure 15 also illustrates that the U.S. primordial interest in 2003 o f securing Iraqi
oil for the benefit o f U.S. energy is not operating in isolation. Instead, it is interrelated to
other temporal events in the policy, such as the Pentagon’ granting o f sweetheart deals to
American oil companies in no bid contracts, increasing the value o f the dollar versus the
Euro or the Yen via the power o f oil in the world market, enhancing U.S. militarism in
order to secure oil reserves in the Middle East for U.S. interests, and strengthening the
administrative state in the United States in order for such tactics to pass without political
or Congressional scrutiny. By understanding the complex dimension o f all these elements
and their interconnectedness, we gain a better understanding o f the primordial interest in
2003 to secure the Iraqi oil for U.S. interest.
Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 illustrate the interconnected relations between the
policy’s ingredients within each Interpretive Level separately. However, the four
Interpretive Levels are also interdependent. These dynamics enable the political decision
making process to become a living organism, changing and interchanging as it moves
from one phase to another in order to survive. Figure 16 illustrates the S-Matrix dynamics
among the policy’s four Interpretive Levels.

Dichotomy

Mythticism

Primordial
Rational
Choices

Figure 16. The Four Interpretive Levels and the S-Matrix Analogy
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Figure 16 demonstrates that the policy’s mythticism is related with the policy’s
dichotomy, just as the dichotomy in turn is related with the policy’s primordial interests,
the primordial interests are related with the policy’s rational choice, and the rational
choice is related with the policy’s mythticism. The diagram also illustrates that
mythticism is related with the policy’s primordial interests, primordial interests then are
related with the dichotomy, the dichotomy is related with the policy’s rational choice, and
rational choice is related with the primordial interests.
The primordial interests are thus related to the policy’s mythticism,'mythticism is
related to rational choice, rational choice is related to the dichotomy, and so on. As such,
all the policy’s Interpretive Levels and their individual components are related with one
another and interrelated and interdependent, rather than linear or fragmented. If we
observe the policy as such, its trajectory through the progression o f several phases is
better understood as a function o f the S-Matrix.

Mutual Causality
Mutual causality explains the internal changes in the policy. This is examined by
observing the impact of positive and negative feedback on behavioral changes within the
policy’s four Interpretive Levels. This observation enables us to see how mutual causality
translates the systemic changes in the policy’s internal mechanism.
Feedback is manifested metaphorically as a flux metaphor, with positive feedback
meaning that more changes in the Interpretive Level lead to more changes in the policy,
and fewer changes in the Interpretive Level lead to fewer changes in the policy. Negative
feedback, on the other hand, means that a change in the Interpretive Level initiates a
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change in the opposite direction within the policy, with more changes in the Interpretive
Level leading to fewer changes in the policy and fewer changes in the Interpretive Level
leading to more changes in the policy. Changes in the Interpretive Level are always
triggered by changes in the environment.
The idea is that one element in the Interpretive Level influences the entire policy
and that there is a mutual causation in the relationship between the policy and its
Interpretive Levels. This relationship is best understood if observed within a state o f
mutual interdependence.
Mutual causality represents the relationship between events that impact one
another (Daneke, 1999). The concept o f causation is based on the prototype of direct
manipulation, which emerges directly from experiences. Causation is a basic human
concept. It is best understood as an experiential gestalt (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, pp. 6975).
Morgan (1986) observes that mutual causality translates the changes in the system
shaped by the processes o f positive and negative feedback, rather than a single or
collective o f spatial and temporal causes. Feedback is when one element of experience in
a system influences the next. Feedback is either positive or negative (p. 46).
Morgan (1986) adds that positive feedback is when accounting for a system’s
change, we observe that more changes in the system’s environment lead to more changes
in the system internally, while fewer changes in the system’s environment lead to fewer
changes in the system internally. Negative feedback, on the other hand is when a change
in a variable initiates changes in the opposite direction, with more changes in the
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environment leading to less changes inside the system and less changes in the
environment leading to more changes inside the system (pp. 247-248).
The dimension o f mutual causality explains internal changes within the U.S.
policy toward Iraq based on the concept o f mutual causality in complexity theories. The
Interpretive Levels that is emerging in step one o f the analysis is observed according to
mutual causality along with its concepts o f positive and negative feedback to see how
these indicators’ behavior translate internal changes in the policy.

Mutual Causality and Mythticism
If we view mythticism according to positive feedback, we see that more changes
in mythticism result in more changes in the policy, and fewer changes in mythticism lead
to fewer changes in the policy. If we observe mythticism, however, according to negative
feedback, we see that more changes in mythticism lead to fewer changes in the policy,
and fewer changes in mythticism lead to more changes in the policy. Let us observe how
these two types o f feedback are manifested in mythticism.

Positive Feedback
The history chapter in this dissertation reveals that during the 1980s, there were
not many changes occurring in the policy’s myth that supported Saddam under the guise
o f maintaining balance in the Middle East. The perpetuation o f the balance meant that no
structural changes occurred in the policy’s internal dynamics and mythticism. There were
fewer activities in mythticism regarding human rights and democracy in Iraq, and
therefore there were fewer activities by the policy regarding these issues. When Saddam
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used chemical weapons against Iran and the Iraqi Kurds, for example, the U.S. turned a
blind eye to these practices.
After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the policy’s myth changed to reflect the
internal changes in the policy that were triggered by the changes in the environment.
Content analysis through a frequency of seven for a concept related to issues o f
symbolism and a frequency o f 12 for a concept related to issues o f Cold War politics
reveal the presence o f a new emerging myth. This myth spoke o f a new world order,
standing up to brutality and restoring freedom to the victims of aggression. The more
internal changes that occurred in the policy’s myth to describe the policy’s new
environment and the tactical responses for espousing internal changes, the more changes
occurred in the policy’s mythticism and its relationships.
During this same period, there were fewer activities creating mythticism with
regard to democracy in Iraq. Instead, mythticism was used to support only a cosmetic
change in the regime in Iraq by removing Saddam and his inner circle through a CIAsponsored coup designated to maintain the regime intact. As a consequence, there were
fewer activities in support o f a policy to support democracy and a popular movement in
Iraq. For example, the history chapter reveals that when the Iraqi people rose against
Saddam in March 1991, the United States decided not to support them and enabled
Saddam’s forces to crush the uprising.
The 1990s and the containment era brought more changes to mythticism. The
frequency in the content analysis o f 38 for a concept related to issues o f coercion and the
frequency o f 56 for a concept related to issues o f Iraqi opposition reveal that during this
period, the policy’s myth was designed to support sanctions and the use o f force against

286

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Iraq under the guise of maintaining containing Saddam. Policy activities intended to
remove the person of Saddam and his inner circle increased, while the Iraqi people’s
activities to promote true changes aimed toward toppling the Iraqi regime remained
unsupported. Instead, the policy adopted a regime change concept that was based on the
CIA’s support o f a few isolated Iraqi opposition groups in exile rather than supporting a
democratic popular movement in Iraq.
Content analysis with a frequency of 15 for a concept related to issues of
containment reveals that during this same containment period, there was little attention
paid by the policymakers to the suffering of the Iraqi people under the UN- imposed
economic sanctions. As a consequence, there were fewer political decisions to ease those
sufferings or lift the sanctions.
After September 11, 2001 activities related to mythticism increased dramatically.
The new emerging myth began speaking of eliminating an alleged imminent threat posed
by Saddam to the United States and o f promoting a unilateral preemptive war against Iraq
with or without UN authorization.
The policy’s myth after September 11, 2001 was reflected in the talk o f liberating
the Iraqi people from Saddam’s tyranny. It portrayed the U.S. invasion of Iraq as an act
o f liberation rather than an invasion and occupation. The history chapter reveals that the
myth blamed Saddam alone for the sufferings o f the Iraqi people and attributed the
policy’s negative impact on the Iraqi people solely to Saddam, elevating him to the
metaphorical status of Attila the Hun and the symbol o f evil.
A sociologist in the focus group states that the policymakers, in effect, “refused to
look into the mirror and admit their own responsibility in contributing to the sufferings o f

287

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Iraqi people and in prolonging the regime o f Saddam Hussein.” This trend o f blaming
outside enemies for the shortcomings o f policies was not a new phenomenon in American
politics. A political historian observes that “politicians always blamed others for things
that they were responsible for. For example, politicians blamed Communism for the war
in Vietnam during the 1960s that consumed U.S. energy for decades, and as o f 1990 they
blamed solely Saddam for the problems in Iraq.”

Negative Feedback
W hen fewer activities in mythticism lead to more activities in the policy and more
activities in mythticism lead to fewer activities in the policy, this concept is termed as
negative feedback. For example, the history chapter reveals that during the 1980s there
were fewer activities by mythticism to justify U.S. support o f Saddam in building his
military arsenal. This diminished mythticism, however, lead to more activities by the
policymakers in supporting Saddam and building his deadly arsenal.
During the containment period o f the 1990s, there were more activities in
mythticism in support o f multilateralism, legitimacy, and working within the accepted
international norms. Instead, content analysis in a frequency o f 22 for a concept related to
issues o f unilateralism reveals that this increased mythticism led the policy toward less
recognition o f international norms, legitimacy or multilateralism. The daily bombing o f
Iraq, for example, the launching o f operation Desert Fox, and the legalization o f regime
change efforts in Iraq through the Iraq Liberation Act o f 1998 all were in violation o f
international norms and were taken unilaterally and outside the United Nations’
regulations.
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After September 11, 2001 there was more activities in mythticism toward world
peace and legitimacy. This, however, was translated to a policy that took the opposite
direction toward war and unilateralism.

Mutual Causality and Dichotomy
If we view the issue of dichotomy in light o f positive feedback, we see that more
changes in the policy’s recognition o f the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their
government result in more changes in the policy itself toward acknowledging the
separation between the Iraqi people and the regime o f Saddam Hussein. Conversely,
fewer changes in the policymakers’ recognition o f the dichotomy between the Iraqi
people and their government lead to fewer changes in the policy’s treatment of the Iraqi
people as separate and distinct from the regime o f Saddam Hussein.
If we observe this dichotomy, however, according to negative feedback, we see
that more changes in the recognition o f a dichotomy lead to fewer changes in the policy,
and fewer changes in the dichotomy lead to more changes in the policy.

Positive Feedback
This term refers to the notion in effect that less leads to less and more leads to
more. In regard to the issue of dichotomy, the history chapter reveals that when fewer
attempts are made to recognize the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their
government, there is less emphasis by the policymakers on treating the Iraqi people
separately from the regime o f Saddam Hussein.
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Such neglect leads to political and human catastrophe. Examples o f these
catastrophes are the U.S. daily bombing o f Iraq since 1991 and the killing o f civilians, the
enforcement of economic sanctions that resulted in the deteriorating o f living conditions
and the death of many Iraqi children because o f disease and malnutrition, the U.S.
support o f a few isolated and ineffective exiled Iraqi opposition groups instead of
supporting a wider democratic movement in Iraq, and the creation o f an unnecessary war
to invade Iraq under false pretences while promoting it as a war o f liberation.
After September 11, 2001, the frequency in the content analysis o f 24 for a
concept related to issues o f rhetoric shows that there were fewer emphases on the
dichotomy between Iraq and international terrorism. In terms o f policy, this notion was
translated into an increased attempt to link Iraq with international terrorism, but in terms
o f preemption, there were fewer emphases on the dichotomy between the Iraqi people
and their government.
When translated into war, policymakers deliberately ignored the dichotomy
between Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people. As a consequence, Iraqi civilians were
targeted by massive U.S. bombardments during the 2003 war, thereby destroying their
civil infrastructure, increasing the deterioration o f their economy and security, and
focusing instead on protecting the oil industry and a few Iraqi exiles who were flown to
Iraq on board U.S. military jets to be appointed as Iraq’s new leaders.

Negative Feedback
During the Gulf War of 1991 and only for a short time, there was more emphasis by the
Bush administration on the dichotomy between Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi
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After September 11, 2001, the history chapter reveals that there was again more
emphasis on the dichotomy between the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi people. There was
again, however, fewer emphases on such a policy o f dichotomy. That disparity led to the
treatment o f Iraq after the 2003 war as an occupied country, delaying and often blocking
the means for the emergence o f a true democratic movement to create a new, independent
Iraq.
A former leader o f an exiled Iraqi opposition group states in an interview that
“whenever Iraqis are able to organize themselves in a political movement, they express
their organizational efforts either in the form o f tribal loyalty or religious affiliations.
These affiliations are not viewed as democratic because they devalue individual rights in
favor o f the collective rights o f the tribe or the religious sect.”
So when an outside force, such as the U.S. military, was able to overthrow the
regime o f Saddam Hussein, Iraqis did not capitalize on their dichotomy with the fallen
regime by expressing themselves democratically. Rather, they organized their efforts
within tribal and religious affiliations. The U.S. policy toward Iraq reinforced this trend
by creating an administrative regime in Iraq, such as the Iraqi Governing Council, that
was based on tribal and religious affiliation instead o f democratic accountability.

Mutual Causality and Rational Choice
If we view the policymakers’ rational choice according to positive feedback, we
see that more changes in these choices lead to more changes in the policy, and fewer
changes in these choices lead to fewer changes in the policy. If we observe the rational
choice, however, according to negative feedback, we are able to see that more changes in
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these choices lead to fewer changes in the policy, and fewer changes in these choices lead
to more changes in the policy. Let us now see how these two types o f feedback manifest
their impact on the policy’s rational choice.

Positive Feedback
The more tactics are employed in response to environmental changes, the more
changes occur in the policy. For example, the frequency count o f 13 through content
analysis for a concept related to issues o f trajectory indicates that after Iraq’s invasion o f
Kuwait in 1990, tactics such as force, economic sanctions, clandestine plots to topple the
Iraqi regime, and war were used as rational choice to expel the Iraqi Army from Kuwait
and restore the political balance in the region.
As a consequence, the U.S. policy was galvanizing the international community
and was supported by 32 nations in its efforts to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion.
Congress also legitimized the policy and united the country under its mantra. With the
increase o f such tactics, the U.S. claimed a leadership position in the world despite the
geopolitical system at the time that experienced two prominent superpowers, the United
States and the Soviet Union.
The history chapter in this dissertation shows that during the same period in 1991,
fewer tactics were used by the policymakers to support the Iraqi people and their
aspiration for freedom. As a result, the policymakers demonstrate fewer tendencies
toward supporting the Iraqi people, such as during the uprising against Saddam in March
1991. Because o f such lack o f support by the U.S. for the Iraqi people, Saddam’s army
was able to crush the Iraqi uprising and maintain the regime in power.
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During the containment era o f the 1990s, the frequencies in the content analysis o f
44 for a concept related to issues o f force, 38 for a concept related to issues of coercion,
15 for a concept related to issues o f containment, 56 for a concept related to issues o f
Iraqi opposition, and 13 for a concept related to issues o f Middle East status quo indicate
that more rational tactics were used to respond to emerging trends in the environment.
For example, tactics such as coercion, force, supporting the Iraqi opposition groups, and
supporting the political status quo in the Middle East were utilized to respond to the
changes in the policy’s environment. The increased use o f tactics resulted in increased
activities in the policymakers in further moving the policy toward unilateralism, use o f
force outside UN authorization in the so-called No-Fly-Zones, and launching
unauthorized military operations against Iraq such as Desert Thunder and Desert Fox.
A political historian states in a one-on-one interview that during the same era
“fewer tactics were utilized to support the cause o f democracy in Iraq. The policymakers
were less interested in supporting the emergence o f a true democratic movement in Iraq.
Instead, the policymakers supported a few isolated Iraqi exiled groups and funded plans
through the CIA to trim off the leadership o f the Iraqi regime through military coup
attempts but maintained the regime’s structure intact. These plots, however, were
unsuccessful.”
A political scientist in the focus group states that “after September 11, 2001, the
policymakers ushered in an increasing numbers o f tactics. This was done in order to
justify the Bush administration’s new preemptive doctrine against Iraq.” Examples o f
such tactics were the increased use o f Machiavellian methods, elevating Saddam to the
metaphorical position o f Attila the Hun, the use of rhetoric, Trotskyism, force, metaphor
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o f war, fear, falsehood, and the misuse or misinterpretation o f intelligence. The increase
in tactics caused an increase in the policy’s internal activities to allow for ideology,
power interest, the role o f oil, militarism, special interests, and Hobbesian thinking to
take hold in the decision-making process.
Fewer tactics were utilized after September 11, 2001 to support the cause of
democracy in Iraq. The policymakers had minimum interest in supporting a true
democratic movement in Iraq and relied on the U.S. invasion o f Iraq in order to change
the regime through direct military involvement.

Negative Feedback
The history chapter reveals that during the 1980s, tactics were employed to
support Saddam as a means o f balancing the political powers in the Middle East. As a
consequence, the policy was less concerned about the increased military and political
capacity o f Iraq. U.S. aid to Saddam helped in the transformation o f Iraq into the kind o f
force capable o f disrupting the very political balance in the Middle East that the policy
was aiming to protect.
After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, a political scientist and a strategist for the
Republican Party states in a one-on-one interview that “the policy’s tactics increasingly
opposed aggression and brutality, defended freedom, and restored legitimacy.” On the
policy level, however, there were fewer activities to oppose aggression and brutality
inside Iraq, fewer activities to support human rights in Iraq or push the United Nations to
delegitimize the Iraqi regime and encourage its internal collapse.
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The high frequency in the content analysis o f 56 for a concept related to issues o f
Iraqi opposition suggests that during the containment era, support increased for the Iraqi
opposition and regime change efforts as a measure o f opposing Saddam’s regime. On the
policy level, however, fewer activities were generated to support the Iraqi people and
their aspiration for freedom. The policy substituted supporting the Iraqi people with
support o f a few isolated exiled groups that lacked any support or base inside Iraq.
Content analysis yields a frequency of ten for a concept related to issues
concerning the enemy. After September 11, 2001, fewer tactics thus were utilized to
identify the “enemy” and accordingly fewer tactics were utilized to make a correct use o f
U.S. capacity against such an enemy. However, more activities were generated to identify
Iraq as the enemy and U.S. capacity was therefore utilized to defeat Iraq.

Mutual Causality and Primordial Interests
If we view the policy’s primordial interests according to positive feedback, we see
that more changes in the policy’s primordial interests result in more changes in the
policy, and fewer changes in these primordial interests lead to fewer changes in the
policy. If we observe the policy’s primordial interests, however, according to negative
feedback, we see that more changes in these interests lead to fewer changes in the policy,
and fewer changes in the policy’s primordial interests lead to more changes in the policy.

Positive Feedback
The United States’ “nation-state” interest has always been the primary factor and
the moving element in the U.S. policy toward Iraq. All other issues that the policy
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advocates, such as upholding world peace and legitimacy, defending freedom, promoting
democracy, and confronting aggression are secondary.
An economist in the focus group argues that “the U.S. interest, and the interest of
its special interest groups in particular, is always in the center o f the U.S. policy toward
Iraq and constitutes its focal point.” In dealing with Iraq, a historian in the focus group
feels that this could “be seen during the 1960s when the United States supported a
clandestine regime change effort to overthrow the government o f General Qasim in 1963
in order for the American oil companies to regain their concession areas in Iraq. U.S.
support for Saddam during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War could also be seen in the tactics
adopted to serve the policy’s primordial concern: oil.”
After the fall of the Shah in 1979 by an Islamic revolution in Iran, the history
chapter in this dissertation traces how the U.S. feared that the extension o f revolutionary
Islam to Saudi Arabia and the G ulf region would destabilize the oil-rich region. As the
Khomeini regime pulled the Iranian oil out of American control, the United States feared
that the extension o f Khomeinism to other Islamic countries would further increase the
possibility o f the U.S. losing control over Middle Eastern oil. The United States thus
needed a proxy to offset Khomeinism, and it saw in Saddam such a proxy.
The history chapter also shows that in September 1980 Saddam launched his
preemptive strike against Iran. The resulting war between Iran and Iraq lasted for eight
years. During these years, the primordial interests o f the United States were geared
toward supporting Saddam. The prospect of an Iranian win threatened disastrous results
for the United States. As such, the United States increased its support for Saddam and
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designed its policy toward Iraq to translate this mantra without regard to Saddam’s
brutality and possession of weapons o f mass destruction.
Once the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, content analysis provides frequencies o f
70 for a concept related to issues o f oil, 25 for a concept related to issues o f power
interests, and 53 for a concept related to issues o f regionalism. These frequencies thereby
demonstrate that the primordial interest o f the United States no longer was in supporting
Saddam.
W ith Saddam’s armies growing both in size and capacity while Saddam was
espousing Arab unity and control over Arab oil, the policy’s interest was to curtail
Saddam’s capacity to deliver on such a threat to U.S. interests. The decision makers,
however, saw no benefit in overthrowing Saddam at the time and still considered Saddam
as a useful tool to maintain political balance in the region.
On August 2, 1990 Saddam invaded Kuwait. Whether he was duped into doing so
or was misguided by the signals that he was receiving from the United States and its
embassy in Baghdad, Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait in either event served two objectives
for the United States.
The frequency in the content analysis o f 34 for a concept related to issues of
militarism demonstrates that the first objective o f the United States was to reduce
Saddam’s military and political capacity to what it had been prior to the Iran-Iraq War.
The second objective was to establish a permanent American military presence in the oilrich Middle East in order to secure U.S. oil interests. The increase in the policy’s
primordial interests toward enlarging the U.S. presence in the Middle East resulted in an
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increase in policy activity in producing the Gulf War and a political leadership that
became a major player both in the region and the world.
With the increased U.S. role in the Middle East and its control o f Middle Eastern
oil, other nation-states in the world began to challenge the newly emerging trend o f
American hegemony. A political scientist in the focus group states that “as a counter
measure, these nation-states formed regional alliances to challenge America’s political
and economic supremacy. Examples o f these alliances could be seen in Europe and Asia.
Iraq was used as a veto card to advance these alliances’ competition with the United
States for scarce resources, particularly oil.”
The 1990s’ containment period was the era o f friction between these alliances and
the United States. It appeared clearly in dealing with issues related to Iraq. Consequently,
the U.S. policy toward Iraq increased in its level o f activity as decision makers pursued
the policy’s primordial interests in order to secure America’s niche in the world. This was
achieved even with the policy adopting unilateral and illegal tactics outside UN authority.
Another focus group participant, an economist, argues that “the drive to control
oil in the world by the United States, especially in the oil-rich area in the Middle East,
eventually drove the world to be divided into two camps. One camp was headed by the
United States. The second camp was headed by regional alliances such as the European
Union and the Asian economic partnerships. The developing nations o f the Third World
tilted toward the second camp to protect its own interests and to pressure the United
States for more aid and political concessions.”
A political historian states in a one-on-one interview that the struggle between
these camps replaced the Cold War and changed geopolitics to witness increased
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tendencies, especially by U.S. camp, toward isolationism, militarism, and a new state o f
imperialism. As a consequence o f such dynamics, the U.S. policy toward Iraq shifted
toward adopting illegitimate tactics outside international norms. Examples o f these
illegitimate tactics were preemption, neocolonialism, Pax-America, and an administrative
state headed by an imperial presidency.

Negative Feedback
To use Kafka’s (2002) analogy o f the “migration o f consciousness,” the policy’s
primordial interests became the political center for the migration o f political ethics in the
United States. This statement is not a normative judgment. Rather, it is a diagnostic
analysis based on an understanding of the policy’s primordial interests and their anatomy
in leading political discourse in the United States to neglect the sufferings o f the Iraqi
people and in using Iraq as a political campaign issue in the United States.
A sociologist in the focus group contends that “the more the policy’s primordial
interests used to express the American psyche and American idealism, the further its
policy toward Iraq moved away from such notions as political ethics, responsibility and
accountability. The policy was expressed instead in terms o f supporting political
opportunism, local tyrants in the Middle East, and the increased adaptation o f the
methodology o f destruction, wars, and starvation in Iraq.”
Complexity teaches us that life is irreversible. This means that the policy’s
various trajectory phases are unique on their own. None is reversible or could be
repeated. However, the policy’s primordial interests are based on power interests rather
than on human consciousness. The policymakers are thus able to weave parallel trends o f
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similar characteristics within the policy’s internal dynamics in order to move on the same
wave function in a trajectory lasting from the 1960s until the fall of Saddam and the
occupation o f Iraq in 2003.
While moving along this historical pathway, the policymakers produced two
signatory traits that became simultaneously parts o f the policy’s continuous construction.
These two traits are misery and absurdity. Such production brings M arx’s prophecy back
to life. According to Marx (1990), if history is able to repeat itself, it can only do so
twice, once to repeat itself as misery and the other time to repeat itself as an absurdity.
The policy toward Iraq reproduced itself in both conditions. It reproduced itself as a
misery during the Gulf War o f 1991, and as absurdity during the war o f 2003.

Conclusions
In observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its hidden dynamics, our attention
moves from observing it while moving in one direction to viewing it as moving in many
directions. These many directions are the function o f the policy’s internal mechanism,
organizational behavior, phase shift dynamics, interdependent and interrelated
relationships, and the impact o f change that result in impacting the policy as a whole.
These multiple dimensions differ from the linear analysis in that they do not rely
on interpreting the data piece by piece. Instead, we look for emerging trends, hidden
meanings, and the overall behavior and relationships o f these trends in constructing the
internal dynamics o f the policy. These trends together constitute the complex analysis of
the policy’s internal relationships and the qualitative expression of its internal trajectory
in accordance with complexity theories.
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Although complex analysis differs from linear analysis, it relies on the same
themes and concepts that are drive linear analysis. Observing a dynamic system in a
qualitative inquiry in accordance with complexity theories is not a rejection o f linear
analysis. Rather, it is complementary to the linear analysis. Without the empirical
observations needed for linear analysis, we are unable to make sense o f the data and
devise the Interpretive Levels needed for complex analysis. Linear analysis, therefore,
goes hand in hand with complex analysis when conducting a qualitative inquiry.
Together, they enrich our understanding of the world and the dynamic interplay
necessary in changing a living system.
The internal analysis o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity
dimensions is not normative and does not evaluate the policy based on ethical or moral
standards. Rather, the analysis is diagnostic in its nature, and it describes changes
occurring within the internal trajectory o f the policy by emphasizing the dynamics of
organizational reassembly, phase shifts, interrelation dynamics, and non-local causation.
According to this analysis, the policy experiences several self-assembly
processes, and its organizational order at various settings dissipates and collapses,
emerging with newer orders, while in other settings it resists collapse due to artificial
engineering, causing catastrophic results both for the United States and the Iraqi people.
The complex analysis also shows that the policy and its various components are
engaged in an interconnected relationship. A change in one component o f the policy
impacts the policy as a whole.
Although the tactics employed by decision makers are rational choice for the
specific time and trend that emerges in the environment, the policy as a whole lacks a
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coherent strategy, characterized by planning, and clear objectives. The policy is a
trajectory, moving from one phase to another while responding to outside stimuli but
without having a clear objective and strategy from the start to finish.
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CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERACTIVE DYNAMICS
Introduction
This chapter focuses on observing the impact of environmental changes on the
U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity theories. The analysis is conducted by
tracing the behavioral changes within the four Interpretive Levels and presented in a flux
metaphorical model.
The analysis in this chapter is complex in its function, looking holistically into the
data through its indicators (the four Interpretive Levels) and is not constrained by
interpreting the data piece by piece. The characteristics o f this analysis emphasize the
interrelationships between the four Interpretive Levels and their environment. As such,
this analysis is called “Interactive Structure.”
The emphasis in this analysis is on the changes in the policy’s environment that
provide kicks, triggering changes in the policy itself. The relationship between changes in
the environment and those in the policy is interrelated and interdependent. As changes in
the environment trigger changes in the policy, changes in the policy impact the
environment, causing more changes in the environment, then more changes in the
environment cause more changes in the policy, and so forth. The relationship between
changes in the environment and changes in the policy, as such, is analogous to the
Chinese boxes in that it contains wholes within wholes. All the wholes are symbiotic in
their relationships and interdependent on one another
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This way o f thinking helps us recognize that every phase in the policy depends on
others as well as on the environment. The notion o f relating the policy’s survival
mechanism to changes in its environment brings Darwin’s theory o f evolution into the
center o f this analysis.
The policy toward Iraq, like organisms in nature, depends for survival on its
ability to acquire an adequate supply o f resources necessary to exist within the
environment. And since there is, and continues to be a resource scarcity in such an
environment, only the fittest trends, tactics, and phases within the policy survive. The
nature, numbers, and distribution of these trends and phases or tactics at a given time are
dependent on resource availability and on competition among various trends. The
environment is thus the critical factor in determining which trend succeeds and which
fails.
In addition to the policy itself is evolving, the policy’s ecosystem (geopolitics)
also evolves. The process of the policy’s evolution is understood at the level o f the total
ecology o f its ecosystem. This has important implications because it suggests that the
policy’s evolution is always the evolution of the pattern o f relations that embraces
changes in the environment. It is the pattern, not just the separate units comprising any
particular patterns, that evolves. The evolution o f the policy as such involves the survival
o f these phases and patterns that least fit the policy.
To understand the policy’s ecology according to this perspective, it is necessary to
understand that the policy is engages with its environment in a pattern o f co-creation,
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with each producing the other. By analyzing the policy as part of an ecology comprising
collaboration, we see the different levels o f policy development.

External Changes and Their Impacts on the Policy
By viewing the policy within the frame o f reference provided by the flux
metaphor, we are able to examine the nature of the policy’s environment, the critical
tasks that influence the policy’s ability to survive, how it secures a niche in the
environment, how it is able to defend this niche adequately, how it searches for a new
niche, how it adopts appropriate means for dealing with the environment, how it develops
appropriate tactics, and how it satisfies the needs o f its components. This type o f
observation is able to guide us toward observing the policy’s survival mechanism,
adaptation, and relations with the environment as an integral part of such an environment.
In doing so, we need to witness the policy’s ability to occupy a highly competitive
environment. And, we need to look at the loose matrix structure of the policy and observe
its trend toward phase change as it responds to specific changes in its environment.
This analysis places importance on understanding the policy as an open system
that is best understood as processes o f patterns rather than as collections o f parts. As
such, step three is designed to observe the policy toward Iraq as a dynamic system that
experiences internal changes due to environmental change.
To understand the policy’s environmental changes and their impact on internal
changes, dimensions from the complexity theories, such as autopoiesis, bifurcation, the
S-Matrix, and mutual causality are utilized to guide the analysis. Each dimension
explains the external changes in the policy as a function o f environmental changes, and it
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does so by tracing changes in the behavior o f the four Interpretive Levels. Table Seven
illustrates these four dimensions and their functions in the analysis. Morgan’s flux
metaphor is utilized to show changing trends in the U.S. policy toward Iraq as impacted
by changing trends in the environment.

Dimensions
Autopoietic
Bifurcation

The S-Matrix
Mutual causality

Functions
It analyzes environmental changes that impact self-organization
within the policy.
It analyzes environmental changes that impact phase shift,
collapse dynamics, and the emergence o f a new order in the
policy.
It analyzes the environmental impact on the policy as a function
o f the policy’s web o f associations.
It analyzes environmental changes that impact positive and
negative feedback in the policy.

Table 7. Complexity Dimensions and Changes in the Policy’s Environmental

Autopoiesis
Autopoiesis is used as an analytical lens in observing changes in the environment
and its impacts on the process o f self-organization in the policy. This observation enables
us to see the manifestation o f self-production, reassembling o f components and changing
o f structure through top-down dynamics take place. These dynamics occur because the
policy responds to external changes in its environment.
Every pattern within the policy gives way to another pattern and does not stay
fixed in time and place. Neither containment stays fix, for example, nor preemption. This
flow in the process is flux, and the internal changes that occur are irreversible.
In order to understand the impact o f autopoiesis on observing the impact of
environmental changes on the policy, behavioral changes in each indicator in the data’s
four Interpretive Levels are observed. Autopoiesis thus serves as a complexity-guide in
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the process o f observing the impact o f environmental changes on the policy’s internal
changes by tracing the behavioral changes in the four Interpretive Levels.

Autopoiesis and Mythticism
The history chapter reveals that the United States’ relation with Iraq began with
the creation o f the Iraqi state in 1920. The foundation of this relationship was built on oil
exploration in northern Iraq. Since Iraq was under British mandate, U.S. relations with
Iraq remained small and insignificant. The impact o f this minuscule relationship on U.S.
foreign policy and the myth surrounding it were small, and were enlarged only as
changes in the environment dictated more U.S. involvement in Iraq. This involvement,
however, did not take place until 1958.
The emerging myth during the period from 1920-1958 spoke o f capitalism and its
ingenuity as the driving force for democracy and progress, justifying colonialism as a
necessary mechanism to bring progress to the colonized people in the world. Oil was the
fuel to run this engine, and as such it was vital that it be discovered and pumped to reach
the industrial factories in the colonialist states. This mantra continued even during the
Cold War, as the myth was designed to reflect the contrast between two worlds and two
views: the so-called free world as represented by capitalism, and the world behind the
iron-curtain as represented by the Soviet bloc.
The history chapter in this dissertation adds that the relationship between the
industrial West and colonized Iraq continued without many changes until 1958, when the
new Republican government in Iraq expelled the British from Iraq, established the
independent Republic o f Iraq, and reduced the oil companies’ concession areas in Iraq to
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five percent. This angered the oil companies and their nation-states, including the United
States, and led them to conspire against the new Iraqi government.
The U.S. government decided through the CIA and in coordination with the
governments o f Egypt, Kuwait, Iran, and England to support plots to implement a regime
change in Iraq. The myth surrounding the U.S. policy toward Iraq at this time was to
reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East and help bring forth democratic regimes that
allied themselves with the free world. The plots succeeded, and on February 8, 1963 the
CIA was able to topple the Iraqi Republican regime and bring the Baath Party into power
in Iraq..
The Baath government was not democratic but a brutal police regime that
institutionalized terror and murder. The U.S. policy, however, condoned these practices
because they were directed against the Iraqi Communists, the perceived enemies at the
time of capitalism and the free market.
With Communism representing evil in American political myth, the U.S. policy
toward Iraq allowed for the Baath’s brutal tactics to take hold in the name o f fighting
Communism. The policy’s self-assembly was organized around this myth, legitimizing
America’s support for the Baath regime under the guise o f protecting the free market.
The history chapter also describes how the Baath rewarded America’s support by
granting U.S. oil companies’ huge concession areas in Iraq. The alliance between
America’s power interest and its local Baathist managers flourished to further derail any
populist aspiration for democracy in Iraq.
In 1979, the Shah o f Iran was overthrown by a popular Islamic revolution led by
Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s new Islamic republic ended U.S. control o f Iranian oil
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and threatened to spread its ideology to other oil-rich Islamic countries in the region,
especially Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Gulf states. According to a political historian in a
one-on-one interview, this trend in the environment “alarmed the political decision
makers in the United States and triggered a kick in their Iraq policy” toward self
organization in order to “enable Iraq stop the threat o f the Islamic revolution o f Iran.”
This expert adds that the policy’s mythticism during this era emerged with “the
U.S. supporting Iraq to balance the other political powers in the Middle East and to
contain the Iranian revolution.” This assembly o f myth occurred during the Carter’s
administration, with “National Security Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski encouraging Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein to invade Iran in order to protect the stability o f the region.”
Another historian in the focus group states that the myth “continued during the Iran-Iraq
W ar o f the 1980s in order to assure Iranian defeat and Iraqi victory.”
On August 2, 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait to rescue his war-damaged economy
from collapse. The frequency in the content analysis o f 19 o f a concept related to issues
o f mistrust and the frequency o f nine o f a concept related to issues o f survival suggest
that Saddam thought that his invasion o f Kuwait would not cause an American
retaliation, especially after he stopped the Iranian revolution from disrupting U.S.
influence in the region. Saddam also misread signals delivered to him by the U.S.
embassy in Iraq, confusing the ambassador’s message that the U.S. would not interfere in
matters between two Arab nations as a green light to march ahead with his plan to invade
Kuwait. This newly developing trend in the environment provided a kick for the U.S.
policy toward Iraq and its myth to reassemble in order to respond to the changes on the
ground.
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In 1990, the policy’s mythticism was restructured in order to represent the change
in U.S. relations with Iraq from cooperative to confrontational. The new myth was
designed in order to metaphorically represent a New World Order that was devised by the
Bush administration’s outlook toward the world. The assembly o f this myth was arranged
to turn Saddam into Attila the Hun, and the efforts to oust him from Kuwait were
portrayed as matters of freedom, legitimacy, and liberation.
By using Saddam as the symbol o f evil, content analysis in a frequency o f seven
o f a concept related to issues o f symbolism underscores that policymakers claimed the
U.S. military, political and moral leadership o f the world. And with 32 other nations
joining U.S. military efforts to rescue Kuwaiti oil from Saddam’s grip, the Bush
administration was successful in writing the final chapter o f the Cold War by enabling
America to emerge as the world sole superpower.
The policy’s myth continued during the Clinton presidency, reinforced by the
ultimate demise o f the Soviet Union. With the U.S. emerging as the world’s only
superpower, the frequency in the content analysis o f eight o f a concept related to issues of
a unipolar world reveals that America had begun to regard international laws and
legitimacy issues as secondary to U.S. interests. As such, during the 1990s, the policy’s
myth was reassembled autopoietically to reflect these developments, with the new myth
reflecting emerging trends in American politics, such as unilateralism, disregard to
legitimacy and international law, and the increase in coercive actions.
On September 11, 2001, terrorists used commercial airliners to attack the
Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. and the World Trade Center towers in New York
City. The incident created a tense political climate in the United States that shifted its
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foreign policy from operating within the mindset of the Cold W ar to fighting privately
funded clandestine networks of terrorists.
The frequency in the content analysis o f 12 o f a concept related to issues o f
capacity and the frequency o f 12 o f a concept related to issues o f Cold War politics reveal
that the mechanism in fighting terrorism was the same as the one for fighting a nation
state during the Cold War. The U.S. identified a designated nation-state in order to
activate its Cold-War capacity in fighting terrorism. Afghanistan was chosen first for
harboring al-Qaeda, and Iraq was chosen later for allegedly having ties with al-Qaeda.
As o f 2001, the policy’s myth went into rearrangement and self-organization as a
consequence. In order to justify the Bush administration’s preemptive policy against Iraq
and present it as a defense mechanism against imminent threat, and in order to legitimize
this effort as part o f the U.S. war on terrorism, a philosopher in the focus group maintains
that the policy’s myth was “designed to justify the war and occupation of Iraq in 2003 as
a matter of self-defense and to prevent another terrorist attack on America from taking
hold.” This myth was also institutionalized when Congress authorized the President to
use force against Iraq and passed Iraq Liberation Act o f 2002.
Saddam eventually was toppled by the invading U.S. army on April 9, 2003 and
arrested on December 12, 20.03. The history chapter reveals that the Bush
administration’s pre-war claim that Saddam’s regime had weapons o f mass destruction
and the delivery mechanism to threaten the United States through Iraq’s alleged ties with
al-Qaeda proved to be bogus and was based on faulty intelligence.
As a consequence, the policy’s m yth o f 2001 collapsed and reassembled in 2003
within a new organizational structure to justify the Iraq war as a matter o f liberating the
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Iraqi people from tyranny. However, the year-long occupation, killing Iraqi civilians,
imposing discredited figures as Iraq’s new leaders, looting Iraqi oil and destroying its
infrastructure, and torturing Iraqi prisoners led to the collapse o f this newly reassembled
myth as well and exposed it as a mask to hide the policy’s moral bankruptcy. With the
collapse of the policy’s myth of 2003, the U.S. policy toward Iraq lost one o f its greatest
strengths to survive amidst continuous environmental changes. Consequently, the
collapse o f the policy itself is awaiting the impact o f competing forces within its
environment.

Autopoiesis and Dichotomy
Despite continuous changes in the environment, the policy toward Iraq neglects in
its calculation the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and the Iraqi regimes that oppress
them. An Iraqi-American chemist in the focus group contends that “the prime motivator
o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq was the U.S. nation-state interest. The welfare o f the Iraqi
people and their suffering did not matter to the decision-makers.” In order for
environmental trends not to impact changes in the policy’s dichotomous nature, the
decision-makers adopted various measures in order to artificially prevent the collapse o f
the order that neglected such a dichotomy.
A political historian states in a one-on-one interview that “by ignoring this
dichotomy, the policymakers influenced the environment and created a dichotomy of
their own, between U.S. interest in Iraq and the aspirations o f the Iraqi people. Because
o f this new dichotomy, the Iraqi people divorced themselves from the United States and
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its plans in Iraq and widened the gap between their interests and those o f the United
States.”
The frequency in the content analysis o f 24 for a concept related to issues o f
rhetoric and the frequency o f eight o f a concept related to issues o f irony demonstrate that
as the policymakers moved the United States to confront Saddam during the G ulf War of
1991, they shifted the U.S. policy toward Iraq to acknowledge the dichotomy between the
Iraqi people and their government. This acknowledgment, however, was used for mere
propaganda purposes in order to perpetuate the policy’s myth as one that supported the
Iraqi people’s aspiration for freedom. This myth, however, was designed to manipulate
the suffering o f the Iraqi people for the policy’s own advantage and it did not intend to
change the suffering o f the Iraqi people at the hand o f their government.
The main organizational structure o f the policy remained impervious to the
dichotomy and continued using the same structure that it used during the 1980s. This, in
return, impacted the policy’s environment, creating a backlash against the United States
by regional powers in the Middle East, Europe and Asia who viewed the U.S. policy
toward Iraq as harsh, punitive, and hurting the Iraqi people more than the regime o f
Saddam Hussein.
A public administrator in the focus group states that the policy’s neglect of
dichotomy contributed to “the creation o f a gap o f mistrust between the Iraqi people and
the United States. This gap became wider as the policy continued to ignore the dichotomy
between the Iraqi people and the regime o f Saddam Hussein and misused it for its
political advantages.”
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Content analysis with a high frequency o f 43 for a concept related to issues o f
misleading strongly suggests that the misuse of this dichotomy increased after September
11, 2001, with the Bush administration focusing on the Iraqi regime as the main threat to
the United States and pretending to fight Saddam on behalf of the Iraqi people. Such a
claim was quickly exposed in 2003 when the invading U.S. troops began to treat the Iraqi
people as an extension o f Saddam’s regime. Instead o f handing governance in Iraq to the
Iraqi people themselves and encouraging the promotion o f civic and democratic
institutions, the Bush administration decided to occupy Iraq and run it as a war spoil.

Autopoiesis and Rational Choice
The frequency in the content analysis o f 25 for a concept related to issues o f
power interest and the high frequency of 47 for a concept related to nation-state interest
suggest that the policy’s tactics were its only rational choice, representing the
advancement o f the United States’ nation-state interests. Autopoiesis took place as these
tactics responded to changes in the policy’s environment.
If we observe the rational choice during each phase in the policy’s trajectory, we
witness a continuous process o f autopoiesis within the series o f choices that are made.
This observation is determined through the tracing o f these choices and their behavior as
they respond to changing trends in the environment.
During the 1980s, for example, the history chapter in this dissertation shows how
the United States interest in the Middle East was threatened by the Islamic regime o f Iran.
As a consequence, the policy’s rational choice was to support Iraq in its war with Iran in
order to neutralize the Iranian threat. Content analysis with a high frequency o f 67 for a
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concept related to issues of hypocrisy indicates that this choice was not based on ethics or
moral precepts but purely on the United States’ interest in the region. By doing so, U.S.
support for Saddam had an impact on the policy’s geopolitical environment as well. The
relationships between regional nation-states and the United States also became based on
nation-state interests and devoid o f political ethics.
The history chapter also reveals that this trend allowed the West, headed by U.S.
actions in supporting Saddam, to ignore the Iraqi regime’s violation of human rights in
Iraq and its use o f weapons o f mass destruction against civilian populations both in Iran
and Iraq. Turning a blind eye to such violations prolonged the tyrannical regime o f
Saddam and strengthened its repressive apparatus against the Iraqi people, while allowing
it to present itself to the world and the United Nations as the legitimate representative o f
the very people that it was oppressing. The separation between democracy and tyranny in
Iraq disappeared as both concepts were ignored in the quest for scarce resources by the
West and the United States.
The frequency within the content analysis o f 16 for a concept related to issues o f
the administrative state and the frequency o f nine o f a concept related to issues o f the
imperial presidency suggest that while democracy in the United States remained intact
within the system o f governance and civil institutions, its disregard of the problems in
Iraq made it susceptible to anti-democratic norms within the United States itself.
Examples o f such norms can be detected in the emerging o f concepts and tendencies such
as the administrative state and the imperial presidency.
An economist in the focus group feels that “after Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait,
the U.S. power interest became threatened by Saddam’s control o f Kuwaiti oil. If he were
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to be left unchallenged in Kuwait, his next target would probably be Saudi Arabia. The
prospect o f Saddam holding the oil o f Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia was alarming and
antithetical to U.S. interests.”
As such, the policymakers’ tactical choice was to end the Iraqi occupation o f
Kuwait, liberate the Kuwaiti oil, and restore the rule of Kuwaiti local managers o f the
Sabah family. However, in order to achieve this tactic, the U.S. policy toward Iraq had to
experience an autopoietic self-organization and it had to shift from supporting Saddam to
confronting him.
The impact o f this self-reassembly on the environment resulted in new dynamics.
A political historian observes in a one-on-one interview that “geopolitics in the world
shifted from supporting a tyrant such as Saddam to confronting him. This shift created a
temporary alliance between the nation-states in the world and the United States to benefit
from the status of curtailing Iraq.”
Content analysis yields a high frequency of 53 for a concept related to issues o f
regionalism. It thus shows that during the containment era o f the 1990s, the U.S. policy
toward Iraq responded to new changes in the environment, such as the collapse o f the
Soviet Union, the emergence o f the United States as the sole superpower in the world that
no longer was constrained by international norms, and the rise o f regionalism as a
challenge to U.S. supremacy. As a result, the policy toward Iraq experienced another
autopoietic realignment, responding to environmental changes with tactics such as
abusing the UN mission in Iraq and using coercion, regime change, and isolated Iraqi
opposition groups in exile in order to impact the political discourse in Iraq.
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After September 11, 2001 and as a response to changes in the environment,
preemption became the new tactic. The U.S. policy toward Iraq was reorganized once
more in order to respond to the new reality on the ground. The new autopoietic processes
emerged with more tactics in support o f preemption, such as the use o f war as a
corrective action for containment, a shift in ideology toward a Hobbesian thinking, using
faulty intelligence in order to build a case against Saddam, and turning the imagery of
Saddam to one that resembled Attila the Hun.
The impact o f this new set of autopoietic process impacted the policy’s
environment as well. Content analysis reveals that these changes in the policy and its
environment pushed governance in the United States toward a type o f administrative state
that had little or no regard for the Constitutional separation of powers and the traditions
o f checks and balances.

Autopoiesis and Primordial Interests
An economist in the focus group argues that the policy’s primordial interests
“represent the narrow, selfish nation-state interest o f the United States that drives the
policy’s trajectory throughout its phases.” Autopoiesis guides the process o f selforganization in the policy in order to respond to the needs of these primitive interests and
to environmental conditions.
During the policy’s process of adaptation to environmental changes, the policy’s
primordial interests self-organize in order to move the policy toward the most suitable
form that is capable in translating its needs and operating for the sole purpose of serving
U.S. nation-state interest. Content analysis records a frequency o f 25 for a concept related
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to issues o f power interest. It shows that this type o f governance took advantage of
America’s emerging power in the world in order to advance U.S. interest at the expense
o f international norms.
The history chapter in this dissertation describes how the policy’s primordial
interests during the 1980s were structured around the mantra of supporting Saddam
through bank loans, agricultural credits, technology, and military aid in order to assure an
Iranian defeat. Once the environment changed, triggered by Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait
in August 1990, the policy’s primordial interests shifted toward liberating Kuwait oil
from Saddam’s grab.
The shift was represented in changing the policy’s relationships with Saddam’s
regime from one that was supportive during the 1980s to one that became hostile in 19901991 by cutting U.S. aid to Iraq and engaging the United States’ armed forces and the
forces o f 32 other nations in a war with Iraq. The policy’s primordial interests were
served by returning the management o f Kuwaiti oil to the local Kuwaiti agents o f U.S.
interests and by reducing Saddam’s military capacity to the pre-Iran/ Iraq War period.
Operating from America’s pure primordial interests lead regional nations-states to
design their policies and relationships with the United States based on pure self-interest
as well. The high frequency in the content analysis o f 47 for a concept related to issues of
geopolitics underscores that this trend furthers the division in world politics despite the
rhetoric o f a new world order that is perpetrated by the united States.
Instead, the new world order becomes the order and supremacy o f the nation
states’ interests in the world. When these nation-states form alliances among themselves
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(as that during the Gulf War), it is because of their self-interest rather than o f an altruistic
interest in promoting peace and democracy.
A participant in the focus group, an Iraqi-American chemist, adds that “during the
containment era o f the 1990s, nation-interest supremacy drove both U.S. and Iraqi
politics, causing both nations to abuse the UN mission in Iraq, creating a gap between
UN goals and these two nations’ political goals while ignoring the sufferings o f those
whom were caught in the middle: the Iraqi people.” The organizational structure o f the
U.S. policy toward Iraq and its primordial interests stood alone, caring only the needs o f
securing “scores” for the home team at the expense o f legitimacy, political ethics, and
human consciousness.
The quest for power continues to present a challenge to the policy’s primordial
interests. The frequency in the content analysis o f 12 o f a concept related to issues o f the
Dollar versus the Euro, while comparatively low, still suggests that as the Euro rose to
challenge the supremacy o f the dollar, and as oil became a political veto power in the
hands o f emerging ideologues in U.S. government to transform American capitalism into
a new imperial power through direct colonialism and military hegemony, the
organizational structure o f the policy’s primordial interests reassembled and self
organized itself, especially after September 11, 2001. This new self-organization
promoted appointocracy, the administrative state, and the imperial presidency in order to
advance Pax Americana as America’s global policy.
Nation states that wanted to carve a notch for themselves outside the primordial
interests o f American capitalism, for example, welcomed the Euro. This drive toward the
Euro empowered Europe as a new economic and political block to challenge U.S.

319

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

leadership and influence in the world. A content analysis frequency o f 14 for a concept
related to issues o f imperialism and the frequency o f 53 for a concept related to issues of
regionalism reveal that Iraq had become part o f this equation by adopting the Euro for its
economic transactions. This matter further shifted the U.S. policy toward Iraq in favor o f
toppling the Iraqi regime and by doing so, thereby reducing the influence of the Euro in
that oil-rich part o f the world.
An economist in the focus group alludes to the role o f oil as a primordial interest
in directing U.S. policy and leading to war in 2003, stating that “oil on its own was not a
cause for war, especially when Iraq was willing to sell its oil and we were willing to buy
it. The important issue was controlling this oil and using it politically to benefit U.S.
interest in its competition with Europe.”
In a one-on-one interview with a political historian, the importance of oil as a
primordial interest in directing the policy is echoed once more. According to this expert,
“the underlining motive for the United States Bush administration to go to war with Iraq
in 1991 and 2003 was oil. Policymakers had a domestic agenda to roll-back domestic
relation in the United States to the 1890s, by securing the economic advantages for the
key sectors in the society and by bringing us back to complete reliance on oil.”
The frequency in the content analysis o f 30 for a concept related to issues o f
hegemony and the high frequency o f 70 for a concept related to issues o f oil and its
impact on the policy demonstrate that when demand for energy became the central issue
in U.S. policy, policymakers were influenced by increased demand for foreign oil by the
United States both as an energy source and as a political veto to maintain U.S. hegemony
in the world. It was primarily ,because o f this demand that the Bush administration was
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determined to end the policy o f containment in 2003 and to topple the regime o f Saddam
Hussein by force.

Bifurcation
If autopoiesis illustrates how changes in the environment impact the processes o f
self-organization in the policy toward Iraq, bifurcation illustrates how these
environmental changes impact the processes o f transforming the policy from one
organizational state to another through phase shifts. Bifurcation, as such, explains the
impact o f environmental changes on the policymakers by observing the policy’s decision
making process from a state o f equilibrium during a particular organizational phase to a
state of oscillation, chaos, and then to the emerging of a new organizational order in
another state o f equilibrium. We observe these changes by tracing the behavior o f the
four Interpretive Levels as indicators o f the policy movement from one phase to another.
As with observing the impact o f environmental changes on the policy’s internal
changes according to autopoiesis through a flux metaphorical expression, the impact o f
environmental changes on the policy’s internal changes according to bifurcation is also
observed through M organ’s flux metaphorical expression. The reason for choosing a flux
metaphorical expression is to observe the dynamic nature of the policy unfolding and
enfolding as a kind o f pulsating wholeness while impacted by changes in the
environment.
By observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to bifurcation, we witness
whether environmental changes cause the policy’s decision-making structure to collapse,
whether the collapse is delayed or prevented through artificial engineering, and if so,
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what the impact is o f the catastrophic consequences on the policy. As the older internal
structure o f the policy’s decision-making process becomes unstable in response to
environmental changes, it prepares to collapse in order to allow for the new structure to
emerge. Let us now observe how each specific Interpretive Level behaved according to
bifurcation while impacted by environmental changes.

Bifurcation and Mvthticism
The history chapter in this dissertation shows how during the 1980s, the United
States supported Iraq in its war with Iran. The rationale for doing so was to neutralize the
threat o f the Iranian revolution to U.S. oil interests in the region. The myth used to justify
this policy was to restore balance to the region and confront the anti-American Iranians
and their support for radical Islamic political organizations in the region.
For nearly a decade, the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its myth were in a state of
equilibrium, disturbed only by minor criticism in the media and Congress. By large, the
policy was implemented without significant internal or environmental interruptions. The
case o f Americans held hostage in Iran further influenced official sentiment in the United
States toward supporting Iraq.
In 1990, the history chapter traces how this equilibrium was destabilized by
events in the environment. The Iran-Iraq War ended with both Iran and Iraq deeply
wounded and economically crippled. This satisfied the United States since these two
troubling countries in the region managed to severely damage each other. However,
Saddam emerged with a massive military capacity, ambitious political goal to unite the
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Arab world (and its'oil) under his control, thereby threatening the energy security o f the
United States. This tendency alarmed the United States.
On August 2, 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait to remedy his war-torn economy and
keep his huge army employed and redirected from turning on him. The event created a
chaotic disorder in the U.S. policy that supported Saddam for nearly a decade.
As a result of this chaotic disorder, the policy’s older structure (myth and tactics)
collapsed. A new order and structure emerged in order to respond to the changes in the
environment. This new order was clearly visible in the policy’s myth. According to this
new myth, Saddam became the source o f political destabilization in the region while
embodying the spirit o f anti-Americanism and taking on the symbol o f evil. He was
compared by President Bush to Hitler.
The low frequency in the content analysis o f six for a concept related to issues o f
war as a corrective measure and the frequency o f one for a concept related to the
metaphor o f war imply that at least to some extent, the new order impacted the very
environment that created it. Iraq became isolated from the world, and an international
coalition was put together under U.S. leadership to drive the invading Iraqi army from
Kuwait and to reduce Saddam’s military threat. The myth that was constructed to
describe these transformations, such as multilateralism and the translation o f the will o f
the international community to restore legitimacy to the region, was designed to justify
the use o f force as a necessary measure to offset aggression.
High content analysis frequencies of 53 for a concept related to issues o f
regionalism, 47 for a concept related to issues o f nation-state interest, and 47 for a
concept related to issues o f regionalism suggest that during the containment era o f the
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1990s, the U.S. and its policy toward Iraq were no longer operating in a global leadership
position. The decade from 1991 to September 11, 2001 witnessed a global political
competition for scarce resources that bumped the United States out o f the leadership
position that it temporarily enjoyed in the short period after the collapse o f the Soviet
Union.
A public administrator in the focus group states that “although the Soviet Union
collapsed and the United States emerged as the world sole superpower, other nation
states became weary o f the growing U.S. political, economic, and military power. Since
no single nation-state in the world was able to match the United States’ awesome
economic and military power, many nation-states formed regional alliance in order to
challenge U.S. hegemony.”
A political scientist agrees with this statement and asserts in a one-on-one
interview that “these emerging regional powers created a competition for scarce
resources among the capitalist systems in the world. The relationships between the
United States and the emerging regional powers, although they took place within the
union o f the capitalist system, nevertheless were based on fragmentation and friction.”
Content analysis with a frequency o f eight for a concept related to issues o f irony
and a frequency o f 15 for a concept related to issues o f containment reveal that the U.S.
policy toward Iraq during the containment era fell within this formula o f antagonism
within the political union o f the industrialized nation-states. A sociologist in the focus
group states that “the regional powers’ competition for scarce resources used the Iraqi
ticket as a means to compete with the United States and challenge its leadership position
in the world.”
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In response, the history chapter demonstrates that the U.S. chose two approaches.
First, it reverted to illegitimate actions in Iraq, such as unnecessary and excessive use o f
force, coercion, and mastering plots for regime change, or bowed to international
pressure to work with the United Nations. Second, it attempted to remedy the Iraqi
situation diplomatically. The rotation between these two approaches went back and forth
according to U.S. interests and tactical alliances during each period o f time.
These trends in the environment forced the policy’s myth to collapse its older
structure and emerge with a new order better equipped to find a niche for itself in the
containment environment. The newly constructed myth spoke o f world peace, freedom,
and saving the world from Saddam’s threat and weapons o f mass destruction.
This myth continued until another kick in the environment represented by the
terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001 provided a trigger to destabilized the
containment period’s myth, collapsing its older structure and emerging with a new order
in order to bring the policy once more into a state o f equilibrium. The frequency count in
the content analysis o f 29 for a concept related to issues o f preemption indicates that the
newly emerged myth after September 11, 2001 spoke o f the nation-state of America and
its right to strike first even in response to perceived threats, and to take the fight to those
who are threatening or have the potential to threaten America before they are able to
strike at the homeland.
A political scientist states in a one-on-one interview that this myth was presented
“as a matter o f protecting freedom, the American way o f life, and bringing Western style
democracy to the nations that suffered under tyranny. Iraq was chosen as a test arena for
this hypothesis, and the Iraqi soil became America’s battleground in its new war on
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terrorism. America’s actions in Iraq, however, were rejected by regional powers which
questioned America’s motives and unilateral actions in Iraq.” With such a rejection, the
policy’s myth was also rejected and forced to continually collapse and emerge with
newer myths.

Bifurcation and Dichotomy
Unlike Mythticism, the policy o f dichotomy does not go through phase shifts
when the policy’s environment is triggered by kicks. Instead o f allowing for the older
structure to collapse, artificial engineering such as economic sanctions and supporting a
few isolated Iraqi exiled groups are designed to maintain the prolongation o f the older
order and its dichotomy. This artificial engineering creates a catastrophe for the
policymakers as they continued to link Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people and treat
them both as the same. By doing so, the artificial engineering increases the trend toward
failure in the policy’s overall approach toward Iraq.
The policymakers’ neglect to recognize the dichotomy between the Iraqi people
and their government impacted their own political environment, creating a dichotomy
between U.S. interests and the interests o f other nation-states and regional alliances in the
world. The dichotomy between the United States and other nation-states in the world also
intensified when America emerged as the sole superpower after the collapse o f the Soviet
Union.
The frequency in the content analysis o f eight for a concept related to issues o f a
unipolar world suggests that the rise o f U.S. power in a unipolar world created a sense of
insecurity and uneasiness in other nation-states which viewed themselves as threatened
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by the dictates o f U.S. power interests. This sensitivity was ignored by the United States.
And, instead o f embracing an international world effort for collective cooperation, the
United States continued to act on its nation-state interests. A political scientist in the
focus group adds that “the policy toward Iraq was used as a vehicle to advance these
tendencies, and other nation-states reacted by using Iraq as an avenue to reject U.S.
imperialism.”
This trend in the environment emerged during the 1990s and became apparent
during A m erica’s unilateral war on Iraq in 2003. The double dichotomy between the
United States and other nation-states, and between the Iraqi people and the regime of
Saddam Hussein further weakened the U.S. policy toward Iraq as it approached both
dichotomies with arrogance, ignorance, and a focus on its own self-interest.
The U.S. actions during its wars on Iraq both in 1991 and 2003 reflected the
policymakers’ neglect to account for these double dichotomies. Because o f such neglect,
the U.S. gradually became isolated in the world even as it was trying to isolate the regime
o f Saddam Hussein.
The content analysis frequency of 44 for a concept related to issues o f force
reflects the willingness o f the U.S. to consider using force in Iraq. Evidence o f the
catastrophic results may be seen in the U.S. campaigns o f overkill in Iraq during both
wars o f 1991 and 2003, its disregard for the welfare o f the Iraqi people in enforcing
crippling economic sanctions against Iraq for nearly twelve years, the mistreatment and
killing o f Iraqi civilians during the routine bombing o f Iraq since 1991, and the torture of
Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad in 2003. These catastrophic results not
only were felt in Iraq but also on a global level. They demoralized supporters of
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America’s leadership in the world and exposed the United States as a power that had lost
control.
W hat is surprising about the abuses committed against the Iraqi prisoners in Abu
Ghraib prison during the American occupation o f Iraq as o f 2003 is the fact that they
came as a surprise. Content analysis in a frequency o f 30 for a concept related to issues o f
hegemony, when combined with willingness to use force described above, shows that the
abuse o f Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison confirmed what has historically long been a
tactic within U.S. foreign policy: targeting and torturing civilians in order to maintain
U.S. hegemony. Whether it is was a “war on communism” during the Cold War,
Vietnam, or a “war on terrorism” in the post-September 11 era, the targets and tactics
have remained the same. The abuses in Abu Ghraib were the logical outcome of
neglecting the dichotomy between people and regimes, treating everyone as an enemy,
and dehumanizing that enemy. This is the language o f power.

Bifurcation and Rational Choice
Because o f changes in the environment, the policy’s rational choice goes through
bifurcation and phase shifts. The U.S. witnessed the collapse o f its older orders during the
policy’s phase shifts in order to allow new tactics to emerge as a response to new trends
in the environment. The history chapter demonstrates that during the 1980s, the Iranian
revolution provided a kick to the policy’s environment. The result was a shift in the
policy toward supporting Saddam and his war against Iran. This kick resulted in a phase
shift and the emergence o f U.S. support for Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War.
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The frequency in the content analysis o f 25 for a concept related to issues o f
power interest and the high frequency o f 67 of a concept related to issues o f hypocrisy
remind us that for many years prior to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the United
States supported Iran and the government o f the Shah. This support was carried on
despite the Shah’s corruption and abuse o f human rights in Iran. The notorious SAVAK,
the Shah’s secret police, was condemned by various international human rights agencies
for abuse, torture, and assassinations o f political dissidents. Yet, the United States
government turned a blind eye to these practices as long as the Shah was acting as a local
policeman in the region and safeguarding U.S. interests.
The U.S. support for the Shah and its neglect o f the dichotomy between the
Iranian people and the Iranian government created a sense o f rage and resentment among
the Iranian people toward the United States. When the Shah was eventually overthrown
in 1979 by an Islamic revolution, the newly emerging regime adopted a hostile policy
toward the United States and its client states in the region as a means o f expressing the
Iranian people’s rejection of the U.S. policy in the region.
The U.S., in response, used Saddam as a proxy to punish and neutralize
revolutionary Iran, and it did so while turning a blind eye to Saddam’s abuse o f the Iraqi
people as well. This neglect now created a sense of resentment among the Iraqi people
toward the United States just as previously had happened with the Iranian people. An
Iraqi-American chemist in the focus group states that “this resentment was reinforced
year after year as the U.S. continued to neglect the suffering o f the Iraqi people by
continually punishing Iraq either through the use o f force or by imposing crippling
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economic sanctions. The resentment clearly manifested itself when the Iraqi people
overwhelmingly rejected U.S. occupation o f their country.”
The shift in U.S. policy toward supporting Saddam began in the late 1970s,
shortly after the Iranian revolution o f 1979 (see the history chapter o f this dissertation).
The Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait in 1991, however, caused the policy to enter into a period of
oscillation when its state of equilibrium was disrupted by the resulting disorder caused by
Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait. These dynamics led the policy to collapse. U.S. decision
makers then abandoned the old structure o f supporting Saddam and emerged with a new
tactic and a new order. The newly emerging tactic confronted Saddam and engaged him
militarily. Once the policy settled on confronting Saddam with a new tactic, it returned to
a state o f equilibrium.
The state o f equilibrium, however, was short lived. Once the G ulf War ended, the
containment era dictated the need for new policy measures to respond to changes in its
environment. Although the rational choice o f containing Saddam as o f 1991 continued
for 12 years, content analysis with a frequency o f nine for a concept related to survival
issues suggests that the Iraqi regime’s cat-and-mouse game with UN weapon inspectors,
selling oil outside UN monitoring, and the inspectors’ inability to verify that Iraq had
completely rid itself o f all weapons o f mass destruction made containment a difficult
phase to maintain.
Also, as public opinion in the world was turning against the United States because
o f the negative impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people, the U.S. policy toward Iraq began
to experience another oscillation. This led once again to a state o f chaos and disorder and
to the collapsing o f the older tactic and the emergence o f new tactical choices to respond
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to these changes in the environment. For example, as o f 1998 the United States officially
adopted the concept o f regime change in Iraq and funded the Iraqi opposition groups in
order to enable them to bring about regime change in Iraq.
These efforts, however, did not result in a regime change in Iraq due to the
ruthlessness o f Saddam’s security apparatus. After September 11, 2001, the environment
created another kick that triggered the policy o f preemption.
The content analysis frequency o f 54 for a concept related to issues o f ideology
and of 29 for a concept related to issues o f preemption show that the terrorists’ attacks on
America, combined with the new Bush administration’s ideological drive toward shifting
the U.S. to adopt force and preemption, triggered the environment to force another set o f
internal changes in the policy to occur. As such, the policy’s tactical choice and the
containment o f Saddam collapsed and a newer tactic emerged. This new tactic was to
invade Iraq militarily and remove Saddam by force. Congress passed the Iraq Liberation
Act of 2002 in order to legalize this newly emerging tactic.
This new tactic is impacting the policy’s environment as well. With the U.S.
handling Iraq unilaterally, content analysis reveals through a frequency o f 22 for a
concept related to issues o f unilateralism that most other large nation-states in the world
respond by rejecting U.S. unilateralism and leadership. As a consequence, the U.S.
operation in Iraq is becoming one that lacks international support and is threatening to
consume America’s energy and resources for years to come.
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Bifurcation and Primordial Interests
The policy’s myths and tactics experience changes as the policy moves from one
phase to another, such as when the policy moved from supporting Saddam during the
1980s to confronting him military in 1991, to containing him during the 1990s, and
finally to overthrowing him during the 2003 invasion o f Iraq. However, the policy’s
primordial interests (as the policy’s dichotomy) fail to experience any change or collapse
to its organizational order despite changes in the environment.
This is because the fact that the policy’s primordial interest remains at a state of
equilibrium throughout the policy’s phase shifts. These primordial interests represent the
primary interests o f the United States as a nation-state. They remain the same throughout
the policy’s trajectory.

The S-Matrix
The S-Matrix explains the impact of environmental changes on the political
decision making by shifting the emphases from objects to events and from building
blocks to a web o f interconnectedness. On their own, the ingredients that comprise the
four Interpretive Levels do not have a significant meaning as isolated entities. They are
understood only while interconnected, reflecting the oneness o f the policy toward Iraq.
These four specific Interpretive Levels and the behavior o f the themes and concepts that
construct them determine the impact o f environmental changes on the policy.
As with autopoiesis and bifurcation, the S-Matrix utilizes the flux metaphor in
order to explain the impact o f environmental changes on the dynamic nature o f the
policy’s relationships. The S-Matrix assists in the construction o f the flux metaphor by
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focusing on the connections that simultaneously create the relationships between changes
in the environment and the U.S. policy toward Iraq. The S-Matrix also illustrates the
interconnected and dynamic nature o f the policy as a system that does not live
independently and is not predictable or rational. Rather, it is a system that shares many
worlds, many dimensions, many players, and many forces.
In order to understand the impact o f the S-Matrix on observing the environmental
changes and their impact on the policy’s internal changes, we observe the behavioral
changes in each indicator and their impact on the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its
environment. The S-Matrix thus serves as a complexity-guide in the process o f observing
the environmental changes and impact on the political decision-making process by
tracing behavioral changes at the four Interpretive Levels.

The S-Matrix and Mvthticism
Changes in the policy’s environment compelled the decision-makers to view a
policy’s internal and external relationships as an interdependent and interconnected web
o f association. This web is manifested clearly in the policy’s mythticism.
The policy’s relationships, while manifested as myth, are based on processes
rather than units. The ingredients that go into the making o f mythticism during each
phase o f the policy’s trajectory share a relationship with the players in the policy’s
environment and make the transition from one myth to another through an interconnected
web of interrelated stories.
Examples o f the forces that go into the construction o f the policy’s trajectory are
the relationship between mythticism’ metaphors, such as the telephone pole, shadows,

333

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and beyond good and evil, and the changing trends in the environment. Since each
metaphor is composed o f concepts, the relationship between these concepts, their
composing themes, and the emerging Interpretive Level o f mythticism is based on the
interconnectedness o f these ingredients and their behavior. Each component affects the
entire relationship through the S-Matrix association.
If we observe the myth o f the New World Order that emerges during the Gulf
War o f 1991, for example, we see that the components engaged in the dynamics o f this
myth are interconnected with changing trends and events in the policy’s environment. In
such dynamics, there are no starting or ending points since the web o f association is a
continuous process o f relationship between patterns o f behavior. Figure 17 demonstrates
these patterns.

New
World
Order

Iraq’s
invasion

The
demise o f
the Soviet

Kuwait

Union

The
weakening
of Iran and
its Islamic
revolution

The rise of
America’s
leadership
position in
the world

Figure 17. The Myth o f the New W orld Order and its Environmental Relationship in 1991

Many patterns in Figure 17 are engaged in an S-Matrix relationship, reflecting the
policy’s myth o f a New World Order that emerged during the G ulf War. Each pattern is
relating with the myth o f the New World Order, its life, duration, strength, and behavior.
This relationship, however, is not a causal relationship. Instead, it is a pattern of
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relationships between temporal events that are understood as interconnected in a web o f
association rather than as isolated units.
The myth o f the New World Order, for example, cannot be understood if
observed in isolation and without its associated network. Instead, the New World Order
must be observed in its relation with elements such as the Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait in
1990, the demise o f the Soviet Union, the weakening o f Iran and its Islamic revolution,
and the rise o f American leadership in the world. Together, the myth o f the New World
Order and its environment then can give us a better picture of the interconnected and
intertwined dynamics that characterized the U.S. policy toward Iraq in 1991 as it was
gearing to form its web o f interdependent association and continue to move to the next
phase.
These dynamics continued during the containment era or in the post September 11
period. The S-Matrix during each period illustrated the emerging myth while
interconnected with other events and associated elements in the environment. These
emerging myths, as the myth o f 1991, are best understood if placed within the context o f
their associations.
Although Figure 17 illustrates the environmental relations o f a policy myth within
a specific period of time, this same myth is also engaged in relationships with events
within the policy toward Iraq. Together, internal and environmental relationships are
what constitute the policy’s complex relationships. In order to understand the policy’s
trajectory, it must be observed within such a holistic context. This notion applies to the
policy’s myth as well as to dichotomy, rational choice, and primordial interests.
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The S-Matrix and Dichotomy
Although the policy’s dichotomy does not change throughout the policy’s
trajectory, the dichotomy’s associations and networks, however, change from one phase
to another. These changes in the dichotomy’s association are caused by changing trends
in the policy’s environment, making dichotomy an ever greater complex phenomenon
within the US policy toward Iraq.
If we observe the U.S. policy toward Iraq during the containment era, for
example, we see that changes in the environment lead to the construction o f a web o f
association between the policy’s dichotomy and the temporal events in the policy’s
environment during the 1990s. Figure 18 shows these dynamics and the emerging o f the
S-Matrix relationship.

US Policy’s
view of the
dichotomy
in Iraq

Unilateralism

Regionalism
and nation
state interests

Sanctions

Unipolar
world

Figure 18. Dichotomy During the Containment Era and Environmental Relationship

As Figure 18 demonstrates, the policy’s dichotomy during the containment era is
engaged in an interrelated relationship with other elements in the environment, such as
regionalism, unipolar world with the U.S. as the sole superpower after the collapse o f the
Soviet Union, the continuous UN economic sanctions against Iraq, and the rise o f U.S.
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militarism and military response to political conflicts. Together, these elements
exacerbate the policy’s dichotomy and contribute to the suffering o f the Iraqi people.
Understanding dichotomy in such a context gives us better perspective o f the policy
toward Iraq and its multi-level dimensions.
In a one-on-one interview with a former leader o f an exiled Iraqi opposition group
who is examining the policy’s dichotomy in post-Saddam Iraq, he observes that such a
dichotomy “can be better understood if it is observed within its relationships with other
factors in the environment, such as the policymakers’ tendency to rely too much on
appointocracy.” This expert urges the policy’s decision-makers to avoid “appointed Iraqis
chosen by America rather than the Iraqi people,” and advises them to “build civil and
democratic institutions from the bottom up, by creating local councils that are
democratic, and to respect the right o f the Iraqi people to take charge o f their own
affairs.” By understanding the location o f dichotomy within a web o f relationship with
appointocracy and other important environmental factors, we are better able to
understand this policy’s multi-layered dimensions.
As with mythticism, the policy’s dichotomy operates in a web o f relationship that
includes temporal elements both within the policy toward Iraq and in its environment.
Together, internal and environmental relationships are what constitute the policy’s
complex relationships. In order to understand the policy’s trajectory, we observe these
elements within the context o f the S-Matrix relationship. This notion applies to the
policy’s all four Interpretive Levels.
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The S-Matrix and Rational Choice
The dimension o f the S-Matrix illustrates the interconnected dynamics and
relationships between the policy’s environmental forces and their relationships with the
policy’s rational choice. If we observe the relationship between the policy’s rational
choice during each trajectory period and the events and forces in the policy’s
environment, we see that there is a pattern o f interdependent association between these
elements.
In a one-on-one interview, a political historian explains the interconnectedness o f
the policy’s tactic, such as in 1991, to remove Saddam from Kuwait and the association
o f this tactic with other elements that are engaged within a complex web of relationships.
“There was strategic concern that included the Cold W ar and the influence o f the Soviet
Union, with Iraq on its way to becoming a client state o f the Soviet Union. After the
collapse o f .the Soviet Union, the U.S. was no longer concerned about a counterweight to
its foreign policy.”
A political scientist in the focus group agrees, arguing that “we attend to the
views rather more o f a kind of balance o f powers, playing one against another, rather than
responding to them directly. With the Soviet Union having veto power in the UN, we did
not have much flexibility in dealing with others within the very troubled environment in
the world, such as in Iraq. That changed once the Soviet Union disappeared.”
An economist in the focus group expands further on this observation, suggesting
that “Iraq was a pro-Soviet state. When the Soviet Union collapsed, a lot of things had to
be reshuffled in the new world order. At this point, the U.S. had the upper hand in settling
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things with Iraq for its past associations and pay a price for being a former client-state o f
the Soviet Union.”
A sociologist in the focus group alludes to the demise o f even concepts such as
Pan-Arabism, nationalism, and Baathism once the Soviet Union collapsed. “Some o f
Saddam’s action had also to do with the idealism o f Pan-Arabism, o f Baathism. Such
idealism no longer held ground in the Arab world, especially in a world without the
Soviet Union and the U.S. as the single superpower. It was the Soviet Union that enabled
such regimes to promote their idealism.”
A political historian in the focus group references the relationship between the
United States and Europe or between the United States and the United Nations regarding
Iraq as a product o f such world politics. The participant argues that “the impact o f the
Iraq war on the world is a question o f the relationship between the U.S. and Europe and
between the U.S. and the UN. No one can hide from the reality o f these guerillas living in
the world.”
The frequency in the content analysis o f 29 for a concept related to issues o f
preemption demonstrates that the policy’s rational choice of preemption in 2003 strove to
survive by securing a niche for itself in the environment and acquiring the necessary
resources to remain alive. Without this niche, preemption as a rational choice was unable
to survive and eventually had to die. Preemption toward Iraq survived because it was able
to secure a niche for itself in the environment. Once preemption is no longer able to
secure such a niche in a future policy toward any other nation, it will eventually die.
A high content analysis frequency o f 53 for a concept related to issues o f
regionalism shows that after September 11, 2001, for example, there was an
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interconnected relationship between preemption, the policy’s new choice after September
11,2001, and the factors in the policy’s environment during that period o f time. Figure
19 depicts preemption as a rational choice engaged in a web o f association with factors in
the policy’s environment after September 11, 2001.

Preemption
as a
rational
choice

The war in
Afghanistan

The decay

containment

The rise of
the
admibnistrative state

Unilateral
ism

Figure 19. Preemption and the S-Matrix Relationship with the Environment after September 11,

2001

As with mythticism and dichotomy, the policy’s rational choice operates in a web
of relationships that include temporal elements both within the policy toward Iraq and in
its environment. Together, internal and environmental relationships are what constitute
the policy’s complex relationships. In order to understand the policy’s trajectory, we
observe these elements within the context o f the S-Matrix relationship. This notion
applies to the policy’s all four Interpretive Levels.

The S-Matrix and Primordial Interests
Changes in the environment impact the policy’s primordial interests. The
relationships between events and factors in the environment and the policy’s primordial
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interests are interconnected and interdependent, with one component relating to another.
If we view the policy’s primordial interests at any trajectory stage and observe these
interests’ relationship with the forces in the policy’s environment, we see that there is a
web o f interconnected relationship between the factors in the environment and the
primordial interests’ of the United States.
The high frequency count in the content analysis o f 47 for a concept pertaining to
issues o f nation-state interest suggests strongly that after September 11, 2001, for
example, the changes, events, and factors in the policy’s environment were related to the
policy’s primordial interests o f Pax Americana. Figure 20 illustrates these relationships.

Pax
Americana
as a
primordial
interest

Regionalism

Oil

Dollar vs.
Euro

Power
interest

Figure 20. Pax Americana and the S-Matrix Relationships with the Policy’s Environment after
September 11, 2001

As with mythticism, dichotomy, and rational choice, the policy’s primordial
interests operate in a web of relationship that include temporal elements both within the
policy toward Iraq and in its environment. Together, internal and environmental
relationships are what constituted the policy’s complex relationships.
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Mutual Causality
Mutual causality explains the impact of environmental changes on the U.S. policy
toward Iraq by observing the impact o f positive and negative feedback on the behavior o f
the four Interpretive Levels. This observation enables us to see how mutual causality
translates the impact o f environmental changes on systemic changes in the political
decision-making process within the U.S. policy toward Iraq.
This feedback is manifested metaphorically as a flux metaphor, with positive
feedback meaning more changes in the environment lead to more changes in the policy,
and fewer changes in the environment lead to fewer changes in the policy. Negative
feedback, on the other hand, means that a change in the environment initiates a change in
the opposite direction within the policy, with more changes in the environment leading to
fewer changes in the policy and fewer changes in the environment leading to more
changes in the policy.
The idea is that one element in the environment influences the entire policy and
that there is a mutual causation in the relationship between the policy and its
environment. This relationship is best understood if we observe it in the state o f mutual
dependence.

Mutual Causality and Mythticism
If we view mythticism according to positive feedback, we see that more changes
in the environment result in more changes in the policy’s mythticism, and fewer changes
in the environment lead to fewer changes in the policy’s mythticism. If we observe
mythticism according to negative feedback, however, we see that more changes in the
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environment lead to fewer changes in the policy’s mythticism, and fewer changes in the
environment lead to more changes in the policy’s mythticism. Let us observe how these
two types o f feedback are manifested in the interaction between the policy’s environment
and its mythticism.

Positive Feedback
Evidence in the history chapter reveal that during the 1980s, the main change in
the policy’s environment was the threat o f the Islamic revolution in Iran to destabilize the
oil-rich region o f the Middle East. Because o f that threat, the United States supported
Saddam under the guise o f maintaining the political balance in the Middle East. As such,
the change in the environment led the United States to upgrade its support for Saddam.
This upgrading was the only structural change that occurred in the policy’s internal
dynamics in response to the trends in the environment.
After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the policy’s environment changed. As a
consequence, the policy itself changed and responded to emerging trends in the
environment. The change in the policy was reflected in a change in its mythticism. The
more changes occurred in the policy’s environment, the more changes occurred in the
policy.
During this period there were fewer activities as a result o f the policy regarding
issues of democracy and freedom in Iraq. Consequently, there were fewer activities by
the policy’s mythticism to support democracy and popular movements in Iraq.
During the containment era, the frequency in the content analysis o f 44 for a
concept related to issues of force indicates that the policy’s myth was constructed to
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justify the use o f force in order to contain Saddam. During this period, there were fewer
activities as a result o f the policy addressed toward the sufferings o f the Iraqi people
caused by the UN-imposed economic sanctions. As a consequence, there were fewer
activities by the policy’s mythticism addressed toward the suffering o f the Iraqi people.
And, after September 11, 2001 activities in the policy’s environment increased
dramatically. These changes caused corresponding changes in the policy and its myth.

Negative Feedback
When fewer activities in the environment lead to more activities in the policy’s
mythticism and more activities in the environment lead to fewer activities in the policy’s
mythticism, this is termed here as negative feedback. For example, the history chapter
shows that during the 1980s, the main change in the policy’s environment was the
increase in .U.S. support for Saddam in order to neutralize the Iranian threat to the oil-rich
region of the Middle East. These fewer changes in the policy’s environment, however,
led to more activities in the policy’s mythticism to openly justify U.S. support for
Saddam in building his military arsenal as a matter o f preserving peace and stability in
the region.
During the containment period o f the 1990s, a content analysis frequency count o f
nine for a concept related to issues o f multilateralism indicates to some extent that there
were more activities in the environment toward multilateralism, legitimacy, and working
within accepted international norms. Instead, this eventually led the policy and its
manifested mythticism toward less recognition o f international norms, legitimacy and
multilateralism.
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And, after September 11, 2001 there were more activities in the policy’s
environment toward world peace and legitimacy. This, however, was translated in the
policy’s mythticism toward taking the opposite direction in creating a war in Iraq
unilaterally and outside international norms.

Mutual Causality and Dichotomy
If we view the policy’s failure to recognize the dichotomy between the Iraqi
people and their government according to positive feedback, we see that more changes in
the policy’s environment were able to pressure the policymakers to recognize the
dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government, and fewer changes in the
policy’s environment were less able to influence this dichotomy. If we observe the
policy’s treatment o f the dichotomy, however, according to negative feedback, we see
that more changes in the policy’s environment led to fewer attempts by policymakers to
change the policy’s dichotomy, and fewer changes in the policy’s environment were able
to lead to more attempts by policymakers to change the same dichotomy.

Positive Feedback
When less leads to less and more leads to more, it is called positive feedback. In
regard to the dichotomy, positive feedback had no impact on the policymakers’
recognition o f the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government despite
changes in the policy’s environment.
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Negative Feedback
The history chapter indicates that, the more changes that occurred in the policy’s
environment, the less changes occurred in the acknowledgment by the policymakers o f
the dichotomy between Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people. This trend continued until
April 9, 2003 when the U.S. invading forces in Iraq toppled the regime o f Saddam
Hussein.
As o f September 11, 2001 there were more changes in the policy’s environment
created by the terrorists’ attacks on America and the Bush administration’s political
agenda in targeting Iraq as part o f the war on terror. The U.S. policy toward Iraq,
however, witnessed fewer activities in term of its treatment o f the dichotomy between the
Iraqi people and the regime o f Saddam Hussein.

Mutual Causality and Rational Choice
If we view the policy’s rational choice according to positive feedback, we see that
more changes in the policy’s environment lead to more changes in the policy’s rational
choice, and fewer changes in the policy’s environment lead to fewer changes in the
policy’s rational choice. If we observe the policy’s rational choice, however, according to
negative feedback, we see that more changes in the policy’s environment lead to fewer
changes in the policy’s rational choice, and fewer changes in the policy’s environment
lead to more changes in the policy’s rational choice.
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Positive Feedback
The more changes that occur in the policy’s environment, the more tactics are
employed by the policymakers in order to respond to these environmental changes. For
example, after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the developments in the environment forced
the policymakers to adopt new tactics in dealing with Iraq, such as the use o f force,
economic sanctions, and clandestine plots to topple the Iraqi regime.
During the containment era o f the 1990s, the frequency in the content analysis o f
16 for a concept related to issues o f U.S. and Iraq’s abuse o f the UN mission in Iraq
demonstrates that the environment once again changed because o f Iraq’s reluctance to
cooperate proactively with United Nations inspection teams. As a consequence, the
policymakers adopted more tactics in order to correspond with the increased changes in
the environment.
After September 11, 2001, however, evidence in the history chapter suggests that
the policy’s environment witnessed larger changes caused by the terrorist attacks on
America. These environmental changes served as catalysts to change the policy itself by
increasing its tactics in relation to Iraq.

Negative Feedback
The history chapter reveals that there were fewer changes in the policy’s
environment, such as during the 1980s. However, the policy’s tactics increased in number
in order to support Saddam as a means to balance the political powers in the Middle East.
A content analysis frequency count o f 19 for a concept related to issues o f
mistrust reveals that in 1990 the policy’s environment changed once more when Saddam
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invaded Kuwait. However, the U.S. response toward Saddam’s abuse o f human rights in
Iraq was minuscule, and the policy manifested fewer tactics to oppose Saddam’s
aggression and brutality inside Iraq.
During the containment era, the policy’s environment changed once again due to
Saddam’s misuse o f the UN mission and activities in Iraq. The U.S. policy toward Iraq,
however, reflected fewer tactics to support the Iraqi people’s aspiration for freedom.
After September 11, 2001, the policy’s environment changed, triggered by the
terrorist attacks on America. However, there were fewer tactics employed by the
policymakers in order to correctly identify and target the real “enemy” in the war on
terror.

Mutual Causality and Primordial Interests
If we view the policy’s primordial interests according to either positive or
negative feedback, we see that regardless o f any change in the policy’s environment, the
policy’s primordial interests do not change. The motivating factor o f these primordial
interests is the United States’ own interests as a nation-state. These interests are the
primary motive beyond the policy, its mythticism, dichotomy and choices. As a result o f
these interests, issues o f legitimacy in the world o f diplomacy and politics and the
welfare o f other people are ignored. While the policy’s primordial interests do not change
as a result o f changes in the environment, what relates to the policy in the way of
relationships do change.
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Conclusions
The environment has a great impact on any policy. Changes in the environment
impact policies and their webs of associations. In regard to the U.S. policy toward Iraq,
the environment is an important factor in impacting the policy and its trajectory. As the
environment impacts the policy and causes its internal changes, the policy itself impacts
its environment and causes changes within the environment as well. As such, there is a
symbiotic relationship between the policy and its environment, with one feeding and
depending on the other for resources, renewal and survival mechanism.
As with any other species, policies compete for survival in order to secure a niche
for themselves in the environment. This also is the case with the U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The primary motive for this policy is to secure U.S. interests as a nation-state. These
interests are competing with other nation-state interests, and as such, alliances and
networks are assembled in the form of regional powers in order to gain access and control
o f scarce resources.
Iraq is used as an arena to secure these interests, and the U.S. policy toward Iraq
responded to environmental demands in the form o f political issues emerging in Iraq
itself. As such, the policy often was out o f touch with the political process in Iraq and
more engulfed in responding to U.S. nation-state interests as they competed to secure a
niche in the environment.
As shown in the history chapter, for centuries, the United States had little or no
interest in Iraq. This interest gradually developed as oil was discovered in northern Iraq
shortly after the creation o f the modern Iraqi state in 1920. Once U.S. oil companies
secured 25 percent o f the concession areas in Iraq for oil exploration, the U.S. virtually
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adopted a hand-off policy toward Iraq until the overthrow o f the oligarchic monarchic
regime in 1958.
The new Iraqi military regime that established the Republic o f Iraq on July 14,
1958 brought the U.S. policy toward Iraq to an active stage. The reason for this
development was because o f the new Iraqi regime’s oil policy in reducing all foreign oil
companies’ concession areas in Iraq to 5 percent o f the drilling area.
By 1959, the United States (through the CIA) was active in supporting efforts for
a regime change in Iraq. These activities by the United States enabled the Baath Party to
seize political power in Iraq in 1963, which then rewarded the U.S. oil companies with
huge contracts.
The honeymoon between the Baath Party and the United States, however, was
shortlived. Driven by greed, the Baath Party nationalized Iraqi oil in 1972 in order to
empower its own economic base. The nationalization o f Iraqi oil created a drift between
the U.S. and the Baath regime, causing the U.S. policy toward Iraq to support local
unrest, such as the national movement o f the ethnic Kurds, in order to pressure the Iraqi
government to change its oil policy.
As a consequence, Iraq gradually shifted its oil policy and alliances from the
Soviet Union toward, the West. After the fall o f the Shah in Iran in 1979, Iraq became one
o f the United States favorite allies in the region and a perfect proxy to stop the threat of
the Iranian revolution.
After Saddam’s invasion o f Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. policy toward Iraq shifted
once more. As o f 1990, the policy was no longer acting on a predetermined political
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agenda but purely responding to outside changes caused by changing trends in the
environment.
The policy’s trajectory as o f 1990 has been based on the primitive need to secure
a niche in the environment. Because o f this need, the policymakers do not hesitate to
operate within or outside the accepted international norms and practices. And after the
collapse o f the Soviet Union, policymakers are encouraged to secure these needs through
even greater disregard to issues o f legitimacy and multilateralism.
Meanwhile, governance in the United States itself is shifting toward more o f an
administrative type o f government headed by an imperial presidency. The policy toward
Iraq is exposing this trajectory in the four Interpretive Levels o f mythticism, dichotomy,
rational choice, and primordial interests. The trajectory o f these levels illustrates the
impact o f changes in the policy’s environment on the policy itself.
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CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
The main purpose o f this research is to observe the U.S. policy toward Iraq from
1990-2003. The research is qualitative in nature and relies on the power o f words and
descriptive analysis in order to conduct the study. And since there is no prior research
conducted in the social sciences that made use o f a qualitative inquiry in analyzing a
phenomenon according to complexity theories, the research’s methodology and analysis,
as such, are exploratory in nature.
A qualitative methodology is used in this research to observe a dynamic system
(the U.S. policy toward Iraq) according to dimensions derived from complexity theories.
These dimensions are autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality. A
Machine Metaphorical Model is utilized to present a traditional, linear analysis o f the
U.S. policy toward Iraq, and a flux Metaphorical model is utilized for the purpose o f
presenting a complex analysis.
Data is gathered through document review, content analysis, focus group and oneon-one interviews. Data is first analyzed linearly by breaking it into pieces (concepts) and
by utilizing Ethnograph for the purpose o f coding that data. Emerging themes are then
formed metaphorically to interpret the data and, by grouping similar themes, emerging
super themes are identified as the data’s Interpretive Levels.
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The four Interpretive Levels serve as indicators in the complex analysis. By
tracing these indicators’ behavior according to autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and
mutual causality, environmental trends and their impacts on the internal changes in the
U.S. policy toward Iraq are analyzed according to complexity theories.
Complex qualitative inquires in the social sciences are important vehicles in
observing the dynamics o f living systems, whether these systems are social phenomena,
policies, or administrative procedures. These inquires are complementary analyses to the
linear analysis and not a substitute. The progress o f scientific methodology in explaining
the world and the supremacy of reason over intuition and metaphysics binds all scientific
inquires together, whether linear or complex, with one complementing the other.
A linear analysis provides the complex analysis with interpretive levels necessary
for a complex analysis. Without a linear analysis, there is no viable means in qualitative
inquires and metaphorical expressions to provide the complex analysis with manageable
data qualified for the conditions of the analysis.
A Phi Model is designed in order to guide the analytical procedure. The model is
composed o f three steps. Step one is to analyze the data according to the linear tradition.
Step two is to analyze the emerging Interpretive Levels from the linear analysis to
observe internal changes in the policy according to four complexity dimensions:
autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix, and mutual causality. And, step three is to analyze the
same Interpretive Levels but to observe the impact o f environmental changes on the
policy according to the same four complexity dimensions.
Data is collected from various sources, such as books, newspapers, magazines,
electronic articles, official governmental documents, a focus group, and one-on-one
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interviews. Four sets o f data emerge as a consequence and are identified as data from
Books, Articles, Documents, and Interviews. These four data sets are coded by using 67
concepts.
Ethnograph is utilized to identify the frequency with which these concepts
occurred in the four sets and aid in the process o f identifying the emerging themes and
super themes (Interpretive Levels). This process constitutes step one o f the analysis. The
highest occurring concepts in all four data sets are the roles of oil, force, and rhetoric in
influencing the policy’s directions, as well as concepts such as imperialism, hegemony
and targeting an enemy. The least frequently occurring concepts, on the other hand, are
the lack o f debates within the political discourse that guide the policy, the political status
quo in the Middle East, and colonialism as a phase in U.S. foreign policy.
Once the data is coded and conceptualized, 13 themes surface from grouping
together concepts with similar meanings. These themes provide the analysis with 13
metaphors in order to interpret trends within the unit o f analysis. Some o f these
metaphors are political metamorphism, the Judas Syndrome, the Baseball Pitcher, the
Eskimo Community, Moby Dick, Rasputin, and Pax Americana.
Political metamorphism refers to the phase shifts and changes in composition of
U.S. policy toward Iraq. The Judas Syndrome refers to the policy representing the narrow
nation-state interest o f the United States that purports to do good but results in a series of
unintended consequences that cause sufferings for the Iraqi people and damage the
political discourse in the United States.
The Baseball Pitcher categorizes the type o f functional and behavioral state o f the
American executive leadership in the post Cold War era that often operates outside the
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constitutional separation o f powers and emphasizes the rule o f the executive branch over
Congress. The Eskimo Community refers to the sense o f community, universal
association, regional collaboration, multilateralism, and acceptance o f norms by several
political systems in the world in order to secure the survival o f regional and global
interests.
Moby Dick refers to the use o f war as a corrective action in restoring justice to the
savage state o f nature rather than utilizing reason in order to resolve conflicts in the
world. In using the metaphor o f Moby Dick as an analogous theme in interpreting the
U.S. policy toward Iraq, it appears that war and violence are utilized by the policymakers
in regard to Iraq rather than using reason, negotiation or diplomacy in solving the crisis
with Iraq.
Rasputin, on the other hand, is a metaphor that refers to the special powers, such
as think tanks, ideologues, and special interests, behind the decision-making process in
the policy toward Iraq. And, Pax Americana as a metaphor refers to America’s drive to
dominate the world as a new imperial power through its use o f the military.
From these 13 themes, four super themes surface as a result of grouping together
themes that share common perspectives. The four super themes that compose the data’s
Interpretive Levels are: mythticism, dichotomy, rational choice, and primordial interests.
With the emerging o f these super themes, the linear analysis is complete, and the analysis
moves to steps two and three.
Step two analyzes the internal changes in the policy by observing the behavior of
the four Interpretive Levels according to autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix and mutual
causality. And, step three analyzes changes in the policy’s environment and their impact

355

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on the policy by observing the behavior o f the same four Interpretive Levels, also
according to autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix and mutual causality.
Does the Phi-Model work? The Phi-Model is able to prove itself through its
findings and by following a rigorous and systematic methodology. Findings that emerge
both from the linear analysis and the complex observation appear to support the
soundness o f the model and its ability to carry on its intended function.
The policy displays its trajectory within its four Interpretive Levels. These levels
are mythticism, dichotomy, rational choice, and primordial interests. All four o f these
levels are impacted by changing trends in the policy’s environment as the policy moves
from one phase to another.
Out o f these four Interpretive Levels, primordial interests emerge as the driving
engine beyond the policy and its associations. The super theme o f the primordial interests
is composed o f themes that project the type o f functional and behavioral state o f U.S.
foreign policy that often operates after the end o f the Cold War.
The super theme o f Primordial Interests shows the constitutional separation o f
powers and emphasizes the dominant role o f the executive branch over Congress. This
behavior in relation to Iraq reflects U.S. needs as a nation-state. The most important need
is to secure America’s power through the control o f Middle Eastern oil and maintain the
supremacy o f the dollar in the world.
In order to achieve its primordial interests, content analysis and the interviews
reveal that policymakers in the United States often seek other nation-states’ cooperation
and strive for universal association while maneuvering at the same time among regional
powers, using militarism and hegemonial tactics to secure U.S. primordial interests.
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Both content analysis and the interviews reveal that one o f the major elements in
impacting the policy’s progression is oil. Oil constitutes a U.S. primordial interest that
drives the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Such an interest began with the discovery of oil in
Iraq in the early 1920s and continues to this day.
For decades, the United States had little or no interest in Iraq. Content analysis
reveals that this interest gradually developed as the British discovered oil in northern Iraq
shortly after the creation o f the modern state o f Iraq in 1920. Once U.S. oil companies
secured 25 percent o f the concession areas in Iraq for oil exploration, the U.S. virtually
adopted a hand-off policy toward Iraq until the overthrow o f the monarchy in 1958.
The new Iraqi military regime that established the Republic o f Iraq on July 14,
1958 angered the United States and caused it to move its Iraq policy toward a more active
stage. Content analysis attributes the reason for this development to the new Iraqi
regime’s oil policy in reducing all foreign oil companies’ concession areas in Iraq to five
percent. This led the CIA to support plots for regime change in Iraq. As a result, the
Baath Party seized political power in 1963 and later in 1968, rewarding the American oil
companies with huge contracts in Iraq.
The honeymoon between the Baath Party and the United States, however, was
short-lived and soon changed to hostility. Driven by greed, the Baath nationalized Iraqi
oil to empower its own economic base. This led the United States to support local unrest
in Iraq, such as the national movement o f the ethnic Kurds, in order to exert pressure on
the Iraqi government and shift its alliance toward the West and away from the Soviet
Union. As a consequence o f the U.S.-supported Kurdish insurgence, Iraq moved toward
the West in 1975.
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After the fall o f the Shah of Iran in 1979, Iraq became an important ally o f the
United States in the region to stop the spread o f the Iranian revolution. The policy toward
Iraq was proactive in nature, responding to environmental changes to secure its niche by
altering the political situation in the region to one that would secure and protect U.S.
interests.
After Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the policy shifted from a proactive to
a reactive response mechanism. Although during both proactive and reactive states the
policy was responding to environmental changes, as o f 1990 it no longer was acting on a
predetermined agenda to manipulate its environment. Rather, it was responding to
external changes. As o f 1990, content analysis and the interviews revealed that the
policy’s trajectory was based on primitive survival needs. Because o f these needs, the
policy was applied both inside and outside accepted international practices in order to
implement its agenda.
After the collapse o f the Soviet Union, the U.S. policymakers in formulating their
policy toward Iraq felt compelled to secure the nation’s survival needs through all means,
including illegitimate ones such as the employment o f U.S. military power to advance its
political and economic interests. With such a shift, governance in the United States
moved toward the posture o f an administrative state and an imperial presidency.
As the policy’s response to external and internal trends created more o f a dead
end trajectory, rather than opening windows o f opportunity for multiple alternatives,
policy-makers began to adopt desperate measures, often outside the collective of
multilateral internationalism, in order for the policy to survive as an organism. These
measures resulted in efforts for regime change in Iraq either through supporting political
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proxies (such as Iraqi opposition groups) in 1998 or through direct military intervention
in 2003.
Despite the regime change in Iraq, however, content analysis and the interviews
reveal that the policy did not move toward a positive and desired end. Instead, it further
alienated the United States from the rest o f the world and exposed its political tactics as
Machiavellian in nature, designed only to advance its nation-state interest at the expense
of legitimacy and world peace.
The remaining three Interpretive Levels (mythticism, rational choice, and
dichotomy) explain the specific conditions o f the policy. Mythticism explains the policy’s
internal mechanism, in the form o f its tactics, short-lived strategies, and perceived goals.
The dichotomy explains the policy as it relates to the political process in Iraq, and
Rational choice explains the nexus between the political process in the U.S., Iraq and the
World within the context o f the policy itself.
Mythticism reveals the fallacy in the policy that is presented in its fagade. An
example o f this fallacy is the promotion o f the policy as a system that reflects American
idealism, democracy, freedom and human rights. Content analysis and the interviews
reveal that the policy, although presented under such a facade, is none of that. On the
contrary, the policy is based on hypocrisy, mistrust, misrepresentation, and circular
reasoning.
Mythticism is composed of themes that identify the collapse o f the opposition
party in the United States as a viable voice for political discourse, resulting in the lack o f
political debates and the supremacy o f narrow political perspectives to justify specific
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political agendas. These agendas stand alone as a telephone pole, dictating their messages
and transforming them into a wider orientation without being seriously challenged.
Content analysis and the interviews reveal that mythticism is reflected in vague
definition o f concepts such as the “enemy,” “terrorism,” and “evil.” Mythticism is also
based on symbolism and a simplistic interpretation o f the world and rests on the element
of refusing to look inward and take responsibility for the U.S. own role in creating
atrocities.
The super theme o f Dichotomy, on the other hand, illustrates the errors in the
policy and its failure to reflect the on-going dichotomy between Saddam’s regime and the
Iraqi people. Content analysis and the interviews reveal that the policy reduced such a
dichotomy to the person o f Saddam Hussein, emerging as a folly policy that continues to
hurt the Iraqi people.
This neglect is causing the U.S. policy toward Iraq to distance itself from the path
of the United Nations in Iraq and creating a paradox that is based on a widening gap
between U.S. political objectives in Iraq and the objectives o f the UN or the international
community. Content analysis and the interviews reveal that this gap is deepened when the
UN itself committed errors in its approach toward Iraq by failing to take decisive actions
against illegal and unauthorized U.S. actions in Iraq and later legitimizing these illegal
actions, such as the U.S. occupation o f Iraq after the unauthorized war o f 2003.
The super theme o f Dichotomy is composed of themes such as mistrust and abuse
that represent the policy’s translation o f the United States’ interests as a nation-state.
These interests and the neglect o f the dichotomy led to catastrophic results as witnessed
in the sufferings o f the Iraqi people since 1990 due to crippling economic sanctions
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intended to contain or topple Saddam. These sanctions instead ended up hurting the Iraqi
people.
The super theme o f Rational Choice illustrates the triumph o f tactics over
strategy. Because the policy lacks any long-term comprehensive strategy and it is a
trajectory in its nature, it responds primarily to trends in its environment. Therefore, it
lacks a clear strategy. It evolves accordingly by responding to the specifics of emerging
trends in the environment.
Rational Choice as an Interpretive Level is composed of themes that represent
phase shifts and changes in the policy. Content analysis and the interviews reveal that
Rational Choice emphasizes war as a corrective action and a tactical maneuver, as well as
the constant use o f force. Furthermore, it leans toward a Hobbesian perspective o f the
world that stands in opposition to the American Psyche and to American regime values.
Rational Choice also represents the impact o f special interests, such as think
tanks, ideologues, and lobbyists on the decision-making process in the policy toward
Iraq. The most important ingredient in Rational Choice is that o f serving U.S. nation-state
interests in Iraq and the world.
These observations are diagnostic in their nature, and they interpret the anatomy
o f change occurring within the internal trajectory o f the policy as a dynamic system. The
anatomy o f change records the policy’s organizational reassembly, phase shifts,
interrelation matrix, and non-local causation rather than assessing its normative values.
Figure 21 views these diagnostic observations o f the policy’s anatomy according to the
Phi-Model.
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Figure 21 illustrates the concepts, metaphorical themes, four super themes
(Interpretive Levels) and the four complexity dimensions of autopoiesis, bifurcation, the
S-Matrix, and mutual causality that compose the Phi Model. The model is composed o f
67 concepts, 13 metaphorical themes, four super themes, and four complexity
dimensions. These concepts, themes, super themes, and their complexity dimensions are
interconnected in holistic and interdependent relationships. We cannot understand any
particular part o f this model without understanding the whole.

KJ

67 concepts

•

13
metaphorical
themes

A

X

4 Interpretive
Levels

4 Complexity
Dimensions

Figure 21. The Anatomy o f the U.S. Policy Toward Iraq According to the Phi Model

Conclusions
The Phi-Model proves that the combination o f linear and complex observation of
the U.S. policy toward Iraq can explain the policy’s trajectory and provide a sound
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analysis through a qualitative study. The model’s methodology, its choice o f concepts,
metaphors and data sources and emerging metaphorical themes and super themes, are
sufficient to support both a linear and a complex analysis. By doing so, the model
answers the following research questions.
1. How does a linear observation interpret the U.S. policy toward Iraq?
2. How do the new sciences o f complexity interpret the U.S. policy toward Iraq?
3. How does a linear observation of the U.S. policy toward Iraq contrast and
compare with that o f a complex analysis?
Figure 22 (page 364) illustrates the specifics o f this model by identifying the 67
concepts that compose the m odel’s 13 metaphorical themes. It also illustrates the 13
metaphorical themes that comprise the model’s four Interpretive Levels. In order to
explain the model’s trajectory from the 1980s to 2004, Table Eight (pages 364-368)
illustrates the policy’s trajectory and the resulting linear and complex findings that
emerged during each phase o f the progression. Table Eight, as such, illustrates the Phi
M odel’s three analytical steps in action, demonstrating through the linear and complex
finding what the Phi Model is able to accomplish in its utility to observe a dynamic
phenomenon, such as the U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The linear findings refer to findings that emerge from breaking the data into
concepts, themes and super themes. The complex findings refer to findings that emerge
from observing the data by tracing changes in each super theme according to autopoiesis,
bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality. Each super theme plays as an indicator of
self-organization, phase shift, interconnectedness, and positive and negative feed back in
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the trajectory o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Together, the linear and complex findings
provide the research with a comprehensive observation o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq.
Concepts

Themes

Interpretive Levels

Democratic Cave-in; Discourse; Debate;
Priorities and Resources; Simplicity;
Symbolism; Ambiguity; Enemy; W ar on
Terrorism; Hypocrisy; and Looking into a
Mirror.

Mythticism

Iraq Abuse o f UN; Mistrust; Narrow State
Interests; Presidential Extra; Gap Between
UN and US Goals; UN Mistakes; Folly
Politics.
Containment; Trajectory and Status Quo;
Kondratiev; Regime Change Trajectory;
Iraqi Opposition; War as a Corrective
Action; Force; Metaphor o f War; Hobbes
vs. Kant; American Psyche; Unipolar
World; Capacity; Circular Reasoning;
Coercion; Irony; Machiavelli; Fear
Factor; Falsehood; Misuse or
Misinterpretation o f Intelligence; Current
as Epiphenomenon; Misleading; Pattern
o f Behavior; Attila the Hun; Ideology;
Intensionality; Preemption; Rhetoric;
Special Interests; and Trotskyism.

Administrative State; Imperial Presidency;
Appointocracy; Unilateralism; Paranoia;
Capitalism; Dollar Vs. Euro; The role of
Oil; Power Interests; Geopolitics;
Regionalism; Cold War Politics; ME
Status Quo; Multilateralism; Legitimacy;
Colonialism; Hegemony; Imperialism; and
Militarism.

Dichotomy

Rational
Choice

► M d b w D ic k

H

Primordial
Interests
■Pax Aniericana ■ ■

Figure 22. Interpretive Levels, Themes, and Concepts
Table 8. The Trajectory o f U.S. Policy Toward Iraq
I n te r p r e tiv e
T im e
P h ase
L ev e ls
W ave
Primordial
Equilibrium
1979Interests
1990
Dichotomy

According to the Phi Model
L in e a r F in d in g s
C o m p le x F in d in g s
Serving the nation
state interest o f the
United States
Ignoring human
rights violations in
Iraq.

Competition for scarce
resources; no phase shift.
Maintaining the same
structural order.
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Table 8— Continued

Time
Wave

Phase

Interpretive
Levels

Linear Findings

Complex Findings

1 979-

Equilibrium

Rational
Choice

Supporting Iraq to
neutralize Iran

Mythticism

Maintaining
political balance
and stability in the
Middle East

Primordial
Interests

Protecting U.S.
interests in the
region, mainly oil.

Dichotomy

Misuse o f the
dichotomy for
propaganda
purposes.

Rational
Choice

Forming
multilateral
alliances to liberate
Kuwaiti oil.
Refuting
aggression,
protecting world
peace, protecting
U.S. interest in the
region, and
protecting stability
in the Middle East.
Protecting the
United States
interest.

Positive feedback, with
increased trends in the
policy’s environment,
triggered by the Iranian
revolution lead to increased
tactical support o f Iraq.
Within an interconnected web
o f associations in geopolitics,
the policy’s myth was
designed to maintain alliances
within a bi-polar world with
the U.S.
No phase shift. Maintaining
the same organizational order
in serving the interest o f the
United States as a nation-state.
Folly politics and artificial
engineering (such as
propagandizing dichotomy
and shifting the attention to
another dichotomy that was
emerging between Saddam
and the United Nations in
order to delay any collapse
dynamics and prevent phase
shift).
The dissipation o f the former
order that supported Saddam,
leading to the collapse o f its
tactic.
The dissipation o f the former
myth that was based on
supporting Saddam, and a
phase shift toward the birth o f
a new myth that resulted from
changes in the environment.

1990
(c o n t.)

1990

Oscillation

Mythticism

The Gulf
War of

Chaos

Primordial
Interests

1991
Dichotomy

Misuse of
dichotomy for
propaganda
purposes and to
destabilize the Iraqi
regime.

No phase shift. M aintaining
the same order.
No phase shift. Maintaining
the same organizational order.
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Table 8— Continued

Time
Wave
The Gulf
War of
1991
(cont.)

Phase

Interpretive
Levels

Linear Findings

Complex Findings

Chaos

Rational
Choice

War as a corrective
measure, imposing
sanctions on Iraq to
enforce compliance
with UN
resolutions and the
destruction o f the
Iraqi infrastructure.
Restoring
legitimacy, fighting
aggression,
liberating a victim,
and defending
peace.
Maintaining the
policy to serve U.S.
power interests.

The emergence o f new tactics
that shifted from supporting
Saddam to confronting him.

Mythticism

The
Contain.
Era (19912001)

Equilibrium

Primordial
Interests

Dichotomy

Rational
Choice

Mythticism

20012002

Oscillation

Primordial
Interests

Ignoring the
dichotomy between
the Iraqi people
and Saddam ’s
regime; reducing
Iraq to the person
o f Saddam.
Supporting Iraqi
opposition,
sanctions, misuse
o f UN inspectors,
continuous use o f
force against Iraq,
and Operation
Desert Fox.
W orld peace,
maintaining the
political balance in
the ME, promoting
multilateralism &
legitimacy, and
containing threat.
Maintaining the
power interest o f
the United States.

The emergence o f a new myth
that portrayed Saddam as a
new Hitler and the U.S. as the
champion o f freedom.

Continuing with the previous
structural order to serve U.S.
interests.
Continuing with its previous
order by ignoring the
dichotomy between the Iraqi
people and their government.

Negative feedback, with fewer
changes in the policy’s
environment leading to more
tactics by the policy to serve
the policy’s objective in
containing Saddam.

Bifurcation during the G ulf
W ar results in a new mythical
order: containing Saddam
internationally under US
leadership.

Continue with the previous
structural order in serving the
nation-state interest o f the
United States. No phase shifts.
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Table 8— Continued

Time
Wave
20012002
(cont.)

Phase

Interpretive
Levels

Linear Findings

Complex Findings

Oscillation

Dichotomy

Reducing the Iraqi
people and Iraq to
the person o f
Saddam Hussein.
M isuse o f
intelligence, fear,
m isleading the
public, preemption
as a national
policy, and
unilateralism.
M etaphor o f war,
securing America,
lack o f debate and
political discourse,
and exonerating
U.S. role in
contributing to the
problems in Iraq.
Maintaining the
pow er interest o f
the United States.

Resisting collapse and phase
shifts through folly politics
and artificial engineering.

Rational
Choice

Mythticism

The Iraq
War of
2003

Chaos

Primordial
Interests

Dichotomy

Rational
Choice

Mythticism

M isuse o f
dichotomy for
policy objectives in
toppling Saddam
through direct
m ilitary
intervention.
Invasion,
preemption,
occupation,
administrative
state, and imperial
presidency.
Good versus evil,
liberating the Iraqi
people,
w ar as a corrective
measure, ending
tyranny and threat
preemptively.

Dissipation triggered by
changes in the environment,
such as September 11.

Dissipation triggered by
changes in the environment,
such as September 11.

Continue with the previous .
structural order in serving the
nation-state interest o f the
United States. No phase shifts.
Resisting collapse and phase
shifts through artificial
engineering, resulting in
catastrophe, such as the
continuous suffering o f the
Iraqi people.
Collapse o f the previous
structural order. The
emergence o f new tactics.

Collapse o f the previous
structural order. The
emergence o f a new myth.
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Table 8— Continued

Time
Wave
2004

Phase

Interpretive
Levels

Linear Findings

Complex Findings

Emergence

Primordial
Interests
Dichotomy

Securing the U.S.
pow er interest.
Treating the Iraqi
people with the
same tactics that
were used to treat
the Saddam’s
regime. The
absence o f the Iraqi
people from the
political process.
Installing a non
elected interim
Iraqi government,
the use o f force
against Iraqi
civilians,
privatizing Iraqi
economy, and
torturing Iraqi
prisoners.
The myth o f
making Iraq a
model o f freedom
and democracy in
the region, and
rebuilding Iraq.

Continue with the previous
structural order.
Continue to resist collapse and
phase shift through artificial
engineering, such as the
imposition o f the Iraqi
Governing Council and the
occupation o f Iraq.

Rational
Choice

M ythticism

The emergence o f a new order
(tactics) to support U.S.
occupation o f Iraq, maintain
U.S. hegemony and
militarism, and to secure the
U.S. power interest.

The emergence o f a new myth
to portray U.S. involvement in
Iraq as part o f the American
psyche.

As Table Eight illustrates, the U.S. policy toward Iraq collapses its myth and
tactical orders during its trajectory from the 1980s to 2004 in order to respond to
changing trends in the environment. The policy resists collapsing its primordial interest
and dealing with the dichotomy in Iraq, and in its trajectory it responds to emerging
trends rather than following a coherent and rational strategy. This trajectory suggests that
the U.S. policy toward Iraq is irrational in its trajectory but rational in its tactics, and it is
motivated first and foremost by U.S. power and nation-state interests.
As Table Eight also demonstrates, the policy toward Iraq experiences phase shifts
in the trajectory o f its tactics and myths while responding to changing trends in the
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environment. The policy, however, resists phase shifts in the structure of its primordial
interest as well as in its neglect o f the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their
government. The policy maintains these orders because it is driven from the start by the
national interest o f the United States and is not based on the idealism of promoting
democracy, freedom or human rights in Iraq.
Data also reveals that policymakers are making decisions regarding Iraq based on
the Garbage Can Model. They are chosen ready-made solutions that are accumulated
throughout the time within an institutional memory from prior experiences in dealing
with “hot” spots in the world (such as Iran, Vietnam, and Cuba) and then applying these
ready-made solutions to Iraq. At best, these solutions are inadequate because they lack
specification the in their application to the U.S. policy toward Iraq and are foreign to the
historical, social, economic, and political conditions in Iraq.
The U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1990 until 2003 is a trajectory. This means that
the policy neither evolves from a particular point nor leads to a desired aim. Rather, it is a
system o f complex relationships that is fixed within the particularities of its time and the
political and administrative system o f governance that generates it.
This trajectory begins in 1990 as a response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and its
disruption o f the oil market (and as such the U.S. nation as a state interest in the region).
It then gradually moves ahead ambiguously and without clear objective, responding only
to evolving trends. Within this progression, the policy adopts several tactics in order to
survive. The supremacy of tactics within the policy is at the expense of clear goals and
strategy.
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The policy’s trajectory is based on the primitive need o f securing a niche in the
environment. Because o f this need, the policymakers do not hesitate to operate within or
outside the accepted international norms and practices. And after the collapse o f the
Soviet Union, policymakers in the United State are encouraged to secure the nation-state
needs o f the United States through even greater disregard to issues o f legitimacy and
multilateralism.
After the Iranian Revolution o f 1979, the foreign policies o f both Iraq and the
United States went through a process o f phase shift, changing from the state of
equilibrium that described the period o f temporary cooperation between the two
countries, into a period o f oscillation and disturbance once Saddam invaded Kuwait in
1990. What followed was a state o f chaos and direct confrontation manifested in the G ulf
War of 1991 and the United States’ readiness to lead an international coalition and go to
war with Iraq in order to rescue Kuwait oil (and U.S. energy dependence on Middle
Eastern oil) from any threat that might repeat the catastrophic example o f the Arab oil
embargo o f 1972.
The resulting relationship between the two countries reflects a new dynamic that
emphasizes the re-ordering and re-organization of the political and administrative
systems o f both countries and their foreign policies. The new system is better equipped to
deal with conditions and requirements o f containing the Iraqi regime without another
military involvement.
Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait in 1990 on its own does not create chaos within the
Iraqi political system or the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Rather, it serves as a catalyst in
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triggering a process o f change within both systems that managed to sustain both systems
operating within their outdated moods and avoiding collapse for almost a decade.
The collapse o f the political and administrative system in Iraq and within the U.S.
policy toward Iraq after the Gulf War o f 1991 do not take place as it ought to have. Such
a collapse is needed by the dissipative requirements o f a decaying system and an
outmoded policy that is designed for a Cold War era. The system’s natural collapse in
Iraq, for example, is delayed through artificial engineering, such as the excessive use of
the state’s police power. In the United States, the policy toward Iraq does not collapse
and is modified through artificial engineering by legislations and executive orders in
order to sustain the policy operating despite its inability to live in the new and changing
environment.
The U.S. policy toward Iraq experiences several self-assembly process, and its
organizational order at various settings emerges with newer orders, such as in employing
new tactics. However, the policy’s main structural order resists collapse due to artificial
engineering, causing catastrophic results both for the United States and the Iraqi people.
Although the tactics employed by decision makers are rational choice for the
specific time and trend that emerges in the environment, the policy as a whole lacks a
coherent strategy, characterized by planning, and clear objectives. The policy is a
trajectory, moving from one phase to another while responding to outside stimuli but
without having a clear strategy and objective from the start to finish.
The older system, whether in Iraq or within the U.S. policy toward Iraq continues
with its previous structure, resisting natural collapse and for a newer system to be bom.
The conditions for such birth and emergence are ready. Yet, artificial engineering delays
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the system’s natural collapse, and the results are what we are experiencing today:
continuous catastrophes caused by this system’s inability and failure to respond
accurately to emerging trends in the environment.
An example o f such a catastrophe is the system’s intelligence failure to anticipate
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The same intelligence failure results in
misinterpreting intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons o f mass destruction, which
ultimately lead to the war o f 2003 and the preemptive strike against Iraq.
Other examples are the super-sizing o f the function and role o f the U.S. military
industrial machine as a twin organ o f U.S. foreign policy and the strengthening o f the
executive branch o f the federal government at the expense of the judiciary and the
legislative branches. The current Bush doctrine o f preemptive strike and the surrendering
o f power to declare war by Congress to the President, a power that is entrusted by the
Constitution in 1789 to Congress, is an example o f such artificial engineering
The same delay in the collapse o f political and administrative systems takes place
in Iraq as well. However, the Iraqi political and administrative systems eventually
collapses under their own weight in 2003 (assisted by a catalyst in the environment that is
triggered by the U.S. invasion o f Iraq) in spite o f artificial engineering employed by the
Iraqi government in order to prevent the system’s collapse.
The delay in time for the collapse to occur, especially once it is triggered by the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resulting G ulf War, results in catastrophes measured by
human misery and suffering under the Baath regime and the UN-imposed embargo
against Iraq. Yet, the Iraqi political system eventually collapses despite the delay once
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conditions in the environment (the U.S. invasion o f Iraq in 2003) provide the catalyst for
its demise.
The world and living systems are constantly changing, never static, and moving
from equilibrium to oscillation to chaos and then to the emergence o f new worlds and
new systems. The new emerging systems go through the same process, experiencing
oscillation and chaos and give birth to other new systems, and the cycle o f birth and
rebirth continues resulting in a world that is dynamic, alive, and continually changing.
This transformation is complex, irreversible, holistic, irrational, uncertain and takes place
within an interconnected web o f relationships.
The reorganization o f the political and administrative systems in the United States
and Iraq, either through artificial engineering and the sustaining o f the old system, as in
the United States, or through collapse dynamics and the emergence o f a new system, as in
post-Saddam Iraq, is triggered by a kick in the environment. Reorganization is influenced
by the systems’ environments, and these systems’ internal mechanisms evolve in order to
deal with changes through patterns o f interaction.
Such systems, although reacting to their environments, they are primarily driven
by one force, the sole self-interest o f the nation-state in competition for resources. The
American nation-state is transformed from being one o f the two superpowers in a bipolar
world in 1990 to one that was the only superpower in a unipolar world in 2003. The Iraqi
nation-state, on the other hand, is transformed from a totalitarian, highly bureaucratic,
and highly centralized state prior to the Gulf War o f 1991 to a fragmented state after the
G ulf War and during the containment era, and later to a no-state in post 2003 war era.
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The environment is an important factor in impacting the administrative and
political system in Iraq as well as the U.S. policy and its trajectory. As the environment
impacts Iraq and the U.S. policy toward Iraq, Iraq itself and the U.S. policy toward Iraq
also impact their environments and cause changes within these environments as well. As
such, there is a symbiotic relationship between these systems and their environments,
with one feeding and depending on the other for resources, renewal and survival
mechanism.
The need for re-organization and dealing with the environment of the containment
era, for example, drives the Iraqi political system after the chaotic trigger o f the invasion
o f Kuwait and the G ulf War o f 1991 to resist the militarization o f Iraq’s foreign policy,
especially after Iraq’s failure during the Gulf War. The system no longer is able to
continue within its former structure.
However, events during the containment era do not tilt the center of gravitation
(the military) toward a full-scale war. Instead, it takes a different course and forces the
political/ administrative systems in both countries to transform through chaos and the
dissipation o f their previous structures toward adapting to the conditions and
requirements o f containment. This transformation enables the force o f entropy within the
political and administrative systems o f both countries to evolve and witnessed the
emergence o f new dynamics within new systems whether administratively or politically.
The interactions of the political and administrative systems in the United States
and the former Iraqi regime o f Saddam Hussein with their environments are internally
determined. While there are countless chains o f interactions within and between these
systems, there is no independent pattern o f causation. Changes in one element do not
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cause changes in other elements since the whole chain o f relations is part o f the same
self-determining pattern. The systems evolve as complete fields o f relations. One element
o f experience in each system thus is influencing the next.
The systems’ evolution enables them to rearrange their components and emerge
through phase transitions. For example, we witness aspects of these evolutions in areas
such as communication, organizational decentralization and horizontal networking in
organizational structure. These manifestations not only impact the dynamics o f the
systems themselves, but also all other systems that are associated with them.
These systems do not live independently in the world. Their movements and the
events created by them are not predictable, rational, or -precipitated by local causes that
are fixed within their own local time and space. Rather, these systems have many
dimensions, players, and forces, and the events that they produce are non-linear and
interconnected. Therefore, these systems frequently move from one trigger to another.
One pattern o f transformation begins by triggering the other. The transformation stems
from one trigger settling into a new pattern o f relations that is triggered by another
pattern of connections and so forth.
There is no starting or ending point in the web of these systems’ functions and
dynamics, especially when they are in continuous processes o f relationships bridged with
other dynamic systems in the world. If we look, for example, at any particular element
within these systems, we will observe that their relationships with other systems in the
world have transcended fixed time and space.
Governance in the United States itself is shifting toward more o f an administrative
type of government headed by an imperial presidency. The U.S. policy toward Iraq is
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exposing this trajectory in the four Interpretive Levels o f mythticism, dichotomy, rational
choice, and primordial interests. The trajectory o f these levels illustrates the impact o f
changes in the policy’s environment on the policy itself.
As the responses to trends create more o f a dead-end trajectory for the policy
rather than opening windows o f opportunity, policymakers begin to adopt desperate
measures/often outside the collective o f internationalism, in order for the policy to
survive. These measures result in efforts at regime change in Iraq either through political
proxies composed o f exiled Iraqi opposition groups in 1998 or through military wars in
2003. The policy, however, despite the efforts at regime change does not move forward
toward a desired end. Instead, it further alienates the United States in the world and
exposes its political tactics as Machiavellian in nature, designed only to advance its
nation-state interest at the expense o f legitimacy and world peace.
Both political systems in Iraq and the United States engage in circular patterns of
interaction whereby change in one element in either one o f the systems is coupled with
changes in the other and elsewhere, setting up continuous patterns o f interactions that are
self-referential. These patterns are self-referential because the systems are unable to enter
into interactions with one another or with their environments unless they are specified in
the pattern of relations that defined their own organization.
In observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its hidden dynamics, our attention
moves from observing it while moving in one direction to viewing it as moving in many
directions. These many directions are the function o f the policy’s internal mechanism,
organizational behavior, phase shift dynamics, interdependent and interrelated
relationships, and the impact of change that results in impacting the policy as a whole.
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Understanding a phenomenon, such as the U.S. policy toward Iraq, does not rest
on any simple cause, but on deviation from the process o f linear evolution itself. This
deviation explains the political evolution in the United States, for example, as a process
o f change that is triggered by a kick in the environment. The kicks initiate an open-ended
process o f self-organization within the political system in the United States, while
interacting with other systems within its network o f association to produce changing
patterns in order to assume a relatively stable form.
If we observe an element o f this system independently within its chain o f inter
dependent and inter-related dynamics, such as the political ramifications o f the U.S.
policy toward Iraq, but without observing the entire relationship of this element with all
the components in the network o f geopolitics, we are unable to understand its dynamic
even within its own fixed time and space. However, if we observe the elements o f the
U.S. policy toward Iraq in relation to other elements and events in the world beyond a
fixed time and a fixed space, then we will be able to understand the precise function of
these elements within the collective function o f relationships on the S-Matrix that shapes
the association o f any system’s dynamics.
Iraq is used as an arena to secure the nation-state interests o f the United States,
and the U.S. policy toward Iraq responds to environmental demands in the form of
political issues emerging in Iraq itself. As such, the U.S. policy toward Iraq often is out of
touch with the political process in Iraq and more engulf in responding to U.S. nation-state
interests as they are competing to secure a niche in the environment.
The United States is also unable to use Iraq in order to dictate its hegemony and
political will on the world despite its military and economic might. The reason for such a

377

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

challenge is because o f the competing self-interests o f other nation-states which are able
to form regional alliances in order to preserve their primordial interests and compete with
the United States for scarce world resource.
W ithin such a competition, the U.S. policy toward Iraq operates on four distinct,
yet inter-related levels. These levels are Mythticism, Dichotomy, Rational choice and the
Primordial o f Interests. Out o f the four emerging inter-related levels, the Primordial Level
is the driving engine beyond the policy and its associations. Everything else falls in
between. The policy is implemented from day to day as a tool to advance the primordial
interests o f the United States. Once this is understood, the overall picture, direction and
aim of the policy starts to make sense.
The U.S. policy toward Iraq, thus contain wholes within wholes. Each event
produced by these systems provides a trigger that becomes part o f another event and
requiring a broader focus. This broadening of analysis adds to the complexity o f political
perspective and brings us to identify new means o f understanding problems o f multiple
dimensions. W hen these problems are then re-framed, new opportunities then come to the
forefront.
Reaching to such an understanding and conclusion is possible because o f this
research’s ability to combine both linear and complex analysis in order to observe the
U.S. policy toward Iraq. What I do not expect the Phi Model to prove is that the linear
analysis is an integral part o f a complex analysis in a qualitative inquiry. My assumption
is that the complex analysis could stand on its on and bring an end to the application of
traditional Newtonian science in public policy analysis. Instead, the model proves that all
sciences are integrated and complement one another.
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Recommendations
As public administrators, we ought to treat each situation as unique and relevant
to all factors engaged in the holistic relationships that motivate internal and external
changes. As such, this research makes the following recommendations concerning the
U.S. policy toward Iraq based on short-term assessments.
The U.S. policy toward Iraq needs to avoid artificial engineering and folly politics
to delay its collapse. The policy ought not to oppose an internal collapse o f its structure
and should allow a new order to emerge. Without a collapse, the policy will continue to
create one catastrophic event after another.
U.S. policy toward Iraq cannot be viewed through the prism of a single-issue.
Such policy reflects the complex dynamics o f the interconnected relationships between
various interacting players in geopolitics. The better the understanding o f such
complexity and its multiple layers, the more likely that decision-makers will be able to
choose the more viable solutions for emerging policy challenges.
To secure such a shift in U.S. foreign policy, the American consciousness must be
awakened in order to guide governance without fear, gimmicks or manipulation. The
United States is in need both as a nation and government o f a genuine self-evaluation and
self-assessment o f its policies and actions both at home and abroad. This tendency calls
for the adoption o f morality and ethics in our policy, not the moral codes and ethics o f a
particular group or religion but the universal doctrine o f “doing unto others as you would
have them do unto you.”
There are lessons for us to learn from the policy toward Iraq. We need to promote
pluralism o f ideas in governance and depart from the simplistic mentality o f “you are
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either with us or against us.” And, we need to encompass in our policies the complexity
o f the world in which we live and reject the narrow ideology o f the few who would
decide our political direction.
We need to change our attitude toward power from one that is based on the
Hobbesian philosophy o f mistrust and force in a savage state o f nature to one that is
based on the Kantian philosophy of reason and enlightenment. For an end to be just, the
means to reach that end must be just as well. There must be no room for hypocrisy and
Machiavellian tactics in our policies, and we must remain committed to our democratic
ideals and values.
We need to devote our energies and policies toward building a cooperative human
society that promotes peace, transparency, openness, social justice, and prosperity,
instead of war, militarism, power, and greed. And, we need to understand and recognize
the dichotomy between regimes and people in our foreign policy and stop dehumanizing
other people if their regimes stand against our interest.
Ending wars and conflicts in the world cannot be realized until we reconcile the
struggle between our power interest arid the oppressed in the world. Our humanity
matters more than our differences. This ought to be the single most important concept in
our political mantra in dealing with Iraq or any other nation.
Life is shaped by a cycle of coming and going and growth and decay. Everything
that begins in a process becomes something else. Living systems, including political and
administrative systems in the United States, are not static but dynamic, moving from
equilibrium to oscillation to chaos and once again to equilibrium. This transformation
takes place within an interconnected world o f uncertainty, resulting in continuous
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changes within an irreversible world. The U.S. policy toward Iraq is an illustrative
example o f such dynamics.
In understanding this, we can create a new way o f thinking about dealing with
change. Rather than attempting to deal with the discrete events that contribute to the
limited manifestation o f understanding and knowledge, we can attempt to deal with life
itself as a whole and as a collective of non-discrete events in order to understand the
epistemology of our experiences.
In doing so, we begin to shape and guide the forces that we experience as
belonging to an objective reality that appears independent o f our own making. This kind
o f thinking encourages us to understand that life fluxes in different ways: as a
manifestation o f our experiences, as a network o f mutual causality shaped by processes o f
interconnected dynamics, and as dialectical processes o f contradiction.

Suggestions for Future Research
Although the Phi-Model contributes to the body o f knowledge in the social
sciences, more needs to be done in employing complexity theories in the observation of
social phenomena. In observing the policy toward Iraq within a qualitative inquiry guided
by complexity dimensions, it is useful to explore complexity dimensions other than
autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix and mutual causality to guide a complex analysis.
Examples o f other complexity dimensions are syn-referentiality, ecology, entropy, and
cybernetics.
Syn-referentiality refers to the shared reality constructs, the behavioral programs
connected with those constructs, and the norms and values shared by the members of a
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social system that a basis for communication and interaction. The idea o f synreferentiality is compatible with a view o f social systems as self-referential, self
organizing, and self-regulating. Yet, syn-referentiality avoids the conception o f social
systems as autopoietic (Little, 1999, pp. 164-166).
Ecology, on the other hand, is the scientific study o f relationships between entities
and their environments. It involves assessing the effects o f complex interactions of
internal and external stimuli and how entities evolve and survive over time. Entropy is a
measurement of the level of disorder, energy loss, or noise in a given system, and also a
measurement o f the system’s capacity for change (Daneke, 1999). In a system increasing
in entropy, the number of possible system states that evolve from some initial distribution
over time also increases.
As for cybernetics, it is derived from the Greek word kybernatas, which means
steerman, and is also the root that produced the word governance. Cybernetics is the art
o f steering. It deals with ways o f behaving, rather than with things, and it helps in
developing theories o f adaptation, evolution, and growth as processes o f regulation. It
also deals with a system’s effort to maintain equilibrium or to reach a goal (Little, 1999,
p. 151-171).
We should also explore the use o f other linguistic media instead o f metaphors in
order to present a qualitative, complex analysis, and try excluding linear analysis from
the Phi-Model and explaining collapse dynamics in a system caused by external
interventions. The Phi-Model is successful in explaining internal collapse caused by
changes in environmental trends. It needs, however, to be expanded to include the
explanation o f internal collapses caused solely by outside interference as well.
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Other suggestions for future researches include several other methodologies, such
as conducting a loop analysis o f the U.S. policy toward Iraq, undertaking an ethical
observation o f the policy, and using Iraqis living in Iraq itself as a sample for the focus
group and one-on-one interviews. Such a suggested study needs to investigate the Iraqi
policy toward the United States as well, go beyond the time line limitation o f 1990-2004
in observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq itself, and investigate the possible shift in the
policy toward the emergence of another Iran-Iraq war in the future with the U.S. using
Iraq as a base to extend its preemptive war to other nations in the region. It is useful to
hear what indigenous Iraqis think about these issues before the advent o f another
preemptive strike takes place.
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Appendix A

Protocol Clearance From the Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board
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Human Subjects Institutional Review Board

!" 'C e n t e r a i i a I
1903-2003 C e l e b r a t i o n

Date: June 6, 2003
To:

Peter Kobrak, Principal Investigator
Alexander Dawoody, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Mary Lagerwey, Chair
Re:

j/Vj

HSIRB Project Number: 03-05-32

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled “The Policy of
Preemption Toward Iraq within the Context o f Complexity Theories” has been approved
under the expedited category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review
Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of
Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as
described in the application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved.
You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In
addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events
associated with the conduct o f this research, you should immediately suspend the project
and contact the Chair o f the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit o f your research goals.

Approval Termination:

June 6, 2004

Walwocd Hall, Kalamazoo. Ml 49508-5456
rtWNi: (2G9) 3«y-tJ293 rAX. -285) 3 ^ 7 -3 2 7 6
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Introductory Question
In 1990, Iraq became an important part of U.S. foreign policy. From your
perspective why do believe Iraq played this role?

Transitional Questions
What were the elements that impacted the U.S. policy toward in Iraq in 1990?

Key Questions
1. In 1998, the U.S. policy toward Iraq shifted toward the concept of regime change
in Iraq. In your opinion, what caused this shift in U.S. policy?
2. What were the elements that impacted the shift in U.S. policy toward the concept
of regime change in Iraq in 1998?
3. In 2002, the U.S. policy toward Iraq shifted toward the concept o f preemption. In
your opinion, what caused this shift in U.S. policy?
4. What were the elements that impacted the shift in U.S. policy toward Iraq toward
the concept o f preemption in 2002?

Closing Question
Is there anything we have left out that in your opinion is particularly important
when thinking about these issues?
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Appendix C

One-on-One Interview Questions
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1. The Baath Party rose to power in Iraq in 1968. In your opinion, why was there no
reaction either by the United States or the United Nations regarding the Iraqi
regime’s behavior from 1968 until 1990?
2. In 1980, Iraq invaded the western part o f Iran and caused the Iran-Iraq War that
lasted for eight years. During this war, Iraq used WMD against Iranian troops and
bombed Iranian cities. In your opinion, why did the United States or the United
Nations choose not to pressure Iraq to stop the war and pay restitution for the
damages caused to Iran as it was the case with Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait in 1990?
3. Prior to Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Kuwaiti government
asked for U.S. intervention as Iraqi troops massed on its borders. The U.S.
ambassador to Iraq at the time told Saddam that the U.S. was not going to
interfere in a conflict between two Arab nations. In your opinion, why did the
U.S. refuse to warn Saddam not to invade Kuwait prior to August 2, 1990?
4. In 1991 and after the G ulf War, the U.S. had the opportunity to remove Saddam
from power. In your opinion, why did it choose not to do so?
5. The Bush administration’s justification for the Iraq war in 2003 was that it was
the front-line in the war on terrorism. In your opinion, how does the Iraq war of
2003 tie to the war on terrorism?
6. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War o f 2003 strengthen or weakened terrorism?
7. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War o f 2003 impact the political situation in
Iraq?
8. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War o f 2003 impact the political situation in the
region?
9. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War o f 2003 impact the political situation in the
United States?
10. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War o f 2003 impact the political situation in the
world?
11. In your opinion, what is the impact o f the Bush administration’s unilateral
decision to go to war in Iraq on international law and legitimacy?

12. In your opinion, what role did the former Iraqi opposition groups in exile play in
pushing for the Iraq war o f 2003?

392

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13. In your opinion, why did the issue of WMD become the main justification for war
in 2003?
14. In your opinion, what were other options available to the Bush administration
regarding Iraq in addition to war?
15. In your opinion, what were the Bush administration’s underlining motives in
pushing for war in 2003?
16. In your opinion, how the Bush administration’s policy o f preemption toward Iraq
became an evolutionary phase within the U.S. policy toward Iraq?
17. Some o f the Bush administration’s critics suggest that the Iraq war was planned in
1998 by a think tank known as Project for the New American Century. In your
opinion, what was the impact o f ideology and think tanks on the U.S. policy
toward Iraq in 2002/ 2003?
18. What are the differences and similarities between the Kennedy administration’s
preemptive policy toward Cuba and Bush administration’s preemptive policy
toward Iraq?
19. In your opinion, why did Congress choose to surrender its right to declare war in
2002 to the President?
20. In your opinion, what are the challenges poised by the post-Saddam era in Iraq for
the United States?
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Concepts and Conceptual Definitions

394

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Concept
Administrative
State
Imperial
Presidency

Appointocracy
Unilateralism

Paranoia

U.S. and Iraq
Abuse o f UN

Narrow State
Interests
Presidential Extra
Gap Between UN
and U.S. Goals
UN Mistakes

Definition
The Shifting in governance toward increasing power o f the
executive branch o f government at the expense o f the legislative
and judicial branches.
An archetypal type o f presidential leadership in the administrative
state that is based on characteristics driven from the symbolic
representation o f imperial power, such as authority, dictation,
unilateral decision-making, secrecy, arrogance, one best way
mentality, unipolar (you are either with us or against us), and the
monopoly of power.
The process o f governance by appointment o f selected individuals
to public offices rather than being elected democratically.
A type o f decision-making in politics that negates multi
dimensional inputs and considerations and relies solely on a
particular aspect, direction, idea, or perspective.
A psychological state o f individuals within the political decision
making realm that reflects suspicion o f plots, conspiracy, illintentions and counter measures that are based on exaggeration and
mistrust rather than facts and evidence.
The process o f misusing the United Nations’ efforts to enforce the
1991 G ulf W ar’s cease-fire agreement both by the United States’
government and the former Iraqi government from 1991 until 2003,
such as planting spies in the UN inspection teams, directing UN
inspection teams to resolute outside the established UN guidelines
and in favor o f a particular nation-state political agenda, armtwisting the Security Council to pass resolutions that were more
reflective o f a particular nation-state interest than the cease-fire
goal, not cooperating with the UN inspection teams, and blocking
free access of the UN inspection teams to complete their tasks.
The political and economic interests o f a particular nation-state
irrespectful o f the global interests o f other nations in the world.
Personal or family issues that affect the decision-making process of
the President o f the United States in relation to U.S. foreign policy.
Differences between the stated goals o f the United Nations
regarding disarming Iraq as a condition for the 1991 cease-fire and
U.S. political agenda regarding changing the Iraqi regime.
Errors caused by U N ’s attempt to disarming Iraq, which resulted in
unintended consequences, such as enforcing the economic sanctions
on Iraq and causing the death o f more than three million Iraqi
children, not incorporating the oil-for-food program from day one
o f the sanctions, having different ceiling for the oil-for-food
program that were not comparable with Iraqi people’s needs, and
failure to recognize Iraq’s long abuse o f human rights and not
taking actions to prevent or stop it.
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Concept
Folly Politics

Containment

Trajectory and
Status Quo
Kondratiev Wave
Regime Change
Trajectory
Iraqi Opposition
Control Issues

Survival Issues
Capitalism

Dollar Vs. Euro

The Role o f Oil

Power Interests

Colonialism
Hegemony

Definition
Wrong political measures by the U.S. in relation to its policy
toward Iraq that resulted in catastrophic consequences, such as the
persistence on enforcing the economic sanctions despite their
severe negative impact on the Iraqi people or aiding CIA-supported
Iraqi opposition groups who had no connections with the Iraqi
people nor did they represent their interests.
The policy of maintaining the former Iraqi regime o f Saddam
Hussein within his own boundaries and within the standards set by
the UN resolutions, with the Iraqi regime not posing a threat to
other nations, not causing a material breach to UN resolutions, and
not warranting war as an enforcement mechanism for these
resolutions.
The progression o f U.S. policy toward Iraq in order to maintain
political stability in the Middle East that corresponds with U.S.
interests.
A cycle or trend composed f several phases that keeps recycling
itself within U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The progression o f the regime change concept in U.S. policy
toward Iraq.
Various Iraqi opposition groups that were supported by the United
States in order to topple the former regime o f Saddam Hussein.
Political measures taken by the former Iraqi regime o f Saddam
Hussein in order to exert its political authority on the Iraqi people,
such as the insistence on administering the U N ’s oil-for-food
program.
Political measures by the former Iraqi regime to remain in power.
The economic system o f the United States. It is based on free
market principles o f capital investments and the use o f natural
resources and wage labor in order to create profit through the
manufacturing and sales o f goods.
The political strive by the United States’ government to maintain
the supremacy o f the U.S. currency against other foreign currencies,
such as the Euro and the Yen.
The impact of oil as a political power on U.S. policy and status in
the w orld’s economic and geopolitical systems, as well as o the
U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The special interests o f the United States as a nation-states based on
the principle of power and dominance in shaping U.S. foreign
policy as a whole and its policy toward Iraq in particular.
The military and political occupation of one nation by another
through the acts o f war and invasion.
The political or economic dominance o f a nation-state or a political
or economic entity over others, whereby enforcing a particular
perspective that only serves the interests o f the dominating entity.
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Concept
Imperialism

Militarism
Democratic Cavein
Discourse
Debate
Priorities and
Resources
War as a
Corrective Action
Force
M etaphor o f War

Hobbes vs. Kant
American Psyche

Unipolar World

Capacity
Geopolitics
Regionalism
Cold W ar Politics
The Middle East
and the Status Quo
Multilateralism

Definition
Subjugating by force or coercion the political and economic
systems o f more than one nation to the power, political and
economic will o f a dominating nation-state.
The use o f military as a political tool to advance the regional or
global power interests o f a nation-state.
Representatives of the Democratic Party in U.S. government that
base their decisions according to the stated agenda o f the
Republican administration and Congressional representatives.
Political debates and differences within the American political
system and governmental structure.
The absence o f political debate within the American political
system and governmental decision-making process.
The negation or sacrificing o f political discourse and debates for the
sake o f political priorities and agendas based on the perspectives of
the controlling political party in the White House.
The use o f war as a surgical measure to correct a perceived political
failure.
The mentality o f using force as a mechanism for a political agenda.
The use o f war as a metaphor in solving social, economic, and
political problems instead o f finding solutions based on dialogue
and treating the cause, not the symptoms. Examples o f such
metaphors are the war on terror, the war on poverty, the war on
drugs, and the war on illiteracy.
The philosophy o f coercion versus the philosophy o f
enlightenment.
The uninhibited characteristics o f the American people reflected in
the Bill o f Rights and U.S. Constitution that desire goodness for all
people in the world and believe in the fundamental principles o f
human rights.
The world’s geopolitical system after the end o f the Cold W ar and
the collapse o f the Soviet Union that left the united States as the
only superpower in the world, thereby changing the system from a
bipolar to a unipolar.
The American military, intelligence and political response system
to threats based on Cold-War nation-states conflicts.
The collective political relationships between nation-states.
Political, economic, and military decisions taken by nation-states
based on regional interests.
Geopolitical relationships based on bipolar superpowers as primary
motivators to define alliances and networking.
Decisions taking by nation-states in the Middle East that are
motivated to preserve the political status quo in the region.
Political decisions taken whether on national or international levels
based on multiple inputs, perspectives and concerns.
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Concept
Legitimacy
Circular Reasoning
Coercion

Irony
Machiavellian
Methods
Fear Factor
Falsehood
Misuse or
Misinterpretation
of Intelligence
Current as
Epiphenomenon

Misleading

Pattern o f
Behavior

Attila the Hun

Ideology
Intensionality
Preemption
Rhetoric
Special Interests

Definition
Political decisions made in accordance with established national
and international laws.
Doing A as a pre-requisite for accomplishing B, and accomplishing
B as a pre-requisite in accomplishing C, and so for.
Political maneuvers and actions designed to alter other political
situations and actions toward the desired outcomes o f a certain
political agenda.
Saying or intending something but doing something in opposite.
Political decisions and tactics based on the principle o f the outcome
justifying the means.
The use o f fear as a prime motivator to persuade public support and
opinion in favor o f certain political agenda.
Exaggerations and misrepresentation o f reality in favor o f certain
political agenda.
The U.S. government’s misuse or misinterpretation o f its own or
other nations’ intelligence in order to serve its own political agenda
in reference to the policy toward Iraq.
The continuous negation o f considering past roles and associations,
and the constant reliance on the present as a standing phenomenon.
By emphasizing the present, the political system can avoid the guilt
of past mistakes, and enable itself to claim moralistic positions that
it cannot claim otherwise if it considered past experiences.
The use o f false information, coercion, or fabrication in order to
lead others toward desired political objectives that they did not
otherwise want on their own if they were left to make their own
choices and decisions without being mislead.
The various types of relationships between the United States’
government and the governments o f other nations that are more
often based on U.S. interests than those nations’ political
orientations and practices.
The transformation o f Saddam’s images by U.S. government and
media from a brutal dictator to an even larger and further
exaggerated image that often resembled Attila the Hun.
The role o f specific political thinking or ideology on decision
making in the political process.
Conscious and deliberate use o f political means to achieve a desired
outcome.
A political doctrine based on the use of U.S. military to strike any
entity without provocation based on perception o f future threats.
Jargons used by US government to justify specific political
agendas.
Representatives o f various political, economic, and social groups
that lobby the executive and legislative branches o f government to
secure policies favoring these groups’ interests.
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Concept
Trotskyism

Simplicity
Symbolism
Ambiguity
Enemy
War on Terrorism

Hypocrisy
Looking into the
Mirror

Mistrust

Definition
A political ideology within the American neoconservative
movement that is based on Trotsky’s ideas regarding a permanent
revolution (war) and the destruction o f existing orders through
violence in order to construct new orders that are more in line with
U.S. interests.
Reducing complex political issues to simplistic presentation that
lacks the richness and depth o f the substance.
The use of symbol to explain a political agenda, often through the
use o f simplistic presentation o f complex political issues.
Uncertainty and confusion regarding a particular political issue.
The target o f offensive or defensive response measures taken by
U.S. government both politically and militarily.
A vague and unspecified response by U.S. government to
international terrorism emerged after September 11, 2001 that lacks
specificity, duration, boundaries, target or enemy definition or
identification, or having a clear and defined exit strategy. It is an
on-going war, stretching across the globe, involving anyone whom
the U.S. government may preserve as a potential threat to U.S. .
political and economic interests. It is, as the wars on drugs and
poverty, more o f a metaphorical expression than an actual war in
classical terms that involves military conflicts, execution o f military
strategies, and ending the conflicts after specific periods of
engagement with either wins or loses.
Criticizing others for doing something that you were or are already
doing.
A metaphorical expression o f U.S. government’s behavior to negate
reflecting inward and assessing its own role in supporting the
former Iraqi regime in the past, while placing itself on a high moral
ground and accusing that regime o f the very thing that the U.S. was
supporting.
A situation when both the United States government and the former
Iraqi regime were suspicious of one another and neither government
trusted the other.
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GLOSSARY
ADAPTATION

An entity’s ability to reproduce and survive, despite changes in the
environment, by changing its structure and/or function (Daneke,
1999).

ATTRACTOR

An indicator that describes the particular state o f systematic
behavior (Daneke, 1999).

AUTOPOIESIS

It means self-producing. Autopoietic systems are self-organizing in
that they produce and change their own structures as well as their
own components (Little, 1999).

BIFURCATION

A vital element o f self-organization, it involves the appearance of
an additional pattern of behavior or sequence o f states for a system
when it passes a critical level o f turbulence (Daneke, 1999).

BUREAUCRACY

Rule exercised through use o f the written word, which provides the
basis for a rational-legal type o f authority, or “rule o f law”
(Morgan, 1986).

CAUSALITY

A relationship between events or activities by which they are
assumed to impact one another (Daneke, 1999).

CHAOS

Chaos is uncertain order that is neither random nor totally
disordered. Chaos in the technical sense of the term is the ordered
but unpredictable pattern (Newell, 1999).

CLOSED SYSTEM

A system that does not interact or exchange energy with its
environment (Daneke, 1999).

COMPLEXITY

The study o f the simple behavior o f systems exhibiting complex
patterns o f interactions (Daneke, 1999).

COMPLEX SYSTEM It follows multiple logics. Complex system have several
characteristics: nonlinear and often not well-behaved (producing
effects disproportionate to their causes and exhibiting sudden large
changes in behavior), dynamical (thus not in equilibrium), not
deterministic or formally predictable (but not completely random
or disordered either), often open, in that the boundaries with its
environment are permeable, and containing paradoxes (Newell,
1999).
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Glossary—Continued
CONCEPT

Refers to groups o f works with similar meanings and/or
connotations (Weber, 1990).

DECISION

It presupposes a choice among alternatives with reference to some
goal (Allison, 1999). The passing o f judgment on an issue under
consideration. The act o f reaching a conclusion or making up one’s
mind (Morris, 1975).

DETERMINISTIC

A property o f formal (mathematical) descriptions so that having
met a set o f relevant conditions, a particular event is assumed to
occur with regularity (Daneke, 1999).

DETERMINISTIC
SYSTEM

A system in which later states evolve from earlier ones according
to a fixed law (Lorenz, 1993).

DYNAMIC
SYSTEM

A deterministic system. A system with a slight amount of
randomness provided that the qualitative behavior would not be
appreciably changed if the randomness were somehow removed
(Lorenz, 1993).

ECOLOGY

The scientific study of relationships between entities and their
environments assessing the effects o f complex interactions o f
internal and external stimuli and how entities evolve and survive
over time (Daneke, 1999).

EPISTEMOLOGY

The study o f the origins and nature o f knowledge itself (Daneke,
1999).

EMERGENCE

The process by which “behavior” and “properties” arise within a
given system. These entities are novel products o f the interaction
o f the parts, and thus cannot be inductively derived from the parts
alone (Daneke, 1999).

ENTROPY

A measurement o f the level o f disorder, energy loss, or noise in a
given system. Also a measurement o f the system’s capacity for
change (Daneke, 1999). In a system increasing in entropy, the
number o f possible system states that evolve from some initial
distribution over time also increases (Brown, 1996a).

EVIL

Morally bad or wrong; wicked; malevolent; sinful. Causing an
undesirable condition, as ruin, injury, or pain; harmful, injurious.
Characterized by or boding misfortune, foreboding; ominous
(Morris, 1975)
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Glossary— Continued
FEEDBACK

One element o f experience in a system influences the next.
Feedback can be positive or negative. Together, these feedback
mechanisms can explain why systems gain or preserve a given
form, and how this can be elaborated and transformed over time
(Morgan, 1986).

GOVERNANCE

It has more to do with the emergent order arising out o f the
dynamic activities o f empowered social movements o f people
governing themselves (Brem, 1999).

HOLISM

The doctrine of holism is “the whole is often greater than the sum
of its parts.” It is based upon the assumptions that the whole is
irreducible (its parts cannot be understood alone) and the whole is
understandable within its complex, contextual elements (Daneke,
1999).

LINEAR SYSTEM

A system in which alterations is an initial state will result in
proportional alterations in any subsequent state (Lorenz, 1993).

METAPHOR

It is the figure o f speech in which a name or descriptive term is
transferred to some object to which it is not properly applicable”
(Trumble & Stevenson, 2002). The relation between the central use
o f a word and its metaphorical use is similar to the relation
between the central use o f emotion term and its use in an
expressive judgment as both relations are asymmetrical
(Matravers, 1998).

METHODOLOGY

The tools and concepts used to guide a given scientific inquiry
(Daneke, 1999).

MODELING

A means o f representing real world phenomena to facilitate
understanding processes (Daneke, 1999).

MUTUAL
CAUSALITY

It gives particular attention to the nature o f relations and
interconnections (Morgan, 1986).

NEG ATIV E
FEEDBACK

A change in a variable initiates changes in the opposite direction
(Morgan, 1986).

NONLINEAR

The mathematical property o f complex relationships among two or
more elements interacting. Generally speaking, it means getting
more than one bargained for (Daneke, 1999).
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Glossary—Continued
NONLINEAR
SYSTEM

A system in which alterations in an initial state need not produce
proportional alterations in subsequent states; one that is not linear
(Lorenz, 1993).

IDEOLOGY

The body o f ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations o f an
individual, group, class, or culture (Morris, 1975).

INTERPRETATION It consists o f translating one set of linguistic or linguistically
expressed elements into another (Weber, 1990).
ONTOLOGY

A branch o f philosophy that deals with beings (Morcol, 1999).

ONTOLOGICAL
METAPHORS

Metaphors that are cognitive-domain references and define our
experiences as if experiences were discrete entities. (Morcol,
1999).

OPEN SYSTEM

A system that exchanges energy and information with its
environment; it changes its behavior in response to conditions
outside its boundaries (Daneke, 1999).

ORGANIZATION

It is collections o f human beings arranged systematically for
harmonious or united action (Allison, 1999).

PARADOX

It is the logical equivalent o f self-reference (Little, 1999).

PARADIGM

A set o f theories, models, practices, findings, explanation, values,
beliefs, and feelings that characterize a given culture at a given
time (De Greene, 1996). It is a systematic statement o f the basic
assumptions, concepts, and propositions employed by a school o f
analysis (Allison, 1999).

POLICY

It means the realization in a number of particular instances o f some
agent's objectives (Allison, 1999).

POSITIVE
FEEDBACK

When accounting for system change, more leads to more, and less
lead to less (Morgan, 1986).

POWER

It involves an ability to get another person to do something that he
would not otherwise have done (Dahl, 1957).

RANDOM

Attribute of a process that is entirely or largely governed by chance
(Daneke, 1999).
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Glossary—Continued
RANDOM SYSTEM A system in which the progression from earlier to later states is not
completely determined by any laws; a system that is not
deterministic (Lorenz, 1993).
RATIONALITY

It referees to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified
constraints. It denotes behavior that is appropriate to specified
goals in the context o f a given situation (Allison, 1999).

REDUCTIONISM

A doctrine stating that complex phenomena, knowledge, and
experiences can be reduced to indivisible parts to facilitate
explanation and understanding (Daneke, 1999).

SELF
ORGANIZATION

The spontaneous emergence o f structural organization (Daneke,
1999).

SELF-REFERENCE Is independent o f observations by others and implies that unity, or
self, can only be produced through relational operations designates
the unity that an element or a system is for itself (Little, 1999).
SIMPLE SYSTEM

A state map, for example, presents a simple system. It is a simple
system because it follows a single logic and its terminology and
method remain unchanged (Newell, 1999).

THE S-MATRIX
THEORY

It shifts the emphasis from objects to events, and from building
blocks (elementary particles) to a web o f interconnectedness. The
basic structures o f the physical world are determined ultimately by
the way we look at this world; the structures and phenomenon we
observe in nature are nothing but creations o f our measuring and
categorizing mind (Morcol, 1999).

SOCIAL ENTROPY The deterioration o f structures that govern a social system
(Daneke, 1999).
SYNERGETIC

A nonlinear system in which the summing o f previously individual
inputs produces an output which is greater than, or different from,
the sum of the inputs (Daneke, 1999).

SYSTEM

Any entity that can undergo variations o f some sort as time
progresses (Lorenz, 1993).

STRUCTURE

It refers to the actual components and relations between
components that make up a particular example o f a type of system
(Little, 1999).
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Glossary— Continued
THEME

It refers to clusters o f concepts with similar meanings or
connotations that taken together refer to some theme or issue
(Weber, 1990).

WHOLE

An irreducible pattern o f interaction such that without recognition
o f its parts, a whole is essentially structure and cannot be analyzed.
(Daneke, 1999).

ZEITGEIST

A way o f thinking that characterizes a generation or time period.
The new sciences Zeitgeist is a new (and ancient) awareness that
we participate in a world o f interconnectedness (Wheatley, 1999).
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